Court : Chennai
Decided on : Feb-03-1891
Reported in : (1896)6MLJ254
Muthusami Aiyar, J.1. The question referred for our opinion is whether in cases in which a married woman is defamed by imputing unchastity to her, her husband is a person aggrieved by the defamation, upon whose complaint the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am of opinion that our answer must be in the affirmative. The words ' aggrieved by such offence' include the husband in their ordinary meaning and his reputation is so intimately connected with that of his wife that it would be unreasonable to hold that the defamation would ordinarily not be as much hurtful to the feelings of the former as it is to those of the latter. It is true that under Section 345 the wife may without the consent of the husband and : even contrary to his wish compound the offence as ' the person defamed ' thereby rendering the complaint made by the latter liable to be dismissed. But it must be observed that generally the husband and the wife wi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Feb-03-1891
Reported in : (1891)ILR14Mad379
Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. The question referred, for our opinion, is whether in cases in which a married woman is defamed by the imputation of unchastity, her husband is a person aggrieved by the defamation, upon whose complaint the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am of opinion that our answer must be in the affirmative. The words, 'some person aggrieved by such offence,' include the husband in their ordinary meaning, and his reputation is so intimately connected with that of his wife that it would be unreasonable to hold that the defamation would ordinarily not be as hurtful to his feelings as it is to those of his wife. It is true that under Section 345 the wife may, without the consent of the husband, and even contrary to his wish, compound the offence as 'the person defamed,' thereby rendering the complaint made by the latter liable to be dismissed. But it must be observed that generally the husband and the wife will ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Mar-03-1891
Reported in : (1896)6MLJ478
Arthur J.H. Collins Kt., C.J.1. This is an appeal by Mr. Robert Fischer, a barrisier-at-Iaw, who has been convicted under Section 68 'of the Indian Christian Marriage Act of 1872.2. The facts of the case appear to be as follows:--Mr. Robert ' Fischer is a Lay Trustee of Saint George's Church, Madura, and in Aril and May last the Native Pastor of that Church published the banns of marriage between Samuel Louis Ormsby and Miss Bibiana Elizabeth O'Connor both of whom profess the Christian religion. A day was appointed for the marriage ceremony to take place; but the Incumbent of the Church was away on duty ait Kodaikanal and the Native Pastor left Madura apparently on some private business 3' days before the manrags was to take place in spite of urgent requests that he would stay and parform the ceremony. Mr. Fischer was then asked to perform [464] the ceremony as he was a Lay Trustee of the Church. Mr. Fischer sent a letter to Mr. Wansbrough, the Incumbent informing that gentleman that h...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Mar-03-1891
Reported in : (1891)ILR14Mad342
Arthur J.H. Collins, Kt., C.J.1. This is an appeal by Mr. Robert Fischer, a Barrister-at-Law, who has been convicted under Section 68 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act of 1872.2. The facts of the case appear to be as follows: Mr. Robert Fischer is a Lay Trustee of St. George's Church, Madura, and in April and May last the Native' Pastor of that Church published the banns of marriage between Samuel Louis Ormsby and Miss Bibiana Elizabeth O'Connor, both of whom profess the Christian religion. A day was appointed for the marriage ceremony to take place; but the incumbent of the Church was away on duty at Kodaikanal and the Native Pastor left Madura apparently on some private business three days before the marriage was to take place in spite of urgent requests that he would stay and perform, the ceremony. Mr. Fischer was then asked to perform the ceremony, as he was a Lay Trustee of the Church. Mr. Fischer sent a letter to Mr. Wansbrough, the Incumbent, informing that gentleman that he ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Mar-17-1891
Reported in : (1896)6MLJ358
Muthusami Aiyar, J.1. This reference arises out of Calendar Case No.133 of 1890 on the file of the 2nd Class Magistrate of Cuddalore Taluq in the District of South Arcot. There is a place of worship called Muniyanar Kovil in the midst of a jungle in the [345] village of Perumathoor in that Taluq. One Arunachela Gounden who was its Pujari died about 19 months ago, and upon his death, a dispute arose between his widow and the 2nd accused as to the right of succession to the office of pujari. There is no temple at the place of worship, but the property of the shrine was secured in a building adjacent to the house of the late pujari's widow, the first witness for the prosecution. Her complaint, was that the building was in her possession and that on the 14th April last, the ten accused assembled together in order to take forcible possession of the property, committed a riot, broke into the building, and breaking open a box containing Jewels carried them off. Several witnesses gave evidence...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Mar-25-1891
Reported in : (1891)ILR14Mad334
Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. This reference arises out of Calendar Case No. 133 of 1890 on the file of the Second-class Magistrate of Cuddalore taluk in the district of South Arcot. There is a place of worship called Muniyanar Kovil in the midst of a jungle in the village of Perumathoor in that taluk. One Aruna-chela Gounden, who was its pujari, died about 19 months ago, and upon his death, a dispute arose between his widow and the second accused as to the right of succession to the office of pujari. There is no temple at the place of worship, but the property of the shrine was secured in a building adjacent to the house of the late pujari's widow, the first witness for the prosecution. Her complaint was that the building was in her possession, and that on the 14th April last, the ten accused assembled together in order to take forcible possession of the property, committed a riot, broke into the building, and breaking open a box containing jewels carried them off. Several witnesses gave evid...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Jul-13-1891
Reported in : (1892)ILR15Mad83
1. The procedure of the Deputy Magistrate in all these cases seems to have been irregular in several respects. In the first place the proceedings were not commenced by any summons to the accused or other formal notice that a criminal investigation was about to take place.2. Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not appear to intend that proceedings in summary trials shall commence ordinarily otherwise than in other criminal trials either by summons or warrant, indeed Section 262 implies the contrary. Section 263 requires a record of the proceedings to be made by the presiding officer, and we think that it is intended hat the record shall be made at the time of the trial. Presumably the Deputy Magistrate, while seated on his pony, could not have kept the record required by Section 263, and he states that no clerk accompanied him. The record must, therefore, have been prepared after the close of the trial from memory or possibly from some rough note. This is not the procedu...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Aug-06-1891
Reported in : (1892)ILR15Mad39
1. Under Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code, the District Magistrate had power to make further inquiry himself or to direct the Sub-Magistrate to make further inquiry, but if he chose the latter course he had no legal authority to fetter the Sub-Magistrate in the exercise of his judicial discretion.2. A commitment to the sessions (assuming that the case was one which ought to be tried by the Sessions Court) would not be justifiable unless the committing Magistrate considered a prima facie case had been made out which in his judgment ought to be tried at the sessions. The order of the District Magistrate that the case was to be committed if the Sub-Magistrate thought it was possible for two views to be held, (the District Magistrate distinctly stating he held another view), was therefore ultra vires, and practically took away from the Subordinate Magistrate the exercise of his judicial discretion. In making the commitment the Sub-Magistrate does not profess to have exercised any judic...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Sep-08-1891
Reported in : (1892)ILR15Mad95
1. In our opinion the District Judge was right in holding that plaintiff had not proved his right to eject defendant. On the findings of both Courts, it must be taken that the only facts proved are that plaintiff is the Inamdar of the village, that defendant and his father have been in occupation of the lands for 40 or 50 years as tenants. Plaintiff's case, as set up in his plaint, was that of an occupancy commencing with the execution by defendant of a muchalka for 10 years in 1874-75. This is clearly not supported by the evidence. It was for plaintiff to show that, under the terms of the tenancy and in the circumstances that exist, he has a right to eject defendant, and this he has not shown. The cases of Appa Rau v. Subbanna I.L.R. 13 Mad. 60 and Venkan v. Kesavalu S.A, No. 1078 of 1887, unreported there referred to, are distinct authorities for the position that, when the plaintiff does not prove what the terms of the tenancy are, he cannot eject, although defendant may fail to pro...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Sep-14-1891
Reported in : (1892)ILR15Mad132
1. It appears to us that under Section 40, the Sub-Registrar was competent to exercise on his transfer to Gannavaram the powers conferred upon him as Sub-Registrar of Ponnur unless the local Government directed him not to exercise them. In the Government order of 29th May last the Government declined to invest him with those powers as Sub-Registrar of Gannavaram. The order was passed apparently under the impression that the powers had to be conferred again whilst no such fresh grant of powers was necessary under Section 40. Again the Government order was not communicated to the Sub-Registrar until after he had decided the cases under reference. We do not think that under these circumstances there is any necessity to interfere....
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