Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad189
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. (Keman, Kindersley, and Muttusami Ayyar, JJ.)1. The 5th Section of the Limitation Act provides that, if the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal expires on a day on which the Court is closed, the appeal may be presented on the day the Court reopens.2. The Statute 24 and 25 Vic., c. 104, Section 15, empowers a High Court, established under that enactment, to make and issue general rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of the Courts which might be subject to its Appellate Jurisdiction. Act XXIII of 1861, Section 40, conferred on, and Act X of 1877, Section 652, continued to the High Court the like power in regard. to all Courts subordinate to it.3. In the exercise of this power, the Court in 1869 issued a general rule, directing that, during the adjournment of the Courts of every grade, two days in the week at the least should be set apart and notified in the District Gazette on which plaints, petitions, or other papers would be received ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad222
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.1. The point of law raised in this petition is one on which we arrive at a conclusion not without some hesitation.2. The power conferred on the then existing Zila Courts by Madras Regulation III of 1802 was, on the abolition of those Courts, transferred by Act VII of 1843 to the Subordinate Judges and Principal Sadr Amins appointed under Regulations I and II and VII and VIII of 1827.3. Subordinate Judges appointed under The Madras Civil Courts' Act, 1873, are empowered by that Act to exercise jurisdiction in all suits and proceedings of a civil nature. These terms appear sufficiently large to confer on them not only the general jurisdiction but also any special jurisdiction which had theretofore been exercised by the Subordinate Judges and Principal Sadr Amins whom they superseded, and which, at the time of the passing of the Civil Courts' Act, was still subsisting. The remedy was not taken away, and it is reasonable to infer an intention that the jurisdicti...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad234
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.1. The father of the respondents having been sued by the appellant for her maintenance, entered into a compromise with her, whereby he agreed to pay her the sum of Rs. 36 on the 1st April in each year during her life, and a decree was passed in those terms.2. It may be the father was sued because he was the manager of the family property; but this is not apparent on the face of the decree.3. The decree can be executed against the sons for arrears, which have accrued since their father's death, only as representatives of their father and until his assets are exhausted, it being of course understood that, on the father's death, the interest he had in his lifetime in joint ancestral property lapsed, and would not be available as assets. We set aside the order of the Judge and direct him to reconsider the application in reference to the above observations.4. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad284
Kernan, Innes and Kindersley, JJ.1. Both the Civil Courts Act III of 1873 and Court Pees Act VII of 1870 deal with the 'value of the subject-matter of suit,' and the Act of 1873 refers to the Act of 1870.2. It seems reasonable, therefore, that, when a particular subject-matter is valued in one Act, the same value ought to he adopted in respect of the same matter in the other Act, unless contrary to some special provision, or unless there is manifest inconsistency in so doing. There is special reference in Section 141 of the Civil Courts Act to Section 7, Clause 5,2 of the Court Fees Act, and it may be argued that, if the value in the Court Fees Act was intended to be adopted, there should be some particular provision to that effect.3. This may be admitted. But the reason of that special reference was that the valuation of the particular subject, land, was peculiarly difficult, and, as the mode of valuation of it was settled already for stamp purposes by the Court Fees Act, and this was...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad217
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.1. In order to put a limit to litigation and to prevent one suit growing out of another the Legislature has enacted that all questions between the parties to the suit in which a decree is passed and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree and not by separate suit. The plaintiff, a judgment-debtor in Original Suit No. 88 of 1872, brought the suit now before the Court on appeal, against the defendant, the decree-holder in Original Suit No. 104 of 1876, who had purchased certain land in execution of the decree, to have it declared that the sale is void, the decree-holder having in fraud procured the sale to be made without due advertisement. It is admitted that between a party to the suit and a stranger the provisions of Section 312 would not debar the person aggrieved from instituting a suit if he could establish that a material error in the publication or conduct of the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad230
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. and Innes, J.1. The complaint disclosed offences with which, it they were not serious, the Village Magistrate had jurisdiction to deal, viz., hurt followed by theft. It was not averred that the hurt and theft were so combined as to constitute the offence of theft robbery. Until the Magistrate had inquired into the case he could not have determined whether the offences were or were not petty, and for the reason that the complainant had elected the tribunal, it might be assumed, until the contrary was proved, the offences were not serious.2. The conviction for disobedience to the summons cannot be set aside on the ground suggested. It is a more difficult question whether a Village Magistrate has power to issue a summons. The Regulation conferring on the Village Munsif jurisdiction in criminal cases does not give him expressly power to issue summonses. 'We have, however, no doubt that he has authority incidental to his jurisdiction to issue a summons, whether ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad239
Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. The contest in this second appeal has reference to items of land 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, in which alone appellants (defendants 4 to 7) are interested. The respondents (plaintiffs) alleged that those items had been demised on kanam in December 1856 to one Avulkadar Ravuthan, the brother of the second defendant and of the husband of the third defendant, under whom appellants claim by right of purchase. In Suit 19 of 1870 on the file of the District Munsif of Palghat, respondents' Karnavan sued appellants' vendors and others to redeem the same kanam, but that suit was dismissed on the ground that the equity of redemption as to all the lands which were then and are now sought to be recovered had been sold to one Anantakrishna Bhatta in execution of the decree in Suit No. 67 of 1869 on the file of the Principal Sadar Amin of Calicut. It appears that appellants' vendors then pleaded that the right of redemption as to all the lands had passed to Anantakrishna Bhatta and that t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad302
1. Appellants brought this suit to recover 2-15-0 kanis of Inam land together with Rs. 75 for loss of produce for the year Iswara (1878-79). They alleged that the first and second respondents had granted to them a lease on the 27th April 1879 for a term of nine years, and that the third to sixth respondents, who had previously been in possession, refused to surrender the land and enjoyed the produce in the year Iswara, which, it was stated, amounted to 30 kalams. The seventh respondent was exonerated from all responsibility, and the first and second respondents, who are the Inamdars, admitted the lease and the appellants' claim. The other respondents contended that they were in possession under one Muniyappa Udayan who had reclaimed the land, and that the appellants' lessors were entitled only to a tirva of Rs. 8 per annum. The District Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the 'Pensions Act barred its institution in the Civil Courts. In the title-deed granted to the first and se...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad184
1. Yeswara Ramana, the then owner of the land in suit, mortgaged it with other plots to Puttu Gangana on the 30th March 1863, and on the 8th July 1865 he again mortgaged it by registered deed to the respondent, who, in 'pursuance of the terms of the contract, immediately entered into, and has since continued in possession. On the 30th November 1865 the respondent advanced a further sum of Rs. 99 on the same security. In 1868 Original Suit 26 of 1868 was brought on the first mortgage and a decree obtained, which directed the sale of the property mortgaged. The respondent was not made a party to that suit, but, when the land occupied by him as mortgagee was attached, he preferred an objection, which was disallowed without inquiry.2. At the sale held on the 12th April 1871, in pursuance of the decree, Paradesi Pillai became the purchaser of the land in suit, and formally received possession, but the actual possession of the respondent was not disturbed.3. On the 12th November 1878 the app...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad259
1. The facts of this case, so far as they have been ascertained, are as follows : Damodaram Numbudri, the last male owner of the Thiruthil Illam, having no sons, gave his daughter Nangeli in marriage to the second defendant, Shangaran Nambudri, whom he accepted as a Sarvaswadanam son-in-law.2. [The ordinary incidents to this Sarvaswadanam custom have not as yet been ascertained after any complete inquiry. The Judge refers to two of his own decisions, of which the latter follows the earlier, and the earlier proceeds, not so much on evidence, as on the hypothesis that the custom is a survival of the obsolete practice of constituting as heir the son of an appointed daughter. These rulings cannot then be safely accepted as conclusive. It is agreed that the effect of the custom is to introduce the son into the Mam, to confer on him the status of a son in respect of the property of the Illam, coupled with the obligation of managing, or assisting in the management, of the estate and of suppor...
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