Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)ILR43Mad855
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.1. The plaintiff is the appellant in this Second Appeal. He is the purchaser from the reversioner to the estate of one Gurappa. Gurappa died in 1883, leaving two widows as his heirs. The younger widow on receipt of rupees thirty gave up all her rights (about six months after her husband's death) in favour of the elder widow under the deed, Exhibit E. I agree with the Lower Appellate Court on the construction of Exhibit E, that she thereby gave up her whole life-interest in her husband's estate, whether that interest might have extended beyond the lifetime of the elder widow or whether it would have come to an end during the lifetime of the elder widow. The elder widow died in 1902 and the younger widow in 1914, and the present suit was brought by the purchaser from the male reversioner in 1916. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit on the preliminary ground of limitation. His argument was, that by the junior widow giving up her right of survivorship (if she ha...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1921Mad326; (1921)ILR44Mad329
Abdur Rahim, J.1. There can be no doubt that the settlement as it is called, Exhibit B, was made with the object and in consideration of the donee cohabiting with the settlor. This can be plainly inferred from the terms of the document itself. The plaintiffs, who are usufructuary mortgagees of the property, obtained the mortgage from the donee, Sadachi Ammal. The first defendant who is the appellant before us is the settlor. His case is that the settlement or transfer to Sadachi having been made for immoral considerations, the transaction is void altogether and the plaintiffs can have no title under the mortgage executed by Sadachi Ammal.2. The facts are that this woman was kept by the first defendant who made a gift of the property to her with the object that she should continue to be his mistress. She did in fact remain in his keeping and lived with him as contemplated by Exhibit B and to that extent therefore the immoral purpose which the donor had in view was attained. It is well e...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 59Ind.Cas.1003
Abdur Rahim, J.1. There can be no doubt that the settlement, as it is called, Exhibit B, was made with the object and in consider of the donee cohabiting with the settlor This can be plainly interred from the terms of the, document itself. The plaintiffs, who are usufructuary mortgagees of the property, obtained the mortgage from the donee Sadachi Ammal. The first defendant, who is the appellant before us, is the settlor. His case is that the settlement or transfer to Sadachi having been made for immoral consideration, the transaction is void altogether and the plaintiffs car have no title under the mortgage executed by Sadachi Ammal.2. The facts are that this woman was kept by the first defendant who made a gift of the property to her with the object that she should continue to be his mistress, She did in fact remain in his keeping and lived with him as contemplated by Exhibit B, and to that extent, therefore, the immoral purpose which the donor had in view was attained It is well est...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1921Mad536; 60Ind.Cas.670
ORDER1. This is a dispute between neighbouring villagers. There is a supply channel (A2 and A5) flowing from the Terbogi 'Kanmoi' to the Konjani 'Kanmoi'. The ryots or the Sathamangalam Kanmoi' and the accused in this case are charged with damming A2--A5 at place B in the plan and clearing or making a channel B-B1 and thereby diverting the water flowing in (A2-A5) and so guilty under Section 430 Indian Penal Code.2. Dr. Swaminathan, for the accused (appellants) urges that the channel, A2--A5 is not a supply channel, secondly, that this is a matter for the Civil Courts, and, thirdly, that the elements for the offence of; mischief are not present here.3. There is no doubt that A2--A5 is a supply channel, that is found by both Courts and is also established by Exhibit A whereby the Konjani villagers were to enjoy the water flowing along A2-A5. The Exhibit is dated 9th March 1914 and in it the channel is called Kulaikal (supply channe). There is no substance in the suggestion that this a s...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ417
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The facts have been set out in the judgment of my learned brother which I have had the advantage of reading before writing this opinion of mine. I have considered in Subramania Mudaliar v. Ranga-natham Chettiar (1918) 24 M.L.J. 301 the Sloka about Atma bandhus, Pitru bandhus and Matru bandhus which is attributed to Baudhayana by one commentator and Vriddah Satatapa by others. I have expressed my considered opinion in that case that the sloka is a childish and spurious text and that it is an illogical, incomplete and inconsistent classification of bandhus. Mr. S. Srinivasa Aiyangar with great legal acumen and a wealth of legal terms of highly subtle meaning tried to establish that the classification was not so illogical or inconsistent as I thought. I can only say that he has merely confirmed me in my view, though it may be that the subtlety and, what he called, the intricacy of the ideas involved in the classification make it so elusive as to escape the grasp of or...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ567
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The plaintiff is the appellant in this second appeal. He is the purchaser from the reversioner to the estate of one Gurappa. Gurappa died in 1883 leaving two widow as his heirs. The younger widow on receipt of Rs. 30 gave up all her rights (about 6 months after her husband's death) in favour of the elder widow under the deed Ex. B. I agree with the Lower Appellate Court on the construction of Ex. B that she thereby gave up her whole life interest in her husband's estate whether the interest might have extended beyond the lifetime of the elder widow or whether it would have come to an end during the lifetime of the elder widow. The elder widow died in 1902 and the younger widow in 1914 and the present suit was brought by the purchaser from the male reversioner in 1916. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit on the preliminary ground of limitation. His argument was that by the junior widow giving up her right of survivorship, (if she happened to survive the se...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1921Mad671; 59Ind.Cas.690
Napier, J.1. In this suit the plaintiff claims to be entitled as an heir to a moiety of the estate of one Ramsawmy Iyengar, deceased, and to set aside certain alienations as not binding on him. The sole question before this Court in second appeal is, whether the plaintiff is a heritable bandhu and is entitled to the estate of the last male owner.2. The District Munsif has found, and there is no dispute on this point, that the last male owner is the plaintiff's paternal grandfather's mother's brother's grandson and has held that as such he is not entitled to inherit. The lower Appellate Court accepted that view.3. It is argued before us that the statement to this effect in Dr. Sarvadhikari's Book on Hindu Law is not correct and that, even if it was thought good law previously, the decision of the Privy Council in Buddha Singh v. Laltu Singh 30 Ind. Cas. 529 renders this view no longer tenable. I do not propose to consider the principles underlying sapinda relationship on which this plai...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 61Ind.Cas.528
Odgers, J.1. In this case the question referred by Kumaraswami Sastri, J, is, whether a retracted statement of an approver is evidence against an accused. In Queen-Empress v. Rangi 10 M. 295 . Kernan, J., observed: As the second prisoner has withdrawn all the confessional statements made by hermit is necessary, according to the rulings of this Court, to examine the evidence and see if there is reliable independent evidence of corroborate to a material extent and in material particulars the statements contained in the withdrawn confessional statements. If no such corroborative evidence exists, then the contradictory statements of the second prisoner remain, and doubt exists as to which statement is true, and the confesaional statements cannot be safely relied on against the prisoner.'2 Again in Queen-Empress v. Rama Tevan 15 M 352, the Court pointed out that the right acurse to have been adopted at the trial was to have treated the evidence given by the two approvers before the Committi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1921Mad511; 61Ind.Cas.741
Wallis, C.J.1. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Temporary Subordinate Court of Vellore giving the plaintiffs a decree in a suit brought by them as trustees appointed by the Devasthanam Committee for a declaration that they are lawfully appointed dharmakarthaa and are entitled to be in possession of the trust properties. Defendants Nos. 9 to 11 had been removed by the Temple Committee for misconduct and in their written statements they have denied misconduct and contested validity of the plaintiff's appointment. They would he entitled to succeed if they established either of these cases. The view taken in this Court as to these trusteeships in, that they are in the nature of free-hold offering held under a Corporation, and in England, to justify the removal of a free hold officer during good behaviour, it must be shown that he has been removed and removed by competent authority and with due observance of the rules of natural justice and also for cause which is sufficient to ju...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 60Ind.Cas.215; (1920)39MLJ697
Abdur Rahim, J.1. It is not necessary in dealing with the Second Appeal to state the history of this litigation as it has been set out in the previous judgment of the learned Judge against whose decree this appeal has been preferred. Two questions have been argued before us. The first which relates to the merits is this : whether the finding of the Lower Court that the defendants 2 and 3, the appellants before us, had any notice as to Narasayya's title to the property. It appears that the property stood in the name of the plaintiff and Narasayya. The case of the plaintiff is that Narasayya had no title inasmuch as he had not paid his share of the consideration money which he was to have paid. We must take it as found in a previous judgment in the course of this litigation that Narasayya had in fact no title although his name stood in the title deeds. The High Court in its previous order of remand had remitted two issues for trial. One was 'Had the defendants 2 and 3 notice of plaintiff...
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