Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1878)ILR2Bom142
West, J.1. We think that the first head of the charge in this case did not give to the accused the information which the law intended him to have of the particular offence, expressed circumstantially, to which he was called upon to answer. The descriptions of crimes in the Penal Code must of necessity be expressed in abstract terms, but the very object of a trial is to determine whether particular acts or omissions on the part of an accused fall or do not fall within the rule thus abstractedly stated. Conformably to this principle, all the models of charges in Schedule III to the Code of Procedure contain or imply the setting forth with reasonable particularity of the matters alleged to constitute the offence. Here the accused was charged that he being a public servant * * * knowingly disobeyed the direction of the law as to the way in which he had to conduct himself as such public servant with respect to the property found in an investigation held in a case of theft, etc.;' what the d...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal298
Jackson, J.1. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of Mr. C.T. Manson, Deputy Collector, also called Extra Assistant Commissioner, of Rajmehal, which is admittedly and entirely within the Sonthal Pergannas. The appeal is valued at Rs. 5,922.2. By Act XXXVII of 1855 of the Governor-General in Council, the Sonthal Pergannas were removed from the operation of the general laws and regulations of the Bengal Code, except so far as was thereinafter provided.3. By Section 2 of that Act1 I the administration of civil justice was vested in officers to he appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. There was a proviso that all suits beyond the value of Rs. 1,000 were to be tried and determined, according to the general laws and regulations, in the same manner as if that Act had not been passed.4. The 4th section 2 declared that all decisions in civil suits passed by such officers to the extent of the powers conferred on them were final, and it was made lawful for the Lieutenant-Gove...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1878)ILR2Bom384
Melvill, J.1. Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the sanction to a prosecution should be given by 'the Court before or against Which the offence was committed, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.'2. The decision of the Sessions Court proceeded upon the ground that although, in certain executive matters, all Magistrates are subordinate to the Magistrate of the District, yet that such subordination is not of a judicial character, and that, as a Court, a Magistrate of the First Class is not subordinate to the Court of the Magistrate of the District, but to the Court to which appeals from the decisions of a Magistrate of the First Class ordinarily lie, i.e., to the Court of Session. 3. There is no doubt a good deal to be said in favour of the view adopted by the Sessions Judge. Section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code divides the Criminal Courts in British India into four grades only, and one of these is the Court of the Magistrate of the Fir...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1878)ILR2Bom148
Michael Westropp, C.J.1. On the 1st of May 1876 a warrant of arrest, under Section 201 of the old Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), was issued against Ratansi Kalianji pursuant to a Judge's order of the 29th April 1876, upon an application for execution of a decree of the 27th April 1876. Ratansi Kalianji was arrested upon the 30th of October 1876, was brought before a Judge in Chamber on the 31st October 1876, and then finally committed by the Judge, 'until he (Ratansi Kalianji) satisfy the amount of the decree passed against (him) the said Ratansi Kalianji in the above suit.' Then followed in the same order the usual direction, under Section 278 of Act VIII of 1859, that the plaintiffs should pay to him subsistence allowance at the rate of 4 annas per diem, by monthly payments in advance. The receipts indorsed on the Judge's order by Mr. Lake, for the superintendent of the gaol, and by the sheriff, and the certificate of the latter, show that the detention of the prisoner Rata...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal190
Markby, J.1. The two prisoners, Harai and Umed, whose case is now before us under Section 263 of the Criminal Procedure Code, were put upon their trial before the Sessions Court on a charge 'that being members of an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, they had committed murder.' This was a charge under Sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. They were also charged 'that being members of an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, they had voluntarily caused grievous hurt.' This was under Sections 326 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Other prisoners were likewise charged at the same time, and the verdict of the jury as regards these two prisoners was a verdict of acquittal upon both these charges; but in answer to a question put to them by the Sessions Judge, they stated that the two prisoners, Harai and Umed, were in the company of two of the other prisoners, whom they found guilty on the second of the c...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1878)ILR2Bom457
Michael Westropp, C.J.1. The plaintiffs, who are Mussulmans, sue to establish their alleged right to carry tabuts in procession along a certain road for immersion in the sea. They aver that the defendants have obstructed them in so doing, and that the Magistrate, at the instance of the defendants, has made an order prohibiting the plaintiffs from using the road for that purpose.2. This claim is resisted by the defendants, also Mussulmans, who allege that the road, along which the plaintiffs wish to carry their tabuts, passes through the mohola (quarter of the town) of the defendants, and close to their musjid, and that the plaintiffs have no right of way along that road, but that there is another and a public road, whereby the sea is accessible to them, which road they have hitherto used for the same purpose.3. The defendants also relied upon the law of limitation.4. The Subordinate Judge found that the suit was barred by that law. The District Judge reversed his decision, and held tha...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1879)ILR4Cal623
Ainslie, J.1. The provisions of Section 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 176 of the Indian Penal Code ought not to be used for purposes of vexation, but in order to secure due information to Magistrates and the Police of offences committed within their jurisdiction: Provided that information is conveyed to the nearest Magistrate or Police officer by one of the parties bound to give such information; it is not reasonable that every other person who may possibly be bound to give information should be prosecuted for not having done so. A Police officer is not better off when he has half-a-dozen copies of the same report than when he has the first. In the present instance it appears as a matter of fact, from the record which has come up to us, that the petitioner did not himself get any information regarding the theft until the fourth day after its occurrence, and that, in the meantime, an account of the theft had been duly reported to the Police by another gomashta and a punc...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1878)ILR2Bom481
West, J.1. In the appeal before us, Mr. Gill, the counsel for Lakshman, has taken objection, on his behalf, to the sufficiency of the sanction given by the District Magistrate. He contends that, under Section 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no complaint can be entertained for any offence whatever against any public servant not removeable from his office without the sanction of the Government, except with the sanction of the Government itself; and that the sanction by the District Magistrate, besides being vague and indefinite, is insufficient. He referred to the case of Regina v. Parashram Keshav 7 Bom. H.C. Rep. 61, in which it was held that Section 167 of the superseded Code of Criminal Procedure, which corresponds with Section 466 of the one now in force, required such sanction to give jurisdiction to the trying Court, and that a conviction, founded on evidence taken without such sanction, was bad. He argued that Section 466 does not restrict itself to chapter IX or any other...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Coleman v. Tennessee - 97 U.S. 509 (1878) U.S. Supreme Court Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878) Coleman v. Tennessee 97 U.S. 509 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE Syllabus 1. The thirtieth section of the Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 731, entitled "An Act for enrolling and calling out the national forces and for other purposes," did not make the jurisdiction of the military tribunals over the offenses therein designated, when committed by persons in the military service of the United States and subject to the Articles of War, exclusive of that of such courts of the loyal states as were open and in the undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction. 2. When the territory of the states which were banded together in hostility to the national government and making war against it was in the military occupation of the United States, the tribunals mentioned in said section had, under the authority conferred thereby and under the laws of war, exclusive jurisdict...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Whiskey Cases - 99 U.S. 594 (1878) U.S. Supreme Court Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878) Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878) 99 U.S. 594 ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS Syllabus 1. The district attorney has no authority to contract that a person accused of an offense against the United States shall not be prosecuted or his property subjected to condemnation therefor if, when examined as a witness against his accomplices, he discloses fully and fairly his and their guilt. 2. A person so accused cannot plead the contract in bar of proceedings against him or his property, nor avail himself of it upon the trial, but has merely an equitable title to executive mercy, of which the court can take notice only when an application to postpone the case is made in order to give him an opportunity to apply to the pardoning power. The first two of these cases were actions of debt instituted in the circuit court to recover the penalties imp...
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