Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1948)50BOMLR649
Thankerton, J.1. This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the Federal Court of India dated May 4, 1945, which varied a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore dated March 27, 1944.2. The respondent, who had been a member of the Indian Civil Service since 1922, instituted the present suit on July 20, 1942, against the Secretary of State for India, challenging the validity of an order by the latter dated August 10, 1940, which purported to remove the respondent from the Indian Civil Service,3. The Secretary of State for India was the original appellant in this appeal, but, after the hearing before this Board in July last, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, came into operation on August 15, 1947. By Section 15(2) of the Act, the present appeal by the Secretary of State was abated, and by Section 15(2) the appeal was continued by the High Commissioner. By Sub-section (3) of that section, the expression 'the High Commissioner' is defined for the purposes of the section. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1891)ILR14Mad186
Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. The appellants are parties interested in the due administration of an endowed public charity in Tanjore, and the respondent is its present trustee by right of inheritance. The former charged the latter with negligence and misconduct and instituted this suit in the District Court of Tanjore to remove him from the office of trustee and to have another appointed in his place. The Judge held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, relying on the decision in Narasimha v. Ayyan I.L.R. 12 Mad. 157), dismissed the claim with costs.2. The contention in appeal is that the Judge has jurisdiction, and if he has no jurisdiction, he ought to have returned the plaint to be presented to a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is urged that since Narasimha v. Ayyan I.L.R. 12 Mad. 157), was decided, Section 539 has been amended, and that, as pointed out in Chimpa v. Pattabhirama (Appeal No. 199 of 1887 not reported), th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1934Mad516
Beasley, C.J.1. These two appeals can be dealt with together. Although the facts are different, the main point for decision is common to both. The facts in each appeal may be briefly Stated. In O.S. No. 1 of 1931 the appellant brought a suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council, the respondent in this appeal. In that suit he asked for a declaration that he was wrongly dismissed, after he has been discharged on an invalid pension and for damages amounting to Rs. 9,900. His case was that he was discharged in October 1927 on an invalid pension and whilst a pension it was dismissed on February 1928 on the ground that he had been found guilty of misconduct before his retirement. The result of this was that his pension was withdrawn. His case was and is that under Rule 351 of the Civil Service Rules a pension can be withdrawn only if the pensioner bas been guilty of misconduct subsequent to his retirement. He next contends that his dismissal was contrary to the provision in Su...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1941)43BOMLR896
Blackwell, J.1. The petitioner is the owner of land in various districts upon which grow toddy-producing trees. Up to July 31, 1939, licences were granted to his agents or managers for tapping the trees and supplying toddy to shops. Thereafter owing to the introduction of prohibition no such licences were granted. By a letter dated November 18, 1940, from his solicitors to the Collector of Bombay, the petitioner applied for the issue of a licence to tap and draw toddy from the trees on his land at Lady Jamsetji Road, Upper Mahim, for private consumption, and not for sale. This application is not in the form prescribed by Rule 4 of the rules for the tapping of toddy-producing trees to which I shall presently refer, but the Advocate General informed me that he desired the matter to be argued as if the application were in the form prescribed by the rules. In a letter in reply dated November 29, 1940, the Collector regretted his inability to grant a licence. The petitioner then appealed, a...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1904)ILR27Bom122
Tyabji, J.1. This suit was filed by Mr. Jehangir Manekji Cursetji against the Secretary of State for India in Council on the 6th November, 1900, complaining of a Resolution of the Government of Bombay, set forth in the plaint, and praying that the plaintiff may be awarded a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 as damages sustained by the wrongful acts of Government, and that the said Resolution dated the 6th November, 1899, may be ordered to be set aside, and for costs of the suit.2. The plaintiff, at the time of the Resolution complained of, was a Government servant in the Provincial Civil Service of the Bombay Presidency, and, according to the plaint, had served Government for twenty-five years. Prior to this Resolution ha was serving as a fourth grade Deputy Collector, and was in charge of the treasury. The Resolution, which is dated the 6th November, 1899, is based upon a, memorandum from the Commissioner, C.D., commenting on the conduct of the plaintiff in respect of certain of the plaintiff's act...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1898)ILR21Mad78
Shephard, J.1. The question is whether a person charged under Section 183 of the Indian Penal Code was rightly acquitted, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the goods seized by the Amin and rescued by the accused were, as being part of the assets of the deceased debtor, liable to be taken in execution of the decree against his representatives. The question is whether the seizure of the goods was an act done by the lawful authority of a public servant within the meaning of Section 183. It was argued on behalf of the accused that no offence had been committed in resisting the Amin, because he was acting unlawfully in seizing goods, which could not properly be taken in execution. The Amin, being commissioned to take the goods of the deceased debtor, forfeited the protection of the law, when he proceeded to take the goods of the defendant himself, although he might have acted in good faith.2. It appears to me that, in construing Section 183, the language of Section 99,...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1938Bom50; 172Ind.Cas.873
Broomfield, J.1. His Lordship, after setting out the facts, as above continued). The first point taken in the appeal is that the provisions of Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, have not been complied with. It is contended that the sanction is not in the proper form and does not specify with sufficient clearness the offences for which prosecution of the appellant was permitted. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on Queen-Empress v. Samavier 16 M 468 : 3 MIJ 227 : 2 Weir 220. It was held in that case that an order by the Board of Revenue, Madras, sanctioning the prosecution of a Deputy Tahsildar by the Collector of the District for 'bribery or such of the charges set forth in the Deputy Collector's report as he thinks likely to stand investigation by a Criminal Court' is not a legal sanction within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code. But, as has been pointed out in Emperor v. Madhav Laxman : AIR1918Bom117 , what happened in the Madras case was that Government ha...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1937)39BOMLR18
George Rankin, J.1. In this case two appeals from the High Court at Bombay have been consolidated. Both appeals are brought by income-tax authorities and both arise out of proceedings to assess a company registered outside British India called the Hong Kong Trust Corporation Limited, (herein referred to as the Hong Kong company) to income-tax in respect of the year of assessment 1928-9. The income-tax authorities have claimed to be entitled to assess the Hong Kong company in the name of the Bombay Trust Corporation Limited, (herein called the Bombay company) as its agent under the provisions of Section 42(I) and Section 43 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, that is, upon the footing that in the year 1927 profits and gains accrued or arose to the Hong Kong company through its business connection with the Bombay company. The Income-tax Officer having on March 29, 1930, made an assessment upon this footing the matter came on appeal from him before the Assistant Commissioner. The Assistan...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1923Bom44; (1922)24BOMLR534; 67Ind.Cas.818
Norman Macleod, C.J.1. The accused was charged before the Acting Chief Presidency Magistrate that he on or about the 14th day of October 1921 at Bombay abetted the commission by H.B. Clayton, Esquire, Municipal Commissioner of Bombay, a public servant, of an offence of taking gratification as the said public servant other than legal remuneration as a motive for doing a future official act, viz., giving contracts, punishable with imprisonment under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, which said offence was not committed in consequence of the said abetment and thereby committed an offence punishable under as, 116 and 161 of the Indian Penal Code.2. The accused was acquitted and Government have appealed.3. The facts are shortly as follows:-A cousin of the accused, one Ebrahim Mahomedally, had submitted plans to the Municipality, for a building on the Queen's Road, to which objections were raised. On the 21st September, accused called on Mr. Clayton and handed him a memorandum in respect...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1943Bom167; (1943)45BOMLR215
John Beaumont, Kt., C.J.1. These are second appeals from decisions of the District Judge of Bijapur, all raising the same point of law.2. The plaintiff in all these suits was suing for damages for defamation, the statements made by the several defendants being substantially the same. The trial Judge decreed the plaintiff's suits, holding that the statements were defamatory, untrue and made maliciously. The learned District Judge in appeal set aside the decrees passed by the trial Judge on the ground that the statements, which he agreed were defamatory, untrue and malicious, were absolutely privileged, and the question we have to decide is whether that view of the law is right. We are, of course, bound by the findings of the lower Courts as to the facts that the statements were untrue and malicious, and there can be no question that they were defamatory in their nature : so that it is only on that basis that we have to consider whether they were privileged. No qualified privilege will h...
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