Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1921Mad144; 57Ind.Cas.674
Oldfield, J.1. I agree with the judgment my learned brother is about to pronounce.Seshagiri Aiyar, J.2. In this suit for possession of one item of the demised Kunies and for rent on other items, two defences were put forward by the tenants. The one was that the claim for rent was barred by limitation and that, therefore, it should not be set off against their claim for the value of improvements, secondly, that, as plaintiff was in possession under a decree which was reversed by the High Court, he was accountable for the profits which the defendants could have derived from the property during the period of that possession. As regards the first point, the Court in Harihara Mangalath v. Ibrayan Kutti 38 Ind. Cas. 655, after examining the provisions of Act I of 1900, came to the conclusion that the landlord is entitled to setoff arrears of rent even though barred by limitation. That decision has not been dissented from in any later ease. That concludes the first point.3. As regards the sec...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 57Ind.Cas.735
Abdur Rahim, C.J.1. IN the suit in which the appeal has arisen the plaintiffs-respondents, who are the reversioners to the estate of one Gopalakrishnamma, seek for a declaration that the adoption of the 2nd defendant made by the 1st defendant, the widow of Gopalakrishnamma, on the 29th January 1917 is invalid inasmuch as it was not, authorized by the 1st defendant's deceased husband and was not made by the consent of his kinmen. The question for decision on which the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Napier differed in the appeal from the judgment of the Court of 1st instance is whether the suit is barred by res judicata by virtue of the decision in a previous suit (Original Suit No. 20 of 1900, in the Ganjam District Court). In the latter suit, the present first plaintiff and some other reversioners bad asked for a declaration that a Will dated 2nd December 1897, propounded as being the last Will and testament of the above mentioned Gopalakrishnamma, was a forged and 'false docume...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 60Ind.Cas.226
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The plaintiff is the appellant. (Both plaintiff and defendant are women). The facts out of which this suit has arisen may be shortly stated thus. The plaintiff was the simple mortgagee of certain lands under a bond of 1899 executed by third persons to her predecessors-in-title. She hypothecated that hypothecation right and other properties to the defendant in 1908 for Rs. 200 The hypothecated hypothecation right became barred in 1911, owing to a suit not having been brought against the third persons either by the plaintiff (the mortgagee under it) or by the defendant (who obtained transfer of that mortgage from plaintiff by way of security). Then the defendant brought a suit in 1915 against the plaintiff on her (defendant's) own mortgage of 1903 for recovery of the amount due to her. The defendant in that suit, (namely, the present plaintiff) pleaded that the present defendant (plaintiff in that suit) having by her default failed to sue for and recover from the thi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ63
1. The questions for consideration are:1. Whether 2nd defendant is entitled to contract himself out of the Malabar Tenants Improvements Act where the terms of the contract are more favourable to him than the provisions of the Act relating to improvements.2. Whether the calculation of the value of improvements according to Desa Maryada (usage of the land) mentioned in the contract should be made at the rate prevailing on the date of Ex. A. or a) the time of ejectment.3. What is the amount claimable for improvements according to the contract Is it (a) two times the value of Kuzhikanam improvement plus twice that amount again for Vettu Kanarn or (b) twice the Kuzhikanam amount plus twice the Vettu Kanam amount or (c) two times the value of Kuzhikanam plus the value of the Kuzhikanam for Vettu Kanam (that is thrice on the whole).2. We think that Section 19 of the Act does not prevent the tenant from claiming under a contract made even after the passing of the Act if it is more favourable t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ629
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The plaintiff is the appellant. His ancestors got a grant of lands as Bhudanam from the Maharaja of Mysore in 1743 for the support of a Chatram at Dindigul, the Mysore dynasty having then been the ruling power in that part of the country. That grant, Exhibit A, describes the grantor as the Lord of the Earth (Prithivisam-rajyam) and it grants these plaint lands in Giriyampatti village with Ashtabogam (8 kinds of enjoyment) and 10 kinds of rights (with water, trees, minerals, etc.) Having regard to the recent decisions of the Privy Council in Suryanarayana v. Patanna I.L.R. (1917) Mad. 1012 and Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu v. Divi Sitaramudu I.L.R. (1913) Mad. 166 there is no presumption that the grant was only of the melwaram in these lands, and on the other hand, the grant is almost conclusive that the soil in the lands themselves was made a gift of to the plaintiff's ancestor, In other words it was a nilamanibham and not a thirvamnibham grant.2. As the chatram was ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)ILR43Mad722
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.1. The questions for consideration are:(1) Whether second defendant is entitled to contract himself out of the Malabar Tenants Improvements Act where the terms of the contract are more favourable to him than the provisions of the Act relating to improvements.(2) Whether the calculation of the value of improvement according to Desa Maryada (usage of the land) mentioned in the contract should be made at the rate prevailing on the date of Exhibit A or at the time of ejectment.(3) What is the amount claimable for improvements according to the contract? Is it (a) twice the value of kuzhikanam improvement plus twice that amount again for vettukanam or (b) twice the kuzhikanam amount plus twice the vettukanam amount or (a) twice the value of kuzhikanam plus the value of the kuzhikanam for Vettukanam (that is thrice on the whole).2. We think that Section 19 of the Act does not prevent the tenant from claiming under a contract made even after the passing of the Act, if it is m...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 55Ind.Cas.940
1. The questions for consideration are:1. Whether 2nd defendant is entitled to contract himself out of the Malabar Tenan's' Improvements Act where the terms of the contract are more favourable to him than the provisions of the Act relating to improvements.2. Whether the calculation of the value of improvements according to Dasameryada (usage of the land) mentioned in the contract should be made at the rate prevailing on date of Exhibit A or at the time of ejectment.3. What is the amount claimable for improvements according to the contract? Is it (a) two times the value of Kozaikanom improvement plus twice that amount again for Vettukanom or (b) twice the Kuzhikanom amount plus twice the Vettukanom amount or (c) two times the value of Kuzhikanom puls the value of the Kuzhikanom for Vettukanom (that is thrice on the whole)?2. We think that Section 19 of the Act does not prevent the tenant from claiming under a contract made even after the passing of the Act, if it, is more favourable to ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 59Ind.Cas.973
1. The lower Courts were wrong in relying on Narasinga Row v. Muthaya Pillai 26 M. 362 for their conclusion that the defendant was not the prosecutor in the criminal case and hence not liable as such. See Periya Goundan v. Kuppa Goudan 52 Ind. Cas. 782.2. But they have concurrently found that there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. The District Munsif might have misdirected himself on the question of burden of proof as regards one of the points involved (namely, that plaintiff was innocent of the charge of being liable to be called upon to furnish security) but the Subordinate Judge points out that error of the Munsif, quoting Gopalakrishna Kudva v. Bangle Narayana Kamthy 45 Ind. Cas. 803, and has considered the evidence from his own correct standpoint and concurred in the Munsif's finding.3. We must accept the finding of the lower Appellate Court on this point. So accepting, we dismiss the second appeal with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)38MLJ465
Wallis, C.J.1. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court in this case was pronounced on 21st December 1918, the first day of the Christmas vacation, and under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act time began to run from the following day. The fact that the judgment was pronounced in the vacation made no difference in this respect, as the only provision with regard to the vacation is that under Section 4, if the prescribed period expires on a day when the Court is closed the appeal may be preferred on' the day when the Court re-opens. The appellant applied for copies of the decree and judgment on the 7th January 1919 which he duly obtained, but even excluding the time taken in obtaining them, he is admittedly out of time, unless he is entitled to add the days when the Court was closed for the Christmas vacation and to treat them as part of the time requisite for obtaining copies of the decree and judgment within [the meaning of Section 12, It has been held by Sankaran Nair, and Ayling, JJ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 56Ind.Cas.67
John Wallis, C.J.1. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court in this case was pronounced on 21st December 1918, the 1st day of the Christmas Vacation, and under Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act time began to run from the following day. The fact that the judgment was pronounced in the vacation made no difference in this respect as the only provision with regard to the vacation is that under Section 4; if the prescribed period expires on a day when the Court is closed, the appeal may be preferred on the day when the Court re opens;2. The appellant applied for copies of the decree and judgment on the 7th January 1919, which be duly obtained, but even excluding the time taken in obtaining them, he is admittedly out of time, unless he is entitled to add the days when the Court was closed for the Christmas Vacation and to treat them as a part of the time requisite for obtaining copies of the decree and judgment within the meaning of Section 12. It has been held by Sankaran Nair and Ayli...
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