Court : Mumbai
Decided on : May-22-1922
Reported in : (1922)24BOMLR1167; 76Ind.Cas.433
Marten, J.1. This is a notice of motion by Captain Yanovsky the caveator asking for an order that the decree made in Suit No. 1 of 1922 by my brother Crump on April 25, 1922, may be Bet aside, and that the sale made in pursuance of the said decree be also set aside. The notice of motion states that I have granted an interim injunction against completion of the sale until further order of the Court. That statement is admittedly 'incorrect and should be struck out. All I did was to give leave to serve short notice of motion for last Saturday.2. The suit itself is a curious one. The application is also a curious one : and it bristles with legal points-points which are of interest from an historical aspect and also on the question of our Admiralty Jurisdiction in this Court. It also carries with it points of interest to all of us in this High Court of Bombay, viz, that the various matters arising in the exercise of the Court's extensive jurisdiction should be carried out in a way which is ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Decided on : Jul-10-1922
Reported in : AIR1923Bom39; 79Ind.Cas.210
1. It is unfortunate that the hearing of this Rule has been delayed so long as the notice could not be served. The order of this Court was passed on the 12th August 1919 on Appeal No. 41 of 1917 and Civil Extraordinary Application No. 333 of 1917. The circumstances under which the decree of the Trial Court was set aside and the case sent back to the Trial Court for passing a fresh decree are stated in the judgment of this Court. Apart from the difficulty in the way of the applicants in getting a certificate under Section 110, arising out of the terms of Section 109 (a), we do not think that, under the special circumstances of this case, it would be right to grant the certificate applied for. But the difficulty which we have referred to 'seems to be insuperable. The order of this Court cannot be said to be a final order passed on appeal. The substantial portion of the order which the applicants complain of in their petition for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was really passed...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Decided on : Jul-21-1922
Reported in : AIR1923Bom177; (1922)24BOMLR1111
Lallubhai Shah, Acting C.J.1. This appeal arises out of an originating summons taken out by the trustees for the construction of two deeds, one of August 13, 1879, and the other of July 19, 1888. The original summons stated the questions in a general form; but the questions for decision are stated in the judgment of Mr. Justice Kanga, and we have ordered the summons to be so amended as to indicate in terms the points which we have to decide. On a further hearing of this appeal, we have directed further amendment of the summons, and as a result of that two more questions have been raised.2. It will be convenient to show in a tabular form the relationship of the parties interested in these questions:- Dhanabaiji (died in 1891). | Rustomji (dided in 1893) married Maneckbai | (died in 1897); --------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | Framji (died in Ratanbai Edulji Gulbai Byramji 1908)=married (daughter) (died (daughter) (died in 1886; Havabai (died (deft. 2....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Decided on : Oct-13-1922
Reported in : AIR1923Bom218; 76Ind.Cas.317
Marten, J.1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent from the order of Mr. Justice Shah, dated 13th December 1921, dismissing the defendants' appeal against the order of the District Judge of Poona who directed the Subordinate Judge of Vadgaon to proceed with the execution of the decree under Darkhast. No. 29 of 1919.2. The question is one of limitation and concerns, primarily, Section 14, Sub-section (2) and Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act. To explain it, I will state shortly the material facts. The suit was an ejectment suit brought in 1906, and on the 27th November 1907 the plaintiff obtained a decree for possession in the Vadgaon Court. I understand from Counsel that the plaintiff has now recovered possession of all the suit land except a particular cottage, and that the present Darkhast relates only to that cottage. Be that as it may, there have been numerous Darkhasts since the original decree, but it is unnecessary to mention them all. It is common ground that the...
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