Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad433
1. The Second-Class Magistrate has acquitted the accused in these two cases of an offence under Section 283, Indian Penal Code, on the ground that the encroachment, if such there be, does not cause any 'danger, obstruction or annoyance' to the public.2. It may be that Section 283 is inapplicable in the absence of evidence that danger, obstruction or injury was caused to any particular person, but the acts of the accused clearly fell within the definition of a 'public nuisance' in Section 268, Indian Penal Code, and was, therefore, punishable under Section 290.3. The public is entitled to the use of the full width of the public street, however wide it may be. Whoever appropriates any part of the street by building over it infringes the right of the public quoad the part built over. The act must necessarily cause obstruction to persons who may have occasion to use their public right over the part encroached upon.4. The Second-Class Magistrate has not decided whether the land built over w...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ26
1. From the instances which have come before this court since Bamasami Bhagavathar v. Nagendrayyen I.L.R. (1895) M. 31 was decided, it would seem that a notion is coming to be entertained that every chit or kuri in which more than twenty persons are concerned falls within Section 4 of the Indian Companies Act and therefore, if unregistered, is illegal. It is scarcely necessary to point out that whether an undertaking which generally goes by the name of chit kuri falls within the said section, depends of course, not upon the mere name given to the undertaking, but on the existence of the essential characterestics required by that provision of the law. Whether these requirements are present must be ascertained in each case. In the present instance the Subordinate Judge has paid attention to this matter. He has taken evidence as to it and has come to the conclusion that the case is not governed by the abovementioned Section 4 and is distinguishable from Ramasami Bhagavathar v. Nagendrayya...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad68
1. From the instances which have come before this Court since Ramasami Bhagavathar v. Nagendrayyan I.L.R. 19 Mad. 31 was decided, it would seem that a notion is coming to be entertained that every chit or kuri in which more than twenty persons are concerned falls within Section 4 of the Indian Companies Act and, therefore, if unregistered, is illegal. It is scarcely necessary to point out that whether an undertaking which generally goes by the name of chit or kuri falls within the said Section, depends, of course, not upon the mere name given to the undertaking, but on the existence of the essential characteristics required by that provision of the law. Whether these requirements are present must be ascertained in each case. In the present instance the Subordinate Judge has paid attention to this matter. lie has taken evidence as to it and has come to the conclusion that the case is not governed by the above-mentioned Section 4 and is distinguishable from Ramasami Bhagavathar v. Nagend...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ30
1. Plaintiff, a member of an undivided Hindu family, sued for partition and delivery to him of his one-third share of the joint family property.2. The value of the share claimed was below Rs. 2,500, but the value of the whole property exceeds Rs. 4,000.3. The District Munsif following the ruling in Vydianatha v. Subrahmanya I.L.R. (1884) M., 235 declined jurisdiction and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. His action was upheld on appeal to the District Judge. The plaintiff meantime presented his plaint to the Subordinate Judge, who also declined jurisdiction and returned the plaint to be presented to the proper court. The Subordinate Judge held that under Section 7, Clause 4 (b) of the Court Fees Act the suit should be valued for purposes of court fees at the relief sought in the plaint viz., at the value of the share claimed which was less than Rs. 2,500, and that under Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act (VII of 1887) the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad293
1. The terms of the will read in the light of the deed of partition referred to therein clearly indicate that the intention of the testator was to confer on his daughters an absolute, and not a limited, estate, in so far as the moveable property which was at his absolute disposal was concerned. There is nothing in the instrument or in the surrounding circumstances, which could lead one to think that the intention was to limit the gift to a daughter's estate, or in other words, simply for their lives. The daughters thus having taken an absolute estate, the alienation sought to be impeached was within their rights. We must, therefore overrule the view taken by the District Judge, and in reversal of his decree we dismiss the suit with costs throughout. This involves the dismissal of the memorandum of objections also....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ87
1. The only point argued is the question of priority raised in the third issue. It is contended that the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Gokaldas Oopaldas v. Puranmal I.L.R. (1884) C. 1035 is applicable only to the case of a purchaser of the equity of redemption. There is no ground for limiting the principle to that case only. It is true that that is the only case provided for by Section 101 of the Transfer of Property Act, but that is a--if not the--very extreme case where otherwise an extinguishment of the charge would ordinarily be presumed. This Gourt has in several instances applied the principle to cases like the present. Rupabai v. Audimulam I.L.R. (1888) M. 346 and Seetharama v. Venkatakrishna I.L.R. (1893) M. 94 and see also the the judgment in appeal No. 113 of 1895, The Subordinate Judge was therefore right in holding that by the mere execution of A, the security under E in respect of the plaint debt was not given up.2. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismiss...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ71
1. In so far as the plaintiff's claim is made for lands adjudged to the defendant in O.S. No. 22 of 1884, it is not sustainable in the face of that adjudication.2. But as to the claim for damages for breach of the alleged agreement, the suit is not barred. (Subbakka v, Viraragava Reddi I.L.R., 5 M., 397 and Mallamma v. Venkappa I.L.R., 8 M., 277 respectively). If the Subordinate Judge in his orders in execution of the decree in the previous suit had decided that there was no agreement as alleged, that decision would no doubt have operated as a bar by res judicata to this suit which is based upon that agreement. We find, however, that there was no such decision. The agreement was set up simply for the purpose of staying execution until the arrangements under the agreement were ripe for being certified to the Court in adjustment of the decree. The. Subordinate Judge proceeded with the execution of the decree not because he found that there was no agreement, but on the other hand because ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ84
1. We do not think that the general principles of justice as to hearing the other side is applicable to this case, since the words in the section. 'on the perusal of the application' clearly indicate nothing else than that perusal is required of the Judge before giving his sanction. These words render untenable the position that the Judge is bound to do more, that is in the way of giving notice, hearing parties, and so on, if the application itself satisfies him. If any such regular preliminary enquiry had been intended the language of the section must have been very different.2. We, therefore, hold the Judge was wrong in considering the sanction void for want of notice prior to its being granted.3. We reverse his decree and remand the suit for disposal according to law. Costs to abide and follow the event....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad249
1. Though the precise point for decision in the Full Bench Case Veeramma v. Abbiah I.L.R. 18 Mad. 99 related to the applicability of Section 7 of the Limitation Act alone to suits brought under Section 77 of the Registration Act, yet having regard to the reasoning, as a whole, adopted by the learned Judges in arriving at their conclusion that Section 7 did not apply, we think we cannot but hold, on the strength of that decision, that Section 5 also is inapplicable to such suits.2. Arguments, however, have been urged before us, which appear to have considerable force in favour of the applicability of Section 5, but we think the question is concluded by the Full Bench decision, and consequently that we are not at liberty to discuss it.3. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad369
1. In so far as the plaintiff's claim is made for lands adjudged to the defendant in Original Suit No. 22 of 1884, it is not sustainable in the face of that adjudication.2. But as to the claim for damages for breach of the alleged agreement, the suit is not barred, Viraraghava v. Subbakka I.L.R. 5 Mad. 397 and Mallamma v. Venkapva I.L.R. 8 Mad. 277. If the Subordinate Judge in his orders in execution of the decree in the previous suit had decided that there was no agreement as a lleged, that decision would no doubt have operated as a bar by res judicata to this suit which is based upon that agreement. We find, however, that there was no such decision. The agreement was set up simply for the purpose of staying execution until the arrangements under the agreement were ripe for being certified to the Court in adjustment of the decree. The Subordinate Judge proceeded with the execution of the decree, not because he found that there was no agreement, but, on the other hand, because there we...
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