Court : Allahabad
Reported in : AIR1975All324
Yashoda Nandan, J. 1. Special Appeals Nos. 403 and 621 of 1967 which arose out of the same judgment of a learned Single Judge came up before a Division Bench consisting of two of us. The appeals involved a consideration of the nature, extent of and conditions under which the Compensation Statement signed and sealed by the Compensation Officer in accordance with Section 240-J of U. P. Act 1 of 1951-- hereinafter referred to as the Act--assumes finality. Since there was considerable divergence of opinion on these questions in reported and unreported decisions of this Court the Bench referred the following questions for answer to a larger Bench:-- '1. Whether the finality of Compensation Statement under Section 240-J. U P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act extinguishes the rights and title of the landholder and the land-holder is debarred from showing in the subsequent proceedings that the land is not held by Adhivasi? 2. Whether the finality of Compensation Statement under Sectio...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : AIR1975All341
T.S. Misra, J.1. This appeal by defendant No. 2 arises in the following circumstances. The plaintiff and one Mst. Bhurki purchased the southern half portion of premises No. D-3/36 situate in Mohalla Shivala, Bhelpur Ward, Varanasi on 26th of November, 1964. After some time the plaintiff and Smt. Bhurki partitioned the premises and thus the half northern portion thereof came to the share of the plaintiff and the southern portion fell to the share of Smt. Bhurki. A partition wall was raised between the two portions. The main door of the house for egress and ingress purposes abutted the settlement plot No. 1709 which is a public street. The plaintiff alleged that she and Smt. Bhurki and their predecessor in title had always enjoyed the right of passage to and from the said premises over the public street as of right without any hindrance and obstruction from anybody. Defendant No. 1 Nagar Mahapalika of the City of Varanasi, however, wrongly and illegally granted a lease of a portion of th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : 1975CriLJ1426
H.N. Seth, J.1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution Banna Lal challenges the validity of the order of the State Government dated 19-12-1974 directing him to be detained under the provisions of Section 3(1) of of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 Annexure 9 to the writ petition.2. The petitioner alleges that on 1st October 1974 he was detained in pursuance of an order of the District Magistrate passed under the provision of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971 as amended by Ordinance II of 1974 issued on 17-9-1974. Subsequently, the grounds for his detention as contemplated by Section 8 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act were communicated to him on 4-10-1974. The petitioner then filed a Habeas Corpus Petn. No. 6181 of 1974 before this Court and challenged the validity of his detention on a number of grounds. That petition was heard by a Full Bench of this Court on 12-12-1974 and onwards. Ultimately ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : AIR1975All395
M.P. Mehrotra, J.1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for declaration and injunction. The plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the will dated 3rd July, 1963, executed by Ram Saran in favour of the defendant is void. He also prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the land in suit. The brief facts are these; The plaintiff-respondent claimed that he was the adopted son of Ram Saran deceased. The defendant, Jagdish, happened to be the daughter's son of the mother of Ram Saran. The said defendant set up a will dated 3rd July 1963, alleged to have been executed by Ram Saran in his favour and the plaintiff came to know about this will in the mutation proceedings. The plaintiff claimed that no such will was really executed and the one in question was forged and it was obtained by fraud and undue influence. The plaintiff claimed to be in possession of the property of Ram Saran as an adopted son. As he felt aggrieved with...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : [1976]102ITR557(All)
1. This is a reference under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.2. The assessee is an association of brick-kiln owners called the 'District Brick-kiln Owners Association, Bulandshahr'. Every brick-kiln owner was entitled to become its member on payment of an annual subscription of Rs. 12. The district authorities used to distribute coal to the brick-kiln owners through the assessee. The assessee started collecting donation from its members for the construction of ' Congress Bhawan '. Every member was required to pay Rs. 100 per wagon of coal allotted to him in pursuance of a resolution dated July 12, 1961, passed by the executive committee of the assessee-association. The original resolution is in Hindi and when translated in English would read :' Resolved unanimously as per decision of brick-kiln owners that whosoever amongst the brick-kiln owners comes to the association, the secretary and the treasurer of the association shall charge from them a sum of Rs. 100 per wagon of c...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : [1976]38STC72(All)
R.L. Gulati, J.1. In this petition the petitioner has challenged the recovery proceedings of sales tax on the ground that he is not a partner in the firm against which the assessment has been made. His name appears in form 14, but he says that his name was inserted without his knowledge and consent. He also says that he never knew of the levy of the tax until the recovery proceedings were taken against him. He has filed objection denying his status of a partner before the Recovery Officer.2. Whether the petitioner is a partner or not is a question of fact which we cannot undertake to decide under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, if an objection has been filed by him denying his status as a partner in the assessee-firm, it is the duty of the authority concerned to decide it before taking further proceedings.3. We, accordingly, direct the 3rd respondent, the Deputy Collector, Sales Tax (Collection), Betia Hata, Gorakhpur, to decide the petitioner's objection after giving him due...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : (1975)4CTR(All)66; [1982]133ITR632(All)
Satish Chandra, J.1. These two references are inter-connected. I.T.R. No. 18 of 1973 has been made at the instance of M/s. Kamla Town Trust, the assessee. It is a consolidated reference relating to the assessment years 1949-50 to 1955-56. I.T.R. No. 715 of 1972 is at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax. It is also a consolidated reference and relates to the assessment years 1956-57 to 1965-66.2. The two principal questions that require consideration are-' (i) Whether the Kamla Town Trust, the assessee, was a public charitable trust and (ii) Whether the rectification made in its indenture by an order of the court made in 1955 was retrospective in effect, with the result that the trust was a public charitable trust right from its inception ' 3. The J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur, by a deed of indenture dated October 27, 1941, created a charitable trust called Kamla Town Trust so that a colony or settlement be erected and established primarily for the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : [1976]103ITR652(All)
Satish Chandra, J. 1. The Tribunal has submitted this statement of the case for the opinion of this court on the following question of law:'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the proceedings of reassessment under Section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, were invalid and without jurisdiction ?'2. Shri Kanhaiya Lal died on 3rd April, 1962. His widow, Smt. Sarla Devi, filed a return under the Estate Duty Act, 1953. She claimed, inter alia, that her husband had one-fourth share in the coparcenary properties. The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Meerut, felt that the deceased's share in the coparcenary properties was half because the deceased was the sole surviving coparcener in the bigger Hindu undivided family. He called upon the accountable person by a notice dated February 5, 1963, to show cause why the deceased's share should not be taken as one-half. The accountable person filed a reply on 23rd February, 1963, and pointed out that her husband's share wo...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : 1975CriLJ1573
ORDERP.N. Bakshi, J.1. This application in revision arises out of the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. in which a preliminary order was passed by the Magistrate on 10th October, 1973. By this preliminary order attachment was also made of the property in dispute. It appears that subsequently on the application of the parties the Magistrate made a local inspection and thereafter came to the conclusion that as the case was not one of emergency and was likely to lead to miscarriage of justice the order of attachment should be withdrawn. Hence the order attaching the property was withdrawn. Aggrieved thereby a revision was filed before the Sessions Judge, Bareilly in which the preliminary order dated 10th October. 1973 was challenged. It was also submitted before the Sessions Judge that the order dated 2nd November, 1973 modifying the attachment of the property in question was not warranted in law. The Sessions Judge has made & reference to this Court for passing suitable orders.2. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : AIR1975All295
Satish Chandra, J. 1. It appears that a zamindari share including Sir and khudkasht plots was usufrucruarily mortgaged. The mortgagee continued in possession even after the date of vesting. Subsequently the mortgagor, who had become a bhumidhar, filed a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for the ejectment of the mortgagee from the bhumidhari plots, which, prior to the date of vesting, were sir and khudkasht. The defence, inter alia, was that the suit was barred by time, because the defendants were in possession after the date of vesting, as trespassers, and the period of limitation commenced to run from the date of vesting. The plaintiff's case was that the retention of possession by the mortgagee was, after the date of vesting, permissive. The time will begin to run from the date of demand for possession, if any: otherwise from the date of the institution of the suit. The suit was within time.2. The suit was under Section 209 of the U. P. Zami...
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