Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1927Mad961; (1927)53MLJ633
ORDER1. The petitioners have been convicted by the Bench Magistrates of Madura for failing to take out a license under Section 249 of the Madras District Municipalities Act and have now put in a petition asking for a revision of that order. The offence of which the petitioners have been convicted is that of failing to take out an annual license for the rice mills owned and worked by them on the ground that a rice mill is a place used for the purposes specified in Schedule V, Clause (q) of the Act, namely, 'using for any industrial purposes any fuel or machinery or doing in the course of any industrial process anything which is likely to be dangerous to human life or health or property'. The contention for the petitioners is that when a permission to construct or establish a factory or instal in any premises any machinery, etc., has been obtained under Section 250 of the Act, no annual license under Section 249 need be obtained as the two sections are mutually exclusive. This is the vie...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1927Mad1035; (1927)53MLJ688
Devadoss, J.1. The plaintiffs' suit is for cancellation of a revenue sale of the plaint items on the ground that there was fraud and material irregularity in publishing and conducting it. Both the Lower Courts have found on the merits in plaintiffs' favour and set aside the sale. The legal representatives of the 1st defendant, the landholder, have preferred this Second Appeal.2. The vakil for the appellants raises the contention that no suit lies to set aside a sale in execution of a rent decree on the ground of fraud or material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale as a suit is barred under Order 21, Rule 92, Civil Procedure Code. This point was not raised in the Lower Courts. But we allowed it to be raised as it affected the maintainability of the suit. The argument is that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 with a few exceptions are made applicable to the proceedings under the Estates Land Act and therefore a suit to set aside a sale is barred under Sec...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1928)54MLJ456
Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.1. The petitioner in this Criminal Revision Case was convicted by the First Class Sub-divisional Magistrate of Vellore for the offence of kidnapping a girl from lawful guardianship under Section 363, Indian Penal Code. In this petition I am not concerned with the 2nd accused who has been acquitted, on appeal, by the Sessions Judge. In the appeal which was preferred by both the accused the learned Sessions Judge while confirming the conviction of the petitioner reduced the sentence with regard to him to rigorous imprisonment for one year instead of two years. Mr. V.L. Ethiraj, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, took only two points before me. His first contention was that the facts of the case indicated an offence under Section 366, Indian Penal Code, an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session. He therefore contended that the conviction of the accused by the First Class Magistrate for the smaller offence under Section 363 was illegal and should be ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1928Mad224
ORDERWallace, J.1. The petitioners in these cases were jointly charged before and convicted by the 3rd Presidency Magistrate, of the offence of cheating under Section 420, I.P.C.2. The case against them generally was that they are the officials of a so-called Royal Sports Club, which existed for the purpose of receiving from clients bets on horse races and employing agents on the race-courses to put their clients' bets on the horses, and for paying to the winning clients the sums less commission, which they had won. The clients became members of the club by a small payment and were then entitled to the above services. They put in applications to the Secretary stating the horses they wished to back and paying up the amounts of their bets.3. The prosecution case was that P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3, under these rules, became members of the club, and paid various sums as bets on horses running at Kolhapur races, believing that the club would have an agent there to place their bets, that there was no...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1928Mad234a; 108Ind.Cas.277
Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.1. The main point for determination in this appeal is quite simple and depends almost entirely on the construction of a single document. That document marked as Ex. 1 in the case, was an instrument of mortgage executed in favour of one Basana Simon by three persons as mortgagors. The original plaintiff in the action claimed as the assignee of the mortgagors and he having died during the pendency of the suit plaintiff 2 came on the record as his legal representative and he is the appellant in this Court.2. The mortgage was with possession and in the suit the plaintiff claimed redemption primarily on the allegation that the whole of the principal and interest due to the mortgagee under the instrument had been paid off by the usufruct There was also a claim for an account of the usufruct from the mortgagee in possession and an offer in the alternative to pay off to the mortgagee whatever may on the taking of the accounts be found due to him.3. The plaintiff's suit wa...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1928Mad271; 108Ind.Cas.202
Phillips, J.1. In this case the appellant is the widow of one Chenchu Ranga who died in 1902, leaving a will, Ex. U. Reddi. Under this will he made certain bequests to his brother's wife and sister and left the rest of his estate to his widow with absolute rights. He also gave authority to the widow to adopt a son if she wished. It has been found by the lower Court that she exercised this power and adopted defendant on 2nd April 1911. The factum of adoption has been disputed, but, apart from oral evidence which has been believed by the lower Court, there are several documents in which the plaintiff has mentioned the fact of adoption, namely Ex. 1 to V, J, X and XVI series. Of these the only registered document is Ex. J. Ex. X and X (a) show that in 1918 a lawyer's notice was issued on behalf of the plaintiff in which the adoption is referred to. D. W. 9 is the High Court vakil who issued this notice, and he asserts that the plaintiff informed him of the adoption and asked the notice to...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1928Mad971
Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.1. I have come to the conclusion in this second appeal that it must be allowed. If I should not, the result, shortly stated, would be that on account some mistake or inadvertence of the Court the party, transferee decree-holder, the appellant before me, would have to lose a valuable decree for really no fault of his own. I am unable to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge in the Court below that there was any fault or default on the part of the appellant when he made an application on 17th June 1918, which was in terms for recognizing his transfer and also for making the decree final and the Court finally made the order thereon ' Transfer proved already accepted.' One of the two things must be held to have followed. The petitioner might have believed that all the reliefs prayed for were granted to him or else the transfer alone being recognized his prayer with regard to the other reliefs is not disposed of. It should be noted that there was no order refusing o...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1928Mad499; 107Ind.Cas.290
William Watkins Phillips, J1. The only question which arises in this case is whether the money sued for was a deposit with the defendant's father or whether it was a loan. The money was remitted to defendant's father by one Govinda Pillai in 1914 and this suit is brought in 1925 the plaintiff haying taken an assignment of the debt from a lady who purchased it in Court sale. The Subordinate Judge has found that prima facie the suit is barred by limitation and, unless plaintiff can show that this remittance was in the nature of a deposit and that the suit had been brought within three years of demand having been made, the suit must fail. He has held on the evidence that plaintiff has failed to prove his case and dismissed the suit.2. It is contended here that there is evidence sufficient to prove the case and reliance is placed on a remark in Narayanan Chettyar v. Vellayappa Chettydr 34 Ind. Cas. 347 : (1916) 1 M.W.N. 206 : 19 M.L.T. 237. This refers to Ramanathan Chetty v. Subramaniam C...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1927Mad1000; (1927)53MLJ655
Phillips, J.1. The question that arises for decision is whether under Rule 15 of the Municipal Election Rules an illiterate's voting paper must be marked by the polling officer in secret and not in the presence of the candidates or their agents. In the rules for election to the Local Boards there is a specific provision in the rule corresponding to Rule 15 that this paper shall be marked in the presence of the candidates or their agents. There is also a similar provision in the English Electoral Rules. In the Municipal Rules as in the rules for election to the legislative Council, etc., there is no such provision and Rule 15 reads as follows:If the voter is unable to read the ballot paper or to make a cross thereon, and applies for assistance in doing so, that Polling Officer shall read it for him and, if so required, mark the ballot paper according to the directions of the voter and give it to him to put in the ballot box.2. It is contended for the petitioner that there is no directio...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1927Mad1069; (1927)53MLJ730
1. The only question in this appeal is whether the bond executed by the insolvents on 26th July 1911 created a charge on the immoveable property. They subscribed for half a ticket in a Kuri and took a prize of Rs. 10,000. By the rules of the Kuri a subscriber who took a prize was to furnish security for the payment of future subscriptions and it is significant that the bond given by the insolvents was stamped as if it was a mortgage. It seems to us clear that the intention of the parties was to create a charge. The respondent relied on two features of the deed. The first is that the insolvents undertook, when required by the stake-holder, to give him a mortgage on the property. The second is that the clauses on which the appellant relies were added to the deed as a sort of supplement, though before it was signed by the insolvents.2. The first point would undoubtedly be conclusive in favour of the respondent, were it not for the supplementary clause. That clause runs ' We and the proper...
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