Court : US Supreme Court
Walton v. Arizona - 497 U.S. 639 (1990) U.S. Supreme Court Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) Walton v. Arizona No. 88-7351 Argued January 17, 1990 Decided June 27, 1990 497 U.S. 639 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA Syllabus Petitioner Walton was found guilty in an Arizona court of first-degree murder and was sentenced in a separate sentencing hearing before the judge, as required by state law. Under that law, the judge, inter alia, determines the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and "shall impose" a death sentence if he finds one or more of several enumerated aggravating circumstances and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The burden is on the prosecution to establish the existence of aggravating circumstances and on the defendant to establish mitigating ones. The judge sentenced Walton to death, after finding the presence of two aggravating circumstances -- that the murder was commi...
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Mills v. Maryland - 486 U.S. 367 (1988) U.S. Supreme Court Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) Mills v. Maryland No. 87-5367 Argued March 30, 1988 Decided June 6, 1988 486 U.S. 367 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Syllabus Petitioner, a Maryland prison inmate, was tried by a state court jury and convicted of the first-degree murder of his cellmate. In the trial's sentencing phase, the same jury found that the State had established the statutory aggravating factor that petitioner committed the murder while he was confined in a correctional institution, and marked "no" beside each mitigating circumstance referenced on the verdict form, thereby requiring the imposition of the death penalty under Maryland's capital sentencing scheme. Petitioner challenged the sentence on the ground that the Maryland capital punishment statute, as applied to him, was unconstitutionally mandatory. He asserted that the statute, as explained to the jury by the court's instructions a...
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McCleskey v. Kemp - 481 U.S. 279 (1987) U.S. Supreme Court McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) McCleskey v. Kemp No. 84-6811 Argued October 15, 1986 Decided April 22, 1987 481 U.S. 279 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In 1978, petitioner, a black man, was convicted in a Georgia trial court of armed robbery and murder, arising from the killing of a white police officer during the robbery of a store. Pursuant to Georgia statutes, the jury at the penalty hearing considered the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of petitioner's conduct, and recommended the death penalty on the murder charge. The trial court followed the recommendation, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. After unsuccessfully seeking postconviction relief in state courts, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court. His petition included a claim that the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a racially discrimina...
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Lowe v. SEC - 472 U.S. 181 (1985) U.S. Supreme Court Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission No. 83-1911 Argued January 7, 1986 Decided June 10, 1985 472 U.S. 181 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Syllabus Petitioner Lowe is the president and principal shareholder of a corporation (also a petitioner) that was registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Act). Because Lowe was convicted of various offenses involving investments, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), after a hearing, ordered that the corporation's registration be revoked and that Lowe not associate with any investment adviser. Thereafter, the SEC brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that Lowe, the corporation, and two other unregistered corporations (also petitioners) were violating the Act, and that Lowe was violating the SEC's order by publishing, for paid subscribers, purport...
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Wallace v. Jaffree - 472 U.S. 38 (1985) U.S. Supreme Court Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) Wallace v. Jaffree No. 83-812 Argued December 4, 1984 Decided June 4, 1985 * 472 U.S. 38 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE `ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In proceedings instituted in Federal District Court, appellees challenged the constitutionality of, inter alia, a 1981 Alabama Statute ( 16-1-20.1) authorizing a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer." Although finding that 16-1-20.1 was an effort to encourage a religious activity, the District Court ultimately held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit a State from establishing a religion. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: Section 16-1-20.1 is a law respecting the establishment of religion, and thus violates the First Amendment. Pp. 472 U. S. 48 -61. (a) The proposition that the several States have no greater power to r...
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City of Memphis v. Greene - 451 U.S. 100 (1981) U.S. Supreme Court City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) City of Memphis v. Greene No. 79-1176 Argued December 3, 1980 Decided April 20, 1981 451 U.S. 100 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus The city of Memphis decided to close the north end of a street (West Drive) that traverses a white residential community (Hein Park), the area to the north of which is predominantly black. West Drive is one of three streets that enter Hein Park from the north. The stated reasons for the closing were to reduce the flow of traffic using Hein Park streets, to increase safety to children who live in Hein Park or use it to walk to school, and to reduce "traffic pollution" in the residential area. Respondents, residents of the predominantly black area, and two civic associations brought a class action in Federal District Court against the city and various officials, alleging that the street cl...
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Fullilove v. Klutznick - 448 U.S. 448 (1980) U.S. Supreme Court Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) Fullilove v. Klutznick No. 78-1007 Argued November 27, 1979 Decided July 2, 1980 448 U.S. 448 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Syllabus The "minority business enterprise" (MBE) provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (1977 Act) requires that, absent an administrative waiver, at least 10% of federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members, defined as United States citizens "who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Under implementing regulations and guidelines, grantees and their private prime contractors are required, to the extent feasible, in fulfilling the 10% MBE requirement, to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBE's, to provide technical a...
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City of Mobile v. Bolden - 446 U.S. 55 (1980) U.S. Supreme Court City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) City of Mobile v. Bolden No. 77-1844 Argued March 19, 1979 Reargued October 29, 1979 Decided April 22, 1980 446 U.S. 55 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Mobile, Ala., is governed by a Commission consisting of three members elected at large who jointly exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power in the city. Appellees brought a class action in Federal District Court against the city and the incumbent Commissioners on behalf of all Negro citizens of the city, alleging, inter alia, that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Although finding that Negroes in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District Court nevertheless held that the at-large electoral system violated t...
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Cannon v. University of Chicago - 441 U.S. 677 (1979) U.S. Supreme Court Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) Cannon v. University of Chicago No. 77-926. Argued January 9, 1979 Decided May 14, 1979 441 U.S. 677 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides in part that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Petitioner instituted litigation in Federal District Court, alleging that she had been excluded from participation in the medical education programs of respondent private universities on the basis of her gender and that these programs were receiving federal financial assistance at the time of her exclusion. The District Court granted respon...
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Argersinger v. Hamlin - 407 U.S. 25 (1972) U.S. Supreme Court Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) Argersinger v. Hamlin No. 70-5015 Argued December 6, 1971 Reargued February 28, 1972 Decided June 12, 1972 407 U.S. 25 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA Syllabus The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 , is not governed by the classification of the offense or by whether or not a jury trial is required. No accused may be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied the assistance of counsel. In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who was tried for an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a $1,000 fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence, had n...
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