Judgment Search Results Home > Cases Phrase: patents act 1970 39 of 1970 section 150 security for costs Sorted by: old Year: 1910 Page 1 of about 2 results (1.476 seconds)

King Vs. Virginia

Court : US Supreme Court

King v. Virginia - 216 U.S. 92 (1910) U.S. Supreme Court King v. Virginia, 216 U.S. 92 (1910) King v. Virginia Nos. 445, 446, 447 Argued December 14, 15, 16, 1909 Decided January 31, 1910 216 U.S. 92 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA Syllabus When this Court has determined the constitutionality of a state statute, that question is not open, and cannot be made the basis of jurisdiction for a writ of error, and so held as to the statute of West Virginia involved in this case and sustained as constitutional in King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404 . On writ of error, this Court cannot deal with facts, and whether the land involved is within or without certain boundaries is for the state court to determine. The construction and effect of, and rights acquired by, a decree of the state court are matters of state procedure. Nothing in the federal Constitution prevents a state court from modifying a decree while the case remains in the court; nor is ...

Ballinger Vs. Frost

Court : US Supreme Court

Ballinger v. Frost - 216 U.S. 240 (1910) U.S. Supreme Court Ballinger v. Frost, 216 U.S. 240 (1910) Ballinger v. Frost No. 54 Argued December 8, 1909 Decided February 21, 1910 216 U.S. 240 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus The power of supervision and correction vested in the Secretary of the Interior over Indian allotments is not unlimited and arbitrary; it cannot be exercised to deprive any person of land the title to which has lawfully vested. However reluctant the courts may be to interfere with the executive department, they must prevent attempted deprivation of lawfully acquired property, and it is their duty to see that rights which have become vested pursuant to legislation of Congress are not disturbed by any action of an executive officer. Page 216 U. S. 241 The head of a department of the government is bound by the provisions of congressional legislation, which he cannot violate, however laudable may be his motives. After all...

Maryland Vs. West Virginia

Court : US Supreme Court

Maryland v. West Virginia - 217 U.S. 1 (1910) U.S. Supreme Court Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 1 (1910) Maryland v. West Virginia No. 1, Original Argued November 2, 3, 4, 1909 Decided February 21, 1910 217 U.S. 1 I N EQUITY Syllabus The record in this case sustains the proposition that, for many years, the people of Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, have accepted as the boundary between Maryland and West Virginia the line known as the Deakins line, and have consistently adhered to the Fairfax Stone as the starting point of such line, and that none of the steps taken to delimit the boundary since such line was run in 1788 have been effectual, or such as to disturb the continued possession of people claiming rights up to such Deakins line on the Virginia and Vest Virginia side. Whether long continued possession by a territory has ripened into sovereignty thereover which should be recognized by other states depends upon the facts in individual cases as they arise. ...

Frellsen and Co. Vs. Crandell

Court : US Supreme Court

Frellsen & Co. v. Crandell - 217 U.S. 71 (1910) U.S. Supreme Court Frellsen & Co. v. Crandell, 217 U.S. 71 (1910) Frellsen & Co. v. Crandell No. 129 Argued March 7, 8, 1910 Decided April 4, 1910 217 U.S. 71 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA Syllabus Whether a patent is wrongfully issued or can be set aside is a matter to be settled between the state and the patentee, but no individual is authorized to act for the state. Even if the state could set aside a patent for having been issued on illegal or inadequate consideration, the matter is between it and the patentee, and, until set aside, one tendering the statutory price does not thereby become entitled to receive such land from the state, nor does the tender create a contract with the state within the protection of the contract clause of the federal Constitution. Where the state court so holds, public land of a state, as is the case of public land of the United States, held under patent or certificate o...

Los Angeles Farming and Milling Co. Vs. Los Angeles

Court : US Supreme Court

Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. Los Angeles - 217 U.S. 217 (1910) U.S. Supreme Court Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217 (1910) Los Angeles Farming & Milling Company v. Los Angeles No. 137 Argued March 10, 11, 1910 Decided April 4, 1910 217 U.S. 217 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus In this case, both parties claim under Spanish or Mexican titles, confirmed by proceedings under the Act of March 3, 1851, c. 41, 9 Stat. 631. The federal rights alleged by plaintiff in error to have been violated by the decision of the state court, so far as concerns this act, relate to the extent of the right and ownership of the parties in the use of the Los Angeles River. Plaintiff in error contended that, by its grant, it became the owner of riparian rights without limitations by any right of the City of Los Angeles to use the water of the river, and that the city, by failing to present its claim for the use of such water to the c...

In Re: the Second-grade Pleaders

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1911)ILR34Mad29

ORDERArnold White, C.J.1. In these proceedings two second-grade pleaders have been called upon to show cause why they should not be suspended or dismissed by reason of their conduct in having joined the Board of Directors of the ' Cirears Provident Fund Limited of Bapatla' and in connection with the affairs of that company.2. The company is now in liquidation. One of the pleaders was the President of the company (I will refer to him as ' the President'). The other was a Director (I will refer to him as 'the Director')- Criminal proceedings were taken against the two pleaders in connection with the affairs of the company and they were convicted of criminal breach of trust by the Sessions Judge of Guntur. On appeal, these convictions were set aside. There can. I think, be no question that the convictions could not be upheld. In appropriating to their own use the sums of money which formed the subject-matter of the charge of criminal breach of trust, the President and the Director did not...

NabIn Chandra Shaha Vs. Kula Chandra Dhar

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1910)ILR37Cal742

Lawrence H. Jenkins, C.J.1. This is a suit brought for enhancement of rent under Section 30 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It was dismissed by the Munsif, and that decree of dismissal was confirmed by the lower Appellate Court. On appeal to this Court Mr. Justice Caspersz expressed his agreement with the lower Appellate Court. It is from this judgment of Mr. Justice Caspersz that the present appeal is preferred under Section 15 of the Letters Patent.2. The grounds on which the plaintiffs based their claim for enhancement were, first, that the rate of rent paid by the defendants was below the prevailing rate paid by occupancy raiyats for land of a similar description and with similar advantages in the same village or in neighbouring villages, and that there was no sufficient reason for their holding at so low a rate; and, secondly, that there has been a rise in the average local prices of staple food-crops during the currency of the existing rent. Both these grounds, in the opinion of the l...

NabIn Chandra Saha and ors. Vs. Kula Chandra Dhur

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : 6Ind.Cas.506

Lawrence Jenkins, C.J.1. This is a suit brought for enhancement of rent under Section 30 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It was dismissed by the Munsif, and that decree of dismissal was confirmed by the lower appellate Court, and on appeal to this Court Mr. Justice Caspersz expressed his agreement-with the lower appellate Court. It is from this judgment of Mr. Justice-Caspersz that the present appeal is preferred under Section 15 of the Letters Patent.2. The grounds on which the plaintiffs based their claim for enhancement were, first, that the rate of rent paid by the defendants was below the prevailing rate paid by occupancy ryots for land of a similar description and with similar advantages in the same village or in neighbouring villages, and that there was no sufficient reason for their holding at so low rate; and, secondly, that there has been a rise in the average local prices of staple food crops during the currency of -the existing rent. Both these grounds, in the opinion of the low...

T.V. Tuljaram Row Vs. M.K.R.V. Alagappa Chettiar

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1912)ILR35Mad1

Arnold White, C.J.1. The question we have to determine in this ease turns on the meaning of the word 'judgment' in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, I find it impossible to reconcile the decisions on the point.2. I do not think the word 'judgment' is used in contradistinction to the worlds 'sentence' or 'order' which immediately follow it. The words 'not being a sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial,' as it seems to me, were introduced in order to exclude all criminal proceedings from the operation of the section and that it is not to be inferred from the introduction of these words that the legislature intended that the word ' judgment should include all orders in civil proceedings.3. Further, I am not prepared to infer, from the fact that in Sections 39 and 40 of the Letters Patent a distinction is drawn between final judgments, decrees or orders, and interlocutory judgments, decrees or orders, that the word ' judgment ' in Section 15 is to be deemed to include any or...

United States Vs. Chicago, M. and St.P. Ry. Co.

Court : US Supreme Court

United States v. Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co. - 218 U.S. 233 (1910) U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 233 (1910) United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company No. 11 Argued April 26, 27, 1910 Decided October 17, 1910 218 U.S. 233 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus The grant made by the Act of May 1, 1864, c. 84, 13 Stat. 72, was one in praesenti. Where a railway land grant is one in praesenti, the beneficiary is entitled to all the lands granted within place limits which had not been appropriated or reserved by the United States for any purpose, or to which a homestead or preemption right had not attached, prior to the definite location of the road proposed to be aided. A claim by a state that it is entitled to lands as swamp or overflowed under the Swamp Land Act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, is not an appropriation or reservation if the land is not in fact sw...