Court : Supreme Court of India
1. Leave granted.By the order passed by us on April 1, 2011, we had allowed this appeal. We had, further, observed that we will indicate our reasons by a separate judgment. We do so herein.2. The Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, like other Municipal Acts, provides for the election of the Municipal Councillors, the Mayor or Chief Councillor and the Deputy Mayor/Deputy Chief Councillor. It also provides for an Empowered Standing Committee to exercise the executive power of the Municipality. This committee is supposed to consist of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor and seven other Councillors nominated by the Mayor/Chief Councillor under section 21 (3) of this Act. Section 27 of this Act provides that the term of office of the Mayor/Chief Councillor and the members of the Empowered Standing Committee shall be co-terminous with the duration of members of the Municipality. The Act provides for the removal of the Mayor/Chief Councillor and the Deputy Mayor/Deputy Chief Councillor under section 25 (4) of...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Baker v. Carr - 369 U.S. 186 (1962) U.S. Supreme Court Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) Baker v. Carr No. 6 Argued April 19-20, 1961 Set for reargument May 1, 1961 Reargued October 9, 1961 Decided March 26, 1962 369 U.S. 186 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Syllabus Appellants are persons allegedly qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly of Tennessee representing the counties in which they reside. They brought suit in a Federal District Court in Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, to redress the alleged deprivation of their federal constitutional rights by legislation classifying voters with respect to representation in the General Assembly. They alleged that, by means of a 1901 statute of Tennessee arbitrarily and capriciously apportioning the seats in the General Assembly among the State's 95 counties, and a failure to reapportion them subsequent...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1973SC1461; (1973)4SCC225; [1973]SuppSCR1
1. I propose to divide my judgment into eight parts. Part I will deal with Introduction; Part II with interpretation of Golakhnath case; Part III with the interpretation of the original Article 368, as it existed prior to its amendment; Part IV with the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act; Part V with the validity of Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act; Part VI with the validity of Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act; Part VII with Constitution (Twenty- ninth Amendment) Act; and Part VIII with conclusions.PART I-Introduction2. All the six writ petitions involve common questions as to the validity of the Twenty- fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Amendments of the Constitution. I may give a few facts in Writ petition No. 135 of 1970 to show how the question arises in this petition. Writ Petition No. 135 of 1970 was filed by the petitioner on March 21, 1970 under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of his ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Cannon v. University of Chicago - 441 U.S. 677 (1979) U.S. Supreme Court Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) Cannon v. University of Chicago No. 77-926. Argued January 9, 1979 Decided May 14, 1979 441 U.S. 677 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides in part that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Petitioner instituted litigation in Federal District Court, alleging that she had been excluded from participation in the medical education programs of respondent private universities on the basis of her gender and that these programs were receiving federal financial assistance at the time of her exclusion. The District Court granted respon...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : (1982)3SCC24; [1983]1SCR145a
R.S. Sarkaria, J.1. This reference to the Constitution Bench raises a question in regard to the constitutional validity of death penalty for murder provided in Section 302, Penal Code, and the sentencing procedure embodied in Sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the CrPC, 1973.2. The reference has arisen in these circumstances :Bachan Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979, was tried and convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for the murders of Desa Singh, Durga Bai and Veeran Bai by the Sessions Judge. The High Court confirmed his death sentence and dismissed his appeal.3. Bachan Singh's appeal by special leave, came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court (consisting of Sarkaria and Kailasam, JJ.). The only question for consideration in the appeal was, whether the facts found by the Courts below would be 'special reasons' for awarding the death sentence as required under Section 354(3) of the CrPC 1973.4. Shri H.K. Puri, appearing as Amicu...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1982SC149; 1981Supp(1)SCC87; [1982]2SCR365
P.N. Bhagwati, J.1. These writ petitions filed in different High Courts and transferred to this Court under Article 139 of the Constitution raise issues of great constitutional importance affecting the independence of the judiciary and they have been argued at great length before us. The arguments have occupied as many as thirty five days and they have ranged over a large number of issues comprising every imaginable aspect of the judicial institution, Voluminous written submissions have been filed before us which reflect the enormous industry and vast erudition of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and a large number of authorities, Indian as well as foreign, have been brought to our attention. We must acknowledge with gratitude our indebtedness to the learned Counsel for the great assistance they have rendered to us in the delicate and difficult task of adjudicating upon highly sensitive issues arising in these writ petitions. We find, and this is not unusual in cases of th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1982SC1413; 1983CriLJ647; 1982(1)SCALE676; (1982)3SCC140; [1983]1SCR393; 1982(2)SLJ582(SC); 1982(14)LC695(SC)
D.A. Desai, J.1. Validity and legality of an order made against each petitioner convening General Court Martial to try each petitioner in respect of the charges framed against each of them is questioned on diverse grounds but principally the composition in each of these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Writ Petition No. 4903/81 the petitioner has also challenged the constitutional validity of Rules 22, 23, 25 and 40 of the Army Rules, 1954 ('rules' for short) as being violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. As certain contentions were common to all the three petitions they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Facts alleged on which legal formulations were founded may be briefly set out in respect of each petitioner.Re Writ Petition No. 4903/81 :Petitioner Lt. Col. Prithipal Singh Bedi was granted permanent regular commission in the Regiment of Artillery in 1958 and...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1983SC75; [1983]53CompCas184(SC); (1983)1CompLJ1(SC); (1983)ILLJ45SC; (1983)IIMLJ1(SC); 1982(2)SCALE1144; (1983)1SCC228; [1983]1SCR922
P.N. Bhagwati, J.1. There three appeals by special leave raise a short but interesting question of law relating to the right of workmen employed in a company to appear and oppose a petition for winding up of the company. The controversy between the parties arises out of a petition for winding up a private limited company called Ramakrishna Industries (P) Limited (hereinafter referred to as a company). The Company has three units, one a textile mill in the name of Jotie Mills which employs about 500 workmen, another, a workshop for manufacture of textile and other machinery which employs about 400 workmen and the third a printing press which brings out a Tamil daily, called 'Nav India' and employs about 100 workmen. It is a closed company in which there are two groups of shareholders, one group consisting of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and the other consisting of respondent Nos. 7 to 14. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 hold 608 shares and respondent Nos. 7 to 14 687 shares while the remaining 300 sha...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1984SC802; 1984LabIC560; 1983(2)SCALE1151; (1984)3SCC161; [1984]2SCR67; 1984(16)LC29(SC)
Bhagwati, J.1. The petitioner is an organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded labourers in the country. The system of bonded labour has been prevalent in various parts of the country since long prior to the attainment of political freedom and it constitutes an ugly and shameful feature of our national life. This system based on exploitation by a few socially and economically powerful persons trading on the misery and suffering of large numbers of men and holding them in bondage is a relic of a feudal hierarchical society which hypocritically proclaims the divinity of men but treats large masses of people belonging to the lower rungs of the social ladder or economically impoverished segments of society as dirt and chattel. This system under which one person can be bonded to provide labour to another for years and years until an alleged debt is supposed to be wiped out which never seems to happen during the life time of the bonded labourer, is totally incompatible with the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1984SC684; AIR1984SC991; (1984)86BOMLR365; 1984CriLJ613; 1984CriLJ819; 1984(1)Crimes568(SC); 1984(1)Crimes926(SC); 1984(1)SCALE198; 1984(1)SCALE583; (1984)2SCC183; (1984
D.A. Desai, J.1. Respondent Abdul Rehman Antulay (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra from 1980 till he submitted his resignation on January 12, 1982, which became effective from January 20, 1982. He thus ceased to hold the office of the Chief Minister from January 20, 1982 but continues to be a sitting member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly till today.2. As the contentions canvassed before this Court are mainly questions of law, facts at this stage having a peripheral relevance in the course of discussion, it is unnecessary to set out the prosecution case as disclosed in the complaint filed by complainant Ramdas Shrinivas, Nayak (complainant for short) in detail save and except few a pertinent and relevant allegations. In the process the brief/history of the litigation may also be traced.3. The complainant moved the Governor of Maharashtra by his application dated September 1, 1981 requesting him to grant sanction to prose...
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