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    [0] =>  ..... improper treatment, thus aggravating page 361 u. s. 355 his injury, and that respondent was responsible for such negligence. at the close of the case, the trial judge sustained the motion of respondent to strike petitioner's evidence and discharged the jury. on petition for writ of error claiming that the issues should have been presented to  .....  than a year. even the "junior brakeman" is shown by his undisputed testimony to have worked at that occupation for respondent for "about a year." moreover, no act -- either of commission or omission -- of those brakemen is shown to have in any way caused or contributed to cause petitioner to slip on and fall from the  ..... 361 u. s. 357 -358. judgment reversed and cause remanded. mr. justice clark delivered the opinion of the court. this is a negligence case under the federal employers' liability act, 35 stat. 65, 45 u.s. c. 51. petitioner, an employee of respondent, was injured while shifting various railroad cars on its tracks in and about the ford  ..... 
    [1] =>  .....  find no justification, consistent with the course of adjudication in this court, for upholding state power here, without so much as even suggesting the need for an inquiry as to the extent of federal interest in the activity in question. [ footnote 2/14 ] iv nothing in the wrongful death cases on which the court relies ..... in the hamilton that resort to such statutes would not result in "any lamentable lack of uniformity" in maritime law. what no lesser authority in admiralty matters than judge addison brown said many years ago in the city of norwalk, 55 f. 98, [ footnote 2/12 ] is highly illuminating. he gave these reasons for permitting .....  wrongful death statute is invoked wholly governs liability. [ footnote 2/2 ] at the same time, the court leaves open the question whether a state wrongful death act might contain "provisions so offensive to traditional principles of maritime law that the admiralty would decline to enforce them," finding that this oregon statute "presents no such problem ..... 
    [2] =>  ..... have rendered devoted service in the trial and appellate courts of the united states, voluntarily and without economic incentive of any kind. [ footnote 5 ] an enlightening discussion by judge maris of the thorough administrative machinery worked out by the court of appeals for the third circuit appears in 14 f.r.d. 91. [ footnote 6 ] it  ..... . 691 statute is to be changed, it is for congress, not for us, to change it. we conclude for these reasons that, under existing legislation, a retired circuit judge is without power to participate in an en banc court of appeals determination, and accordingly that the judgment must be set aside. american construction co. v. jacksonville, t.  ..... whether a circuit judge who has retired is eligible under this statute to participate in the decision page 363 u. s. 686 of a case on rehearing en banc. we have concluded that he is not. this litigation arose when the respondents, who had chartered ships from the government under the merchant ship sales act, 50 u.s ..... 
    [3] =>  ..... , see note 3 ante, and we think it should so be taken. as to the reference to "oral examination," we are in agreement with the explanation offered by judge rifkind in mulligan v. united states, 87 f.supp. 79, 81, that it comprehends only those forms of oral examinations traditionally recognized in admiralty, primarily the deposition de .....  on the decision of the court of appeals for the third circuit in dowling v. isthmian s.s. corp., 184 f.2d 758. in an exhaustive discussion, judge fee, for that court, expressed the view that the traditionally flexible and adaptable admiralty practice empowers a court to order a party to submit to pretrial oral examination.  .....  process acts. but, as early as the first general admiralty rules of 1844, this court had provided for subsidiary rulemaking power by the district courts in terms fairly similar to those of the present general admiralty rule 44. see general admiralty rule 46 of 1844, 3 how. xiii. [ footnote 2/4 ] in the last-cited case, judge learned ..... 
    [4] =>  .....  exception to its coverage for such a risk, although it has pages of small printed type stating its extensions, limitations, exclusions and general conditions. the united states district judge who tried this case, experienced in florida law, not surprisingly paid scant attention to this contention. no case in which we have ever "abstained" from passing on difficult .....  insured property page 363 u. s. 209 by the insured's spouse. [ footnote 1 ] the jury was charged that, if the losses were caused by the deliberate acts of petitioner's wife, they were not therefore excluded from coverage. the jury found for petitioner, and judgment in the amount of $6,800 was entered. the district court .....  awarded a judgment to petitioner after ruling that, (1) under florida law, the losses were not excluded from "all risks" coverage if they were caused by deliberate acts of petitioner's wife, and (2) the suit was not barred by a provision in the policy that suit on any claim for loss must be brought within 12 ..... 
    [5] =>  .....  statute; and if it were applied as a determinative rule of "law," it would force the tribunals trying tax cases involving the donee's liability into elaborate inquiries into the local law of corporations or into the peripheral deductibility of payments as business expenses. the former issue might make the tax tribunals the most frequent investigators  ..... deficiency against him for failure to include this amount in his gross income. stanton paid the deficiency and sued in a federal district court for a refund. the trial judge, sitting without a jury, made the simple finding that the payment was a "gift," and entered judgment for stanton. the court of appeals reversed. held: the finding .....  jury. . . ." the last words first came into the statute through an amendment to 1141(a) of the 1939 code in 1948 ( 36 of the judicial code act, 62 stat. 991). the purpose of the 1948 legislation was to remove from the law the favored position (in comparison with district court and court of claims rulings in  ..... 
    [6] =>  .....  court in this case to bind the commissioner to former relevant rulings, with indifference to the correctness of his present position as an independent matter, the appropriate inquiry is not, "can such and such a principle be drawn from the administrative rulings?" the right question is, "is there any rational basis for the prior .....  unlike the ordinary strike benefit, wholly a benefaction because of need, uninfluenced by the union's self-interest in promoting the success of the strike. the trial judge held that the record precluded the jury's verdict; the court of appeals reinstated that verdict. on the evidence in this case, may the jury's verdict ..... constitute gross income unless excluded by law. . . . " page 363 u. s. 325 ". . . amounts received as pensions or annuities under the social security act or the railroad retirement act are excluded from gross income." 24. rev.rul. 57-383, 1957-2 cum.bull. 44. payments to unemployed workers from union unemployment fund financed through dues. plan ..... 
    [7] =>  ..... , the parties have in this court commendably narrowed their contentions to the scope of the only relevant inquiry. the points of contention may be sharpened by first observing what is not in contest. discretion of the district judges concerned is not involved. propriety of the remedy of mandamus is not assailed. no claim is made .....  1400(b), which provides: "(b) any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." see stonite products co. v. melvin lloyd co., 315 u. s. 561 ; fourco glass co. ..... of such a provision, see baltimore & ohio r. co. v. kepner, . . . 314 u. s. 44 , . . . which was prosecuted under the federal employer's liability act in new york, although the accident occurred and the employee resided in ohio. the new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the ..... 
    [8] =>  ..... the contention that it had a three-league maritime boundary which existed "at the time" it was admitted to the union, and must be judged by the same standards. the act of congress admitting the state to the union in 1812 [ footnote 107a ] described the new state's boundaries as follows: "beginning at  ..... state's boundaries, we must nevertheless endeavor to apply that standard to the historical events surrounding admission. we are brought back, then, to a two-fold inquiry: first, whether the three-league maritime boundary asserted by the republic of texas embraced an area which was "properly included within, and rightfully belonging to"  ..... of submerged land rights [ footnote 38 ] -- while undoubtedly representing the sincere beliefs of the speakers, cannot serve to relieve this court from making an independent judicial inquiry and adjudication on the subject, as contemplated by congress. the earlier "quitclaim" bills defined the grant in terms of presently existing boundaries, [ footnote 39 ]  ..... 
    [9] =>  .....  witness. appeal may be made to the court under whose aegis the grand jury sits to have the witness ordered to answer the grand jury's inquiries in the judge's physical presence, so that the court's persuasive exertion to induce obedience, and its power summarily to commit for contempt should its authority be ignored .....  resolved not to answer at all, petitioner then might well have insisted that, as summary punishment was to be imposed, the courtroom be opened so that the act of contempt, that is, his definitive refusal to comply with the court's direction to answer the previously propounded questions, and the consequent adjudication and sentence, might ..... to a subpoena, petitioner appeared as a witness before a federal grand jury in the southern district of new york engaged in investigating violations of the interstate commerce act. he was asked six questions relevant to the grand jury's investigation. after consultation with his attorney, who was in an anteroom, he refused to answer them ..... 
    [10] =>  .....  made. it is apparent that the legislature of alaska vested the judicial power of the state in the interim district court for the time being, that the district judge in this case explicitly deemed himself to be exercising such power, and that, in light of the express consent of the united states, he properly did so. benner ..... fishing in alaskan waters generally, but excepting the appellants, thereby granting them in effect a license to fish with traps. the authority under which the secretary purported to act is the act of 1924, 43 stat. 464, as amended 48 u.s.c. 221, 222. a question not free from doubt, to put it at its lowest, thus .....  injunctions, dismissing the complaints with prejudice, and denying an injunction pending appeal to this court. 174 f.supp. 500. on july 11, 1959, mr. justice brennan, acting in his capacity as a circuit justice, granted appellants' application for an injunction pending final disposition of their future appeals to this court. his opinion noted the existence of  ..... 
    [11] =>  ..... thus unseaworthy and one of the crew received damage as the direct result thereof, he was entitled to recover compensatory damages." [ footnote 2/2 ] chief judge magruder has appropriately noted that no previous decision in this court has considered whether liability for unseaworthiness existing at the start of the voyage extends to subsequently arising  ..... and therefore entitled to those rights if any which flow from the maritime law and flows [ sic ] from the act of congress." in a memorandum filed almost a month after the trial, the district judge, apparently relying upon the fact that the shipowner had no direct financial interest in the spawn which had been unloaded  .....  the carriage of goods by sea act would, of course, bar recovery. the silvia, 171 u. s. 462 . but where, as here, there is neither a claim that the vessel was initially unseaworthy, nor any showing of negligence, the imposition of liability seems to me borrowing from judge magruder, a "hard doctrine," "startlingly opposed  ..... 
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