Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1997KAR2607; 1998(2)KarLJ26
ORDER1. In all these writ petitions the resolution dated 14-5-1997, removing the President and the Vice-President of the City Municipal Council, Nippani by passing a no confidence motion has been challenged.2. The total strength of the City Municipal Council, Nippani, is 36. The petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 16533 and 16738 of 1997, were elected as President and Vice-President respectively on 13-2-1996. Thereafter 26 Councillors delivered the notice of intention to move the resolution as against the President and the Vice-President to the Personal Assistant of the President on 2-5-1997. The said notice was placed before President on 3-5-1997 to take appropriate steps. This fact is disputed by the President stating that it was placed before her on 5-5-1997 and not on 3-5-1997. It is seen that the President on 5-5-1997 asked the Commissioner to call for the meeting fixing the date of meeting as 14-5-1997 to consider the motion of no confidence. Accordingly, the meeting was called fix...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : 1999(4)KarLJ116
Sethi, C.J.1. Aggrieved by the order passed by the State Government under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appellant-Society filed a writ petition with a prayer for quashing the said order and granting the appellant the consequential benefits.2. The admitted position is that before delivery of possession of the land to the appellant-Society, the State Government had passed an order under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Such an action could not be challenged by the Society in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay and Others v M/s. Godrej and Boyce.3. This Court cannot direct the State, either to acquire or not to acquire the land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that as the impugned order was actuated by mala fides and extraneous considerations, the same should have been quashed by allowing the writ petition. In support of his contention he has referred to ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : 1998(1)KarLJ694
ORDER1. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to the effect that this Court may be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 24-8-1984 in Writ Petition No. 4490 of 1984 by this Hon'ble Court vide Annexure-B to the writ petition and to pass suitable orders.2. The facts of the case in brief are that the land involved is measuring 2 acres 20 guntas of land of Sy. No. 53/A and Sy. No. 53/AA measuring 3 acres 29 guntas, situate in village Ben-Chincholi, Tq. Humnabad, District Bidar. These lands originally are alleged to have belonged to one Bandappa who was alleged to be the exclusive owner in possession of the property. The parties to the case are related as under. The following tree will indicate the relationship of the parties and is material for the purpose of the case. Bandappa s/o MariappaSambanna Laxmappa KallappaChandrappa Ismail3. Writ Petition No. 4490 of 1984 had been filed by Annappa s/o Bhimrao, challenging the order of the Ta...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1998KAR3878
G.C. Bharuka, J. 1. In this appeal, the sole question which requires our consideration is as to whether sugar candy, locally known as 'Kallusakkare' falls within the ambit of entry 31-B of the Fifth Schedule to the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (in short the 'State Act') and thus is exempt from levy of tax thereunder.2. The appellant is a registered dealer under the provisions of the State Act. It inter alia carried on business of sale and purchase in sugar candy. It appears that because of some communication made by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under his letter No. CLR.CRA.80/93-94 dated 1.9.1993, taking a view that sugar candy, instead of being an exempted commodity, is liable to tax at the rate of 4% under Entry 18A of the second schedule to the State Act, the appellate taking that to be a cause of action, filed Writ Petition No. 29519/95 in this Court for declaring the said clarification as contrary to the statutory provisions. But, having failed before the learned Single J...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : 2000(4)KarLJ173
ORDER1. Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 ('Act' for short) exempts a newly set up establishment from the provisions of the said Act for a particular period initially, which is called protection during the infancy period. The question that arises in this case is as to when can an establishment be said to have been set up for the purposes of the said Section 16(1)(d).2. The petitioner herein is M/s. Bhandari Forgings and it is submitted that it is essentially a manufacturing concern, manufacturing non-ferrous and ferrous castings i.e., forgings. The petitioner sought the protection of the infancy period under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act on the ground that it is set up in September 1982. Under Annexure-D, however, the respondent-Regional Provident Fund Commissioner held that it must be taken as having been set up not in September 1982, but, in March 1982. Petitioner seeks quashing of the said Annexure-D in this writ petition under A...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : 1998ACJ1025; 1996(5)KarLJ115
ORDERM.F. Saldanha, J. 1. This matter came up for orders on 24-6-1997. While considering the I.As. 2, 3 and 4, I was of the view that it would be desirable to hear the appellant's learned Advocate on merits because the case is an old one and it is essential to consider whether at all it warrants admission. The I.A. No. II is allowed and the abatement is set aside. I.A. No. I is also allowed and the delay is condoned. I.A. No. III is allowed and consequently the amendments shall be treated as having been carried out. 2. Having heard the appellant's learned Advocate, I do concede that this is a case in which a considerable scaling down of the compensation would have been justified. In the first instance, it was submitted before me that even though the disability was fixed at 80% on the basis of the medical evidence that the authority has scaled it upto 100%. The justification for this was because the applicant was a bus driver whose arm was amputated and in his evidence he stated that hi...
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