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Judgment Search Results Home > Cases Phrase: the madras marumakkattayam act 1932 Sorted by: recent Court: mumbai Page 62 of about 919 results (0.088 seconds)

Jun 13 1939 (PC)

The Trustees of Tribune Press Vs. the Commissioner of Income-tax

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : (1939)41BOMLR1150

..... directed in accordance with the advice tendered by the board :(2) that the case ought to be remitted to the high court of judicature at lahore with a direction that the said high court shall refer the case back to the said commissioner under section 66(4) of the indian income-tax act 1922 first for the addition of such facts during the lifetime of the testator sardar dyal singh as may bear upon the proper interpretation of the expression keeping up the liberal policy of the said newspaper in clause xxi of the will of the said testator dated ..... the 15th day of june 1895 ..... on january 31, 1933, the income-tax officer, lahore, for the year of assess-1 ment 1932-3 assessed the appellants to tax upon an income of rs. ..... the claim to exemption was first made by the appellants in respect of the year 1932-3-that is, in the proceedings out of which this appeal arises. .....

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Jun 12 1939 (PC)

Surajmal Deoram Bhavsar Vs. Motiram Kalu Wani

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1940Bom22; (1939)41BOMLR1177

..... 880 a full bench of the madras high court seems to have taken the view that if a suit is filed before partition, the father continues to represent the son till the decree, in spite of a partition during the pendency of the suit, and the decree passed against the father is binding on the son. ..... indap 22 :when the decree which was executed was made in a suit to which the sona were not parties and the property sold was the joint property of the father and the son, the sale was good on the principle of hindu law that it is the pious duty of a hindu son to pay his father's debts unless it is shown that the debt in respect of which the decree was made was contracted by the father to the knowledge of the lender for the purposes of immorality.23. ..... filed this suit for a declaration that the defendant acquired no interest in the property in suit by his auction purchase, on the ground that the debt for which the decree was passed was immoral and illegal and not binding on him, that by reason of the property having gone to his share at the partition between himself and his father in 1932, it could not be attached and sold in execution of the decree against his father alone, and that the sale of his property behind his ..... where a case was wrongly decided owing to a misunderstanding of sections 107 and 108 of the indian evidence act, it was held that the case could be properly regarded as a wrong disposal on a preliminary point, and the suit was remanded to the original court to be tried afresh. .....

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May 09 1939 (PC)

Jhina Soma Vs. Emperor

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1939Bom457; (1939)41BOMLR965

..... the main grounds of appeal are : (a) that the direction given by the judge to the jury as to the consideration of the alternative defences was not proper and should have been placed more clearly ; (6) that the point whether there was occasion for reasonable apprehension in the mind of the opponents (accused) justifying the killing of the deceased was not explained to the jury in a proper way ; (c) that having regard to the medical evidence and to the conduct of the first and second opponents! ..... bai lali : (1932)34bomlr896 where the sessions judge had disagreed with the verdict of the jury and submitted the case under section 307 of the criminal procedure code to the high court, and yet the high court held that, unless there was any perversity in the verdict or any misdirection, there was no reason why they should interfere with the verdict.7. ..... the jury unanimously came to the conclusion that the accused were not guilty of the offences with which they were charged, and the learned judge agreeing with the verdict of the jury act quitted and discharged the accused on august 5, 1938.2. ..... , that the accused acted in self-defence or defence of their person, was not fully and properly explained to the jury. .....

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Apr 12 1939 (PC)

Bai Hakimbu Vs. Dayabhai Rugnath

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1939Bom508; (1939)41BOMLR1104

..... ha is clearly not a person having an interest in the property within the meaning of the section, which apparently refers to interest, which exists in fact at the time of the transfer objected to.this was the interpretation of the section as it stood before 1929, but the view expressed above is in no way affected by the amendment of the section by the amending act of 1929. ..... 713):the inferences deducible from the established facts show that both' the transferor and the transferee had the intention of defeating or delaying the creditors of the transferor, and under those circumstances it appears to us that the document must at the option of the person defeated or delayed be treated as void in toto, and not merely as void in so far as there is no consideration. ..... a decree-holder does not lose his right to the benefit of section 53 of the transfer of property act by himself becoming an auction purchaser, and if the property purchased by him at the auction had been transferred by the judgment-debtor with intent to delay or defeat him, the transfer is voidable at his option.6. ..... it was so held by a full bench of the madras high court in ramaswami chettiar v. ..... the plaintiff, therefore, amended his plaint on june 6, 1932, and prayed for the possession of the property.2. ..... the suit was filed on june 15, 1931, and on april 10, 1932, the defendant took possession of the property as the auction purchaser. .....

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Apr 11 1939 (PC)

Anwar F.J. Laljee Vs. Ebrahim F.J. Laljee

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : (1939)41BOMLR1091

..... 377 the same judge held that where the petitioning creditors failed in their petition to adjudicate the debtor an insolvent, and were ordered to pay the debtor's costs, the petitioning creditors were not, on the subsequent adjudication of the debtor, entitled to set-off the amount of those costs against the amount payable by the debtor to them, so as to defeat the lien of the debtor's attorneys in respect of the costs awarded to the debtor. ..... the solicitors act of 1860 has now been replaced by the solicitors act of 1932. ..... it was further argued that even though that rule did not apply specifically in india, the principle was applicable, and that, therefore, the applicant's lien could not be prejudiced by reason of the set-off of the costs payable in execution proceedings as against the decretal amount in the suit, on the ground that the proceedings in the suit and proceedings in execution were distinct and separate. ..... the attorney's lien in the high courts of india is governed exclusively by the law as it existed in england before the passing of the solicitors act of 1860, by which that lien was very much extended. ..... with the judicature acts these rules were abolished, and order lxv, rule 14, of the rules of the supreme court, now provides for a set-off notwithstanding the lien, as i have stated before. .....

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Mar 20 1939 (PC)

Keshav Ramkrishna Bhatt Phadke Vs. Subba Manga Naik

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1939Bom490; (1939)41BOMLR994

..... but unless all the parties agree, an application cannot be made to the court of first instance in the original suit to set aside the consent decree; it must be done by a fresh suit brought for the purpose.it was brought to my notice that this case was on the original side of the high court, but i do not think that that makes any difference. ..... the lower court, however, thought that the terms in the vakalatnama empowering the pleader to put in a compromise application were sufficient to enable the court to assume that the pleader had been authorised also to negotiate and settle the terms of the compromise. ..... in that case the vakalatnama did not show that the pleader had been authorised either to enter into a compromise or to present a compromise application in court, and it was held that it was the inherent power of every court to correct its own proceedings where it had been misled, and, as the compromise was not binding on the party who had not authorised the pleader to sign it, the decree was void against him. ..... it is, therefore, necessary to have these points decided before the plaintiff's application can be disposed of the trial court summarily dismissed the application merely on a reference to the contents of the vakalatnama, without ascertaining whether the compromise itself was duly authorised by the plaintiff.6. ..... 221 of 1932, on the ground that the compromise application had been presented by the petitioner's pleader without any authority from him and without consulting him. .....

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Mar 17 1939 (PC)

Surendra Bahadur Singh Vs. Behari Singh

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : (1939)41BOMLR1047

..... in this appeal were not represented, and though their lordships are confident that the learned counsel for the appellants drew their attention to all the sections of the acts and all reported decisions which he considered material, their lordships have not had the benefit of any argument on behalf of the respondents, and they are loth to express an opinion on such an important question as the one under consideration upon an appeal which is presented ex parte unless it is really necessary.44. secondly ..... one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence:provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the indian registration act, 1908, unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied ..... the full bench of the allahabad high court in the case now under consideration declined to follow the above-mentioned decision in 52 madras 123, and their reasons for their conclusion are set out in their judgment delivered on june 21, 1932. .....

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Mar 10 1939 (PC)

Jaisukhlal Harishankar Girnara Vs. Mahomed HusseIn Dawoodbhai Karwa

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1939Bom522; (1939)41BOMLR1084

..... the judgment of the lower court was superseded by the judgment of the court of appeal.thus, as soon as the huzur diwani adalat of junagadh passed the decree in the second appeal on october 16, 1932, the decree of the trial court and the first appeal court were superseded, and as between the parties the only decree which remained res judicata was the decree passed by the huzur diwani adalat. ..... after a review of all the authorities the learned judges came to the conclusion that the term 'judgment' in article 117 of the indian limitation act meant a decree, and if there is the decree of the appeal court, it is that decree which is the starting point for counting the period of limitation. ..... 1 it is urged that article 117 of the indian limitation act applies to the suit, and that in computing the period of limitation the starting point is march 18, 1928, i.e. ..... the matter has, therefore, to be adjourned to enable the plaintiff to obtain the necessary endorsement or certificate to comply with the provisions of section 79 of the indian evidence act. ..... ' as pointed out in numerous cases by their lordships of the privy council, it is useful to rely on the strict grammatical construction of the words used in an act in preference to interpretations given to words under different sets of laws even by the courts in england. ..... in order to prevent hardship the proviso in the amending act gives six months' time in respect of decrees for which the period of limitation was thus curtailed. .....

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Feb 22 1939 (PC)

Shankar Dyamangonda Patil Vs. Puttabai Gurunathgonda K. Patil

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : (1939)41BOMLR947

..... the admission of an appeal, fails to furnish the security or make the deposit required (or apply with due diligence to the court for an order admitting the appeal), the court may, on its own motion or on an application in that behalf made by the respondent, cancel the certificate for the admission of the appeal, and may give such directions as to the costs of the appeal and the security entered into by the appellant as the court shall think fit, or make such further or other order in the premises, as in the opinion of the court, the justice of the ..... , rule 7, civil procedure code, an applicant desiring to appeal to the privy council is required, within ninety days or such further period, not exceeding sixty days, as the court may upon cause shown allow, from the date of the decree complained of, or within six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate, whichever is the later date, to furnish security in cash or in government securities. ..... it seems to me that the discretion given to the court by rule 9 of the privy council rules is a general one, which does, if the justice of the case requires it, enable the court to extend the time for lodging security to any extent; but in exercising that discretion we must have regard to the fact that under order xlv, rule 7, the extension of time for giving security is strictly limited, and i think that it would require a strong case to induce the court to hold that justice requires an extension ..... however, the madras high court in ..... 1932) .....

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Feb 10 1939 (PC)

Tarabai Shriniwas Naik Guttal Vs. Murtacharya Anantacharya

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : AIR1939Bom414; (1939)41BOMLR924

..... on the latter's death, the three defendants, as his daughters, succeeded to the property, and the plaintiff brought the suit for a declaration that he was the preferential heir to the lands under the provisions of section 2 of bombay act v of 1886 by which every female member of a watan family, other than the widow, mother or paternal grandmother of the last male owner, and every person claiming through a female, is to be postponed in the order of succession to a watan, or part thereof, or interest therein devolving by succession after the date of the act, to every male member of the family ..... it is admitted that if wasudevacharya was a watandar, then the plaintiff and the defendants are members of a watan family, an expression which is not denned in the act v of 1886 or in the principal act of 1874, and i think that the real question which arises is whether a person in the position of wasudevacharya who acquires watan lands without acquiring the office and without being under any obligation to perform the services attached to the office is a watandar within the meaning of the watan act of 1874. ..... dyamemd (1932) 35 bom. l.r. .....

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