Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1954Cal412
Lahiri, J.1. This appeal by the defendant under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against a judg-ment and decree of Mr. Justice Das dated March 24, 1948 whereby he has decreed a suit for eviction of the defendant.2. The facts leading up to this litigation are broadly these. On 7-6-1857, the predecessor of one Bibhuti Bhusan Roy granted a Mokarari Mourashi lease to the predecessor of one Jatindra Nath Bose in respect of 1051 bighas and 13 cottas of land in the Sunderban area. Out of this total area, 1000 bighas were actually assessed to rent at a progressive rate. On 12-7-1936, Jatindra Nath Bose granted a mokorari mourashi lease in respect of 8 bighas and 10 cottas out of the lands of his tenancy in favour of the defendant, Sushil Kumar Chakra-varty, at an annual rent of Rs. 17/ . The estate of Bibhuti Bhusan Roy was taken over by the Court of Wards and in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent, the tenancy of Jatindra Nath Bose was sold on September 5, 1938, under th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1953Cal653
Guha Ray, J. 1. The appellants are the joint receivers of the Auddy Estate, Chetla, who are the settlement holders from the Government in respect of certain Sundarban lands, known as Mouza Sridharnagore in P. S. Mathurapore in the district of 24-Parganas. One of the terms of the lease is that the lessees are responsible for the efficient maintenance of the existing embankments, sluice gates, etc. to the standard which is necessary for keeping the lot under cultivation and it was open to the Collector, in whose favour the lease was executed, to give notice to the lessees calling upon them to remedy the breach of any ' condition including the condition relating to the efficient maintenance of the embankment. 2. On 4-5-1950, on receipt of a telegram from a number of cultivating tenants of the said lot, the Collector called for a report from the Assistant Engineer and the report of the Assistant Engineer, printed at page 11 of the paper book, is to the effect that there were several breach...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1951Cal361
G.N. Das, J.1. These are two appeals by the defendant Manindra Nath Dinda against the judgments and decrees passed by Sri G. Palit, Additional Subordinate Judge third Court, 24-Parganas and dated 31-5-1946.2. The suit out of which F. A. No. 204 of 1946 has arisen, was numbered as Title Suit 23 of 1943 and later renumbered as Title Suit 6 of 1946. The suit out of which F. A. No. 203 of 1946 has arisen was numbered as Title Suit 40 of 1943 and later renumbered as Title Suit 7 of 1946.3. The two suits were heard together, and the Court below delivered one judgment disposing of the two suits.4. In this Court, F. A. No. 204 of 1946 was heard first and immediately thereafter F. A. No. 205 of 1946 was heard.5. I shall first state the case of the plaintiff Amiya Pal Chowdhury in Title Suit No. 6 of 1946. The allegation briefly is that on 20-5-1908, Sm. Radha Sundari Pal Choudhury, who died in 1924 and whose estate is now in the hands of her son, Amiya Pal Chowdhury, the plaintiff, as the admin...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Privy Council
Reported in : AIR1949PC179
Sir John Beaumont: This is a consolidated appeal embodying three appeals to His Majesty in Council, namely, Nos. 16, 17 and 18 of 1945, from a judgment and decrees, all dated 7th June 1945, of the High Court at Calcutta, which reversed the judgment and decrees, all dated 7th November 1941, of the Special Land Acquisition Judge, 24-Parganas, delivered and passed in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894), hereinafter referred to as "the Act." [2] The property acquired consisted of 3 plots of beel (marsh lands) of which the appellant was the owner to the extent of four-fifth shares, and of which the respondents were the tenants, under mokarari mourasi leases (permanent, heritable and transferable tenures at a fixed rent) granted to their predecessor-in-title by predecessors-in- title of the appellant. [3] The question for determination relates to the apportionment of compensation awarded under the Act as between the appellant as proprietor and the respondents as tenant...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1949)51BOMLR960
John Beaumont, J.1. This is a consolidated appeal to His Majesty in Council, namely, Nos. 16,17 and 18 of 1945, from a judgment and decrees, all dated June 7, 1945, of the High Court at Calcutta, which reversed the judgment and decrees, all dated November 7, 1941, of the Special Land Acquisition Judge, 24 Parganas, delivered and passed in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act (Act I of 1-894), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act.'2. The property acquired consisted of 3 plots of beel (marsh lands) of which the appellant was the owner to the extent of four-fifth shares, and of which the respondents were the tenants under mokorari mourasi leases (permanent, heritable arid transferable tenures at a fixed rent) granted to their predecessor in title by predecessors in title of the appellant.3. The question for determination relates to the apportionment of compensation awarded under the Act as between the appellant as proprietor and the respondents as tenants, and the answer to this ques...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1947Cal41
Chakravartti, J.1. In the year 1864, the Bengal Legislature commenced a course of legislation on the pattern of English statutes under which public roads and certain other means of communication were placed under the control and management of local authorities. A beginning was made with municipal areas and, as in England, it was thought that in order that the local authorities might effectively discharge the obligation laid upon them, it was necessary to vest in them some property in the material objects to which the public right was attached. What was thus vested in the local authorities was not the same under all the successive statutes, but was enlarged or varied from time to time. Under Act 3[III] of 1864, it was 'all public highways, not being the property of and repaired by and kept under the control of the Government and not being private property.' Under Act 5[v] of 1876, it was 'all roads, bridges, embankments, banks, ghats, wharves, jetties, wells, channels and drains, not be...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1939Cal617
B.K. Mukherjea, J.1. This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff, and the suit was one for a declaration that the embankment described in the schedule to the plaint, was a 'D' schedule embankment for which the Government was not entitled to realize costs from private proprietors, under the Bengal Embankment Act. It was also alleged that the order of apportionment passed by the Collector under Section 68, Bengal Embankment Act was illegal and ultra vires, and that as there was no notice served on the plaintiff in compliance with the provisions of the Act no liability attached to him under law The plaintiff further claimed a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from realizing the embankment costs from the plaintiff. The defence was really of a twofold character. The first defence was that the embankment in dispute was not a 'D' schedule embankment; and it was con tended in the second place that notices were duly served on the plaintiff and other parties interested, and that the C...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1939Cal338
Henderson, J.1. This appeal is by defendants 1 to 4. The question involved is the amount which the plaintiff is liable to pay to them before he can be allowed to redeem a mortgage. The mortgage in question was-executed, by the plaintiff's predecessor in favour of the appellants on 8th October 1898. The mortgagees were put into possession. The arrangement was that out of the annual profits, Rs. 280 was to be retained by the mortgagees on account of interest and the remainder applied to the satisfaction of the mortgage. The plaintiff acquired a four and a half annas share of the equity of redemption in the land mentioned in Schedule 1 on 14th November 1930. He instituted the present suit for redemption on 16th January 1931. It is to be-noticed that in the meantime the appellants have themselves acquired the remainder of the equity of redemption. One of their predecessors-in-interest, namely Sarada Lala, had redeemed two other mortgages.2. The plaintiff obtained a preliminary-decree on 15...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1939Cal528
ORDEREdgley, J.1. In this case, the petitioner hag been convicted under Section 76(b), Bengal Embankment Act 2 of 1882. It appears that he constructed a hut on the space between the river Peali and the embankment of this river and thereby obstructed the course of the river within the meaning of Section 76(b) of the Act. It is contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner that Section 76(b) cannot apply in a case in which the course of a river has been obstructed, and he maintains that this part of the Section is only intended to apply to watercourses such as those mentioned in the definition of the expression 'water-course' in Section 3 of the Act. This definition is however not exhaustive. With regard to this matter, I agree with the view held by M.C. Ghose J. in Emperor v. Lakshmi Narain : AIR1934Cal836 . In that case the learned Judge observes:The definition of 'water-course' in the Embankment Act includes a line of drainage, weir, culvert, pips or other channel, whether natu...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1936Cal686,165Ind.Cas.847
Cunliffe, J.1. We granted this rule on a point of law based upon the principle of autrefois acquit laid down in Section 403, Criminal P. C. The petitioner was originally tried for an offence under Section 283, Penal Code, and sentenced to pay a fine with a term of imprisonment in default of the fine. Section 283 is widely drawn, Section dealing with criminal acts causing danger to property, obstruction or injury to persons in a public highway or in a public line of navigation. After that conviction, the petitioner went up on appeal. On appeal, he was acquitted somewhat technically perhaps on the ground that the place which he had obstructed was not a navigable river as during considerable portions of the year, it consisted of a dry bed and the learned appellate Court Judge relied on a definition of 'navigable river' laid down in the Government Estates Manual. Whether the learned Judge was right in specifically relying upon a definition which I should regard as being rather more executi...
Tag this Judgment!