Court : Karnataka
Reported in : 1999ACJ920
Hari Nath Tilhari, J.1. Heard learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. O. Mahesh and Mr. CM. Desai for respondents.2. This appeal arises from the judgment and award dated 5.1.1989, given in the M.V.C. No. 140 of 1987. The facts of the case are not much in dispute and the only question that has been raised relates to the extent of liability of the insurance company. The Tribunal on the basis of the evidence on record has come to the conclusion and has recorded the finding that the accident in question had taken place on the date and place, namely, on 3.11.86 at 8 p.m. at the place mentioned in the claim petition, due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle in question, namely, Tempo bearing registration No. CNJ 6066, by its driver. The Tribunal assessed the loss of dependency to be Rs. 3,600 per annum and therefore, it assessed the loss of dependency on account of the death of Sidramappa, the son of the claimant No. 1, husband of the claimant No. 2 and father of claimant Nos. 3 and 4,...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1998KAR3033
ORDER VII RILE 11 - Whether the power to reject the plaint can be exercised even after the framing of issues and when the matter is posted for evidence - HELD - Can be rejected even at that stage . We may state that in the context of Order 7, Rule 11, CPC, a contention that once issues have been framed, the matter has necessarily to go to trial has been clearly rejected by this Court in AZHAR HUSSAIN v. RAJIV GANDHI as follows: 'In substance, the argument is that the Court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial.... is concluded that the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with a defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be exercised. With respect to the Learned Counsel, it is an argument which it is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive 'should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court'The a...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1998KAR1195
ORDERH.L. Dattu, J.1. Petitioner before this Court was a Branch Manger at Jangamakote Branch, Central Bank of India ('Bank' for short). While working in the said branch he was served with a charge memo dated 7/9th August 1982 containing charges of misconduct as a Branch Manger of Jangamakote Branch. They relate to the events that took place in the year 1979 and among other things it specified that the petitioner committed gross official misconduct in as much as misused his official position by sanctioning 21 loan applications for a total amount of Rs. 1,05,000/- contrary to the banking procedure, thereby committing gross misconduct within the, meaning of Regulation 3(1) read with Regulation 24 of Central Bank of India Officer, Employees' conduct Regulations 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation) attracting penalty under Regulation 4 of Conduct Regulations. Petitioner was asked to furnish his explanation to the charge memo within 15 days of the receipt of the charge memo, as t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1998KAR1598
ORDERH.L. Dattu, J.1. Petitioner was a Regional Manager of Karnataka Leather Industries Development Corporation Limited (for brevity referred to as 'Corporation'). By an order dated 30.8.1990 passed by Board of Directors of the said Corporation, petitioner was dismissed from the services of the Corporation. Aggrieved by this order, petitioner is before this Court in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. While working as Branch Manager and Show Room Manager of Lidkar Emporium at Mysore, petitioner was kept under suspension pending enquiry on 24.7.1984. The articles of charges was served on the petitioner which contains ten charges. Charges are in the nature of irregularities, mal-practice, mismanagement said to have been committed as Branch Manager at Mysore. The charge memo is dated 14.8.1984. Along with the memo, petitioner was also supplied with statement of imputations, list of witnesses and documents in support of the charges. Petitioner denied the cha...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1998KAR641
ORDERM.B. Vishwanath, J.1. Heard the Learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for R1 to R3 and the Learned Counsel for R4 to R17. 2. In this petition, the order passed by the Land Tribunal, Sirguppa, in No. KOM/BHUSU/24/74-75 on 15.4.94 holding that the petitioners had 30.09 acres of 'D' class land in excess of the ceiling limit. 3. It is seen from the impugned order that it has been passed without hearing the petitioners. The order states that the petitioners were absent on the date of hearing. 4. It is contended by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners that the notices were not served on them. It is contended by the Learned Government Pleader and the Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents that in fact notices were served on the petitioners and they remained absent. The question of delay is not involved in this case.5. Suffice it to say that the impugned order has been passed without hearing the petitioner. Lord Hewart has observed: 'It.....is o...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : 1998(2)ALD(Cri)744; ILR1998KAR2605
L. Sreenivasa Reddy, J.1. Heard the Learned Counsel as both sides.Since identical questions of law are involved in all these petitions, they were heard together and one being disposed of by a common order. In all these cases, the complainant as well as the accused are common. These petitions are filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging the orders of the Magistrate taking cognizance after recording the sworn statements of the complainant and ordering process against the accused for offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.2. Sri Kulkarni, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended before me that the learned Magistrate has committed a grave mistake in taking cognizance of the offences after recording the sworn statement of the accused and he should have taken cognizance of the offences before the examination of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C.3. Per contra, Sri Subhash B. Adi, Learned Counsel for the respondent contended before me that even if ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : [1999(81)FLR962]; ILR1998KAR570; 1998(6)KarLJ488
Ashok Bhan, J.1. Short question which calls for determination in this appeal is whether the employee on reinstatement after his acquittal is entitled to the difference in amount of full wages and the subsistence allowance paid between the date of order of suspension till date of withdrawal of suspension.2. The facts of the case are :For the offence allegedly committed under Indian Penal Code, a charge-sheet had been filed by the police against the petitioner-appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'appellant'). On coming to know of the filing of the criminal case against the appellant, the respondent-Bank placed the appellant under suspension. During the period of suspension the appellant was paid subsistence allowance by the respondent-Bank. The criminal case pending against the appellant was compounded and the appellant was acquitted. Once the criminal proceedings ended in acquittal, the respondent-Bank revoked the order of suspension made against the appellant and reinstated him in se...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1998KAR3206
ORDERV. Gopalagowda, J.1. The Petitioner in this case is seeking a writ of cordierites to quash Annexure-B, the order No. HDUA:39 91/8713 dated 5.2.1992 issued by the Commissioner stating that since the land in question is not converted, the permission sought for residential use cannot be granted urging the following grounds:The impugned order is wholly unsustainable in law in view of the fact that, State Government in exercise of powers under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976 (in short 'the Act') granted exemption in respect of the land in question on the basis that it is a vacant land as defined under the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, in view of the exemption granted under Section 20 of the Act, it must be presumed that it is a converted land from Government Authorities again approaching the revenue authorities under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1964 seeking conversion of the Land in question does not arises. Therefore, the im...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : 1999(3)KarLJ267
ORDER1. The petitioner in this case is seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Annexure-B, the Order No. HDUA : 39 VINAYASA : 91/8713, dated 5-2-1992 issued by the Commissioner stating that since the land in question is not converted, the permission sought for residential use cannot be granted urging the following grounds: The impugned order is wholly unsustainable in law in view of the fact that, State Government in exercise of powers under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976 (in short 'the Act') granted exemption in respect of the land in question on the basis that it is a vacant land as defined under the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, in view of the exemption granted under Section 20 of the Act, it must be presumed that it is a converted land from Government Authorities again approaching the revenue authorities under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1964 seeking conversion of the land in question does not arises. Therefore, the impugn...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : ILR1998KAR1734
ORDERP. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.1. In this batch of petitions, since common questions of law have been raised, these petitions were heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 22740/96, 26483 to 26484/96, 27734 to 27741/96, 28843/96, 2960/97, 15299/97 and 16470/96 have called in question the Constitutional validity of Section 2(7)(bb)(iii) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), and the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 22740/ 96 has called in question the Constitutional validity of Section 2(7) of the Act. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 22740/96 at the hearing of these petitions, limited his argument only to the Constitutional validity of Section 2(7)(bb)(iii) and (iv) and the Explanation given to the said provision. 3. The petitioners, in these petitions, are the tenants in respect of either residential or non-residential premises taken on lease bythem from...
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