Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1882)ILR8Cal895
Prinsep, J.1. It is a rule of this Court that, as a Court of Revision, it cannot interfere with an order of acquittal.2. Let the papers be returned....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1882)ILR8Cal960
Richard Garth, C.J.1. In this case we think that there was quite sufficient ground to justify the Court below in presuming a grant of a permanent nature in favour of the defendants' ancestors.2. It is conceded that the land in question was never let for agricultural purposes. It was apparently let upwards of sixty years ago for building purposes; because it is found that, after the grant (whatever it was), these buildings, which are of a substantial character, were erected some sixty years ago by the defendants' ancestors, and that they and their ancestors have lived there ever since. Under these circumstances we think that the Courts below were at liberty to presume, if they thought fit, that the land was granted for building purposes, and that the grant itself was of a permanent character.3. This has been explained in several recent cases, and amongst others in the case of Prosonno Coomar Chatterjee v. Jagan Nath Bysack 10 C.L.R. 25 to which our attention has been called.4. If the la...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal38
Prinsep, J.1. We are of opinion that the Bench of Magistrates had jurisdiction, in a prosecution under Section 216, Beng. Act V of 1876, to determine whether the order which had not been carried out was a proper order,--that is to say, in the present case, whether there had been any encroachment on the road which the accused was bound to remove on the order of a Municipal authority. It has been held, in an analogous case under Section 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that, when prosecuted under Section 188, Penal Code, for neglecting to carry out an order of a Magistrate to remove a nuisance, that although that order, if properly made, cannot be questioned in any Court, the accused can, when prosecuted for disobedience of it, claim exemption from its operation on the ground that it was not an order which he was bound to obey, as being an order beyond the Magistrate's power and jurisdiction....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1882)ILR8Cal761
Wilson, J.1. This suit came on for settlement of issues, when it appeared that several issues of fact and several issues of law arose on the pleadings. But before the other issues could be usefully tried, it became necessary to determine whether, on the plaint, any case was shown entitling the plaintiff to a decree.2. The plaint shows that, on the 6th of June 1868, the late Prosunno Coomar Tagore executed a deed, by which he conveyed a house, upon certain trusts, for the benefit of the first two defendants and their issue, all of which trusts, the plaintiff contends, are invalid, except those which give life-estates to the first two defendants.3. The plaint then shows that, under the will of Prosunno Coomar Tagore, the defendant, Maharaja Jotendro Mohun Tagore, takes a life-estate in the residuary estate of the testator, the remission in fee being in the testator's son Ganendro Mohun Tagore; and that, in 1879, the plaintiff, for a nominal money-consideration, and in further considerati...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1882)ILR8Cal766
Wilson, J.1. This case came before me for settlement of issues, and several questions of law were argued which I do not deal with, because the view which I take of the scope of the suit makes it unnecessary to do so. This is a suit to revive and give effect to a former suit, and all that is asked for might have been obtained by orders in the former suit (which would have been made almost as a matter of course) if the time for applying for such orders had not long since expired. I took time to consider my judgment, because it was contended that this suit also was barred by limitation, at any rate as to some portion of the accounts asked for.2. The original suit was, and this suit is, brought to enforce express trusts, and the plaintiff's case is that, under Section 10 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), no length of time is a bar. That section is as follows: Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any spec...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1882)ILR8Cal887
Cunningham, J.1. In this case the plaintiff sues the Official Trustee to have it declared that a deed of settlement executed on the 18th September 1880, is invalid and void; and that the plaintiff is entitled to require the Official Trustee to make over to him Rs. 6,000, which, under the deed, have been placed in the hands of the Official Trustee.2. The deed provided that the Official Trustee should, subject to certain conditions, pay the interest of the Rs. 6,000 to plaintiff for life, and after plaintiff 's death, provided he should have lawful issue, the trust-fund should be for his widow or widows and lawful lineal descendants, as specified: and if there should be no lawful issue, then, after deducting the widow's share, for brothers, sisters and others.3. There is a power of revocation with the consent of the Official Trustee.4. The plaintiff married in August 1881; his wife is an infant. Her guardian remains neutral in the suit: the Official Trustee declines to give his assent ex...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1882)ILR8Cal891
Prinsep, J.1. The petitioner Wood has been convicted under Section 77, Beng. Act IV of 1876 (the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act) of having, during 1881, exercised the profession of boardinghouse-keeper without the license required by Section 75, and has been fined Rs. 75.2. Several questions have been raised before us on the merits of the case, and of these the most important is, whether or not petitioner Wood keeps a boarding-house within the meaning of the Act. The term 'boarding-house' is not defined in the law. Looking, however, at the manner in which it is used in Calcutta, we think that, in order to obtain a conviction, it must be shown that the accused held himself out to the public as one whose business or profession it is to receive boarders for profit. In the present case there is evidence on the record sufficient to justify the finding of the lower Court, that the petitioner Wood kept a boarding-house. Nevertheless the sentence of fine cannot be upheld. The law (Sectio...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal237
R. Garth, C.J.1. I am unable to agree in the view which the learned Judge has taken of this case.2. There is no doubt, of course, that as a general principle, when a Hindu family is proved to have been joint, that state of things is presumed to continue, until the contrary is shown. The question is, how far that principle can properly be applied in this case.3. The plaintiff sues to recover an undivided share in certain land, which is now, and has been for many years past, in the defendants' exclusive possession, and his case is this.4. He says that his maternal grandfather Krishto Mohun, and the maternal grandfather of the defendant No. 1, were uterine brothers; and that whilst they were living in commensality they purchased the property in question with their joint funds in the name of Radha Mohun; that subsequently Krishto Mohun left his home, and then his daughter (the plaintiff's mother) enjoyed the property jointly with Radha Mohun, till her death, when plaintiff succeeded to his...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1882)ILR8Cal885
Richard Garth, C.J.1. We think that this appeal must be dismissed. The plaintiffs, in order to establish their case, were bound to prove that the irregularities mentioned in the plaint had been committed with a view to defraud them. Those irregularities might have been as well the result of mistake as of fraud. It was necessary, therefore, for the plaintiffs to prove the fraud, and fraud has been negatived by both the lower Courts. They also find that the purchaser at the sale was a bona fide purchaser for value.2. The Judge's decision, therefore, was quite right.3. We also entirely agree with what he says at the commencement of his judgment, and as that is a matter which concerns Civil Courts generally, we think it right to add a few words upon the subject.4. The suit was brought to set aside a sale in execution of a decree, upon the ground that the land, the subject of the sale, was in part the plaintiff's property. Their case was, that they had been fraudulently and collusively kept...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal50
White, J.1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in the first Court against a decision of the Officiating District Judge of Rungpore, reversing a decree of the First Munsif of Gaibanda passed in favour of the plaintiff.2. The lower Appellate Court has found that the two widows of Kali Kristo Lahiri--namely, the defendant Shyama and one Brohmomoyi, who has since died,--adopted two sons at the same time under a written authority conferred upon each of them by Kali Kristo; and that the son adopted by Brohmomoyi is the plaintiff, and the son adopted by the defendant Shyama is one Norendro, who, however, is not a party to the suit. The lower Appellate Court holds, according to Hindu law, that a simultaneous adoption is bad, and that the plaintiff has, therefore, no right to bring the suit.3. Against this decision the plaintiff appeals. As the point is one of great and general importance, we should have been glad to avoid deciding such a question in the present suit, which is only what is call...
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