Court : Allahabad
Decided on : Dec-31-1969
Reported in : (1895)ILR17All438
Burkitt, J.1. In this case an application was made to Mr. Justice Banerji under Section 169 of the Indian Companies Act (Act No. VI of 1882) to grant an extension of time forgiving notice of an appeal against an order of the District Judge of Allahabad refusing an application under Section 214 of that Act. An extension of time for filing the appeal was also asked for. The learned Judge refused both applications being of opinion that no sufficient reason for granting them had been shown.2. This is an appeal brought under Section 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court against that order of refusal.3. Mr. Strachey for the respondent takes two preliminary objections against the hearing of the appeal. Firstly, he contends that no appeal lies, because, he says, the order under appeal is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of Section 10 of the Letters Patent, which gives a right of appeal from the judgment (not. being a sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial), of no Judge of t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Decided on : Dec-31-1969
Reported in : (1887)ILR9All617
Straight, J.1. In reference to this first appeal from Order No. 35 of 1887, Pandit Ajudhia Nath, on behalf of the respondents, objects to Mr. Amir-ud-din, who appears to support the appeal on behalf of Mr. Reid, who handed over his brief to him, on two grounds: first, that Mr. Reid, as an English barrister, had no power to take direct instructions from the appellant and file the appeal; and, secondly, that if he had such power, he had no power to hand over his brief to Mr. Amir-ud-din, and therefore the appeal ought to be dismissed in default of any person competent to act or to appear on behalf of the appellant having acted or appeared on his behalf. I refer these two points to the Court at large for determination.Mahmood, J.2. I agree.3. The Hon, Pandit Ajudhia Nath, for the respondents, in support of the objections.--I contend that an English barrister is not entitled to file an appeal, or to 'act' for his client in other similar ways. He is not entitled to do so by reason of a posi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Decided on : Dec-31-1969
Reported in : (1887)ILR9All625
Mahmood, J.1. The fact that Her Majesty has omitted for several years to fill up a vacancy does not alter the constitution of the Court or make it illegal; nor does it amount to altering Section 2 of the Letters Patent. If your argument is correct, supposing a Judge were to die, the whole working of the Court would be brought to a standstill until his successor could be appointed.2. To comply with the provisions of Section 2, the vacancy must be filled up within a reasonable time. Otherwise the executive could at pleasure alter the constitution of the Court, and even reduce the Court to a single Judge. This cannot have been intended. Section 7 of the Act prescribes the procedure to be followed when a vacancy occurs, but the powers given by the section have not been exercised. The vacancy now in question occurred in 1873.Tyrrell, J.3. Probably it was inconsequence of the transfer of jurisdiction in rent cases to the Board of Revenue. It was thought that this would greatly reduce the wor...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Decided on : May-22-1969
Reported in : [1970]78ITR491(All)
V.G.O. Oak, C.J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against a search and seizure carried out under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act'). Jawahar Lal Rastogi is the petitioner. His father, Inder Prasad, carried on money-lending business with headquarters at Lucknow. Inder Prasad died in the year 1953. The petitioner became the karta of the Hindu undivided family. The petitioner continued his father's money-lending business. The petitioner is also a partner in a number of industrial concerns. The firms, Rohtas Financiers and Rohtas Pharmaceutical Distributors, have their head offices at Hazratganj, Lucknow, while Messrs. J. E. N. Engineering Corporation has its factory and office at Aishbagh, Lucknow. On September 14, 1964, the Income-tax Officer, A-Ward, Lucknow, directed the petitioner to furnish certain statements. The petitioner was required to furnish the necessary information within 10 days. On September 21, 19...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Decided on : Nov-25-1969
Reported in : [1970]77ITR614(All)
V.G. Oak, C.J. 1. This is a reference under Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The assessee is a limited company, which manufactures sugar. The assessment year is 1958-59. During the relevant accounting period the assessee made a payment of Rs. 25,000 to the Government as contribution towards road development fund. The assessee claimed deduction for this amount of Rs. 25,000. Secondly, the assessee received from the Government a sum of Rs. 40,419 for early start of crushing of sugarcane in accordance with a Government press note dated October 12, 1956. The assessee contended that this sum did not represent the assessee's income. On both the points the Income-tax Officer found against the assessee. As regards the first item, it was held that the sum of Rs. 25,000 represented capital expenditure. On the second point, it was held that the receipt of Rs. 40,419 represented the assessee's income. Assessment was made accordingly. This view was upheld in appeal by the Appellate As...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Decided on : Dec-31-1969
Reported in : (1895)ILR17All294
Banerji, J.1. The suit in which this appeal has arisen was brought by the respondents for the establishment of their right as reversioners to the estate of one Madho Singh, and for a declaration that the alleged adoption of the appellant by Madho Singh was void and ineffectual. One of the grounds on which the alleged adoption was impeached was that the appellant was the son of the sister of Madho Singh's mother. The Court below having held the adoption alleged by the appellant to be invalid, this appeal has been preferred, and the only question which we have to consider and. determine is whether the adoption of the mother's sister's son by a person belonging to one of the three regenerate classes is valid according to Hindu law. The parties are Thakurs, that is, members of the regenerate class of Kshatriyas. It is not alleged that an adoption such as has been set up in this case valid according to any special custom prevailing in the caste or in the locality to which the parties belong...
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