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Judgment Search Results Home > Cases Phrase: the madras marumakkattayam act 1932 Sorted by: recent Court: mumbai Page 77 of about 919 results (0.130 seconds)

Feb 13 1934 (PC)

Kilachand Devchand and Co. Vs. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom452; (1934)36BOMLR992

..... the fact of the receiver having been appointed, it does not necessarily follow that the parties had moved the court officer to act upon it, and in fact the property had gone into the possession of the ..... although, under the indian penal code and under the criminal procedure code, steps could be taken by the receiver to safeguard his possession as against persons who attempt to interfere with the same, i do not think the criminal law contained in those two acts is wide enough to include all kinds of interference with the receiver's possession which would constitute a criminal contempt as ..... motion for contempt of the court is a proceeding of a criminal nature and under the circumstances it is obligatory on the party who applies to the court to state the precise acts complained of in the notice of motion. ..... not be emphasized that the court may act with reluctance in matters where outsiders are concerned, and may leave the receiver to seek the protection of the local courts to safeguard his ..... is either (1) criminal contempt, consisting of words or acts obstructing or tending to obstruct the administration of justice, or (2) contempt in procedure, consisting of disobedience to the judgments, orders, or other process of the court, and involving a private injury. ..... criminal contempt, i do not see any reason to refrain from holding that the court has jurisdiction to call upon a defaulting respondent to account for his acts provided, on the facts, the court considers that it is proper to do so. .....

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Jan 30 1934 (PC)

Hormusji K. Bhabha Vs. Nana Appa

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom299; (1934)36BOMLR658

..... not come under this definition because, although it empowers an advocate to act for the party giving it, it does not authorise him to act in the name of his client, and it is also contended that the definition applies to an instrument which is not chargeable with a court-fee stamp while a vakalatnama in a presidency small causes court is exempt from the court-fees act, and is not simply not chargeable, as contrasted with documents stated in section 19 of that act which, are made not chargeable under ..... but it has been held by this court that it is not only under that section, but also under section 7 of the government of india act, under the letters patent, and under regulation ii of 1827, that this court has jurisdiction to consider, and, if necessary, to rectify orders passed by courts subordinate to it. ..... on november 12, 1931, the chief judge of the court of small causes issued a notice to the effect that from that date the document referred to in the amendment, which authorizes any advocate to act and plead on behalf of his client and which is commonly known as a vakalatnama, falls within the definition of 'power-of-attorney' in section 2(21) of the indian stamp act, and is chargeable with a stamp duty of re. ..... chhotalal i.l.r (1932) 56 bom. .....

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Jan 15 1934 (PC)

Maung Ba Thaw Vs. Ma Pin

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : (1934)36BOMLR427

..... chelikani rama rao, in which a similar objection was taken in respect of the provisions of the madras forest act of 1882, and it was held that, when such a right of appeal is given to one of the ordinary courts of the country, the procedure, orders and decrees of that court will be governed by the ordinary rules of the civil procedure code.5. ..... it is sufficient to say that the appellant has failed to satisfy their lordships that the high court has come to a wrong conclusion, and it becomes unnecessary to consider the further contention of the respondent that the decision of the courts in the earlier proceedings forms res judicata on the question of the particular indebted ness in respect of which the present application is made.7. ..... their lordships will, therefore, humbly advise his majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and that the decree of the high court dated january 18, 1932, should be affirmed, the appellant to pay the respondent her costs in this appeal. ..... the appellant is receiver of the estate of po thit and ma nyein e, his wife, who were adjudicated insolvents on january 11, 1929, and he appeals from a decree of the high court of judicature at rangoon, dated january 18, 1932, which reversed the order of the district court of henzada, dated march 30, 1931, and directed that the respondent be added in the schedule of debts as a creditor of the estate in respect of certain sums, amounting in all to rs. .....

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Dec 08 1933 (PC)

Jagadishprasad Ramlal Vs. D.B. Ambashankar Uttamram Malji

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom324; (1934)36BOMLR625

..... mangla prasad but the point was not taken in the courts below, and as it might ..... neither for a necessity recognised by the law nor for the payment of an antecedent debt, is, in their lordships' view, wholly invalid under the mitakshara law as applied in the united provinces, and it does not pass the shares even of the alienating coparceners.a further point was raised for the first time on behalf of the bank that the bank was at least entitled to a decree for the sale of the minors' interest in execution on the principle enunciated in the second of the five propositions laid down by the board in brij narain v. ..... . as to the meaning of antecedent debt their lordships say that they entirely agree with the view of the learned chief justice in the full bench madras case, armugham chetty v ..... shivappa dundappa, which is cited as laying down the law in the bombay and madras presidencies.6. .....

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Dec 05 1933 (PC)

Mota Raghunath Marwadi Vs. Sidhram Annaji Manurkar

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom248; (1934)36BOMLR502; 152Ind.Cas.60

..... decided on title and it was held that the wall belonged to the predecessors of the present plaintiff and not to the present defendant, and it would be a strange thing if several years after the decision in 1913, from which there was no appeal, and which, therefore, became final, it were possible to reopen the question by a decision of the collector or the survey officer fixing the boundary between the two houses-a decision which deals with the boundary between two plots of land and has no direct reference ..... but it is contended that, when in 1917 the boundary between the two survey numbers, which are the same as the houses occupied by the parties, was fixed, that decision under section 121 of the land revenue code is determinative, and that, therefore, as the wall falls within the boundary of the present defendant's survey number, the plaintiff cannot succeed. ..... in these circumstances i do not know how a subsequent decision with regard to the boundary between two survey numbers can have the effect of setting aside a judgment given four years earlier in which the ownership of the wall in dispute was decided in favour of the plaintiff, when that matter is clearly barred by res judicata; and although questions of boundaries are matters which are to be decided by the collector whose decision is determinative, i do not think that we can hold that other consequences should .....

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Oct 17 1933 (PC)

In Re: Jamnabai Meghji

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom130; (1934)36BOMLR105; 150Ind.Cas.858

..... for her absence as she was bound to be present in court till the case was postponed in the usual course, then, in my opinion, it would be an abuse of the practice, and would operate as a trap for the unwary, because if the roll-call is to be made only for the purpose of postponing the cases, then an order made in the case of an accused for the issue of a warrant or in the case of a complainant for the discharge or acquittal of the accused, if by some chance the party is absent at the time of the roll-call, would be against the principles of natural justice. ..... 153 of 1929 and with a decision of the madras high court in tonkya v. ..... since the said february 20, 1932, there have been eleven adjournments of the case, most of them for want of time owing to congestion of work, and i have to pay fees to my attorneys for all this.i pray that my case may be taken up to-day, but in any case my evidence may be taken up to-day so that i may not have to attend court any further, if the case is adjourned any further.8. ..... , june 9, 1933, in these terms:the complainant abovenamed begs to petition your worship as follows:i am an aged lady.i filed the complaint on january 16, 1932. .....

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Oct 13 1933 (PC)

Dhansukhlal C. Mehta Vs. Navnitlal Chunilal

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom398; (1934)36BOMLR831; 152Ind.Cas.1068

..... it is, however, contended that just as in the case of making the award the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time, after the time prescribed in the order has expired, if the arbitrators have in fact made the award before the court has extended the time, in the present case as the arbitrators have made the award the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time for filing it. ..... by the consent order made on june 22, 1932, the arbitrators were directed to make and file their award within four weeks from the date of service of that order on them, with liberty to enlarge the time for making the award by making endorsements to that effect at the foot of the copy. ..... as all matters, in dispute between the parties in the suit, including the question of costs, which would include the costs of the chamber summons also, have been referred to the arbitrators, i think, in this case, the chamber summons has come to an end, and it was open to the third party to make this application by a chamber summons.8. ..... kanga and, therefore, there is no question of extending the time for filing the award of the arbitrators appointed under the order ; and (3) that the order of reference itself is invalid because under that order the court has not fixed a definite time within which, even after the extensions, the arbitrators have to make the award.3. ..... in my opinion the filing of the award is merely a ministerial act, and para. .....

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Oct 11 1933 (PC)

Rustomji Ardeshir Cooper Vs. Byramji Bomanji Talati

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom84; (1934)36BOMLR79

..... under section 17 of the presidency-towns insolvency act all the property of the insolvent passes to the official assignee, except as otherwise provided in the act, and undoubtedly, the word 'property' is wide enough to cover a chose in action. ..... that being so, i think that we ought not to extend the time for filing the paper book in order to enable the creditors to appeal against the decision of the learned insolvency judge upholding the view of the official assignee that he is not bound to appeal in this case.10. ..... it is quite clear that this particular judgment does not fall within the second class of cases referred to in the passage in halsbury, which i have read, because the cause of action does not arise from any bodily or mental suffering or personal inconvenience of the bankrupt or from any injury to his person or reputation; but, in my opinion, the two classes of choses in action, which are referred to in halsbury, are not exhaustive. ..... forbes contends that the decree, which he wants to set aside, being a mere money decree against the insolvent, does not affect in any way the assets divisible amongst the creditors, since the assets divisible amongst the creditors will remain the same whether this judgment stands or falls. ..... certain creditors then appealed from that decision of the official assignee to the judge in insolvency, and the learned judge dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the official assignee not to appeal. ..... on december 23, 1932, mr. .....

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Sep 26 1933 (PC)

Emperor Vs. Nanubhai Maneklal

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom43; (1933)35BOMLR1167; 147Ind.Cas.1154

..... ; and(e) the weekly holidays fixed under section 22. ..... be fixed is some conspicuous place near the main entrance of every factory, in english and in the language of the majority of the operatives in such factory, the prescribed abstracts of this act and of the rules made thereunder, and also a notice containing the standing orders of the factory upon the following matters, namely :-(a) the time of beginning and ending work on each day;(b) the periods of rest fixed under section 21;(c) the hours of beginning and ending work for each shift (if any);(d) the hours of employment of all persons employed ..... according to the standing orders posted in the mill and notified to the factory inspector under section 36 of the act the working hours for the night shift in the month of may 1932 were 6-30 p.m. to 5-30 a.m. .....

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Sep 21 1933 (PC)

Mathuradas Maganlal Vs. Maganlal Parbhudas

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1934Bom79; (1934)36BOMLR47; 150Ind.Cas.478

..... coltman challenges that decision of the madras high court mainly on the ground that the learned judges took the view that the law on the subject in india is the same as the law on the subject in england, since the wording of the indian arbitration act of 1899 follows very closely the wording of the english act of 1889. ..... out by the madras high court, in arbitrations which do not fall within the ambit of the indian arbitration act it is clear that an oral agreement to refer is valid, and i think that we should not be justified in holding that, in cases which do fall within the ambit of the act, an oral agreement to refer is invalid, unless we find some definite provision in the act to that effect, there is, as i have said, no such definite provision, and that being so, it seems to me that an oral agreement to refer is valid, and that the plaintiff is entitled ..... but i do not think that the latter part of the proviso means that if parties have made an oral agreement for arbitration, they shall be bound-to enter into a written submission, which, in my opinion, they would be obliged to do if the act was to apply, seeing that the act is made applicable only to an arbitration which is commenced after the commencement of the act, and such an arbitration cannot by the very terms of the act and the whole scheme of it be commenced except under a submission in writing. ..... (1932) mad. ..... (1932) mad. .....

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