Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1967Mad57; (1966)2MLJ63
(1) W.P. No. 1124 of 1963 comes before us on a reference made by one of us(srinivasan, J). It was a proceeding in prohibition by Messrs Raval and Co. (petitioners), seeking to restrain the respondents, including the Chief Rent Controller, Madras(4th respondent) from prosecuting or proceeding with a petition for the fixation of fair rent, under the Madras Rent Control Acts. Connected with this are two other proceedings, namely, C.R.P. 1816 of 1963 and Appn. No. 2443 of 1963 in C.S. 163 of 1962, in which certain clearly inter-linked question are involved. Our learned brother(Srinivasan, J.) felt the difficulty that the catena of decisions of this court as far as the Madras Rent Control Acts are concerned, has been only in the consistent directions that these Acts did purport to interfere with contractual tenancies both as regards the fixation of fair rents and as regards the respective rights of landlords and tenants, in the matter of eviction and the grounds for eviction; while certain...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1968Mad1
1. The issue that has been referred to this Full Bench can be very simply stated: It is, whether an order granting leave to sue in forma pauperis by a single Judge of the High Court, is a judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent? Even in this restricted form, the issue involves a conflict of the case law in this Court. In M.R. Ananthanarayana Iyer v. Rarichan, ILR 59 Mad 656 = (AIR 1936 Mad 387), a Division Bench of Beasley C. J. and Stodart J. held that an order of a single Judge of the High Court excusing the delay in the filing of a pauper appeal and admitting the appeal, is not a 'judgment' which can be the subject of an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In P. baba Sah v. Purushottama Sah 47 Mad LJ 932 = (AIR 1925 Mad 167), Spencer C. J. and Srinivasa Aiyangar J. held that an order of a single Judge of the High Court granting permission to the plaintiff to sue in forma paperis amounts to a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15, Letters Patent...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1967)2MLJ1
M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.1. The issue that has been referred to this Full Bench can be very simply stated: It is, whether an order granting leave to sue in forma pauperis by a single Judge of the High Court, is a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent? Even in this restricted form the issue involves a conflict of the case-law in this Court. In M.R. Ananthanarayana Iyer v. Rarichan : (1936)70MLJ306 , a Division Bench of Beasley, C.J., and Stodart, J., held that an order of a single Judge of the High Court excusing the delay in the filing of a pauper appeal and admitting the appeal, is not a 'judgment' which can be the subject of an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In P. Baba Sah v. V M Purushothama Sah : (1924)47MLJ932 , Spencer, O.C.J. and Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., held that an order of a single Judge of the High Court granting permission to the plaintiff to sue in forma pauperis amounts to a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : [1968]21STC367(Mad)
ORDERRamaprasada Rao, J. 1. In this batch of writ petitions, the main question arising for consideration is whether Terylene, Terene, Dacron, Nylon, Nylex etc., would come within the expression ' artificial silk ' which occurs as item 4 in the Third Schedule to the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and therefore exempt from sales tax. Main arguments were addressed in W.P. No. 2927 of 1966, and as the point for consideration in all the writ petitions in this batch is the same, we intend considering the respective contentions of the parties as urged before us in W.P. No. 2927 of 1966. It is not in dispute that notices, which were similar to those issued in W.P. No. 2927 of 1966, were issued to the other writ petitioners in this batch of petitions, and therefore we intend passing a common order considering the contentions of the respective counsel for either side in the main W.P. No. 2927 of 1966.2. The petitioner in this case has made the assessing officer as the 1st respondent, the St...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1969)1MLJ229
T. Ramaprasada Rao, J.1. In this batch of writ petitions, the main question arising for consideration is whether Terylene, Terene, Decron, Nylon, Nylex, etc. would come within the expression ' artificial silk ' which occurs as item 4 in the Third Schedule to the Madras General Sales-Tax Act, 1959 and therefore exempt from sale-tax, main arguments were addressed in W.P. No. 2927 of 1966, and as the point for consideration in all the writ petitions in this batch is the same, we intend considering the respective contentions of the parties as urged before us in W.P. No. 2927 of 1966. It is not in dispute that notices which were similar to those issued in W.P. No. 2927 of 1966, were issued to the other writ petitioners in this batch of petitions, and therefore we intend passing a common order considering the contentions of the respective Counsel for either side in the main W.P. No. 2927 of 1966.2. The petitioner in this case has made the assessing officer as the first respondent, the State ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1970Mad48
1. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment just delivered by my learned brother. I entirely agree with him, not merely on the conclusion that the appeals ought to be allowed, but also on the grounds upon which that conclusion has to be based.2. It may, hence, appear somewhat superfluous that I should write a separate judgment, however, condensed. But I am impelled to do so, for an important reason. It is possible to present the central argument that Mr. V. Thyagarajan has sought to put forward, in these appeals, as the horns of a dilemma. Presented in that form, the argument has the merit of great plausibility, at least on the first scrutiny. It is for this reason that I propose to tersely examine the links, in the logical chain of this argument, and to demonstrate that our conclusion follows as the correct one, even conceding the plausibility.3. The process of reasoning is best expressed, I think, in the following form. Is there a suit known to law by an insurer, as in this c...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1968)2MLJ497
M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.1. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment just delivered by my learned brother. I entirely agree with him, not merely on the conclusion that the appeals ought to be allowed, but also on the grounds upon which that conclusion has to be based.2. It may, hence, appear somewhat superfluous that I should write a separate judgment, however condensed. But I am impelled to do so, for an important reason. It is possible to present the central argument that Mr. V. Thyagarajan; has sought to put forward, in these appeals, as the horns of a dilemma. Presented in that form, the argument has the merit of great plausibility, at least on the first scrutiny. It is for this reason that I propose to tersely examine the links, in the logical chain of this argument, and to demonstrate that our conclusion follows as the correct one, even conceding the plausibility.3. The process of reasoning is best expressed, I think, in the following form. Is there a suit known to law by ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1970)1MLJ19
M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.1. This appeal is instituted by the Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Communications, New Delhi, and the General Manager, Telephones, Madras from the judgment of our learned brother Venkatadri, J., in W.P. No. 2122 of 1966, striking down the recently enhanced Telephone tariff. I might immediately state that the entire Judgment proceeds upon two bases, or comprehensive considerations, both of which have now become academic, or inapplicable. Firstly, in striking down this enhancement of the tariff the learned Judge was largely influenced by the fact that the increased revenue, thereby secured, was sought to be utilised to cover the deficits in the Posts and Telegraph Department. The learned Judge thought that this was illegitimate and inadmissible. To quote:The Posts and Telegraphs Department consists of various units, such as postal, telegraph, radio and telephone units. Each department or wing is a separate unit by itself, with regard to ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1971)2MLJ502
K.S. Ramamurti, J.1. These writ appeals arise out of three writ petitions filed by the petitioners therein, questioning the legality of the Cement Control (Amendment) Order of 1969, (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Order) which came into force on the 16th of April, 1969, introducing certain changes in the Cement Control Order of 1967, hereinafter referred to as the Order.2. The writ petitioners asked for the issue of a writ of mandamus and other appropriate directions. Ismail, J., accepted the contentions of the petitioners on all the main points and allowed the writ petitions issuing certain directions. Chettinad Cement Corporation Ltd. is the petitioner in W.P.No. 2243 of 1969; Madras Cement Ltd. is the petitioner in W.P.No. 2244 of 1969 and the India Cements Ltd. is the petitioner in W.P. No. 2245 of 1969.3. The Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs, New Delhi, and (2) The Cement Controller, New Delhi, the respon...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : [1973]91ITR101(Mad)
Ramaprasada Rao, J. 1. In this batch of writ petitions common questions are involved. It is, therefore, sufficient to refer to the material facts in one of the writ petitions. I am narrating the facts in W.P. No. 1722 of 1967, for purposes of convenience. At the outset I may mention that the only point urged before me by the counsel appearing in this batch of writ petitions is that Section 139(1), proviso (iii)(a) and (b), of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is ultra vires because the same is discriminatory in character and, therefore, violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that in these writ petitions the petitioners as assessees under the Act in the status of registered firms filed returns beyond time and made necessary applications to the Income-tax Officer to excuse the delay in the non-submission of the return within time. Having obtained such an order by invoking the statutory discretion of the income-tax authorities it is said that the provision as a...
Tag this Judgment!