Court : Allahabad
Reported in : AIR1929All53; 113Ind.Cas.442
Boys, J.1. The following question has been referred to the Full Bench:Whether on a true interpretation of Sections 19 and 20 Agra Pre-emption Act of 1922 the defendant vendee can defeat the plaintiff's right of pre-emption, which undoubtedly existed at the date of the institution of the suit, by acquisition of an interest equal or superior to plaintiff's in the mahal after the institution of the suit but prior to the passing of the decree by the first Court2. The reference to Section 19 in the question is inserted in manuscript after the referring order was typed. This subsequent insertion we note only because the discussion of the question in the referring order is confined to the effect of Section 20 of the Act, and no opinion has been expressed in that referring order in regard to the effect of Section 19.3. We have, however, manifestly to consider both sections. In the present case the facts are that Ramsarup on 26th March 1924, sold a zamindari house to the defendant Ramsaran Das ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : AIR1962All43
Desai, C.J.1. I respectfully differ from the judgments of ray brothers Mukerji find Dwivedi and consider that the appeal should be allowed and the suit bought against the appellants by the respondents should be dismissed. The findings of fact which cannot be challenged in second appeal are that the respondents were the owners of the constructions made on the land possessed by the appellants as their riyayas, that is as licensees, that they never abandoned the village, their rights as licensees and the constructions but continued to be the owners of the constructions and the licensees of the site and that during their absence the appellants unlawfully took possession of the constructions and their site, demolished, the constructions and included the site in their own cattle-shed or constructed a cattle-shed over it.On these findings the suit of the respondent was decreed by the trial court and they were ordered to be restored to possession over the sits of the constructions. There could...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
1. Heard Sri B.K. Saxena, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri R.N. Trivedi, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Akhilesh Kalra, on behalf of the respondent.2. Before coming to the merits and demerits of the appeal, it would be useful to mention certain relevant background of the case. The parties entered into a contract in March, 1981. On account of dispute, the matter was referred to Arbitrators appointed by the parties. As there was disagreement between the Arbitrators on certain points, the matter was referred to the Umpire, who delivered the Award on 20.3.1998. Thereafter the matter went to the Civil Court. The orders passed by the Civil Court were assailed before this Court in the instant appeal.3. On 18.12.2008, a Division Bench of this Court while hearing the matter came to the conclusion that as the factual dispute is involved it can be adjudicated by the mediator. On the agreement of the parties, the matter was relegated to mediator for amicable settlement. Later on Justice...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : (1902)ILR24All319
John Stanley, C.J.1. The question raised in this appeal is a narrow one, but it is none the less very important. It is whether or not, having regard to the provisions of Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a mortgage to be effective must bear either the autograph signature of the mortgagor or his mark. The facts of the case are simple and undisputed. On the 25th of August, 1896, one Kukur Bind borrowed a sum of Rs. 381 from the plaintiffs on the security of a mortgage, which provided that the interest on the mortgage-debt should be payable annually, and in default of payment of interest the mortgagee should be entitled to possession of the mortgaged property. Default was made in payment of the second instalment of interest, and in consequence the plaintiffs instituted this suit for possession of the mortgaged property. The mortgagor is illiterate, and the signature to the mortgage was made by the scribe of the deed by the direction and in the presence of the mortgagor. Th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : (1907)ILR29All685
Richards, J.1. In this case one Ganga Prasad applies for the revision of the conviction under Section 500 of the Penal Code and a sentence of fine and imprisonment. It appears that one Birbal was being tried for an offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Ganga Prasad was called as a witness for the defence, and he thereupon made some remarks of a defamatory nature concerning one Banke Lal. Banke Lal then instituted the present prosecution against Ganga Prasad under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, and the prosecution resulted, as already stated, in the conviction of Ganga Prasad. It has been contended on behalf of Banke Lal that the words spoken by Ganga Prasad were so irrelevant and foreign to the charge against Birbal that we ought to hold that the words were not spoken by Ganga Prasad in his capacity as a witness at all, and furthermore that some of the words spoken were spoken by Ganga Prasad after he had left the witness box. As to this last allegation it is by no...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : 5Ind.Cas.503
Richards, J.1. The facts of the case referred are very simple. The defendant by usufructuary mortgages mortgaged to the plaintiff his proprietary rights in a holding. Since the date of the mortgage, that is to say, for nine years before the institution of the suit, the defendant has continued in occupation of certain lands comprised in the holding which were prior to the mortgages in his own cultivation. The present suit was instituted to recover possession of inter alia this land. Both the Courts below gave the plaintiff a decree subject to the occupancy rights of the defendant in the land in his own cultivation. Section 41 of Regulation II of 1877 of the Ajmere Code is as follows Any person who may have, whether before or after the passing of this Regulation, lost or parted with his/proprietary rights in any holding, either, temporarily or permanently and has since continued in occupation of any of the lands comprised in such holding which, as proprietor, he retained under his own cu...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : 6Ind.Cas.101
George Knox, J.1. Rustam Ranghar, Pirthi, Mithani and Hoshnak Rajput have been convicted of the wilful murder of one Anup Singh and sentenced to death. The case has been submitted to us for confirmation of the sentences of death by the Additional Sessions Judge of Meerut. We have also before us a petition from Jail sent in by Rustam. Pirthi, Mithan and Hoshnak have had their cases laid before us by learned Counsel. The case for the prosecution has been very fully and carefully set out by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment, and we do not propose going into the facts of the case. We agree with the learned Additional Sessions Judge that it is beyond doubt that Anup Singh was murdered on the 10th of August, 1909. The Medical evidence shows that death was due to wounds on the neck which had divided the trachea and gullet and severed the vessels on both sides of the throat. Evidence is given by one Bijai Singh to the effect that on the 9th of August, he saw Anup Singh ridi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : 6Ind.Cas.609
Tudball, J.1. This appeal arises out of a suit for profits brought by a recorded co-sharer under Section 164 of the Tenancy Act against a lumbardar who is appellant before us.2. On second appeal to this Court, the learned Judge, before whom this case came, held that on the true construction of Clause 3, Section 201, of the Agra Tenancy Act, a Revenue Court had no power to go behind the entry in the record-of-rights. In that view he remanded the case for trial of the remaining issues.3. It is urged before us that the learned Judge is in error for the following reasons: First, because the words shall presume' in the above-mentioned clause must be held to mean 'shall presume until the contrary is proved' and the Revenue Court is, therefore, entitled to go into the point and decide whether or not the plaintiff actually has title and an appeal will lie from its decision to the District Judge under Section 177(e) of the Act; secondly, that the Court ought not to read the word 'conclusively' ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : 9Ind.Cas.1023
1. On the 24th day of December 1900 the Bank of Upper India Limited obtained a money-decree against three Officers of His Majesty's Regular Forces. No application for execution of this, decree, as the term is ordinarily understood, was made until the 8th day of April 1910 when the decree-creditor applied to the Subordinate Judge of Meerut for execution of the decree by attachment of half of the salary of one of the said Officers, Colonel R. Lecky, appellant to this appeal.2. The judgment-debtor, Colonel R. Lecky, objected to the attachment proposed by the decree-creditor on the grounds that:1. the application was barred;2. his salary was not liable to attachment;3. the decree does not empower the decree-holder to realise under it certain premiums alleged by the decree-holder to have been paid in order to keep alive certain insurance policies held by the Bank as security for the monies originally advanced by the said Bank.3. Other objections were raised, but the present appeal is not co...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : (1912)ILR34All375; 14Ind.Cas.154
Henry Griffin, J.1. This appeal arises out of a suit on a mortgage-bond alleged to have been executed on the 25th January, 1881, by Nathu Singh and Kallu, who are now represented by Musammat Amarti, defendant No. 1. The suit was filed on the 8th August, 1910, the 7th August being a Sunday. The original bond was not produced. The plaintiffs alleged that it was in the possession of defendants 2 to 4 and filed a copy. Musammat Amarti, defendant No. 1, pleaded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue without first obtaining a succession certificate, and that the original bond had been paid off. In the court of first instance a succession certificate to collect a debt of Rs. 500 in respect of the bond now in suit was filed by the plaintiffs. No evidence was adduced by either party. The court held that, as the execution of the bond was not specifically denied in the written statement, it must be held to have been admitted and decreed the plaintiffs' suit. Musammat Amarti, defendant No. 1...
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