Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1950Bom101
Bavdekar, J.1. These are two applications under Section 491, Criminal P. C. in respect of two persons against whom orders have been made under the Foreigners Act. The two persons are Mr. and Mrs. Raab, and it is the case of the Crown that out of them Mr. Raab was, before an order was issued by the Maharaja of Baroda conferring upon him the status of a subject of the Baroda State, a naturalized subject of the Republic of Costa Rica and Mrs. Raab was a Czechoslovak. It is not in dispute that on 8th November 1947, His Highness the Maharaja of Baroda passed an order recognising Mr. Raab as a Baroda State subject, and it is not disputed before us that, if this was a valid order in its inception and is still a valid order, then in that case Mr. and Mrs. Raab will be both subjects of the Baroda State, Mr. Raab, because of the order, and Mrs. Raab because of the provision of international law by which a wife attains the status, as far as nationality is concerned, of her husband. It appears fro...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1949)51BOMLR287
Harilal Kania, Kt., C.J.1. The appellant is the agent of the Gwalior Durbar. The Durbar was participating in various trade and business operations, in and outside the Gwalior State for many years. The record shows that those activities in any event existed in 1924 when the predecessor of the present Maharaja was on the throne. That Maharaja had appointed Mr. F.E. Din-shaw as his agent in Bombay for his, trade or business operations. The record shows that money was advanced as loan and also on the security of immovable properties. The Gwalior Durbar as such has not been treated as an assessee under the Indian Income-tax Act, but in respect of certain trading and business operations of the Durbar the Indian Income-tax authorities sought to make the Durbar liable under the Government Trading Taxation Act, III of 1926. Section 2 of that Act, which alone is material for the present case, runs as follows:-2 (1) Where a trade or business of any kind is carried on by or on behalf of the Govern...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 1949CriLJ684
Rajamannar, C.J.1. The appellants in the above appeals were accused 1 to 4 in case No. 10 of 1948 at the first criminal sessions of this Court in the year 1948. All the four appellants were found guilty by a majority of the jury of the offence of conspiracy to murder the late Dr. Habibulla, The appellants in criminal Appeal No. 183 of 1948 were found also guilty of murdering him, while the appellants in criminal Appeal Nos. 188 and 182 of 1948 were found guilty abetting the murder. The majority verdicts of the jury were accepted by Bell J. who tried the case, and they were sentenced to death. The appeals were pro-ferred under Section 411A, Criminal P. 0., which bad been added to the Code by Act xxvi [26] of 1948, with the leave of the appellate Court on matters of law and fact. The appeals came up for hearing before Horwill and Govinda Menon JJ. The learned Public Prosecutor raised a preliminary objection that the appeals were not maintainable, because Act xxvi [26] of 1913 was invalid...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1949)1MLJ258
P.V. Rajamannar, C.J.1. The appellants in the above appeals were accused 1 to 4 in Case 10 of 1948 at the first Criminal Sessions of this Court in the year 1948. All the four appellants were found guilty by a majority of the jury of the offence of conspiracy to murder the late Dr. Habibulla. The appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 183 of 1948 were found also guilty of murdering him, while the appellants in Criminal Appeals Nos. 169 and 182 of 1948 were found guilty of abetting the murder. The majority verdicts of the jury were accepted by Bell, J., who tried the case, and they were sentenced to death. The appeals were preferred under Section 411-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which had been added to the Code by Act XXVI of 1943, with the leave of the appellate Court on matters of law and fact. The appeals came up for hearing before Horwill and Govinda Menon, JJ. The learned Public Prosecutor raised a preliminary objection that the appeals' were not maintainable because Act XXVI of 1...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Privy Council
Lord Thankerton: (part I). (Delivered on 18-3-1948)-This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the Federal Court of India, D/- 4-12-1941, reversing a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, date 19-9-1940, which had affirmed a decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Peshawar, dated 8th March 1940. The Federal Court made a declaration that the respondent's dismissal was void and inoperative, and submitted the case to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for consideration of the respondent's claim for arrears of pay. [a] On 1st March 1928, the respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police by the Inspector General of Police, North-West Frontier Province. On 25th April 1938, the respondent was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, on a charge of copying during a departmental examination. He was therefore dismissed by an authority subordinate in rank to the officer who had appointed him. [3] Aft...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Orissa
Reported in : AIR1952Ori143
Ray, C.J.1. The question, involved in this appeal, is whether a plaintiff can avail himself of the benefits of the doctrine of part performance of a contract for sale as against an invasion on his rights by an attaching creditor of the transferor (promisor.) He had objected to the attachment by advancing a claim in Order XXI, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code. The claim having been rejected he brought the suit, out of which this Second Appeal arises.2. The appeal was heard 'ex parte', and the learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant No. 1 obtained a decree for costs against them invite our attention to such authorities as could be cited by the respondent had he been represented before us.3. The facts, in short, are that the disputed properties belonged to defendants 2 to 12. Defendant No. 1 obtained a decree for costs against them. After decree, passed on 2-9-1936, the aforesaid defendants separated amongst themselves and the disputed properties fell to the share of defendant ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1950Bom192; (1950)52BOMLR214
Chagla, C.J.1. The question referred to this Full Bench is whether a civil suit will lie to establish the right of members of the public to carry a non-religious procession through the public streets. A suit was filed on behalf of the Hindu community of Sakur against the Muslim community of the same place for a declaration that the Hindu community had a right to conduct religious and social processions accompanied with music along certain public thoroughfares upon which certain Muslim mosques abutted. In 1938 the Muslims attempted to obstruct a Dasera procession from marching with music near one of the moseques. The Magistrate issued an order prohibiting the Hindus from carrying out their procession unless they obtained a declaration of their right from a competent civil Court. Hence the suit. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the decree was confirmed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge at Ahmednagar. The Muslims came in second appeal to this Court, and that appeal having co...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Privy Council
Sir John Beaumont: This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 6th October 1944, upon a reference made to that Court under S. 66 (1), Income-tax Act, 1922, raising two questions relating to the computation of the profits and gains of the Bombay branch of the respondent company (hereinafter called "the assessees"). [2] The assessees are a company incorporated in the Straits Settlement having their head office at Singapore and carrying on life insurance business in British India through their branch office at Bombay. It is therefore a company not resident in British India. The year of assessment is the year 1939-1940, and the previous year, that is the year of charge, is the calendar year 1938. The amendments to the Income-tax Act, 1922, made by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939, which came into force on 1st April 1939, apply to the year of assessment. The Act of 1922 as so amended by the Act of 1933 will hereinafter be referred to as "...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1949)51BOMLR938
John Beaumont, J.1. This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated October 6, 1944, upon a reference made to that Court under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, raising two questions relating to the computation of the profits and gains of the Bombay branch of the respondent company (hereinafter called 'the assessees').2. The assessees are a company incorporated in the Straits Settlement having their head office at Singapore and carrying on life insurance business in British India through their branch office at Bombay. It is therefore a company not resident in British India. The year of assessment is the year 1939-40, and the previous year, that is the year of charge, is the calendar year 1938. The amendments to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, made by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939, which came into force on April 1, 1939, apply to the year of assessment. The Act of 1922 as so amended by the Act of 1939 will herei...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1950Bom4; (1949)51BOMLR602
Gajendragadkar, J.1. When we dealt with First Appeal No. 1 of 1945 and dismissed it with costs on 23rd August 1948, Mr. N.C. Shah for the appellant applied for a refund of court-fees paid by him on the memo of his appeal on the ground that through mistake excessive court-fee had been paid by the appellant. We then directed him to argue this matter before the Taxing Officer and left it open to the Taxing Officer to send the matter back to us if he felt any difficulty in deciding it or if he otherwise thought that the point was of such importance that it should be disposed of by a judgment from the Court itself. Accordingly the matter was argued before the Taxing Officer and he has sent it back to us because he says there is no ruling of our Court on the point in question and that the said point is likely to arise in many other appeals. That is how this matter has come to us again for the determination of the question of the proper court-fees payable in the present appeal.2. This questio...
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