Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1947Bom331; (1947)49BOMLR66
Leonard Stone, Kt., C.J.1. This is a reference under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and the question referred to us is :Whether in the circumstances of this case the remuneration of Rs. 40,000 received by the assessee from Messrs. Tata Sons Ltd. in the year of account is salary chargeable under Section 7 of the Indian Income-tax Act ?2. The assessment year was the year 1942-43, in respect of the accounting year, which is the calendar year 1941, in which year the sum of Us. 40,000 was received by the assessee in respect of her remuneration as a director of Tata Sons, Limited. This sum is made up of remuneration at the rate of Rs. 100 per month, and in addition, Rs. 38,800, being the assessee's share in the remuneration voted to the directors on May 5, 1941, at an annual general meeting of the company, pursuant to the power in that behalf contained in Article 97 of the company's articles. The articles so far as material are as follows:-3. Article 92 provides, that the number ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1925)27BOMLR855
Shaw, J.1. The Courts below agreed. The question which arises has reference to the taxation upon sugar and the point involved is represented to be of very great general importance to all mercantile communities in India which deal with that article.2. Their lordships are satisfied that both the Courts below have come to a just conclusion.3. From the documents produced with the stated case it is clear that the subject of sugar taxation, and particularly the methods of its imposition, have been for some time a matter of concern to the dealers in the article and of communication with the Government of India.4. It is to be noted that in 1911 a letter was addressed by the Under Secretary to the Indian Government Department of Commerce and Industry to the Secretary of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta. The letter noted previous correspondence and in particular that it had been represented by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce supported by the Bengal and Bombay Chambers of Commerce that ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1939Bom183; (1939)41BOMLR257
N.J. Wadia, J.1. The appellant, who was the plaintiff in the lower Court, purchased survey No. 399 of Mangoli from one Dastgir in 1926. Seven years before that, on May 19, 1919, Dastgir had taken a tagavi loan of Rs. 2,000 from Government for the purpose of weeding the land and for making a stone pavement in a part of it. Under the terms of the tagavi bond (exhibit 58), two other lands owned by Dastgir, survey Nos. 383 and 412, were hypothecated for the loan. In the same year, in which Dastgir sold survey No. 399 to the plaintiff, he also mortgaged the other two lands survey Nos. 383 and 412 to Mr. P.A. Desai. Dastgir failed to repay the tagavi loan in accordance with the terms of the bond and the Prant Officer ordered that the arrears due from Dastgir should be recovered by sale of one of the hypothecated lands, survey No. 383. Against that order an application was made to the Collector by Mr. Desai, to whom the land had been mortgaged, and the Collector ordered that survey No. 399, t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : (1918)ILR40All393
Knox, J.1. Maha Ram who described himself as son of Kallu by caste a sweeper, Mangli, son of Sundar, sweeper, and Bachhan, son of Laiq, sweeper, have been convicted of an offence under Section 68 of Act No. XV of 1872. In the ease of Maha Ram Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code is to be read with Section 88 of Act No. XV of 1872.2. The case for the prosecution is that Maha Ram is a Christian; that on the 3rd of June, 1917, he was married to the daughter of one Shib Lal bhangi, and that Bachhan and Mangli ^were mans, or so-called priests of the sweaper class, who solemnized the marriage according to bhangi rites. The assessors gave it as their opinion that Maha Ram was not a Christian and that therefore no offence under Section 68 of Act No. XV of 1872 had been committed. The learned Sessions Judge, however, was of a different opinion. He found the accused persons guilty and sentenced them each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year. The appellants have been represente...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 42Ind.Cas.544
John Wallis, C. J.1. In this case a trustee was ordered to be removed by Mr. Justice Bakewell and an account was directed to be taken against him. That decision was confirmed on appeal and the case went to the learned Official Referee. But the learned Official Referee was of opinion that certain questions of fact involved should be decided by the Court itself: and the case, therefore, came before Mr. Justice Coutts Trotter sitting on the original side and we have now to deal with an appeal from his decision.2. The question argued before us on appeal relates to item No. 11, certain house property to which the trust became entitled in the time of the former trustee, some ten years before the accession to the office of trustee of the defendant in this suit, so that the defendant had two years in which he could have taken steps for recovery of the property. It is stated by the learned Judge, and the case proceeds upon that basis, that neither the present defendant nor his predecessor did a...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1936Bom172; (1936)38BOMLR164
Divatia, J.1. This is a reference made by the Additional District Magistrate, Broach and Panchmahals, recommending that the conviction of accused No. 1 of the offence of mischief under Section 429 of the Indian Penal Code be quashed, and that the fine imposed in respect of this offence be remitted.2. The accused had been charged with the offences of stealing the calf of the complainant, and of committing mischief by subsequently killing it. The learned Magistrate who tried the case found that the accused stole the calf and thereafter killed it, and he convicted him of the offence of theft as well as of mischief under Sections 379 and 429 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 25 for each of the offences, and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a month for each offence. The other accused were convicted of the offence of assisting in the disposal of stolen property under Section 414, Indian Penal Code.3. The learned Additional District Magistrate has ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1945Bom238; (1945)47BOMLR174
Leonard Stone, Kt., C.J.1. This is a reference under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, and the question referred to us is this:Whether, on the facts found by the Tribunal in this case, the Income-tax Officer is by reason of the registration under Section 26A of the instrument of partnership dated November 15, 1937, prevented or estopped from taxing in the hands of the assessee profits representing the share of ten annas and eight pies in full?2. The applicant and his brother, Mr. P.P. Mistry, were partners in a firm of building contractors under a partnership, dated September 24, 1929. On November 15, 1937, they and the applicant's son entered into a deed of that date. An examination of the deed shows that it contained a recital which states:And Whereas from the 15th day of November 1937 the parties of the first and second parts took the party of the third part as a partner in the said business and whereas the parties are desirous of recording by these presents the constituti...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1919)37MLJ284
Wallis, C.J.1. The terms of the reference have, if I may say so, been very properly framed with reference to the terms of Article 182, Clause 5 of the Limitation Act (4 is a misprint) which makes the date of applying in accordance with law to the proper court for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree a fresh starting point for the purposes of the Article which deals generally with applications for the execution of decrees. The question really is, whether a litigant who has been authorised to bring his suit in a particular court and has obtained a decree in such court in his favour, which he is strictly bound to execute within the time limited in Article 182, is not entitled to apply as of course to that court as the proper Court for the purpose of saving limitation under the Article, or whether, when he decides to apply for execution possibly at the last moment, he is bound to stop and enquire whether the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the court wh...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1950)52BOMLR488
Lionel Leach, J.1. The suit out of which this appeal arises was tried in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, of Dhanbad. The real question for decision is whether that Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought or whether it was a matter which could only be dealt with by the Calcutta High Court in its insolvency jurisdiction. The answer requires the consideration of a scheme of composition, a deed of transfer executed in connection therewith, and proceedings in insolvency extending over a period of more than 20 years.2. The appellant is a limited liability company which is now in liquidation. Its business was banking and it will be convenient to refer to it hereinafter as 'the bank.' In 1909 the bank advanced large sums of money to a partnership of five persons, trading under the style of M.L. Laik and Bantierjee. The loans were made against hundis, which were secured by mortgages of immoveable property. Default was made in the repayment of the loans and the bank was compelled t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1927Bom483; (1927)29BOMLR987; 103Ind.Cas.593
Fawcett, J.1. In this appeal by the Government of Bombay, there are only two questions before us. The first is, whether under Section 39 of the Indian Forest Act (Act VII of 1876) and the Notification of the Government of Bombay No. 9475, dated January 5, 1925, timber or other forest produce of the kind mentioned in the schedule to the Notification, is liable to a levy of duty as prescribed in the Notification, when brought into the East Khandesh district, not directly from one of the States mentioned in the Notification (in this case the Indore State), but from Harda in the Central Provinces, to which it had been removed from that State. The second point is, whether, supposing the timber was not liable to this levy, the Range Forest Officer was acting 'in the discharge of his public functions' within the meaning of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, BO that the obstruction offered by the accused in the case was punishable under that section. Both these questions have been discussed...
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