Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma

Decided On : Sep-23-2003

Court : Rajasthan

Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]
Code Context


$shops2 = $shops['topics'];
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma Semantic Analysis',
	'shops' => array(
		'LAW' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Section 13',
			(int) 1 => 'Section 13 of the Act',
			(int) 2 => 'Section 14',
			(int) 3 => 'Section 5',
			(int) 4 => 'Section 14',
			(int) 5 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 6 => 'Section 21',
			(int) 7 => 'Section 21(1',
			(int) 8 => 'Section 13',
			(int) 9 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 10 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 11 => 'Section 35',
			(int) 12 => 'Section 35',
			(int) 13 => 'Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C',
			(int) 14 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 15 => 'Section 13',
			(int) 16 => 'Section 14 of the Act',
			(int) 17 => 'Section 14(2',
			(int) 18 => 'Section 14(2',
			(int) 19 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 20 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 21 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 22 => 'Section 107 &',
			(int) 23 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 24 => 'Section 13(1)(e'
		),
		'ORG' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'A.C. Goyal',
			(int) 1 => 'the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction',
			(int) 2 => 'M. Ethirajulu Nayudu',
			(int) 3 => 'Martin and Harris Limited',
			(int) 4 => 'Ors',
			(int) 5 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
			(int) 6 => 'Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control',
			(int) 7 => 'HUF',
			(int) 8 => 'HUF',
			(int) 9 => 'Choudhari',
			(int) 10 => 'Delhi Rent Control Act',
			(int) 11 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 12 => 'the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act',
			(int) 13 => 'Court',
			(int) 14 => 'Privy Council',
			(int) 15 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
			(int) 16 => 'U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction',
			(int) 17 => 'Court',
			(int) 18 => 'Court',
			(int) 19 => 'Court',
			(int) 20 => 'first Appellate Court',
			(int) 21 => 'Court',
			(int) 22 => 'Court',
			(int) 23 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
			(int) 24 => 'Act.10',
			(int) 25 => 'PW.8 Sh',
			(int) 26 => 'carpet',
			(int) 27 => 'Court',
			(int) 28 => 'Reliance',
			(int) 29 => 'Nasirul Haque',
			(int) 30 => 'Ors',
			(int) 31 => 'Court',
			(int) 32 => 'PW.8 Sh',
			(int) 33 => 'G.S. Bapna',
			(int) 34 => 'Chartered Engineer & Valuer',
			(int) 35 => 'Munshi',
			(int) 36 => 'Reliance',
			(int) 37 => 'Ors',
			(int) 38 => 'Ors',
			(int) 39 => 'S.N. Kapoor',
			(int) 40 => 'Ors',
			(int) 41 => 'Firm Mool Chand',
			(int) 42 => 'Co.',
			(int) 43 => 'Ors',
			(int) 44 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 45 => 'LRS',
			(int) 46 => 'Firm Mool',
			(int) 47 => '& Co.'s',
			(int) 48 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 49 => 'Hihal Chand Jain',
			(int) 50 => 'Munshi',
			(int) 51 => 'P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna',
			(int) 52 => 'PW.8 Sh',
			(int) 53 => 'Rajasthan State Electricity Board',
			(int) 54 => 'Law Department',
			(int) 55 => 'State',
			(int) 56 => 'Dinesh',
			(int) 57 => 'STD',
			(int) 58 => 'Court',
			(int) 59 => 'Prasad',
			(int) 60 => 'High Court',
			(int) 61 => 'STD',
			(int) 62 => 'Life Insurance Corporation of India',
			(int) 63 => 'Ors',
			(int) 64 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 65 => 'High Court',
			(int) 66 => 'the Punjab & Haryana High Court',
			(int) 67 => 'Telegraph Department',
			(int) 68 => 'STD',
			(int) 69 => 'Thakur',
			(int) 70 => 'Kalayan',
			(int) 71 => 'STD',
			(int) 72 => 'STD',
			(int) 73 => 'D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar',
			(int) 74 => 'D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani',
			(int) 75 => 'D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya',
			(int) 76 => 'D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 77 => 'STD',
			(int) 78 => 'STD',
			(int) 79 => 'Court',
			(int) 80 => 'STD',
			(int) 81 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 82 => 'STD',
			(int) 83 => 'Telegraph Department Rules',
			(int) 84 => 'STD',
			(int) 85 => 'the Appellate Tribunal',
			(int) 86 => 'Reliance',
			(int) 87 => 'Ors',
			(int) 88 => 'the Punjab & Haryana High Court'
		),
		'NORP' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'J.1',
			(int) 1 => 'Lathika',
			(int) 2 => 'Lathika',
			(int) 3 => 'Hindu',
			(int) 4 => 'Brij Bihari Sharma'
		),
		'ORDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'first',
			(int) 1 => 'first',
			(int) 2 => 'second',
			(int) 3 => 'third',
			(int) 4 => 'second',
			(int) 5 => 'second',
			(int) 6 => 'second',
			(int) 7 => 'third',
			(int) 8 => 'third'
		),
		'DATE' => array(
			(int) 0 => '15'x 20'ft',
			(int) 1 => 'monthly',
			(int) 2 => 'the month of May, 1992',
			(int) 3 => 'September, 1990',
			(int) 4 => 'October, 1990',
			(int) 5 => '5',
			(int) 6 => '1950',
			(int) 7 => 'five years',
			(int) 8 => 'five years',
			(int) 9 => 'the year 1979/1980',
			(int) 10 => '30.10.1991',
			(int) 11 => 'monthly',
			(int) 12 => 'September, 1993',
			(int) 13 => 'the expiry of one year',
			(int) 14 => 'one year',
			(int) 15 => '65 per month',
			(int) 16 => '150 per month',
			(int) 17 => '27.2.1990',
			(int) 18 => '55',
			(int) 19 => '56',
			(int) 20 => '1882',
			(int) 21 => '500 per month',
			(int) 22 => 'January, 1986',
			(int) 23 => 'years',
			(int) 24 => 'years',
			(int) 25 => 'five years',
			(int) 26 => 'five years',
			(int) 27 => 'six months',
			(int) 28 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 29 => 'five years',
			(int) 30 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 31 => '14',
			(int) 32 => 'October, 1986',
			(int) 33 => '50 years',
			(int) 34 => 'a number of years',
			(int) 35 => 'last 16 years',
			(int) 36 => '20 years',
			(int) 37 => '27',
			(int) 38 => '32',
			(int) 39 => '1955',
			(int) 40 => '1974',
			(int) 41 => 'January, 1995',
			(int) 42 => 'the assessment years 1995 to 2000',
			(int) 43 => 'the assessment years 1995 to 2000',
			(int) 44 => '1950',
			(int) 45 => '35',
			(int) 46 => '37'
		),
		'PERSON' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Moti Lalo Atal Road',
			(int) 1 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 2 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 3 => 'B. Dutt',
			(int) 4 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 5 => 'Ex.10',
			(int) 6 => 'T.K. Lathika',
			(int) 7 => 'Seth Karsandas Jamnadas',
			(int) 8 => 'Rani Pal v. Smt',
			(int) 9 => 'Maya Rani Karmakar',
			(int) 10 => 'Govind Narain v.',
			(int) 11 => 'Mohan Singh',
			(int) 12 => 'Ram Saran Sharma',
			(int) 13 => 'Kamala Acharya',
			(int) 14 => 'A. Ranganatham Chettl',
			(int) 15 => 'Ram Narayan Sharma',
			(int) 16 => 'Shakuntala Gaur',
			(int) 17 => 'Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh',
			(int) 18 => 'Thanwar Das',
			(int) 19 => 'Thanwar Das',
			(int) 20 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 21 => 'Ex.10',
			(int) 22 => 'Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2',
			(int) 23 => 'Chandra Nath Saha',
			(int) 24 => 'Sudhir Chandra Ghosh',
			(int) 25 => 'Mohd',
			(int) 26 => 'Choudhari',
			(int) 27 => 'Gundappa Amabadas Bukate',
			(int) 28 => 'V.N. Sarin v. Ajit',
			(int) 29 => 'Kumar Poplai',
			(int) 30 => 'Anr',
			(int) 31 => 'Rs',
			(int) 32 => 'Ex',
			(int) 33 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 34 => 'Kumar Sharma',
			(int) 35 => 'Ex',
			(int) 36 => 'Mohd',
			(int) 37 => 'V.N. Sarin's',
			(int) 38 => 'V.N. Sarin's',
			(int) 39 => 'Rani Pal's',
			(int) 40 => 'Govind Narain's',
			(int) 41 => 'Ex.10',
			(int) 42 => 'Ram Saran Sharma's',
			(int) 43 => 'A. Ranganatham Chetti',
			(int) 44 => 'Marthin',
			(int) 45 => 'Narayan Sharma's',
			(int) 46 => 'Sardar Singh's',
			(int) 47 => 'Sardar Singh's',
			(int) 48 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 49 => 'Jitendra Nath Dey',
			(int) 50 => 'Krishna Murari Prasad',
			(int) 51 => 'Mitar Singh',
			(int) 52 => 'Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v.',
			(int) 53 => 'Govindram Ramgopal Mundada',
			(int) 54 => 'Satwant Kaur',
			(int) 55 => 'Dhund Singh',
			(int) 56 => 'Babu',
			(int) 57 => 'T.K. Vasudevan',
			(int) 58 => 'Nasirual Haque's',
			(int) 59 => 'Krishna Murari Prasad's',
			(int) 60 => 'Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's',
			(int) 61 => 'Satwant Kaur's',
			(int) 62 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 63 => 'Bega Begum',
			(int) 64 => 'Abdul Ahad Khan',
			(int) 65 => 'Shiv Sarup Gupta v.',
			(int) 66 => 'Mahesh Chand Gupta',
			(int) 67 => 'Basant Lal Khatri',
			(int) 68 => 'Megh Raj',
			(int) 69 => 'Amrit Lal',
			(int) 70 => 'M.L. Prabhakar',
			(int) 71 => 'Rajiv Singal',
			(int) 72 => 'Bega Begum',
			(int) 73 => 'Megh Raj',
			(int) 74 => 'M.L. Prabhakar's',
			(int) 75 => 'Kumar Kapoor',
			(int) 76 => 'Vishnu Avtar Sharma',
			(int) 77 => 'Ashok Jasra',
			(int) 78 => 'Shiv Singh',
			(int) 79 => 'Jai Singh',
			(int) 80 => 'Mahesh Chand Sharma',
			(int) 81 => 'S.N. Sharma',
			(int) 82 => 'M.L. Vyas',
			(int) 83 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 84 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 85 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 86 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 87 => 'Jagdish',
			(int) 88 => 'Navjeevan',
			(int) 89 => 'Jaipur Tower',
			(int) 90 => 'Shekhawati Complex',
			(int) 91 => 'Gundali',
			(int) 92 => 'cam',
			(int) 93 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
			(int) 94 => 'Kalyan',
			(int) 95 => 'Amir Ahmed v.',
			(int) 96 => 'Yusuf',
			(int) 97 => 'Hon'ble D.B.',
			(int) 98 => 'Dev Kumar',
			(int) 99 => 'Swaran Lata',
			(int) 100 => 'alias Anandi',
			(int) 101 => 'C. Setharama Nagarkar',
			(int) 102 => 'Angoori Devi',
			(int) 103 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 104 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 105 => 'Hari Singh v.',
			(int) 106 => 'Kannaiya Lal',
			(int) 107 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali',
			(int) 108 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
			(int) 109 => 'Anr',
			(int) 110 => 'Vinayak N.Joshi',
			(int) 111 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal',
			(int) 112 => 'Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan',
			(int) 113 => 'Hari Singh's',
			(int) 114 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's',
			(int) 115 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
			(int) 116 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja's',
			(int) 117 => 'Mohan Lal',
			(int) 118 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
			(int) 119 => 'Ramesh Ajmers',
			(int) 120 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 121 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 122 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 123 => 'B.L. Asawa',
			(int) 124 => 'Jagdish',
			(int) 125 => 'Parwani',
			(int) 126 => 'Jagdish',
			(int) 127 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 128 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 129 => 'Parwani',
			(int) 130 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 131 => 'Amir Ahmed's',
			(int) 132 => 'Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai',
			(int) 133 => 'Kalyan Sahai v. Smt',
			(int) 134 => 'Narangi Bai',
			(int) 135 => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal'
		),
		'CARDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => '500/-',
			(int) 1 => '2',
			(int) 2 => '31.10.1991',
			(int) 3 => '4',
			(int) 4 => 'ten',
			(int) 5 => '25.10.2000',
			(int) 6 => '3',
			(int) 7 => '6',
			(int) 8 => '4',
			(int) 9 => '10',
			(int) 10 => '1',
			(int) 11 => 'three',
			(int) 12 => '31.5.2002.6',
			(int) 13 => '1',
			(int) 14 => '30.10.1991',
			(int) 15 => '2',
			(int) 16 => '1',
			(int) 17 => '1',
			(int) 18 => '2',
			(int) 19 => '3',
			(int) 20 => '4',
			(int) 21 => '5',
			(int) 22 => '6',
			(int) 23 => '8).8',
			(int) 24 => '25.10.1986',
			(int) 25 => '500',
			(int) 26 => '3',
			(int) 27 => '1',
			(int) 28 => '9',
			(int) 29 => '10',
			(int) 30 => '11',
			(int) 31 => 'transferee',
			(int) 32 => '3',
			(int) 33 => 'two',
			(int) 34 => '10',
			(int) 35 => '31.10.1991',
			(int) 36 => '6',
			(int) 37 => 'transferee',
			(int) 38 => '25.10.1986',
			(int) 39 => '25.10.1986',
			(int) 40 => '31.10.1991',
			(int) 41 => '1912',
			(int) 42 => '3',
			(int) 43 => '20.9.1985',
			(int) 44 => '1',
			(int) 45 => '1',
			(int) 46 => 'two',
			(int) 47 => '1',
			(int) 48 => '2',
			(int) 49 => '3/4th',
			(int) 50 => '31.5.2002',
			(int) 51 => 'half',
			(int) 52 => '150',
			(int) 53 => '150',
			(int) 54 => '12',
			(int) 55 => '13',
			(int) 56 => '15',
			(int) 57 => '16',
			(int) 58 => 'one',
			(int) 59 => '3/4th',
			(int) 60 => 'two',
			(int) 61 => 'four',
			(int) 62 => '1000',
			(int) 63 => '17',
			(int) 64 => '18',
			(int) 65 => '19',
			(int) 66 => '20',
			(int) 67 => '21',
			(int) 68 => 'thousands',
			(int) 69 => '1',
			(int) 70 => '15',
			(int) 71 => '20',
			(int) 72 => 'two',
			(int) 73 => '4',
			(int) 74 => '1000',
			(int) 75 => '3/4th',
			(int) 76 => '3/4th',
			(int) 77 => '3'9'x',
			(int) 78 => 'thousands',
			(int) 79 => '1',
			(int) 80 => '4',
			(int) 81 => '4',
			(int) 82 => '4',
			(int) 83 => '22',
			(int) 84 => '23',
			(int) 85 => '24',
			(int) 86 => '25',
			(int) 87 => '26',
			(int) 88 => '28',
			(int) 89 => '29',
			(int) 90 => '30',
			(int) 91 => '31',
			(int) 92 => 'four',
			(int) 93 => 'two',
			(int) 94 => 'between other two',
			(int) 95 => '1',
			(int) 96 => '5',
			(int) 97 => 'two',
			(int) 98 => '1',
			(int) 99 => 'one',
			(int) 100 => '32',
			(int) 101 => '4',
			(int) 102 => '19.1.1995',
			(int) 103 => '22',
			(int) 104 => '1.50',
			(int) 105 => 'one',
			(int) 106 => '5',
			(int) 107 => '33',
			(int) 108 => '34',
			(int) 109 => 'one',
			(int) 110 => 'two',
			(int) 111 => '36',
			(int) 112 => 'one',
			(int) 113 => 'two'
		),
		'GPE' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 1 => 'Clause',
			(int) 2 => 'Clause',
			(int) 3 => 'T.K.',
			(int) 4 => 'T.K.',
			(int) 5 => 'Sk',
			(int) 6 => 'Smt',
			(int) 7 => 'Clause',
			(int) 8 => 'Clause',
			(int) 9 => 'Clause',
			(int) 10 => 'S.R.',
			(int) 11 => 'S.R.',
			(int) 12 => 'L.Rs',
			(int) 13 => 'S.N. Kapoor',
			(int) 14 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 15 => 'PW',
			(int) 16 => 'Surendra',
			(int) 17 => 'PW',
			(int) 18 => 'Ganpati Plaza',
			(int) 19 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 20 => 'Rajasthan',
			(int) 21 => 'Roop Chand',
			(int) 22 => 'Roop Chand's',
			(int) 23 => 'Pandey',
			(int) 24 => 'D.W',
			(int) 25 => 'P.C.',
			(int) 26 => 'Bhogilal',
			(int) 27 => 'S.R.',
			(int) 28 => 'Subramania'
		),
		'TIME' => array(
			(int) 0 => '3 to Section 11'
		),
		'FAC' => array(
			(int) 0 => '30.6.1985',
			(int) 1 => 'Dhirendra Nath Gorai's'
		),
		'PRODUCT' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Mst',
			(int) 1 => 'LRs',
			(int) 2 => 'Suresh',
			(int) 3 => 'Dinesh'
		),
		'QUANTITY' => array(
			(int) 0 => '300 sq. ft'
		),
		'EVENT' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'PW 8 Sh'
		),
		'PERCENT' => array(
			(int) 0 => '63%',
			(int) 1 => '37%',
			(int) 2 => '63%',
			(int) 3 => '37%'
		)
	),
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '765114',
			'acts' => 'Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 14(3); <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 5',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 15 of 2001',
			'appellant' => 'Jagdish',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. - No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop. 14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. 21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. 22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B. Dutta, Senior Counsel and; J.P. Goyal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.M. Ranjan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-09-23',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.C. Goyal, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.C. Goyal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Brief facts giving rise to this first appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit on 21.9.1993 for eviction from the suit shop on the grounds of default in payment of rent, reasonable and bonafide necessity; sub-letting and nuisance with the averments that the shop measuring 15'x 20'ft situated on Moti Lalo Atal Road, Jaipur was let out to the appellant-defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 500/- on certain terms and conditions mentioned in para 2 of the plaint. The tenancy was oral. The defendant did not pay rent from the month of May, 1992. The plaintiff requires the suit shop for his own profession. The plaintiff has no residential house of his own at Jaipur. He wants to construct residential house upon the details of other grounds of eviction, he prayed for decree of eviction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The defendant in his written statement pleaded that the suit shop was let out to his father by plaintiff's father. Denying all the grounds of eviction, it was pleaded that rent upto September, 1990 was paid to Mr. C.N. Sharma, father, of the plaintiff. Thereafter, he was informed vide letter dated 31.10.1991 that rent from October, 1990 may be paid to the plaintiff. Hence he paid the rent to the plaintiff but the plaintiff declined to accept the rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Rejoinder was submitted by the plaintiff. Amended pleadings were also filedby the parties from time to time. '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed ten issues. After recording evidence of the parties, it was held vide judgment dated 25.10.2000 that landlord required the suit shop reasonably and bonafide, and that the comparative hardship would be caused to the landlord, if the decree of eviction is not passed. Issues No. 3 with regard to partial eviction and No. 6 with regard to default in payment of rent were also decided in favour of the landlord. Issues No. 4, 5 and 10 relating to subletting, nuisance and inconsistent use of the shop for the purpose it was let out were decided against the plaintiff. In conclusion, the trial court decreed the suit of the landlord for eviction, hence this appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned senior counsel Mr. B. Dutt appearing for the appellant-tenant raised three points, first point is that the suit for eviction was not maintainable, the second and third points are that issues with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were wrongly decided by the trial court in cursory manner without considering all the evidence. Attention in this regard was drawn to the application moved on behalf of the appellant-tenant on 31.5.2002.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(3) Restriction on Eviction: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. According to learned senior counsel, the suit shop was let out for business purposes and according to the case of the plaintiff-landlord the original landlord was Sh. C.N. Sharma father of the plaintiff who vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 informed the appellant-tenant to pay rent to the plaintiff from 1.10.1990 and thus the plaintiff became the new landlord and fresh terms and conditions were agreed between them as mentioned in para 2 of the plaint and thus the plaintiff had no right to file a suit for eviction on the grounds set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out the tenant, reliance is placed upon. T.K. Lathika v. Seth Karsandas Jamnadas (1), Smt. Menoka Rani Pal v. Smt. Maya Rani Karmakar (2), Govind Narain v. Mohan Singh (3), Ram Saran Sharma v. Kamala Acharya (4), A. Ranganatham Chettl and Ors. v. M. Ethirajulu Nayudu (5), Martin and Harris Limited v. Vith Additional Distt. Judge and Ors. (6), Ram Narayan Sharma v. Shakuntala Gaur, (7), Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh (8).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that initially Sh. Thanwar Das father of the appellant- tenant was the tenant in the year 1979/1980. Sh. Thanwar Das expired on 25.10.1986 and thereafter the appellant-tenant stated paying the rent as tenant to Sh. C.N. Sharma the original landlord and thereafter to the plaintiff on receiving information as such vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 and monthly rent of Rs. 500 was never enhanced and no rent note was executed and terms and conditions of the tenancy were not altered and thus no new tenancy came into existence, hence Section 14 (3) of the Act is not attracted. It was next submitted that the suit for eviction was instituted in September, 1993 and no such objection was taken by the appellant-tenant in written statement, during trial and even in the memo of appeal and as such the appellant- tenant waived this right if available to him. He placed reliance upon 1. Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2. Subal Chandra Nath Saha and Ors. v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Ors. (9), SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate (10), V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai and Anr. (11) and also relied upon Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra) the original landlord gifted the tenanted premises to his daughter, the transferee landlord. Proviso 3 to Section 11 (3) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act provided that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument. The daughter without waiting for the moratorium period of one year from the date of gift to expire filed eviction petition. Having found two differences in the terms of the old and fresh lease that (i) name of landlord was changed from father to daughter and (ii) rent payable was increased from Rs. 65 per month to Rs. 150 per month. It was held that moratorium period would apply from the date of fresh lease de'ed. This judgment is no instrument of transfer of the suit shop by the original landlord in the name of the plaintiff. A perusal of the letter Ex. 10 dated 31.10.1991 goes to show that Sh. C.N. Sharma, original landlord (HUF), informed the tenant to pay the rent to his son Sh. Manoj Kumar Sharma, the plaintiff, from 1.10.1990 as on account of a family settlement on 27.2.1990, the suit shop had fallen to his share. In para 6 of the written statement, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that the original landlord Sh. C.N. Sharma'did not receive the rent on account of his family reasons and he was informed by pay rent vide this letter to the plaintiff. Ex. 55 is memorandum of family settlement and Ex. 56 is the registered memorandum of family settlement cum partition deed. On perusal of these documents, it is evident that the suit shop was part of the entire properties of HUF and this shop came to the share of the plaintiff on account of family partition and as such it does not amount to any transfer of the property as defined under Section 5 of the <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a>. Such plea was taken in Sk. Mohd. Choudhari and V.N. Sarin's case (both supra). In V.N. Sarin's case (supra) while dealing with the similar provisions contained in Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the process of partition, therefore, involves the transfer of enjoyment of the properties into an enjoyment in severally by them of the respective properties allotted to their shares. Having regard to this basic character of joint Hindu family property, it cannot be denied that each coparcener has an antecedent title to the said property, though its extent is not determined until partition takes place. That being so, partition really means that whereas initially all the coparceners have subsisting title to the totality of the property of the family jointly, that joint title is by partition transformed into separate titles of the individual coparceners in respect of several items of properties allotted to them respectively. Thus, it cannot be said that the suit shop has been acquired by the plaintiff by transfer and so Section 14(3) of the Act cannot be invoked by the appellant. On the same reasonings as discussed here-inabove, the judgment delivered in Smt. Menoka Rani Pal's case (supra) is also not applicable because the transferee landlady acquired the title of the suit premises by purchase and thus eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement was not allowed in view of the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act. In Govind Narain's case (supra), the terms of the tenancy were changed and new tenancy agreement was entered into or a new lease was executed by the tenant and thus the existing tenancy was deemed to have been surrendered and the fact that tenant continued to remain in possession will be of no consequence and Section 14(3) of the Act would apply meaning thereby the premises will be deemed to have been let out to the tenant from the date of commencement of the new tenancy and not from the date of original tenancy. In the instant case, the suit shop was let out to father of the appellant much before 25.10.1986. On the death of appellant's father on 25.10.1986, the appellant continued to pay the rent to the original landlord and continued to pay the rent at the same rate of Rs. 500 per month to the plaintiff in pursuance of letter Ex.10 dated 31.10.1991. No rent note was executed, rent was not enhanced and not terms and conditions of the tenancy were changed, hence no new tenancy came into existence. Similarly the judgment of this Court delivered in Ram Saran Sharma's case (supra) would also not apply as eviction suit was filed by the new landlord who become absolute owner of the suit properly by virtue of valid gift deed. The decision of Privy Council in. A. Ranganatham Chetti and Others's case (supra) is also not applicable as though the physical possession was continuous from 1912 onwards, the possession from 1.10.1922 was attributable to a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra) the respondent No. 3 had purchased the premises on 30.6.1985 and issued a notice to the tenant on 20.9.1985 but filed application for eviction in January, 1986 and the case was taken up for hearing after there years of purchase. The point for consideration was whether the landlord's application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction) Act was not maintainable in view of the proviso to the said section as it was filed before the expiry of there years from the date of purchase of the suit premises by the landlord. It was held that the proviso to Section 21(1) bars entertainment of the application, therefore, the stage at which the Court has to consider whether grounds mentioned in Clause (a) are made out or not will be reached when the Court takes up the application for consideration on merits. In the instant case, Section 14(3) of the Act provides that no suit for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall lie before the expiry of five years. But as stated hereinabove in Marthin's case (supra) the landlord became owner of the suit premises by purchases, thus on the basis of this judgment also, the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant is not acceptable. On the basis of the similar reasoning the judgment delivered in Ram Narayan Sharma's case (supra) is also not applicable as it was also a case of purchaser landlord.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Now another submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that appellant-tenant waived his right even if available to him is taken up. It is not disputed that no such objection was taken in the written statement, during the trial and even in the memo of appeal by the appellant-tenant. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant, Section 14(3) of the Act puts a complete embargo on institution of the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, such question of law can be raised at any stage. In Sardar Singh's case (supra), this Court held that objection under Section 14(3) of the Act can be allowed to be raised in second appeal, despite that such objection was not pressed before first Appellate Court. There is important distinction between the facts of two cases as in the instant case, no such objection was raised even upto the filing of this appeal in this Court while in Sardar Singh's case (supra) such objection was taken in the written statement. Assuming that such objection can be raised in this appeal, the point is whether the appellant-tenant waived this right. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that since the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act create a complete restriction on filing the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement before the expiry of five years, no such waiver can be pleaded. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that such a right can be waived. In Dhirendra Nath Gorai's case (supra) the judgment debtor who received the notice of the proclamation of sale, did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or did not object to the non-compliance with Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act which provide that the Court should specify in the sale proclamation the property to be sold. It was held that non-compliance with Section 35 in specifying the property to be sold is a defect in the proclamation within the meaning of the second proviso to Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C, and such mandatory provision can be waived only if it is not conceived in the public interest but in the interest of the party that waives it. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. It was also held that this prohibition was for protection to the tenant and waiving of such protection by the tenant did not contravene the law. The prohibition was not in public benefit but for his private benefit so he could waive it. In the instant case, the provision contained in Section 14(3) of the Act are for protection of the tenant and the tenant-appellant in the instant case, did not take any objection in this regard till final submissions made in this appeal. Consequently, it must be held that the provision for five years period before filing the suit, though is mandatory and confers protection to the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. In the facts of the present case there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant- Jenant did not think it fit to pursue that point and. on the contrary joined issues on merits and having lost therein and got and adverse decision did not think it fit even to challenge the decision on that ground even while filing an appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, it must be held that the appellant-tenant had waived this right available to him under Section 14(3) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Now second and third objections raised on behalf of the appellant-tenant are taken up. Section 14(3) of the Act reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(2) Restriction on eviction:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is significant that issue No. 2 with regard to reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff was decided in favour of the plaintiff-landlord by the trial court and findings of the trial court on this issue were not challenged by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant at the time of making final submissions. Learned senior counsel confined his submissions with regard to findings of the trial court on the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction. It was contended that the trial court has not critically examined the question of hardship and partial eviction; the trial court did not consider the availability of other reasonable accommodation to the parties; there was no sufficient evidence or material on record for the trial court to reach the satisfaction as provided in Section 14(3) of the Act. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. He referred the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. Learned senior counsel on the basis of the application submitted on 31.5.2002 under Section 14 of the Act contended that the appellant-tenant will be ready to vacate the half of the tenanted premises under his possession and thus the appellant-tenant is still ready to vacate 150 sq. ft. area for the plaintiff which would be sufficient to satisfy his requirement and in the alternative the appellant is further ready to vacate the entire suit shop for a certain period in case the landlord is desirous to re-build the entire premises in his possession including the suit shop on the condition to reserve his right ore-enter in the building comprising 150 sq. carpet area with such terms of tenancy already existing between the parties and for that a commissioner may be appointed by the Court for sorting out the possibility of division for partial eviction of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance is placed upon Nasirul Haque v. Jitendra Nath Dey (12), Krishna Murari Prasad v. Mitar Singh (13), Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada (14), Satwant Kaur v. Dhund Singh (15), S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan and Ors. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Krishna Murari Prasad's case (supra), it was held that it is necessary to make enquiry as to indivisibility of suit premises and drawing presumption merely because suit premises consist one room overlooking factor of dimension of room is not proper. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. In Satwant Kaur's case (supra), it was held that eviction from the entire shop claimed by the landlord for starting motor battery business was not justified and the nature of landlord's business does not require much space, hence partial eviction was upheld. In S.R. Babu's case (supra), it was held that the requirement of the suit premises by the landlord for personal use implies its use not only in the existing condition but also on making necessary repairs to or reconstruction of the same and the court should not pass the order of eviction against a tenant who is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in that building and there is no other building available in the locality for the tenant to carry on such trade or the business. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord while referring the evidence of the parties on the these issued contended that the learned trial Judge having discussed the entire evidence came to this conclusion that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord for the entire suit shop is not only reasonable but bonafide also and relevant factors with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were also considered while considering the issue of requirement and also considered the evidence of the parties while deciding the issues relating to comparative hardship and partial eviction. According to learned counsel for the plaintiff- landlord, the plaintiff is an advocate practicing in various courts since long and he has no office of his own; that he shares the office of his father who is also a practicing advocate and keeping in view the size of the suit shop, its partial eviction is not possible. It was also submitted that the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, with regard to 3/4th portion of the suit shop was in context of only office for the plaintiff-landlord while requirement of the plaintiff was two fold-for the office and for the construction of residential house over the roof of the suit shop and both the requirements were adjudged as reasonable and bonafide by the trial court. He also referred the statement of PW.7 Sh. G.S. Bapna, Chartered Engineer & Valuer who stated, that for four advocates, Munshi, driver, typist, the requirement is 1000 sq. ft. space and he further stated that plaintiff has no conference room; there is no spacejor secretarial work; there is no space for clients to sit and all of them sit in a congested manner; there is no separate chamber for the staff, advocate, for conference room, for clients, for library etc. It was also submitted that the suit shop is in possession of the present appellant since October, 1986 and prior to that it was with his father. Reliance is placed upon Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs and Ors. (17), Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (18), S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS. v. Basant Lal Khatri and Ors. (19), Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. and Co. v. Amrit Lal (20) and M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal (21). In Mst. Bega Begum and Ors.'s case (supra), it was held that it is not doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree of eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiff a decree for eviction. In deciding the extent of the hardship, each parly has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants. In Shiv Sarup Gupia's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the landlord cannot be forced to squeeze into less suitable premises just to protect the tenant's occupancy. In S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held that some discretion has to be allowed in favour of the landlord and the court should not impose there own wisdom as to how the landlord should arrange his affairs and ought not to be carried away by sympathy for the tenant. In Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. & Co.'s case (supra), facts were that the landlord proved his bonafide requirement of shop and the tenant's plea was that he is in possession for 50 years and he is likely to lose thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him. It was held that this was natural hardship not amounting to greater hardship under Section 14(2) of the Act. In M.L. Prabhakar's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the totality of the circumstances including their professions, vocation, style of life, habits and backgrounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. 1 have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. The dimensions of the suit shop are 15ft. x 20ft. = 300 sq. ft. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. This submission cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the trial court that these points were not critically examined and were decided in a very cursory manner. The plaintiff-landlord is a practicing advocate for a number of years. According to his statement, he was a practicing lawyer for last 16 years; that he has no office of his own and no residential house of his own; that he along with his colleagues, staff and clients sits in a portion of the office occupied by his father who is also an advocate; that he is residing with his family members in two rooms accommodation provided by his father; that he has no house of his own at Jaipur and as such he is facing great hardship PW.2 Brij Bihari Sharma, PW. 4 Surendra Kumar Kapoor, PW.5 Vishnu Avtar Sharma, PW.6 Ashok Jasra all clients supported his statement that the accommodation for the office available with the plaintiff is much congested. PW.3 Ramesh Chand Bansal also supported the statement of the plaintiff-landlord that sarva shri Shiv Singh, Jai Singh, Mahesh Chand Sharma, S.N. Sharma, M.L. Vyas, Hihal Chand Jain all the advocates are also working with the plainlif landlord. He has also named Munshi, driver, steno etc. and corroborated the statement of the plaintiff that he has no office of his own, no place for library etc. P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna also supported the statement of the plaintiff with regards to his requirement, hardship and partial eviction. According to his statement, 1000 sq. ft. is required for plaintiff advocate, his associates and the staff. Much stress was put on the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, that according to his statement the requirement of the plaintiff would suffice if the 3/4th portion of the suit shop is vacated and thus partial eviction is possible. PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma stated in cross- examination that minimum requirement for the office of the plaintiff should be 3/4th but definite opinion of this point may be given by architect. But on the basis of the statement of PW. 8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, no such conclusion can be drawn that partial eviction of suit shop is possible. On the basis of the statement of PW 8 Sh; C.N. Sharma, if it is taken that 3/4th portion of the suit shop may serve the purpose of plaintiff-landlord, remaining 1/4th portion of the appellant-tenant. Thus, the appellant-tenant would get the portion of dimension so 3'9'x 5'-75sq. ft. It is nowhere the case of the appellant-tenant that this much portion would serve his purpose. The appellant-tenant Sh. Jagdish stated that in the same area a number of commercial complexes namely Ganpati Plaza, Navjeevan complex, Jaipur Tower, Shekhawati Complex are situated but he is not in a position to have any shop in this area because he is unable lo pay huge amount of pagri and further he is carrying on his business in the suit shop for about a period of 20 years and thus he has earned goodwill and he will suffer a loss of thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Keeping in view the entire discussion made hereinabove, 1 find no ground to interfere with the findings of the trial court that the alternative accommodation is available in nearby area and simply that the appellant-tenant has to pay more rent or it would be difficult for him to recover outstanding amount from the customers are no grounds to hold that comparative hardship would be caused to the tenant instead of landlord. In view of the entire discussion, the application under Section 14(2) of the Act is liable to be rejected for partial eviction on the grounds mentioned in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Now cross objections filed by the plaintiff-landlord are taken up. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord has challenged the finding of the trial court on the issues of subletting and nuisance. Learned trial court while dealing with the issue No. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. In para 4 of the amended plaint, it was pleaded that the tenant is not occupying the shop and he is sub-letting the shop to various persons from time to time and receives money from them. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations in his written statement. In para 4 of the rejoinder, the plaintiff-landlord pleaded that before and after filing of the suit the appellant-tenant let-out the suit shop to Sh. Ramesh Gundali an employee in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, Sh. Kalyan an employee in Law Department, State of Rajasthan and others persons.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The learned trial Judge cam to this conclusion that subletting to Ramesh Gundali, Kalyan and others persons is not proved at all and evidence in this regard cannot be relied upon in absence of specific pleadings. With regard to subletting to Dinesh, it was observed that he is carrying on business of STD/PCO in partnership of the appellant-tenant in a portion of the suit shop and this it does not amount to subletting. In Amir Ahmed v. Yusuf (22), it was held by Hon'ble D.B. of this Court that merely allowing another person to use premises or its part and conversion of exclusive possession of premises by a tenant into joint possession with a third person does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Similar view was taken in Dev Kumar (died) through LRs. v. Smt. Swaran Lata and Ors. (23). In Smt. Laxmi alias Anandi and Ors. v. C. Setharama Nagarkar and Ors. (24), it was held that the landlord should prove as to when sub-tenancy was created and in absence of that, eviction on such ground cannot be ordered. In Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi (25), it was held that mere presence of persons other than the tenant in shop is no ground to presume subletting. Per contra learned counsel for the plaintiff-land lord contended that the plaintiff-landlord and his witnesses were not cross-examination on this point; that evidence cannot be discarded merely in absence of specific pleadings; that High Court in revision allowed the parties to lead evidence on this point; that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; that as per telephone rules, business of STD-PCO is not permissible in partnership. He placed reliance upon M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (26), Hari Singh v. Kannaiya Lal (27), Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (28), Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali (D) by LRs. (29), Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Anr. v. Vinayak N.Joshi and Ors. (30), Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal (31) and Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan (32). In M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd's case (supra), it was held that in case of subletting it is difficult for landlord to prove it by direct evidence or whether sub-tenant had paid monetary consideration and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. In Hari Singh's case (supra), it was held that details of subletting can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot Ute a reason to set aside concurrent findings of the fact. In Roop Chand's case (supra), it was held that when the larger part of the premises was let out to a club registered under Companies Act while tenant retains possession of the smaller part of the premises, it would amount that the tenant parted with the possession and is liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. In Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's case (supra), the tenant entered into partnership with his four sons in 1955. Thereafter, the tenant and his two sons retired from the partnership in 1974 when new partnership came between other two sons. It was held that original tenant having no concern with premises or business therein, it was a case of subletting. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat and another's case (supra), court below arrived at concurrent finding of subletting on account of amended version of the plaint stating that pending the suit the defendants have or any of them has inducted defendants No. 1 to 5 unlawfully. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that High Court erred in overturning conclusions of two fact finding courts on the ground that averments regarding subletting was insufficient. In Janak Raj Ahuja's case (supra) the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that through the partnership deed was produced by the tenant but account books and income tax returns were not produced, it was held that partnership was merely camouflage and it was a case of subletting. Similar view was taken in Harbhajan Singh's case (supra). It was further observed that moreover, as per rules of Telegraph Department, there can be no partnership with respect to STD/PCO.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 have considered the rival submission in the light of the judgments, judgment of the trial court and evidence available on the record. The plaintiff-landlord in his statement tried to support the averments made in the plaint, while the appellant-tenant stated that he never let out any portion of the shop to anyone and he never parted with possession of any part of the shop. According to his statement, the persons named by the plaintiff namely Thakur, Mohan Lal, Suresh were his salary paid workers. He further deposed that Ramesh Gundali and Sh. Kalayan were his customers and one Pandey was a typist and another typist Ramesh Ajmers is no doing his typing job in a separate shop. He also explained photos showing the presence of these persons produced by the plaintiff. He admitted in his statement that Dinesh Parwani is doing STD PCO job in the suit sbop but with him as partner and the partnership deed is Ex. A22 and it was executed in January, 1995. He explained that on account of excess work and marketing competition he had to enter into partnership with Dinesh parwani. It was also stated by him that there entire shop is in his possession, although the STD-PCO is in the name of Dinesh Parwani. It was also stated by him that he is an partner of 63% while Dinesh Parwani is a partner of 37%. He has also proved income-tax returns of this partnership firm which are Ex. A23 to Ex. A 32 for the assessment years 1995 to 2000. D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar, D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani, D.W, 4 Dr. B.L. Asawa, D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya and D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani which corroborating the statement of the appellant-tenant categorically stated before the trial court that the suit shop is in possession of the tenant Jagdish and is run by him. D.W. 5 Sh. dinesh Parwani categorically stated before the trial court that the connection of STD-PCO was issued in his name as he was an educated unemployed person and allotment of STD-PCO under rules is permissible to only educated unemployed person and any portion was never sub-let to him and he never paid any rent to the tenant Jagdish. I agree with this submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that the details of sub-let can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot,, be a reason to discard the evidence. I also agree with this submission also that in case of subletting it is difficult for the landlord to prove it by direct evidence or to prove that sub-tenant had paid any rent and the Court may draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. But in the instant case, the trial Judge decided this issue against the plaintiff- landlord not only on account of lack of details in pleadings but also on the ground that there is no such evidence to prove subletting. As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. On the oilier hand explanation given by the appellant-tenant corroborated by other witnesses was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. As far as the case of Dinesh Parwani is concerned, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that STD-PCO connection is in the name of Dinesh Parwani which is going on the suit shop. On perusal of the entire evidence available on the record, the conclusion drawn by the trial court that this STD-PCO business is being carried out in the partnership of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani appears to be sound. A perusal of deed of partnership Ex.A22 executed on 19.1.1995 along with income-tax returns for the assessment years 1995 to 2000 and the oral evidence adduced by the appellant-tenant go to show that this document Ex. A 22 is not after though document, rather it was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. According to this deed of partnership, Sh. Dinesh Parwani invested a sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs in this business as part of the capital and further shares of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani are respectively 63% and 37%. Therefore, merely on account of non-filing account books is not ground to say that this document of deed of partnership is not genuine one further no such conclusion can be drawn on the basis of Telegraph Department Rules that partnership with respect to STD-PCO is barred, although the relevant rules provide that only educated unemployed persons are eligible for allotment of STD- PCO. In view of Amir Ahmed's case (supra), merely allowing another person to carry on business in partnership does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this issue does not call for any interference by this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Next comes to question of nuisance. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. The term 'nuisance' has not been defined under the Act, 1950. In para 5 of the plaint, it is pleaded that the tenant has allowed a number of persons including the antisocial elements to enter the shop to carry on various activities causing nuisance, they use abusive language and throw filthy material and also put cycles etc. so as to create obstruction in the way and thus are causing continuing nuisance. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant is a man of quarrelsome nature and is creating nuisance regularly making it difficult for the plaintiff-landlord to carry on his profession as an advocate. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations vide his written statement with this plea that names of such persons have not been given in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The plaintiff-landlord reiterated all the averments made in the plaint in this regard in the statement before the trial court. It was also stated by him that the appellant-tenant abused him in open and a complaint was got registered with the police. It was also stated by him that the defendant-tenant is parking his motorcycle, scooter etc. so as to create obstruction in approaching his house and office. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant has fixed a number of sign boards and on account of that a number of strangers enter his house to enquiry about typing, photocopies etc-It was also stated by him that only once the defendant-tenant was bound down as provided under Section 107 & 116 Cr.P.C. and in counter he was also bound down under the same provisions at the instance of the defendant-tenant. The appellant-tenant in his statement denied all these allegations and the learned trial Judge haying considered the evidence held that on account of typing work of the defendant-tenant and since it is a commercial area, no case of actionable nuisance is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord submitted that the trial court has not considered the evidence in proper way as the plaintiff-landlord made a number of complaints against me appellant-tenant regarding nuisance, using abusive language and similar activities of nuisance. He placed reliance upon some judgments. In Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and Ors. (33), it was held that private nuisance is one which interferes with a persons' use and enjoyment of immovable property or some right in respect of it. Suffering of damage must be proved in case of nuisance unless it can be presumed by law to exist. But the damage to amount to actionable nuisance must be substantial or at least of some significance. In other words, if the damage is insignificant or trivial it would not be actionable nuisance. In Bhogilal M. Davay v. S.R. Subramania lyer (34), it was held that on the basis of this evidence that the respondent has been abusing and quarreling and this was admitted by the respondent himself, such acts constitute nuisance. In Re A.S. Vijayaraghavalu Chetti (35), it was held that concurrent finding of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Tribunal were that the petitioner has been the cause of frequent quarrels and has made it impossible for the tenants occupying the other portions of the building to live in the house along with the petitioner, there is no ground to interfere.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that admittedly the suit shop is located in a commercial area in the busy market and there can be no nuisance only on account of visitors visiting the suit shop and further typing work etc. cannot be termed as nuisance. It was also submitted that one or two incidents of quarrel, if any, are not sufficient by themselves to constitute any actionable nuisance. Reliance is placed upon Kalyan Sahai v. Smt. Narangi Bai and Ors. (36), it was held by this court that quarrel or hurling of abusive words do not construe any nuisance as required under Section 13(1)(e). Taking similar view by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Amolak Singh v. Madanlal (37), it was held that quarrels between tenant and landlord on some occasions do not amount to nuisance causing interference with comfort of the landlord and there has to be a series of acts and conduct on the part of the tenant so that nuisance can be inferred against him. The mere existence of ill feelings between the landlord and his tenant could not have justified the ejectment in the provision of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'RLW2004(1)Raj608; 2004(1)WLC685',
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$title_for_layout = 'Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma Semantic Analysis'
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		(int) 58 => 'Nasirual Haque's',
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		(int) 61 => 'Satwant Kaur's',
		(int) 62 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 63 => 'Bega Begum',
		(int) 64 => 'Abdul Ahad Khan',
		(int) 65 => 'Shiv Sarup Gupta v.',
		(int) 66 => 'Mahesh Chand Gupta',
		(int) 67 => 'Basant Lal Khatri',
		(int) 68 => 'Megh Raj',
		(int) 69 => 'Amrit Lal',
		(int) 70 => 'M.L. Prabhakar',
		(int) 71 => 'Rajiv Singal',
		(int) 72 => 'Bega Begum',
		(int) 73 => 'Megh Raj',
		(int) 74 => 'M.L. Prabhakar's',
		(int) 75 => 'Kumar Kapoor',
		(int) 76 => 'Vishnu Avtar Sharma',
		(int) 77 => 'Ashok Jasra',
		(int) 78 => 'Shiv Singh',
		(int) 79 => 'Jai Singh',
		(int) 80 => 'Mahesh Chand Sharma',
		(int) 81 => 'S.N. Sharma',
		(int) 82 => 'M.L. Vyas',
		(int) 83 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 84 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 85 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 86 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 87 => 'Jagdish',
		(int) 88 => 'Navjeevan',
		(int) 89 => 'Jaipur Tower',
		(int) 90 => 'Shekhawati Complex',
		(int) 91 => 'Gundali',
		(int) 92 => 'cam',
		(int) 93 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
		(int) 94 => 'Kalyan',
		(int) 95 => 'Amir Ahmed v.',
		(int) 96 => 'Yusuf',
		(int) 97 => 'Hon'ble D.B.',
		(int) 98 => 'Dev Kumar',
		(int) 99 => 'Swaran Lata',
		(int) 100 => 'alias Anandi',
		(int) 101 => 'C. Setharama Nagarkar',
		(int) 102 => 'Angoori Devi',
		(int) 103 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 104 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 105 => 'Hari Singh v.',
		(int) 106 => 'Kannaiya Lal',
		(int) 107 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali',
		(int) 108 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
		(int) 109 => 'Anr',
		(int) 110 => 'Vinayak N.Joshi',
		(int) 111 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal',
		(int) 112 => 'Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan',
		(int) 113 => 'Hari Singh's',
		(int) 114 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's',
		(int) 115 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
		(int) 116 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja's',
		(int) 117 => 'Mohan Lal',
		(int) 118 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
		(int) 119 => 'Ramesh Ajmers',
		(int) 120 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 121 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 122 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 123 => 'B.L. Asawa',
		(int) 124 => 'Jagdish',
		(int) 125 => 'Parwani',
		(int) 126 => 'Jagdish',
		(int) 127 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 128 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 129 => 'Parwani',
		(int) 130 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 131 => 'Amir Ahmed's',
		(int) 132 => 'Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai',
		(int) 133 => 'Kalyan Sahai v. Smt',
		(int) 134 => 'Narangi Bai',
		(int) 135 => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal'
	),
	'CARDINAL' => array(
		(int) 0 => '500/-',
		(int) 1 => '2',
		(int) 2 => '31.10.1991',
		(int) 3 => '4',
		(int) 4 => 'ten',
		(int) 5 => '25.10.2000',
		(int) 6 => '3',
		(int) 7 => '6',
		(int) 8 => '4',
		(int) 9 => '10',
		(int) 10 => '1',
		(int) 11 => 'three',
		(int) 12 => '31.5.2002.6',
		(int) 13 => '1',
		(int) 14 => '30.10.1991',
		(int) 15 => '2',
		(int) 16 => '1',
		(int) 17 => '1',
		(int) 18 => '2',
		(int) 19 => '3',
		(int) 20 => '4',
		(int) 21 => '5',
		(int) 22 => '6',
		(int) 23 => '8).8',
		(int) 24 => '25.10.1986',
		(int) 25 => '500',
		(int) 26 => '3',
		(int) 27 => '1',
		(int) 28 => '9',
		(int) 29 => '10',
		(int) 30 => '11',
		(int) 31 => 'transferee',
		(int) 32 => '3',
		(int) 33 => 'two',
		(int) 34 => '10',
		(int) 35 => '31.10.1991',
		(int) 36 => '6',
		(int) 37 => 'transferee',
		(int) 38 => '25.10.1986',
		(int) 39 => '25.10.1986',
		(int) 40 => '31.10.1991',
		(int) 41 => '1912',
		(int) 42 => '3',
		(int) 43 => '20.9.1985',
		(int) 44 => '1',
		(int) 45 => '1',
		(int) 46 => 'two',
		(int) 47 => '1',
		(int) 48 => '2',
		(int) 49 => '3/4th',
		(int) 50 => '31.5.2002',
		(int) 51 => 'half',
		(int) 52 => '150',
		(int) 53 => '150',
		(int) 54 => '12',
		(int) 55 => '13',
		(int) 56 => '15',
		(int) 57 => '16',
		(int) 58 => 'one',
		(int) 59 => '3/4th',
		(int) 60 => 'two',
		(int) 61 => 'four',
		(int) 62 => '1000',
		(int) 63 => '17',
		(int) 64 => '18',
		(int) 65 => '19',
		(int) 66 => '20',
		(int) 67 => '21',
		(int) 68 => 'thousands',
		(int) 69 => '1',
		(int) 70 => '15',
		(int) 71 => '20',
		(int) 72 => 'two',
		(int) 73 => '4',
		(int) 74 => '1000',
		(int) 75 => '3/4th',
		(int) 76 => '3/4th',
		(int) 77 => '3'9'x',
		(int) 78 => 'thousands',
		(int) 79 => '1',
		(int) 80 => '4',
		(int) 81 => '4',
		(int) 82 => '4',
		(int) 83 => '22',
		(int) 84 => '23',
		(int) 85 => '24',
		(int) 86 => '25',
		(int) 87 => '26',
		(int) 88 => '28',
		(int) 89 => '29',
		(int) 90 => '30',
		(int) 91 => '31',
		(int) 92 => 'four',
		(int) 93 => 'two',
		(int) 94 => 'between other two',
		(int) 95 => '1',
		(int) 96 => '5',
		(int) 97 => 'two',
		(int) 98 => '1',
		(int) 99 => 'one',
		(int) 100 => '32',
		(int) 101 => '4',
		(int) 102 => '19.1.1995',
		(int) 103 => '22',
		(int) 104 => '1.50',
		(int) 105 => 'one',
		(int) 106 => '5',
		(int) 107 => '33',
		(int) 108 => '34',
		(int) 109 => 'one',
		(int) 110 => 'two',
		(int) 111 => '36',
		(int) 112 => 'one',
		(int) 113 => 'two'
	),
	'GPE' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Jaipur',
		(int) 1 => 'Clause',
		(int) 2 => 'Clause',
		(int) 3 => 'T.K.',
		(int) 4 => 'T.K.',
		(int) 5 => 'Sk',
		(int) 6 => 'Smt',
		(int) 7 => 'Clause',
		(int) 8 => 'Clause',
		(int) 9 => 'Clause',
		(int) 10 => 'S.R.',
		(int) 11 => 'S.R.',
		(int) 12 => 'L.Rs',
		(int) 13 => 'S.N. Kapoor',
		(int) 14 => 'Jaipur',
		(int) 15 => 'PW',
		(int) 16 => 'Surendra',
		(int) 17 => 'PW',
		(int) 18 => 'Ganpati Plaza',
		(int) 19 => 'Jaipur',
		(int) 20 => 'Rajasthan',
		(int) 21 => 'Roop Chand',
		(int) 22 => 'Roop Chand's',
		(int) 23 => 'Pandey',
		(int) 24 => 'D.W',
		(int) 25 => 'P.C.',
		(int) 26 => 'Bhogilal',
		(int) 27 => 'S.R.',
		(int) 28 => 'Subramania'
	),
	'TIME' => array(
		(int) 0 => '3 to Section 11'
	),
	'FAC' => array(
		(int) 0 => '30.6.1985',
		(int) 1 => 'Dhirendra Nath Gorai's'
	),
	'PRODUCT' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Mst',
		(int) 1 => 'LRs',
		(int) 2 => 'Suresh',
		(int) 3 => 'Dinesh'
	),
	'QUANTITY' => array(
		(int) 0 => '300 sq. ft'
	),
	'EVENT' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'PW 8 Sh'
	),
	'PERCENT' => array(
		(int) 0 => '63%',
		(int) 1 => '37%',
		(int) 2 => '63%',
		(int) 3 => '37%'
	)
)
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '765114',
		'acts' => 'Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 14(3); <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 5',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 15 of 2001',
		'appellant' => 'Jagdish',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. - No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop. 14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. 21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. 22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B. Dutta, Senior Counsel and; J.P. Goyal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.M. Ranjan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-09-23',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.C. Goyal, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.C. Goyal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Brief facts giving rise to this first appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit on 21.9.1993 for eviction from the suit shop on the grounds of default in payment of rent, reasonable and bonafide necessity; sub-letting and nuisance with the averments that the shop measuring 15'x 20'ft situated on Moti Lalo Atal Road, Jaipur was let out to the appellant-defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 500/- on certain terms and conditions mentioned in para 2 of the plaint. The tenancy was oral. The defendant did not pay rent from the month of May, 1992. The plaintiff requires the suit shop for his own profession. The plaintiff has no residential house of his own at Jaipur. He wants to construct residential house upon the details of other grounds of eviction, he prayed for decree of eviction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The defendant in his written statement pleaded that the suit shop was let out to his father by plaintiff's father. Denying all the grounds of eviction, it was pleaded that rent upto September, 1990 was paid to Mr. C.N. Sharma, father, of the plaintiff. Thereafter, he was informed vide letter dated 31.10.1991 that rent from October, 1990 may be paid to the plaintiff. Hence he paid the rent to the plaintiff but the plaintiff declined to accept the rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Rejoinder was submitted by the plaintiff. Amended pleadings were also filedby the parties from time to time. '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed ten issues. After recording evidence of the parties, it was held vide judgment dated 25.10.2000 that landlord required the suit shop reasonably and bonafide, and that the comparative hardship would be caused to the landlord, if the decree of eviction is not passed. Issues No. 3 with regard to partial eviction and No. 6 with regard to default in payment of rent were also decided in favour of the landlord. Issues No. 4, 5 and 10 relating to subletting, nuisance and inconsistent use of the shop for the purpose it was let out were decided against the plaintiff. In conclusion, the trial court decreed the suit of the landlord for eviction, hence this appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned senior counsel Mr. B. Dutt appearing for the appellant-tenant raised three points, first point is that the suit for eviction was not maintainable, the second and third points are that issues with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were wrongly decided by the trial court in cursory manner without considering all the evidence. Attention in this regard was drawn to the application moved on behalf of the appellant-tenant on 31.5.2002.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(3) Restriction on Eviction: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. According to learned senior counsel, the suit shop was let out for business purposes and according to the case of the plaintiff-landlord the original landlord was Sh. C.N. Sharma father of the plaintiff who vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 informed the appellant-tenant to pay rent to the plaintiff from 1.10.1990 and thus the plaintiff became the new landlord and fresh terms and conditions were agreed between them as mentioned in para 2 of the plaint and thus the plaintiff had no right to file a suit for eviction on the grounds set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out the tenant, reliance is placed upon. T.K. Lathika v. Seth Karsandas Jamnadas (1), Smt. Menoka Rani Pal v. Smt. Maya Rani Karmakar (2), Govind Narain v. Mohan Singh (3), Ram Saran Sharma v. Kamala Acharya (4), A. Ranganatham Chettl and Ors. v. M. Ethirajulu Nayudu (5), Martin and Harris Limited v. Vith Additional Distt. Judge and Ors. (6), Ram Narayan Sharma v. Shakuntala Gaur, (7), Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh (8).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that initially Sh. Thanwar Das father of the appellant- tenant was the tenant in the year 1979/1980. Sh. Thanwar Das expired on 25.10.1986 and thereafter the appellant-tenant stated paying the rent as tenant to Sh. C.N. Sharma the original landlord and thereafter to the plaintiff on receiving information as such vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 and monthly rent of Rs. 500 was never enhanced and no rent note was executed and terms and conditions of the tenancy were not altered and thus no new tenancy came into existence, hence Section 14 (3) of the Act is not attracted. It was next submitted that the suit for eviction was instituted in September, 1993 and no such objection was taken by the appellant-tenant in written statement, during trial and even in the memo of appeal and as such the appellant- tenant waived this right if available to him. He placed reliance upon 1. Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2. Subal Chandra Nath Saha and Ors. v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Ors. (9), SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate (10), V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai and Anr. (11) and also relied upon Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra) the original landlord gifted the tenanted premises to his daughter, the transferee landlord. Proviso 3 to Section 11 (3) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act provided that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument. The daughter without waiting for the moratorium period of one year from the date of gift to expire filed eviction petition. Having found two differences in the terms of the old and fresh lease that (i) name of landlord was changed from father to daughter and (ii) rent payable was increased from Rs. 65 per month to Rs. 150 per month. It was held that moratorium period would apply from the date of fresh lease de'ed. This judgment is no instrument of transfer of the suit shop by the original landlord in the name of the plaintiff. A perusal of the letter Ex. 10 dated 31.10.1991 goes to show that Sh. C.N. Sharma, original landlord (HUF), informed the tenant to pay the rent to his son Sh. Manoj Kumar Sharma, the plaintiff, from 1.10.1990 as on account of a family settlement on 27.2.1990, the suit shop had fallen to his share. In para 6 of the written statement, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that the original landlord Sh. C.N. Sharma'did not receive the rent on account of his family reasons and he was informed by pay rent vide this letter to the plaintiff. Ex. 55 is memorandum of family settlement and Ex. 56 is the registered memorandum of family settlement cum partition deed. On perusal of these documents, it is evident that the suit shop was part of the entire properties of HUF and this shop came to the share of the plaintiff on account of family partition and as such it does not amount to any transfer of the property as defined under Section 5 of the <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a>. Such plea was taken in Sk. Mohd. Choudhari and V.N. Sarin's case (both supra). In V.N. Sarin's case (supra) while dealing with the similar provisions contained in Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the process of partition, therefore, involves the transfer of enjoyment of the properties into an enjoyment in severally by them of the respective properties allotted to their shares. Having regard to this basic character of joint Hindu family property, it cannot be denied that each coparcener has an antecedent title to the said property, though its extent is not determined until partition takes place. That being so, partition really means that whereas initially all the coparceners have subsisting title to the totality of the property of the family jointly, that joint title is by partition transformed into separate titles of the individual coparceners in respect of several items of properties allotted to them respectively. Thus, it cannot be said that the suit shop has been acquired by the plaintiff by transfer and so Section 14(3) of the Act cannot be invoked by the appellant. On the same reasonings as discussed here-inabove, the judgment delivered in Smt. Menoka Rani Pal's case (supra) is also not applicable because the transferee landlady acquired the title of the suit premises by purchase and thus eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement was not allowed in view of the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act. In Govind Narain's case (supra), the terms of the tenancy were changed and new tenancy agreement was entered into or a new lease was executed by the tenant and thus the existing tenancy was deemed to have been surrendered and the fact that tenant continued to remain in possession will be of no consequence and Section 14(3) of the Act would apply meaning thereby the premises will be deemed to have been let out to the tenant from the date of commencement of the new tenancy and not from the date of original tenancy. In the instant case, the suit shop was let out to father of the appellant much before 25.10.1986. On the death of appellant's father on 25.10.1986, the appellant continued to pay the rent to the original landlord and continued to pay the rent at the same rate of Rs. 500 per month to the plaintiff in pursuance of letter Ex.10 dated 31.10.1991. No rent note was executed, rent was not enhanced and not terms and conditions of the tenancy were changed, hence no new tenancy came into existence. Similarly the judgment of this Court delivered in Ram Saran Sharma's case (supra) would also not apply as eviction suit was filed by the new landlord who become absolute owner of the suit properly by virtue of valid gift deed. The decision of Privy Council in. A. Ranganatham Chetti and Others's case (supra) is also not applicable as though the physical possession was continuous from 1912 onwards, the possession from 1.10.1922 was attributable to a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra) the respondent No. 3 had purchased the premises on 30.6.1985 and issued a notice to the tenant on 20.9.1985 but filed application for eviction in January, 1986 and the case was taken up for hearing after there years of purchase. The point for consideration was whether the landlord's application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction) Act was not maintainable in view of the proviso to the said section as it was filed before the expiry of there years from the date of purchase of the suit premises by the landlord. It was held that the proviso to Section 21(1) bars entertainment of the application, therefore, the stage at which the Court has to consider whether grounds mentioned in Clause (a) are made out or not will be reached when the Court takes up the application for consideration on merits. In the instant case, Section 14(3) of the Act provides that no suit for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall lie before the expiry of five years. But as stated hereinabove in Marthin's case (supra) the landlord became owner of the suit premises by purchases, thus on the basis of this judgment also, the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant is not acceptable. On the basis of the similar reasoning the judgment delivered in Ram Narayan Sharma's case (supra) is also not applicable as it was also a case of purchaser landlord.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Now another submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that appellant-tenant waived his right even if available to him is taken up. It is not disputed that no such objection was taken in the written statement, during the trial and even in the memo of appeal by the appellant-tenant. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant, Section 14(3) of the Act puts a complete embargo on institution of the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, such question of law can be raised at any stage. In Sardar Singh's case (supra), this Court held that objection under Section 14(3) of the Act can be allowed to be raised in second appeal, despite that such objection was not pressed before first Appellate Court. There is important distinction between the facts of two cases as in the instant case, no such objection was raised even upto the filing of this appeal in this Court while in Sardar Singh's case (supra) such objection was taken in the written statement. Assuming that such objection can be raised in this appeal, the point is whether the appellant-tenant waived this right. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that since the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act create a complete restriction on filing the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement before the expiry of five years, no such waiver can be pleaded. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that such a right can be waived. In Dhirendra Nath Gorai's case (supra) the judgment debtor who received the notice of the proclamation of sale, did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or did not object to the non-compliance with Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act which provide that the Court should specify in the sale proclamation the property to be sold. It was held that non-compliance with Section 35 in specifying the property to be sold is a defect in the proclamation within the meaning of the second proviso to Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C, and such mandatory provision can be waived only if it is not conceived in the public interest but in the interest of the party that waives it. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. It was also held that this prohibition was for protection to the tenant and waiving of such protection by the tenant did not contravene the law. The prohibition was not in public benefit but for his private benefit so he could waive it. In the instant case, the provision contained in Section 14(3) of the Act are for protection of the tenant and the tenant-appellant in the instant case, did not take any objection in this regard till final submissions made in this appeal. Consequently, it must be held that the provision for five years period before filing the suit, though is mandatory and confers protection to the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. In the facts of the present case there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant- Jenant did not think it fit to pursue that point and. on the contrary joined issues on merits and having lost therein and got and adverse decision did not think it fit even to challenge the decision on that ground even while filing an appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, it must be held that the appellant-tenant had waived this right available to him under Section 14(3) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Now second and third objections raised on behalf of the appellant-tenant are taken up. Section 14(3) of the Act reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(2) Restriction on eviction:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is significant that issue No. 2 with regard to reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff was decided in favour of the plaintiff-landlord by the trial court and findings of the trial court on this issue were not challenged by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant at the time of making final submissions. Learned senior counsel confined his submissions with regard to findings of the trial court on the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction. It was contended that the trial court has not critically examined the question of hardship and partial eviction; the trial court did not consider the availability of other reasonable accommodation to the parties; there was no sufficient evidence or material on record for the trial court to reach the satisfaction as provided in Section 14(3) of the Act. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. He referred the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. Learned senior counsel on the basis of the application submitted on 31.5.2002 under Section 14 of the Act contended that the appellant-tenant will be ready to vacate the half of the tenanted premises under his possession and thus the appellant-tenant is still ready to vacate 150 sq. ft. area for the plaintiff which would be sufficient to satisfy his requirement and in the alternative the appellant is further ready to vacate the entire suit shop for a certain period in case the landlord is desirous to re-build the entire premises in his possession including the suit shop on the condition to reserve his right ore-enter in the building comprising 150 sq. carpet area with such terms of tenancy already existing between the parties and for that a commissioner may be appointed by the Court for sorting out the possibility of division for partial eviction of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance is placed upon Nasirul Haque v. Jitendra Nath Dey (12), Krishna Murari Prasad v. Mitar Singh (13), Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada (14), Satwant Kaur v. Dhund Singh (15), S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan and Ors. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Krishna Murari Prasad's case (supra), it was held that it is necessary to make enquiry as to indivisibility of suit premises and drawing presumption merely because suit premises consist one room overlooking factor of dimension of room is not proper. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. In Satwant Kaur's case (supra), it was held that eviction from the entire shop claimed by the landlord for starting motor battery business was not justified and the nature of landlord's business does not require much space, hence partial eviction was upheld. In S.R. Babu's case (supra), it was held that the requirement of the suit premises by the landlord for personal use implies its use not only in the existing condition but also on making necessary repairs to or reconstruction of the same and the court should not pass the order of eviction against a tenant who is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in that building and there is no other building available in the locality for the tenant to carry on such trade or the business. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord while referring the evidence of the parties on the these issued contended that the learned trial Judge having discussed the entire evidence came to this conclusion that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord for the entire suit shop is not only reasonable but bonafide also and relevant factors with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were also considered while considering the issue of requirement and also considered the evidence of the parties while deciding the issues relating to comparative hardship and partial eviction. According to learned counsel for the plaintiff- landlord, the plaintiff is an advocate practicing in various courts since long and he has no office of his own; that he shares the office of his father who is also a practicing advocate and keeping in view the size of the suit shop, its partial eviction is not possible. It was also submitted that the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, with regard to 3/4th portion of the suit shop was in context of only office for the plaintiff-landlord while requirement of the plaintiff was two fold-for the office and for the construction of residential house over the roof of the suit shop and both the requirements were adjudged as reasonable and bonafide by the trial court. He also referred the statement of PW.7 Sh. G.S. Bapna, Chartered Engineer & Valuer who stated, that for four advocates, Munshi, driver, typist, the requirement is 1000 sq. ft. space and he further stated that plaintiff has no conference room; there is no spacejor secretarial work; there is no space for clients to sit and all of them sit in a congested manner; there is no separate chamber for the staff, advocate, for conference room, for clients, for library etc. It was also submitted that the suit shop is in possession of the present appellant since October, 1986 and prior to that it was with his father. Reliance is placed upon Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs and Ors. (17), Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (18), S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS. v. Basant Lal Khatri and Ors. (19), Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. and Co. v. Amrit Lal (20) and M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal (21). In Mst. Bega Begum and Ors.'s case (supra), it was held that it is not doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree of eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiff a decree for eviction. In deciding the extent of the hardship, each parly has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants. In Shiv Sarup Gupia's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the landlord cannot be forced to squeeze into less suitable premises just to protect the tenant's occupancy. In S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held that some discretion has to be allowed in favour of the landlord and the court should not impose there own wisdom as to how the landlord should arrange his affairs and ought not to be carried away by sympathy for the tenant. In Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. & Co.'s case (supra), facts were that the landlord proved his bonafide requirement of shop and the tenant's plea was that he is in possession for 50 years and he is likely to lose thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him. It was held that this was natural hardship not amounting to greater hardship under Section 14(2) of the Act. In M.L. Prabhakar's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the totality of the circumstances including their professions, vocation, style of life, habits and backgrounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. 1 have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. The dimensions of the suit shop are 15ft. x 20ft. = 300 sq. ft. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. This submission cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the trial court that these points were not critically examined and were decided in a very cursory manner. The plaintiff-landlord is a practicing advocate for a number of years. According to his statement, he was a practicing lawyer for last 16 years; that he has no office of his own and no residential house of his own; that he along with his colleagues, staff and clients sits in a portion of the office occupied by his father who is also an advocate; that he is residing with his family members in two rooms accommodation provided by his father; that he has no house of his own at Jaipur and as such he is facing great hardship PW.2 Brij Bihari Sharma, PW. 4 Surendra Kumar Kapoor, PW.5 Vishnu Avtar Sharma, PW.6 Ashok Jasra all clients supported his statement that the accommodation for the office available with the plaintiff is much congested. PW.3 Ramesh Chand Bansal also supported the statement of the plaintiff-landlord that sarva shri Shiv Singh, Jai Singh, Mahesh Chand Sharma, S.N. Sharma, M.L. Vyas, Hihal Chand Jain all the advocates are also working with the plainlif landlord. He has also named Munshi, driver, steno etc. and corroborated the statement of the plaintiff that he has no office of his own, no place for library etc. P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna also supported the statement of the plaintiff with regards to his requirement, hardship and partial eviction. According to his statement, 1000 sq. ft. is required for plaintiff advocate, his associates and the staff. Much stress was put on the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, that according to his statement the requirement of the plaintiff would suffice if the 3/4th portion of the suit shop is vacated and thus partial eviction is possible. PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma stated in cross- examination that minimum requirement for the office of the plaintiff should be 3/4th but definite opinion of this point may be given by architect. But on the basis of the statement of PW. 8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, no such conclusion can be drawn that partial eviction of suit shop is possible. On the basis of the statement of PW 8 Sh; C.N. Sharma, if it is taken that 3/4th portion of the suit shop may serve the purpose of plaintiff-landlord, remaining 1/4th portion of the appellant-tenant. Thus, the appellant-tenant would get the portion of dimension so 3'9'x 5'-75sq. ft. It is nowhere the case of the appellant-tenant that this much portion would serve his purpose. The appellant-tenant Sh. Jagdish stated that in the same area a number of commercial complexes namely Ganpati Plaza, Navjeevan complex, Jaipur Tower, Shekhawati Complex are situated but he is not in a position to have any shop in this area because he is unable lo pay huge amount of pagri and further he is carrying on his business in the suit shop for about a period of 20 years and thus he has earned goodwill and he will suffer a loss of thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Keeping in view the entire discussion made hereinabove, 1 find no ground to interfere with the findings of the trial court that the alternative accommodation is available in nearby area and simply that the appellant-tenant has to pay more rent or it would be difficult for him to recover outstanding amount from the customers are no grounds to hold that comparative hardship would be caused to the tenant instead of landlord. In view of the entire discussion, the application under Section 14(2) of the Act is liable to be rejected for partial eviction on the grounds mentioned in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Now cross objections filed by the plaintiff-landlord are taken up. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord has challenged the finding of the trial court on the issues of subletting and nuisance. Learned trial court while dealing with the issue No. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. In para 4 of the amended plaint, it was pleaded that the tenant is not occupying the shop and he is sub-letting the shop to various persons from time to time and receives money from them. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations in his written statement. In para 4 of the rejoinder, the plaintiff-landlord pleaded that before and after filing of the suit the appellant-tenant let-out the suit shop to Sh. Ramesh Gundali an employee in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, Sh. Kalyan an employee in Law Department, State of Rajasthan and others persons.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The learned trial Judge cam to this conclusion that subletting to Ramesh Gundali, Kalyan and others persons is not proved at all and evidence in this regard cannot be relied upon in absence of specific pleadings. With regard to subletting to Dinesh, it was observed that he is carrying on business of STD/PCO in partnership of the appellant-tenant in a portion of the suit shop and this it does not amount to subletting. In Amir Ahmed v. Yusuf (22), it was held by Hon'ble D.B. of this Court that merely allowing another person to use premises or its part and conversion of exclusive possession of premises by a tenant into joint possession with a third person does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Similar view was taken in Dev Kumar (died) through LRs. v. Smt. Swaran Lata and Ors. (23). In Smt. Laxmi alias Anandi and Ors. v. C. Setharama Nagarkar and Ors. (24), it was held that the landlord should prove as to when sub-tenancy was created and in absence of that, eviction on such ground cannot be ordered. In Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi (25), it was held that mere presence of persons other than the tenant in shop is no ground to presume subletting. Per contra learned counsel for the plaintiff-land lord contended that the plaintiff-landlord and his witnesses were not cross-examination on this point; that evidence cannot be discarded merely in absence of specific pleadings; that High Court in revision allowed the parties to lead evidence on this point; that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; that as per telephone rules, business of STD-PCO is not permissible in partnership. He placed reliance upon M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (26), Hari Singh v. Kannaiya Lal (27), Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (28), Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali (D) by LRs. (29), Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Anr. v. Vinayak N.Joshi and Ors. (30), Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal (31) and Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan (32). In M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd's case (supra), it was held that in case of subletting it is difficult for landlord to prove it by direct evidence or whether sub-tenant had paid monetary consideration and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. In Hari Singh's case (supra), it was held that details of subletting can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot Ute a reason to set aside concurrent findings of the fact. In Roop Chand's case (supra), it was held that when the larger part of the premises was let out to a club registered under Companies Act while tenant retains possession of the smaller part of the premises, it would amount that the tenant parted with the possession and is liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. In Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's case (supra), the tenant entered into partnership with his four sons in 1955. Thereafter, the tenant and his two sons retired from the partnership in 1974 when new partnership came between other two sons. It was held that original tenant having no concern with premises or business therein, it was a case of subletting. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat and another's case (supra), court below arrived at concurrent finding of subletting on account of amended version of the plaint stating that pending the suit the defendants have or any of them has inducted defendants No. 1 to 5 unlawfully. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that High Court erred in overturning conclusions of two fact finding courts on the ground that averments regarding subletting was insufficient. In Janak Raj Ahuja's case (supra) the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that through the partnership deed was produced by the tenant but account books and income tax returns were not produced, it was held that partnership was merely camouflage and it was a case of subletting. Similar view was taken in Harbhajan Singh's case (supra). It was further observed that moreover, as per rules of Telegraph Department, there can be no partnership with respect to STD/PCO.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 have considered the rival submission in the light of the judgments, judgment of the trial court and evidence available on the record. The plaintiff-landlord in his statement tried to support the averments made in the plaint, while the appellant-tenant stated that he never let out any portion of the shop to anyone and he never parted with possession of any part of the shop. According to his statement, the persons named by the plaintiff namely Thakur, Mohan Lal, Suresh were his salary paid workers. He further deposed that Ramesh Gundali and Sh. Kalayan were his customers and one Pandey was a typist and another typist Ramesh Ajmers is no doing his typing job in a separate shop. He also explained photos showing the presence of these persons produced by the plaintiff. He admitted in his statement that Dinesh Parwani is doing STD PCO job in the suit sbop but with him as partner and the partnership deed is Ex. A22 and it was executed in January, 1995. He explained that on account of excess work and marketing competition he had to enter into partnership with Dinesh parwani. It was also stated by him that there entire shop is in his possession, although the STD-PCO is in the name of Dinesh Parwani. It was also stated by him that he is an partner of 63% while Dinesh Parwani is a partner of 37%. He has also proved income-tax returns of this partnership firm which are Ex. A23 to Ex. A 32 for the assessment years 1995 to 2000. D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar, D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani, D.W, 4 Dr. B.L. Asawa, D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya and D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani which corroborating the statement of the appellant-tenant categorically stated before the trial court that the suit shop is in possession of the tenant Jagdish and is run by him. D.W. 5 Sh. dinesh Parwani categorically stated before the trial court that the connection of STD-PCO was issued in his name as he was an educated unemployed person and allotment of STD-PCO under rules is permissible to only educated unemployed person and any portion was never sub-let to him and he never paid any rent to the tenant Jagdish. I agree with this submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that the details of sub-let can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot,, be a reason to discard the evidence. I also agree with this submission also that in case of subletting it is difficult for the landlord to prove it by direct evidence or to prove that sub-tenant had paid any rent and the Court may draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. But in the instant case, the trial Judge decided this issue against the plaintiff- landlord not only on account of lack of details in pleadings but also on the ground that there is no such evidence to prove subletting. As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. On the oilier hand explanation given by the appellant-tenant corroborated by other witnesses was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. As far as the case of Dinesh Parwani is concerned, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that STD-PCO connection is in the name of Dinesh Parwani which is going on the suit shop. On perusal of the entire evidence available on the record, the conclusion drawn by the trial court that this STD-PCO business is being carried out in the partnership of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani appears to be sound. A perusal of deed of partnership Ex.A22 executed on 19.1.1995 along with income-tax returns for the assessment years 1995 to 2000 and the oral evidence adduced by the appellant-tenant go to show that this document Ex. A 22 is not after though document, rather it was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. According to this deed of partnership, Sh. Dinesh Parwani invested a sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs in this business as part of the capital and further shares of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani are respectively 63% and 37%. Therefore, merely on account of non-filing account books is not ground to say that this document of deed of partnership is not genuine one further no such conclusion can be drawn on the basis of Telegraph Department Rules that partnership with respect to STD-PCO is barred, although the relevant rules provide that only educated unemployed persons are eligible for allotment of STD- PCO. In view of Amir Ahmed's case (supra), merely allowing another person to carry on business in partnership does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this issue does not call for any interference by this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Next comes to question of nuisance. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. The term 'nuisance' has not been defined under the Act, 1950. In para 5 of the plaint, it is pleaded that the tenant has allowed a number of persons including the antisocial elements to enter the shop to carry on various activities causing nuisance, they use abusive language and throw filthy material and also put cycles etc. so as to create obstruction in the way and thus are causing continuing nuisance. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant is a man of quarrelsome nature and is creating nuisance regularly making it difficult for the plaintiff-landlord to carry on his profession as an advocate. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations vide his written statement with this plea that names of such persons have not been given in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The plaintiff-landlord reiterated all the averments made in the plaint in this regard in the statement before the trial court. It was also stated by him that the appellant-tenant abused him in open and a complaint was got registered with the police. It was also stated by him that the defendant-tenant is parking his motorcycle, scooter etc. so as to create obstruction in approaching his house and office. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant has fixed a number of sign boards and on account of that a number of strangers enter his house to enquiry about typing, photocopies etc-It was also stated by him that only once the defendant-tenant was bound down as provided under Section 107 & 116 Cr.P.C. and in counter he was also bound down under the same provisions at the instance of the defendant-tenant. The appellant-tenant in his statement denied all these allegations and the learned trial Judge haying considered the evidence held that on account of typing work of the defendant-tenant and since it is a commercial area, no case of actionable nuisance is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord submitted that the trial court has not considered the evidence in proper way as the plaintiff-landlord made a number of complaints against me appellant-tenant regarding nuisance, using abusive language and similar activities of nuisance. He placed reliance upon some judgments. In Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and Ors. (33), it was held that private nuisance is one which interferes with a persons' use and enjoyment of immovable property or some right in respect of it. Suffering of damage must be proved in case of nuisance unless it can be presumed by law to exist. But the damage to amount to actionable nuisance must be substantial or at least of some significance. In other words, if the damage is insignificant or trivial it would not be actionable nuisance. In Bhogilal M. Davay v. S.R. Subramania lyer (34), it was held that on the basis of this evidence that the respondent has been abusing and quarreling and this was admitted by the respondent himself, such acts constitute nuisance. In Re A.S. Vijayaraghavalu Chetti (35), it was held that concurrent finding of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Tribunal were that the petitioner has been the cause of frequent quarrels and has made it impossible for the tenants occupying the other portions of the building to live in the house along with the petitioner, there is no ground to interfere.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that admittedly the suit shop is located in a commercial area in the busy market and there can be no nuisance only on account of visitors visiting the suit shop and further typing work etc. cannot be termed as nuisance. It was also submitted that one or two incidents of quarrel, if any, are not sufficient by themselves to constitute any actionable nuisance. Reliance is placed upon Kalyan Sahai v. Smt. Narangi Bai and Ors. (36), it was held by this court that quarrel or hurling of abusive words do not construe any nuisance as required under Section 13(1)(e). Taking similar view by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Amolak Singh v. Madanlal (37), it was held that quarrels between tenant and landlord on some occasions do not amount to nuisance causing interference with comfort of the landlord and there has to be a series of acts and conduct on the part of the tenant so that nuisance can be inferred against him. The mere existence of ill feelings between the landlord and his tenant could not have justified the ejectment in the provision of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			(int) 17 => 'Section 14(2',
			(int) 18 => 'Section 14(2',
			(int) 19 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 20 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 21 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 22 => 'Section 107 &',
			(int) 23 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
			(int) 24 => 'Section 13(1)(e'
		),
		'ORG' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'A.C. Goyal',
			(int) 1 => 'the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction',
			(int) 2 => 'M. Ethirajulu Nayudu',
			(int) 3 => 'Martin and Harris Limited',
			(int) 4 => 'Ors',
			(int) 5 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
			(int) 6 => 'Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control',
			(int) 7 => 'HUF',
			(int) 8 => 'HUF',
			(int) 9 => 'Choudhari',
			(int) 10 => 'Delhi Rent Control Act',
			(int) 11 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 12 => 'the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act',
			(int) 13 => 'Court',
			(int) 14 => 'Privy Council',
			(int) 15 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
			(int) 16 => 'U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction',
			(int) 17 => 'Court',
			(int) 18 => 'Court',
			(int) 19 => 'Court',
			(int) 20 => 'first Appellate Court',
			(int) 21 => 'Court',
			(int) 22 => 'Court',
			(int) 23 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
			(int) 24 => 'Act.10',
			(int) 25 => 'PW.8 Sh',
			(int) 26 => 'carpet',
			(int) 27 => 'Court',
			(int) 28 => 'Reliance',
			(int) 29 => 'Nasirul Haque',
			(int) 30 => 'Ors',
			(int) 31 => 'Court',
			(int) 32 => 'PW.8 Sh',
			(int) 33 => 'G.S. Bapna',
			(int) 34 => 'Chartered Engineer & Valuer',
			(int) 35 => 'Munshi',
			(int) 36 => 'Reliance',
			(int) 37 => 'Ors',
			(int) 38 => 'Ors',
			(int) 39 => 'S.N. Kapoor',
			(int) 40 => 'Ors',
			(int) 41 => 'Firm Mool Chand',
			(int) 42 => 'Co.',
			(int) 43 => 'Ors',
			(int) 44 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 45 => 'LRS',
			(int) 46 => 'Firm Mool',
			(int) 47 => '& Co.'s',
			(int) 48 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 49 => 'Hihal Chand Jain',
			(int) 50 => 'Munshi',
			(int) 51 => 'P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna',
			(int) 52 => 'PW.8 Sh',
			(int) 53 => 'Rajasthan State Electricity Board',
			(int) 54 => 'Law Department',
			(int) 55 => 'State',
			(int) 56 => 'Dinesh',
			(int) 57 => 'STD',
			(int) 58 => 'Court',
			(int) 59 => 'Prasad',
			(int) 60 => 'High Court',
			(int) 61 => 'STD',
			(int) 62 => 'Life Insurance Corporation of India',
			(int) 63 => 'Ors',
			(int) 64 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
			(int) 65 => 'High Court',
			(int) 66 => 'the Punjab & Haryana High Court',
			(int) 67 => 'Telegraph Department',
			(int) 68 => 'STD',
			(int) 69 => 'Thakur',
			(int) 70 => 'Kalayan',
			(int) 71 => 'STD',
			(int) 72 => 'STD',
			(int) 73 => 'D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar',
			(int) 74 => 'D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani',
			(int) 75 => 'D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya',
			(int) 76 => 'D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 77 => 'STD',
			(int) 78 => 'STD',
			(int) 79 => 'Court',
			(int) 80 => 'STD',
			(int) 81 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 82 => 'STD',
			(int) 83 => 'Telegraph Department Rules',
			(int) 84 => 'STD',
			(int) 85 => 'the Appellate Tribunal',
			(int) 86 => 'Reliance',
			(int) 87 => 'Ors',
			(int) 88 => 'the Punjab & Haryana High Court'
		),
		'NORP' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'J.1',
			(int) 1 => 'Lathika',
			(int) 2 => 'Lathika',
			(int) 3 => 'Hindu',
			(int) 4 => 'Brij Bihari Sharma'
		),
		'ORDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'first',
			(int) 1 => 'first',
			(int) 2 => 'second',
			(int) 3 => 'third',
			(int) 4 => 'second',
			(int) 5 => 'second',
			(int) 6 => 'second',
			(int) 7 => 'third',
			(int) 8 => 'third'
		),
		'DATE' => array(
			(int) 0 => '15'x 20'ft',
			(int) 1 => 'monthly',
			(int) 2 => 'the month of May, 1992',
			(int) 3 => 'September, 1990',
			(int) 4 => 'October, 1990',
			(int) 5 => '5',
			(int) 6 => '1950',
			(int) 7 => 'five years',
			(int) 8 => 'five years',
			(int) 9 => 'the year 1979/1980',
			(int) 10 => '30.10.1991',
			(int) 11 => 'monthly',
			(int) 12 => 'September, 1993',
			(int) 13 => 'the expiry of one year',
			(int) 14 => 'one year',
			(int) 15 => '65 per month',
			(int) 16 => '150 per month',
			(int) 17 => '27.2.1990',
			(int) 18 => '55',
			(int) 19 => '56',
			(int) 20 => '1882',
			(int) 21 => '500 per month',
			(int) 22 => 'January, 1986',
			(int) 23 => 'years',
			(int) 24 => 'years',
			(int) 25 => 'five years',
			(int) 26 => 'five years',
			(int) 27 => 'six months',
			(int) 28 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 29 => 'five years',
			(int) 30 => 'Section 14(3',
			(int) 31 => '14',
			(int) 32 => 'October, 1986',
			(int) 33 => '50 years',
			(int) 34 => 'a number of years',
			(int) 35 => 'last 16 years',
			(int) 36 => '20 years',
			(int) 37 => '27',
			(int) 38 => '32',
			(int) 39 => '1955',
			(int) 40 => '1974',
			(int) 41 => 'January, 1995',
			(int) 42 => 'the assessment years 1995 to 2000',
			(int) 43 => 'the assessment years 1995 to 2000',
			(int) 44 => '1950',
			(int) 45 => '35',
			(int) 46 => '37'
		),
		'PERSON' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Moti Lalo Atal Road',
			(int) 1 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 2 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 3 => 'B. Dutt',
			(int) 4 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 5 => 'Ex.10',
			(int) 6 => 'T.K. Lathika',
			(int) 7 => 'Seth Karsandas Jamnadas',
			(int) 8 => 'Rani Pal v. Smt',
			(int) 9 => 'Maya Rani Karmakar',
			(int) 10 => 'Govind Narain v.',
			(int) 11 => 'Mohan Singh',
			(int) 12 => 'Ram Saran Sharma',
			(int) 13 => 'Kamala Acharya',
			(int) 14 => 'A. Ranganatham Chettl',
			(int) 15 => 'Ram Narayan Sharma',
			(int) 16 => 'Shakuntala Gaur',
			(int) 17 => 'Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh',
			(int) 18 => 'Thanwar Das',
			(int) 19 => 'Thanwar Das',
			(int) 20 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 21 => 'Ex.10',
			(int) 22 => 'Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2',
			(int) 23 => 'Chandra Nath Saha',
			(int) 24 => 'Sudhir Chandra Ghosh',
			(int) 25 => 'Mohd',
			(int) 26 => 'Choudhari',
			(int) 27 => 'Gundappa Amabadas Bukate',
			(int) 28 => 'V.N. Sarin v. Ajit',
			(int) 29 => 'Kumar Poplai',
			(int) 30 => 'Anr',
			(int) 31 => 'Rs',
			(int) 32 => 'Ex',
			(int) 33 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 34 => 'Kumar Sharma',
			(int) 35 => 'Ex',
			(int) 36 => 'Mohd',
			(int) 37 => 'V.N. Sarin's',
			(int) 38 => 'V.N. Sarin's',
			(int) 39 => 'Rani Pal's',
			(int) 40 => 'Govind Narain's',
			(int) 41 => 'Ex.10',
			(int) 42 => 'Ram Saran Sharma's',
			(int) 43 => 'A. Ranganatham Chetti',
			(int) 44 => 'Marthin',
			(int) 45 => 'Narayan Sharma's',
			(int) 46 => 'Sardar Singh's',
			(int) 47 => 'Sardar Singh's',
			(int) 48 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 49 => 'Jitendra Nath Dey',
			(int) 50 => 'Krishna Murari Prasad',
			(int) 51 => 'Mitar Singh',
			(int) 52 => 'Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v.',
			(int) 53 => 'Govindram Ramgopal Mundada',
			(int) 54 => 'Satwant Kaur',
			(int) 55 => 'Dhund Singh',
			(int) 56 => 'Babu',
			(int) 57 => 'T.K. Vasudevan',
			(int) 58 => 'Nasirual Haque's',
			(int) 59 => 'Krishna Murari Prasad's',
			(int) 60 => 'Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's',
			(int) 61 => 'Satwant Kaur's',
			(int) 62 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 63 => 'Bega Begum',
			(int) 64 => 'Abdul Ahad Khan',
			(int) 65 => 'Shiv Sarup Gupta v.',
			(int) 66 => 'Mahesh Chand Gupta',
			(int) 67 => 'Basant Lal Khatri',
			(int) 68 => 'Megh Raj',
			(int) 69 => 'Amrit Lal',
			(int) 70 => 'M.L. Prabhakar',
			(int) 71 => 'Rajiv Singal',
			(int) 72 => 'Bega Begum',
			(int) 73 => 'Megh Raj',
			(int) 74 => 'M.L. Prabhakar's',
			(int) 75 => 'Kumar Kapoor',
			(int) 76 => 'Vishnu Avtar Sharma',
			(int) 77 => 'Ashok Jasra',
			(int) 78 => 'Shiv Singh',
			(int) 79 => 'Jai Singh',
			(int) 80 => 'Mahesh Chand Sharma',
			(int) 81 => 'S.N. Sharma',
			(int) 82 => 'M.L. Vyas',
			(int) 83 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 84 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 85 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 86 => 'C.N. Sharma',
			(int) 87 => 'Jagdish',
			(int) 88 => 'Navjeevan',
			(int) 89 => 'Jaipur Tower',
			(int) 90 => 'Shekhawati Complex',
			(int) 91 => 'Gundali',
			(int) 92 => 'cam',
			(int) 93 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
			(int) 94 => 'Kalyan',
			(int) 95 => 'Amir Ahmed v.',
			(int) 96 => 'Yusuf',
			(int) 97 => 'Hon'ble D.B.',
			(int) 98 => 'Dev Kumar',
			(int) 99 => 'Swaran Lata',
			(int) 100 => 'alias Anandi',
			(int) 101 => 'C. Setharama Nagarkar',
			(int) 102 => 'Angoori Devi',
			(int) 103 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 104 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 105 => 'Hari Singh v.',
			(int) 106 => 'Kannaiya Lal',
			(int) 107 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali',
			(int) 108 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
			(int) 109 => 'Anr',
			(int) 110 => 'Vinayak N.Joshi',
			(int) 111 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal',
			(int) 112 => 'Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan',
			(int) 113 => 'Hari Singh's',
			(int) 114 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's',
			(int) 115 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
			(int) 116 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja's',
			(int) 117 => 'Mohan Lal',
			(int) 118 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
			(int) 119 => 'Ramesh Ajmers',
			(int) 120 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 121 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 122 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 123 => 'B.L. Asawa',
			(int) 124 => 'Jagdish',
			(int) 125 => 'Parwani',
			(int) 126 => 'Jagdish',
			(int) 127 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 128 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 129 => 'Parwani',
			(int) 130 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
			(int) 131 => 'Amir Ahmed's',
			(int) 132 => 'Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai',
			(int) 133 => 'Kalyan Sahai v. Smt',
			(int) 134 => 'Narangi Bai',
			(int) 135 => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal'
		),
		'CARDINAL' => array(
			(int) 0 => '500/-',
			(int) 1 => '2',
			(int) 2 => '31.10.1991',
			(int) 3 => '4',
			(int) 4 => 'ten',
			(int) 5 => '25.10.2000',
			(int) 6 => '3',
			(int) 7 => '6',
			(int) 8 => '4',
			(int) 9 => '10',
			(int) 10 => '1',
			(int) 11 => 'three',
			(int) 12 => '31.5.2002.6',
			(int) 13 => '1',
			(int) 14 => '30.10.1991',
			(int) 15 => '2',
			(int) 16 => '1',
			(int) 17 => '1',
			(int) 18 => '2',
			(int) 19 => '3',
			(int) 20 => '4',
			(int) 21 => '5',
			(int) 22 => '6',
			(int) 23 => '8).8',
			(int) 24 => '25.10.1986',
			(int) 25 => '500',
			(int) 26 => '3',
			(int) 27 => '1',
			(int) 28 => '9',
			(int) 29 => '10',
			(int) 30 => '11',
			(int) 31 => 'transferee',
			(int) 32 => '3',
			(int) 33 => 'two',
			(int) 34 => '10',
			(int) 35 => '31.10.1991',
			(int) 36 => '6',
			(int) 37 => 'transferee',
			(int) 38 => '25.10.1986',
			(int) 39 => '25.10.1986',
			(int) 40 => '31.10.1991',
			(int) 41 => '1912',
			(int) 42 => '3',
			(int) 43 => '20.9.1985',
			(int) 44 => '1',
			(int) 45 => '1',
			(int) 46 => 'two',
			(int) 47 => '1',
			(int) 48 => '2',
			(int) 49 => '3/4th',
			(int) 50 => '31.5.2002',
			(int) 51 => 'half',
			(int) 52 => '150',
			(int) 53 => '150',
			(int) 54 => '12',
			(int) 55 => '13',
			(int) 56 => '15',
			(int) 57 => '16',
			(int) 58 => 'one',
			(int) 59 => '3/4th',
			(int) 60 => 'two',
			(int) 61 => 'four',
			(int) 62 => '1000',
			(int) 63 => '17',
			(int) 64 => '18',
			(int) 65 => '19',
			(int) 66 => '20',
			(int) 67 => '21',
			(int) 68 => 'thousands',
			(int) 69 => '1',
			(int) 70 => '15',
			(int) 71 => '20',
			(int) 72 => 'two',
			(int) 73 => '4',
			(int) 74 => '1000',
			(int) 75 => '3/4th',
			(int) 76 => '3/4th',
			(int) 77 => '3'9'x',
			(int) 78 => 'thousands',
			(int) 79 => '1',
			(int) 80 => '4',
			(int) 81 => '4',
			(int) 82 => '4',
			(int) 83 => '22',
			(int) 84 => '23',
			(int) 85 => '24',
			(int) 86 => '25',
			(int) 87 => '26',
			(int) 88 => '28',
			(int) 89 => '29',
			(int) 90 => '30',
			(int) 91 => '31',
			(int) 92 => 'four',
			(int) 93 => 'two',
			(int) 94 => 'between other two',
			(int) 95 => '1',
			(int) 96 => '5',
			(int) 97 => 'two',
			(int) 98 => '1',
			(int) 99 => 'one',
			(int) 100 => '32',
			(int) 101 => '4',
			(int) 102 => '19.1.1995',
			(int) 103 => '22',
			(int) 104 => '1.50',
			(int) 105 => 'one',
			(int) 106 => '5',
			(int) 107 => '33',
			(int) 108 => '34',
			(int) 109 => 'one',
			(int) 110 => 'two',
			(int) 111 => '36',
			(int) 112 => 'one',
			(int) 113 => 'two'
		),
		'GPE' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 1 => 'Clause',
			(int) 2 => 'Clause',
			(int) 3 => 'T.K.',
			(int) 4 => 'T.K.',
			(int) 5 => 'Sk',
			(int) 6 => 'Smt',
			(int) 7 => 'Clause',
			(int) 8 => 'Clause',
			(int) 9 => 'Clause',
			(int) 10 => 'S.R.',
			(int) 11 => 'S.R.',
			(int) 12 => 'L.Rs',
			(int) 13 => 'S.N. Kapoor',
			(int) 14 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 15 => 'PW',
			(int) 16 => 'Surendra',
			(int) 17 => 'PW',
			(int) 18 => 'Ganpati Plaza',
			(int) 19 => 'Jaipur',
			(int) 20 => 'Rajasthan',
			(int) 21 => 'Roop Chand',
			(int) 22 => 'Roop Chand's',
			(int) 23 => 'Pandey',
			(int) 24 => 'D.W',
			(int) 25 => 'P.C.',
			(int) 26 => 'Bhogilal',
			(int) 27 => 'S.R.',
			(int) 28 => 'Subramania'
		),
		'TIME' => array(
			(int) 0 => '3 to Section 11'
		),
		'FAC' => array(
			(int) 0 => '30.6.1985',
			(int) 1 => 'Dhirendra Nath Gorai's'
		),
		'PRODUCT' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Mst',
			(int) 1 => 'LRs',
			(int) 2 => 'Suresh',
			(int) 3 => 'Dinesh'
		),
		'QUANTITY' => array(
			(int) 0 => '300 sq. ft'
		),
		'EVENT' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'PW 8 Sh'
		),
		'PERCENT' => array(
			(int) 0 => '63%',
			(int) 1 => '37%',
			(int) 2 => '63%',
			(int) 3 => '37%'
		)
	),
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '765114',
			'acts' => 'Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 14(3); <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 5',
			'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 15 of 2001',
			'appellant' => 'Jagdish',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma',
			'casenote' => ' -  -  In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. - No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop. 14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. 21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. 22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' B. Dutta, Senior Counsel and; J.P. Goyal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.M. Ranjan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Rajasthan',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2003-09-23',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' A.C. Goyal, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.C. Goyal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Brief facts giving rise to this first appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit on 21.9.1993 for eviction from the suit shop on the grounds of default in payment of rent, reasonable and bonafide necessity; sub-letting and nuisance with the averments that the shop measuring 15'x 20'ft situated on Moti Lalo Atal Road, Jaipur was let out to the appellant-defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 500/- on certain terms and conditions mentioned in para 2 of the plaint. The tenancy was oral. The defendant did not pay rent from the month of May, 1992. The plaintiff requires the suit shop for his own profession. The plaintiff has no residential house of his own at Jaipur. He wants to construct residential house upon the details of other grounds of eviction, he prayed for decree of eviction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The defendant in his written statement pleaded that the suit shop was let out to his father by plaintiff's father. Denying all the grounds of eviction, it was pleaded that rent upto September, 1990 was paid to Mr. C.N. Sharma, father, of the plaintiff. Thereafter, he was informed vide letter dated 31.10.1991 that rent from October, 1990 may be paid to the plaintiff. Hence he paid the rent to the plaintiff but the plaintiff declined to accept the rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Rejoinder was submitted by the plaintiff. Amended pleadings were also filedby the parties from time to time. '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed ten issues. After recording evidence of the parties, it was held vide judgment dated 25.10.2000 that landlord required the suit shop reasonably and bonafide, and that the comparative hardship would be caused to the landlord, if the decree of eviction is not passed. Issues No. 3 with regard to partial eviction and No. 6 with regard to default in payment of rent were also decided in favour of the landlord. Issues No. 4, 5 and 10 relating to subletting, nuisance and inconsistent use of the shop for the purpose it was let out were decided against the plaintiff. In conclusion, the trial court decreed the suit of the landlord for eviction, hence this appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned senior counsel Mr. B. Dutt appearing for the appellant-tenant raised three points, first point is that the suit for eviction was not maintainable, the second and third points are that issues with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were wrongly decided by the trial court in cursory manner without considering all the evidence. Attention in this regard was drawn to the application moved on behalf of the appellant-tenant on 31.5.2002.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(3) Restriction on Eviction: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. According to learned senior counsel, the suit shop was let out for business purposes and according to the case of the plaintiff-landlord the original landlord was Sh. C.N. Sharma father of the plaintiff who vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 informed the appellant-tenant to pay rent to the plaintiff from 1.10.1990 and thus the plaintiff became the new landlord and fresh terms and conditions were agreed between them as mentioned in para 2 of the plaint and thus the plaintiff had no right to file a suit for eviction on the grounds set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out the tenant, reliance is placed upon. T.K. Lathika v. Seth Karsandas Jamnadas (1), Smt. Menoka Rani Pal v. Smt. Maya Rani Karmakar (2), Govind Narain v. Mohan Singh (3), Ram Saran Sharma v. Kamala Acharya (4), A. Ranganatham Chettl and Ors. v. M. Ethirajulu Nayudu (5), Martin and Harris Limited v. Vith Additional Distt. Judge and Ors. (6), Ram Narayan Sharma v. Shakuntala Gaur, (7), Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh (8).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that initially Sh. Thanwar Das father of the appellant- tenant was the tenant in the year 1979/1980. Sh. Thanwar Das expired on 25.10.1986 and thereafter the appellant-tenant stated paying the rent as tenant to Sh. C.N. Sharma the original landlord and thereafter to the plaintiff on receiving information as such vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 and monthly rent of Rs. 500 was never enhanced and no rent note was executed and terms and conditions of the tenancy were not altered and thus no new tenancy came into existence, hence Section 14 (3) of the Act is not attracted. It was next submitted that the suit for eviction was instituted in September, 1993 and no such objection was taken by the appellant-tenant in written statement, during trial and even in the memo of appeal and as such the appellant- tenant waived this right if available to him. He placed reliance upon 1. Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2. Subal Chandra Nath Saha and Ors. v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Ors. (9), SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate (10), V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai and Anr. (11) and also relied upon Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra) the original landlord gifted the tenanted premises to his daughter, the transferee landlord. Proviso 3 to Section 11 (3) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act provided that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument. The daughter without waiting for the moratorium period of one year from the date of gift to expire filed eviction petition. Having found two differences in the terms of the old and fresh lease that (i) name of landlord was changed from father to daughter and (ii) rent payable was increased from Rs. 65 per month to Rs. 150 per month. It was held that moratorium period would apply from the date of fresh lease de'ed. This judgment is no instrument of transfer of the suit shop by the original landlord in the name of the plaintiff. A perusal of the letter Ex. 10 dated 31.10.1991 goes to show that Sh. C.N. Sharma, original landlord (HUF), informed the tenant to pay the rent to his son Sh. Manoj Kumar Sharma, the plaintiff, from 1.10.1990 as on account of a family settlement on 27.2.1990, the suit shop had fallen to his share. In para 6 of the written statement, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that the original landlord Sh. C.N. Sharma'did not receive the rent on account of his family reasons and he was informed by pay rent vide this letter to the plaintiff. Ex. 55 is memorandum of family settlement and Ex. 56 is the registered memorandum of family settlement cum partition deed. On perusal of these documents, it is evident that the suit shop was part of the entire properties of HUF and this shop came to the share of the plaintiff on account of family partition and as such it does not amount to any transfer of the property as defined under Section 5 of the <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a>. Such plea was taken in Sk. Mohd. Choudhari and V.N. Sarin's case (both supra). In V.N. Sarin's case (supra) while dealing with the similar provisions contained in Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the process of partition, therefore, involves the transfer of enjoyment of the properties into an enjoyment in severally by them of the respective properties allotted to their shares. Having regard to this basic character of joint Hindu family property, it cannot be denied that each coparcener has an antecedent title to the said property, though its extent is not determined until partition takes place. That being so, partition really means that whereas initially all the coparceners have subsisting title to the totality of the property of the family jointly, that joint title is by partition transformed into separate titles of the individual coparceners in respect of several items of properties allotted to them respectively. Thus, it cannot be said that the suit shop has been acquired by the plaintiff by transfer and so Section 14(3) of the Act cannot be invoked by the appellant. On the same reasonings as discussed here-inabove, the judgment delivered in Smt. Menoka Rani Pal's case (supra) is also not applicable because the transferee landlady acquired the title of the suit premises by purchase and thus eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement was not allowed in view of the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act. In Govind Narain's case (supra), the terms of the tenancy were changed and new tenancy agreement was entered into or a new lease was executed by the tenant and thus the existing tenancy was deemed to have been surrendered and the fact that tenant continued to remain in possession will be of no consequence and Section 14(3) of the Act would apply meaning thereby the premises will be deemed to have been let out to the tenant from the date of commencement of the new tenancy and not from the date of original tenancy. In the instant case, the suit shop was let out to father of the appellant much before 25.10.1986. On the death of appellant's father on 25.10.1986, the appellant continued to pay the rent to the original landlord and continued to pay the rent at the same rate of Rs. 500 per month to the plaintiff in pursuance of letter Ex.10 dated 31.10.1991. No rent note was executed, rent was not enhanced and not terms and conditions of the tenancy were changed, hence no new tenancy came into existence. Similarly the judgment of this Court delivered in Ram Saran Sharma's case (supra) would also not apply as eviction suit was filed by the new landlord who become absolute owner of the suit properly by virtue of valid gift deed. The decision of Privy Council in. A. Ranganatham Chetti and Others's case (supra) is also not applicable as though the physical possession was continuous from 1912 onwards, the possession from 1.10.1922 was attributable to a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra) the respondent No. 3 had purchased the premises on 30.6.1985 and issued a notice to the tenant on 20.9.1985 but filed application for eviction in January, 1986 and the case was taken up for hearing after there years of purchase. The point for consideration was whether the landlord's application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction) Act was not maintainable in view of the proviso to the said section as it was filed before the expiry of there years from the date of purchase of the suit premises by the landlord. It was held that the proviso to Section 21(1) bars entertainment of the application, therefore, the stage at which the Court has to consider whether grounds mentioned in Clause (a) are made out or not will be reached when the Court takes up the application for consideration on merits. In the instant case, Section 14(3) of the Act provides that no suit for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall lie before the expiry of five years. But as stated hereinabove in Marthin's case (supra) the landlord became owner of the suit premises by purchases, thus on the basis of this judgment also, the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant is not acceptable. On the basis of the similar reasoning the judgment delivered in Ram Narayan Sharma's case (supra) is also not applicable as it was also a case of purchaser landlord.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Now another submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that appellant-tenant waived his right even if available to him is taken up. It is not disputed that no such objection was taken in the written statement, during the trial and even in the memo of appeal by the appellant-tenant. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant, Section 14(3) of the Act puts a complete embargo on institution of the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, such question of law can be raised at any stage. In Sardar Singh's case (supra), this Court held that objection under Section 14(3) of the Act can be allowed to be raised in second appeal, despite that such objection was not pressed before first Appellate Court. There is important distinction between the facts of two cases as in the instant case, no such objection was raised even upto the filing of this appeal in this Court while in Sardar Singh's case (supra) such objection was taken in the written statement. Assuming that such objection can be raised in this appeal, the point is whether the appellant-tenant waived this right. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that since the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act create a complete restriction on filing the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement before the expiry of five years, no such waiver can be pleaded. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that such a right can be waived. In Dhirendra Nath Gorai's case (supra) the judgment debtor who received the notice of the proclamation of sale, did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or did not object to the non-compliance with Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act which provide that the Court should specify in the sale proclamation the property to be sold. It was held that non-compliance with Section 35 in specifying the property to be sold is a defect in the proclamation within the meaning of the second proviso to Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C, and such mandatory provision can be waived only if it is not conceived in the public interest but in the interest of the party that waives it. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. It was also held that this prohibition was for protection to the tenant and waiving of such protection by the tenant did not contravene the law. The prohibition was not in public benefit but for his private benefit so he could waive it. In the instant case, the provision contained in Section 14(3) of the Act are for protection of the tenant and the tenant-appellant in the instant case, did not take any objection in this regard till final submissions made in this appeal. Consequently, it must be held that the provision for five years period before filing the suit, though is mandatory and confers protection to the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. In the facts of the present case there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant- Jenant did not think it fit to pursue that point and. on the contrary joined issues on merits and having lost therein and got and adverse decision did not think it fit even to challenge the decision on that ground even while filing an appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, it must be held that the appellant-tenant had waived this right available to him under Section 14(3) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Now second and third objections raised on behalf of the appellant-tenant are taken up. Section 14(3) of the Act reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(2) Restriction on eviction:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is significant that issue No. 2 with regard to reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff was decided in favour of the plaintiff-landlord by the trial court and findings of the trial court on this issue were not challenged by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant at the time of making final submissions. Learned senior counsel confined his submissions with regard to findings of the trial court on the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction. It was contended that the trial court has not critically examined the question of hardship and partial eviction; the trial court did not consider the availability of other reasonable accommodation to the parties; there was no sufficient evidence or material on record for the trial court to reach the satisfaction as provided in Section 14(3) of the Act. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. He referred the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. Learned senior counsel on the basis of the application submitted on 31.5.2002 under Section 14 of the Act contended that the appellant-tenant will be ready to vacate the half of the tenanted premises under his possession and thus the appellant-tenant is still ready to vacate 150 sq. ft. area for the plaintiff which would be sufficient to satisfy his requirement and in the alternative the appellant is further ready to vacate the entire suit shop for a certain period in case the landlord is desirous to re-build the entire premises in his possession including the suit shop on the condition to reserve his right ore-enter in the building comprising 150 sq. carpet area with such terms of tenancy already existing between the parties and for that a commissioner may be appointed by the Court for sorting out the possibility of division for partial eviction of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance is placed upon Nasirul Haque v. Jitendra Nath Dey (12), Krishna Murari Prasad v. Mitar Singh (13), Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada (14), Satwant Kaur v. Dhund Singh (15), S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan and Ors. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Krishna Murari Prasad's case (supra), it was held that it is necessary to make enquiry as to indivisibility of suit premises and drawing presumption merely because suit premises consist one room overlooking factor of dimension of room is not proper. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. In Satwant Kaur's case (supra), it was held that eviction from the entire shop claimed by the landlord for starting motor battery business was not justified and the nature of landlord's business does not require much space, hence partial eviction was upheld. In S.R. Babu's case (supra), it was held that the requirement of the suit premises by the landlord for personal use implies its use not only in the existing condition but also on making necessary repairs to or reconstruction of the same and the court should not pass the order of eviction against a tenant who is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in that building and there is no other building available in the locality for the tenant to carry on such trade or the business. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord while referring the evidence of the parties on the these issued contended that the learned trial Judge having discussed the entire evidence came to this conclusion that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord for the entire suit shop is not only reasonable but bonafide also and relevant factors with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were also considered while considering the issue of requirement and also considered the evidence of the parties while deciding the issues relating to comparative hardship and partial eviction. According to learned counsel for the plaintiff- landlord, the plaintiff is an advocate practicing in various courts since long and he has no office of his own; that he shares the office of his father who is also a practicing advocate and keeping in view the size of the suit shop, its partial eviction is not possible. It was also submitted that the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, with regard to 3/4th portion of the suit shop was in context of only office for the plaintiff-landlord while requirement of the plaintiff was two fold-for the office and for the construction of residential house over the roof of the suit shop and both the requirements were adjudged as reasonable and bonafide by the trial court. He also referred the statement of PW.7 Sh. G.S. Bapna, Chartered Engineer & Valuer who stated, that for four advocates, Munshi, driver, typist, the requirement is 1000 sq. ft. space and he further stated that plaintiff has no conference room; there is no spacejor secretarial work; there is no space for clients to sit and all of them sit in a congested manner; there is no separate chamber for the staff, advocate, for conference room, for clients, for library etc. It was also submitted that the suit shop is in possession of the present appellant since October, 1986 and prior to that it was with his father. Reliance is placed upon Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs and Ors. (17), Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (18), S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS. v. Basant Lal Khatri and Ors. (19), Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. and Co. v. Amrit Lal (20) and M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal (21). In Mst. Bega Begum and Ors.'s case (supra), it was held that it is not doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree of eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiff a decree for eviction. In deciding the extent of the hardship, each parly has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants. In Shiv Sarup Gupia's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the landlord cannot be forced to squeeze into less suitable premises just to protect the tenant's occupancy. In S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held that some discretion has to be allowed in favour of the landlord and the court should not impose there own wisdom as to how the landlord should arrange his affairs and ought not to be carried away by sympathy for the tenant. In Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. & Co.'s case (supra), facts were that the landlord proved his bonafide requirement of shop and the tenant's plea was that he is in possession for 50 years and he is likely to lose thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him. It was held that this was natural hardship not amounting to greater hardship under Section 14(2) of the Act. In M.L. Prabhakar's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the totality of the circumstances including their professions, vocation, style of life, habits and backgrounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. 1 have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. The dimensions of the suit shop are 15ft. x 20ft. = 300 sq. ft. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. This submission cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the trial court that these points were not critically examined and were decided in a very cursory manner. The plaintiff-landlord is a practicing advocate for a number of years. According to his statement, he was a practicing lawyer for last 16 years; that he has no office of his own and no residential house of his own; that he along with his colleagues, staff and clients sits in a portion of the office occupied by his father who is also an advocate; that he is residing with his family members in two rooms accommodation provided by his father; that he has no house of his own at Jaipur and as such he is facing great hardship PW.2 Brij Bihari Sharma, PW. 4 Surendra Kumar Kapoor, PW.5 Vishnu Avtar Sharma, PW.6 Ashok Jasra all clients supported his statement that the accommodation for the office available with the plaintiff is much congested. PW.3 Ramesh Chand Bansal also supported the statement of the plaintiff-landlord that sarva shri Shiv Singh, Jai Singh, Mahesh Chand Sharma, S.N. Sharma, M.L. Vyas, Hihal Chand Jain all the advocates are also working with the plainlif landlord. He has also named Munshi, driver, steno etc. and corroborated the statement of the plaintiff that he has no office of his own, no place for library etc. P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna also supported the statement of the plaintiff with regards to his requirement, hardship and partial eviction. According to his statement, 1000 sq. ft. is required for plaintiff advocate, his associates and the staff. Much stress was put on the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, that according to his statement the requirement of the plaintiff would suffice if the 3/4th portion of the suit shop is vacated and thus partial eviction is possible. PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma stated in cross- examination that minimum requirement for the office of the plaintiff should be 3/4th but definite opinion of this point may be given by architect. But on the basis of the statement of PW. 8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, no such conclusion can be drawn that partial eviction of suit shop is possible. On the basis of the statement of PW 8 Sh; C.N. Sharma, if it is taken that 3/4th portion of the suit shop may serve the purpose of plaintiff-landlord, remaining 1/4th portion of the appellant-tenant. Thus, the appellant-tenant would get the portion of dimension so 3'9'x 5'-75sq. ft. It is nowhere the case of the appellant-tenant that this much portion would serve his purpose. The appellant-tenant Sh. Jagdish stated that in the same area a number of commercial complexes namely Ganpati Plaza, Navjeevan complex, Jaipur Tower, Shekhawati Complex are situated but he is not in a position to have any shop in this area because he is unable lo pay huge amount of pagri and further he is carrying on his business in the suit shop for about a period of 20 years and thus he has earned goodwill and he will suffer a loss of thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Keeping in view the entire discussion made hereinabove, 1 find no ground to interfere with the findings of the trial court that the alternative accommodation is available in nearby area and simply that the appellant-tenant has to pay more rent or it would be difficult for him to recover outstanding amount from the customers are no grounds to hold that comparative hardship would be caused to the tenant instead of landlord. In view of the entire discussion, the application under Section 14(2) of the Act is liable to be rejected for partial eviction on the grounds mentioned in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Now cross objections filed by the plaintiff-landlord are taken up. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord has challenged the finding of the trial court on the issues of subletting and nuisance. Learned trial court while dealing with the issue No. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. In para 4 of the amended plaint, it was pleaded that the tenant is not occupying the shop and he is sub-letting the shop to various persons from time to time and receives money from them. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations in his written statement. In para 4 of the rejoinder, the plaintiff-landlord pleaded that before and after filing of the suit the appellant-tenant let-out the suit shop to Sh. Ramesh Gundali an employee in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, Sh. Kalyan an employee in Law Department, State of Rajasthan and others persons.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The learned trial Judge cam to this conclusion that subletting to Ramesh Gundali, Kalyan and others persons is not proved at all and evidence in this regard cannot be relied upon in absence of specific pleadings. With regard to subletting to Dinesh, it was observed that he is carrying on business of STD/PCO in partnership of the appellant-tenant in a portion of the suit shop and this it does not amount to subletting. In Amir Ahmed v. Yusuf (22), it was held by Hon'ble D.B. of this Court that merely allowing another person to use premises or its part and conversion of exclusive possession of premises by a tenant into joint possession with a third person does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Similar view was taken in Dev Kumar (died) through LRs. v. Smt. Swaran Lata and Ors. (23). In Smt. Laxmi alias Anandi and Ors. v. C. Setharama Nagarkar and Ors. (24), it was held that the landlord should prove as to when sub-tenancy was created and in absence of that, eviction on such ground cannot be ordered. In Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi (25), it was held that mere presence of persons other than the tenant in shop is no ground to presume subletting. Per contra learned counsel for the plaintiff-land lord contended that the plaintiff-landlord and his witnesses were not cross-examination on this point; that evidence cannot be discarded merely in absence of specific pleadings; that High Court in revision allowed the parties to lead evidence on this point; that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; that as per telephone rules, business of STD-PCO is not permissible in partnership. He placed reliance upon M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (26), Hari Singh v. Kannaiya Lal (27), Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (28), Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali (D) by LRs. (29), Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Anr. v. Vinayak N.Joshi and Ors. (30), Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal (31) and Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan (32). In M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd's case (supra), it was held that in case of subletting it is difficult for landlord to prove it by direct evidence or whether sub-tenant had paid monetary consideration and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. In Hari Singh's case (supra), it was held that details of subletting can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot Ute a reason to set aside concurrent findings of the fact. In Roop Chand's case (supra), it was held that when the larger part of the premises was let out to a club registered under Companies Act while tenant retains possession of the smaller part of the premises, it would amount that the tenant parted with the possession and is liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. In Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's case (supra), the tenant entered into partnership with his four sons in 1955. Thereafter, the tenant and his two sons retired from the partnership in 1974 when new partnership came between other two sons. It was held that original tenant having no concern with premises or business therein, it was a case of subletting. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat and another's case (supra), court below arrived at concurrent finding of subletting on account of amended version of the plaint stating that pending the suit the defendants have or any of them has inducted defendants No. 1 to 5 unlawfully. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that High Court erred in overturning conclusions of two fact finding courts on the ground that averments regarding subletting was insufficient. In Janak Raj Ahuja's case (supra) the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that through the partnership deed was produced by the tenant but account books and income tax returns were not produced, it was held that partnership was merely camouflage and it was a case of subletting. Similar view was taken in Harbhajan Singh's case (supra). It was further observed that moreover, as per rules of Telegraph Department, there can be no partnership with respect to STD/PCO.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 have considered the rival submission in the light of the judgments, judgment of the trial court and evidence available on the record. The plaintiff-landlord in his statement tried to support the averments made in the plaint, while the appellant-tenant stated that he never let out any portion of the shop to anyone and he never parted with possession of any part of the shop. According to his statement, the persons named by the plaintiff namely Thakur, Mohan Lal, Suresh were his salary paid workers. He further deposed that Ramesh Gundali and Sh. Kalayan were his customers and one Pandey was a typist and another typist Ramesh Ajmers is no doing his typing job in a separate shop. He also explained photos showing the presence of these persons produced by the plaintiff. He admitted in his statement that Dinesh Parwani is doing STD PCO job in the suit sbop but with him as partner and the partnership deed is Ex. A22 and it was executed in January, 1995. He explained that on account of excess work and marketing competition he had to enter into partnership with Dinesh parwani. It was also stated by him that there entire shop is in his possession, although the STD-PCO is in the name of Dinesh Parwani. It was also stated by him that he is an partner of 63% while Dinesh Parwani is a partner of 37%. He has also proved income-tax returns of this partnership firm which are Ex. A23 to Ex. A 32 for the assessment years 1995 to 2000. D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar, D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani, D.W, 4 Dr. B.L. Asawa, D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya and D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani which corroborating the statement of the appellant-tenant categorically stated before the trial court that the suit shop is in possession of the tenant Jagdish and is run by him. D.W. 5 Sh. dinesh Parwani categorically stated before the trial court that the connection of STD-PCO was issued in his name as he was an educated unemployed person and allotment of STD-PCO under rules is permissible to only educated unemployed person and any portion was never sub-let to him and he never paid any rent to the tenant Jagdish. I agree with this submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that the details of sub-let can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot,, be a reason to discard the evidence. I also agree with this submission also that in case of subletting it is difficult for the landlord to prove it by direct evidence or to prove that sub-tenant had paid any rent and the Court may draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. But in the instant case, the trial Judge decided this issue against the plaintiff- landlord not only on account of lack of details in pleadings but also on the ground that there is no such evidence to prove subletting. As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. On the oilier hand explanation given by the appellant-tenant corroborated by other witnesses was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. As far as the case of Dinesh Parwani is concerned, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that STD-PCO connection is in the name of Dinesh Parwani which is going on the suit shop. On perusal of the entire evidence available on the record, the conclusion drawn by the trial court that this STD-PCO business is being carried out in the partnership of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani appears to be sound. A perusal of deed of partnership Ex.A22 executed on 19.1.1995 along with income-tax returns for the assessment years 1995 to 2000 and the oral evidence adduced by the appellant-tenant go to show that this document Ex. A 22 is not after though document, rather it was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. According to this deed of partnership, Sh. Dinesh Parwani invested a sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs in this business as part of the capital and further shares of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani are respectively 63% and 37%. Therefore, merely on account of non-filing account books is not ground to say that this document of deed of partnership is not genuine one further no such conclusion can be drawn on the basis of Telegraph Department Rules that partnership with respect to STD-PCO is barred, although the relevant rules provide that only educated unemployed persons are eligible for allotment of STD- PCO. In view of Amir Ahmed's case (supra), merely allowing another person to carry on business in partnership does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this issue does not call for any interference by this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Next comes to question of nuisance. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. The term 'nuisance' has not been defined under the Act, 1950. In para 5 of the plaint, it is pleaded that the tenant has allowed a number of persons including the antisocial elements to enter the shop to carry on various activities causing nuisance, they use abusive language and throw filthy material and also put cycles etc. so as to create obstruction in the way and thus are causing continuing nuisance. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant is a man of quarrelsome nature and is creating nuisance regularly making it difficult for the plaintiff-landlord to carry on his profession as an advocate. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations vide his written statement with this plea that names of such persons have not been given in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The plaintiff-landlord reiterated all the averments made in the plaint in this regard in the statement before the trial court. It was also stated by him that the appellant-tenant abused him in open and a complaint was got registered with the police. It was also stated by him that the defendant-tenant is parking his motorcycle, scooter etc. so as to create obstruction in approaching his house and office. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant has fixed a number of sign boards and on account of that a number of strangers enter his house to enquiry about typing, photocopies etc-It was also stated by him that only once the defendant-tenant was bound down as provided under Section 107 & 116 Cr.P.C. and in counter he was also bound down under the same provisions at the instance of the defendant-tenant. The appellant-tenant in his statement denied all these allegations and the learned trial Judge haying considered the evidence held that on account of typing work of the defendant-tenant and since it is a commercial area, no case of actionable nuisance is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord submitted that the trial court has not considered the evidence in proper way as the plaintiff-landlord made a number of complaints against me appellant-tenant regarding nuisance, using abusive language and similar activities of nuisance. He placed reliance upon some judgments. In Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and Ors. (33), it was held that private nuisance is one which interferes with a persons' use and enjoyment of immovable property or some right in respect of it. Suffering of damage must be proved in case of nuisance unless it can be presumed by law to exist. But the damage to amount to actionable nuisance must be substantial or at least of some significance. In other words, if the damage is insignificant or trivial it would not be actionable nuisance. In Bhogilal M. Davay v. S.R. Subramania lyer (34), it was held that on the basis of this evidence that the respondent has been abusing and quarreling and this was admitted by the respondent himself, such acts constitute nuisance. In Re A.S. Vijayaraghavalu Chetti (35), it was held that concurrent finding of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Tribunal were that the petitioner has been the cause of frequent quarrels and has made it impossible for the tenants occupying the other portions of the building to live in the house along with the petitioner, there is no ground to interfere.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that admittedly the suit shop is located in a commercial area in the busy market and there can be no nuisance only on account of visitors visiting the suit shop and further typing work etc. cannot be termed as nuisance. It was also submitted that one or two incidents of quarrel, if any, are not sufficient by themselves to constitute any actionable nuisance. Reliance is placed upon Kalyan Sahai v. Smt. Narangi Bai and Ors. (36), it was held by this court that quarrel or hurling of abusive words do not construe any nuisance as required under Section 13(1)(e). Taking similar view by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Amolak Singh v. Madanlal (37), it was held that quarrels between tenant and landlord on some occasions do not amount to nuisance causing interference with comfort of the landlord and there has to be a series of acts and conduct on the part of the tenant so that nuisance can be inferred against him. The mere existence of ill feelings between the landlord and his tenant could not have justified the ejectment in the provision of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'RLW2004(1)Raj608; 2004(1)WLC685',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Manoj Kumar Sharma',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '765114'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma Semantic Analysis'
$shops = array(
	'LAW' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Section 13',
		(int) 1 => 'Section 13 of the Act',
		(int) 2 => 'Section 14',
		(int) 3 => 'Section 5',
		(int) 4 => 'Section 14',
		(int) 5 => 'Section 14(3',
		(int) 6 => 'Section 21',
		(int) 7 => 'Section 21(1',
		(int) 8 => 'Section 13',
		(int) 9 => 'Section 14(3',
		(int) 10 => 'Section 14(3',
		(int) 11 => 'Section 35',
		(int) 12 => 'Section 35',
		(int) 13 => 'Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C',
		(int) 14 => 'Section 14(3',
		(int) 15 => 'Section 13',
		(int) 16 => 'Section 14 of the Act',
		(int) 17 => 'Section 14(2',
		(int) 18 => 'Section 14(2',
		(int) 19 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
		(int) 20 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
		(int) 21 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
		(int) 22 => 'Section 107 &',
		(int) 23 => 'Section 13(1)(e',
		(int) 24 => 'Section 13(1)(e'
	),
	'ORG' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'A.C. Goyal',
		(int) 1 => 'the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction',
		(int) 2 => 'M. Ethirajulu Nayudu',
		(int) 3 => 'Martin and Harris Limited',
		(int) 4 => 'Ors',
		(int) 5 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
		(int) 6 => 'Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control',
		(int) 7 => 'HUF',
		(int) 8 => 'HUF',
		(int) 9 => 'Choudhari',
		(int) 10 => 'Delhi Rent Control Act',
		(int) 11 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
		(int) 12 => 'the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act',
		(int) 13 => 'Court',
		(int) 14 => 'Privy Council',
		(int) 15 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
		(int) 16 => 'U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction',
		(int) 17 => 'Court',
		(int) 18 => 'Court',
		(int) 19 => 'Court',
		(int) 20 => 'first Appellate Court',
		(int) 21 => 'Court',
		(int) 22 => 'Court',
		(int) 23 => 'Martin & Harris Limited's',
		(int) 24 => 'Act.10',
		(int) 25 => 'PW.8 Sh',
		(int) 26 => 'carpet',
		(int) 27 => 'Court',
		(int) 28 => 'Reliance',
		(int) 29 => 'Nasirul Haque',
		(int) 30 => 'Ors',
		(int) 31 => 'Court',
		(int) 32 => 'PW.8 Sh',
		(int) 33 => 'G.S. Bapna',
		(int) 34 => 'Chartered Engineer & Valuer',
		(int) 35 => 'Munshi',
		(int) 36 => 'Reliance',
		(int) 37 => 'Ors',
		(int) 38 => 'Ors',
		(int) 39 => 'S.N. Kapoor',
		(int) 40 => 'Ors',
		(int) 41 => 'Firm Mool Chand',
		(int) 42 => 'Co.',
		(int) 43 => 'Ors',
		(int) 44 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
		(int) 45 => 'LRS',
		(int) 46 => 'Firm Mool',
		(int) 47 => '& Co.'s',
		(int) 48 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
		(int) 49 => 'Hihal Chand Jain',
		(int) 50 => 'Munshi',
		(int) 51 => 'P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna',
		(int) 52 => 'PW.8 Sh',
		(int) 53 => 'Rajasthan State Electricity Board',
		(int) 54 => 'Law Department',
		(int) 55 => 'State',
		(int) 56 => 'Dinesh',
		(int) 57 => 'STD',
		(int) 58 => 'Court',
		(int) 59 => 'Prasad',
		(int) 60 => 'High Court',
		(int) 61 => 'STD',
		(int) 62 => 'Life Insurance Corporation of India',
		(int) 63 => 'Ors',
		(int) 64 => 'the Hon'ble Supreme Court',
		(int) 65 => 'High Court',
		(int) 66 => 'the Punjab & Haryana High Court',
		(int) 67 => 'Telegraph Department',
		(int) 68 => 'STD',
		(int) 69 => 'Thakur',
		(int) 70 => 'Kalayan',
		(int) 71 => 'STD',
		(int) 72 => 'STD',
		(int) 73 => 'D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar',
		(int) 74 => 'D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani',
		(int) 75 => 'D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya',
		(int) 76 => 'D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 77 => 'STD',
		(int) 78 => 'STD',
		(int) 79 => 'Court',
		(int) 80 => 'STD',
		(int) 81 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 82 => 'STD',
		(int) 83 => 'Telegraph Department Rules',
		(int) 84 => 'STD',
		(int) 85 => 'the Appellate Tribunal',
		(int) 86 => 'Reliance',
		(int) 87 => 'Ors',
		(int) 88 => 'the Punjab & Haryana High Court'
	),
	'NORP' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'J.1',
		(int) 1 => 'Lathika',
		(int) 2 => 'Lathika',
		(int) 3 => 'Hindu',
		(int) 4 => 'Brij Bihari Sharma'
	),
	'ORDINAL' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'first',
		(int) 1 => 'first',
		(int) 2 => 'second',
		(int) 3 => 'third',
		(int) 4 => 'second',
		(int) 5 => 'second',
		(int) 6 => 'second',
		(int) 7 => 'third',
		(int) 8 => 'third'
	),
	'DATE' => array(
		(int) 0 => '15'x 20'ft',
		(int) 1 => 'monthly',
		(int) 2 => 'the month of May, 1992',
		(int) 3 => 'September, 1990',
		(int) 4 => 'October, 1990',
		(int) 5 => '5',
		(int) 6 => '1950',
		(int) 7 => 'five years',
		(int) 8 => 'five years',
		(int) 9 => 'the year 1979/1980',
		(int) 10 => '30.10.1991',
		(int) 11 => 'monthly',
		(int) 12 => 'September, 1993',
		(int) 13 => 'the expiry of one year',
		(int) 14 => 'one year',
		(int) 15 => '65 per month',
		(int) 16 => '150 per month',
		(int) 17 => '27.2.1990',
		(int) 18 => '55',
		(int) 19 => '56',
		(int) 20 => '1882',
		(int) 21 => '500 per month',
		(int) 22 => 'January, 1986',
		(int) 23 => 'years',
		(int) 24 => 'years',
		(int) 25 => 'five years',
		(int) 26 => 'five years',
		(int) 27 => 'six months',
		(int) 28 => 'Section 14(3',
		(int) 29 => 'five years',
		(int) 30 => 'Section 14(3',
		(int) 31 => '14',
		(int) 32 => 'October, 1986',
		(int) 33 => '50 years',
		(int) 34 => 'a number of years',
		(int) 35 => 'last 16 years',
		(int) 36 => '20 years',
		(int) 37 => '27',
		(int) 38 => '32',
		(int) 39 => '1955',
		(int) 40 => '1974',
		(int) 41 => 'January, 1995',
		(int) 42 => 'the assessment years 1995 to 2000',
		(int) 43 => 'the assessment years 1995 to 2000',
		(int) 44 => '1950',
		(int) 45 => '35',
		(int) 46 => '37'
	),
	'PERSON' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Moti Lalo Atal Road',
		(int) 1 => 'Jaipur',
		(int) 2 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 3 => 'B. Dutt',
		(int) 4 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 5 => 'Ex.10',
		(int) 6 => 'T.K. Lathika',
		(int) 7 => 'Seth Karsandas Jamnadas',
		(int) 8 => 'Rani Pal v. Smt',
		(int) 9 => 'Maya Rani Karmakar',
		(int) 10 => 'Govind Narain v.',
		(int) 11 => 'Mohan Singh',
		(int) 12 => 'Ram Saran Sharma',
		(int) 13 => 'Kamala Acharya',
		(int) 14 => 'A. Ranganatham Chettl',
		(int) 15 => 'Ram Narayan Sharma',
		(int) 16 => 'Shakuntala Gaur',
		(int) 17 => 'Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh',
		(int) 18 => 'Thanwar Das',
		(int) 19 => 'Thanwar Das',
		(int) 20 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 21 => 'Ex.10',
		(int) 22 => 'Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2',
		(int) 23 => 'Chandra Nath Saha',
		(int) 24 => 'Sudhir Chandra Ghosh',
		(int) 25 => 'Mohd',
		(int) 26 => 'Choudhari',
		(int) 27 => 'Gundappa Amabadas Bukate',
		(int) 28 => 'V.N. Sarin v. Ajit',
		(int) 29 => 'Kumar Poplai',
		(int) 30 => 'Anr',
		(int) 31 => 'Rs',
		(int) 32 => 'Ex',
		(int) 33 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 34 => 'Kumar Sharma',
		(int) 35 => 'Ex',
		(int) 36 => 'Mohd',
		(int) 37 => 'V.N. Sarin's',
		(int) 38 => 'V.N. Sarin's',
		(int) 39 => 'Rani Pal's',
		(int) 40 => 'Govind Narain's',
		(int) 41 => 'Ex.10',
		(int) 42 => 'Ram Saran Sharma's',
		(int) 43 => 'A. Ranganatham Chetti',
		(int) 44 => 'Marthin',
		(int) 45 => 'Narayan Sharma's',
		(int) 46 => 'Sardar Singh's',
		(int) 47 => 'Sardar Singh's',
		(int) 48 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 49 => 'Jitendra Nath Dey',
		(int) 50 => 'Krishna Murari Prasad',
		(int) 51 => 'Mitar Singh',
		(int) 52 => 'Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v.',
		(int) 53 => 'Govindram Ramgopal Mundada',
		(int) 54 => 'Satwant Kaur',
		(int) 55 => 'Dhund Singh',
		(int) 56 => 'Babu',
		(int) 57 => 'T.K. Vasudevan',
		(int) 58 => 'Nasirual Haque's',
		(int) 59 => 'Krishna Murari Prasad's',
		(int) 60 => 'Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's',
		(int) 61 => 'Satwant Kaur's',
		(int) 62 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 63 => 'Bega Begum',
		(int) 64 => 'Abdul Ahad Khan',
		(int) 65 => 'Shiv Sarup Gupta v.',
		(int) 66 => 'Mahesh Chand Gupta',
		(int) 67 => 'Basant Lal Khatri',
		(int) 68 => 'Megh Raj',
		(int) 69 => 'Amrit Lal',
		(int) 70 => 'M.L. Prabhakar',
		(int) 71 => 'Rajiv Singal',
		(int) 72 => 'Bega Begum',
		(int) 73 => 'Megh Raj',
		(int) 74 => 'M.L. Prabhakar's',
		(int) 75 => 'Kumar Kapoor',
		(int) 76 => 'Vishnu Avtar Sharma',
		(int) 77 => 'Ashok Jasra',
		(int) 78 => 'Shiv Singh',
		(int) 79 => 'Jai Singh',
		(int) 80 => 'Mahesh Chand Sharma',
		(int) 81 => 'S.N. Sharma',
		(int) 82 => 'M.L. Vyas',
		(int) 83 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 84 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 85 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 86 => 'C.N. Sharma',
		(int) 87 => 'Jagdish',
		(int) 88 => 'Navjeevan',
		(int) 89 => 'Jaipur Tower',
		(int) 90 => 'Shekhawati Complex',
		(int) 91 => 'Gundali',
		(int) 92 => 'cam',
		(int) 93 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
		(int) 94 => 'Kalyan',
		(int) 95 => 'Amir Ahmed v.',
		(int) 96 => 'Yusuf',
		(int) 97 => 'Hon'ble D.B.',
		(int) 98 => 'Dev Kumar',
		(int) 99 => 'Swaran Lata',
		(int) 100 => 'alias Anandi',
		(int) 101 => 'C. Setharama Nagarkar',
		(int) 102 => 'Angoori Devi',
		(int) 103 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 104 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 105 => 'Hari Singh v.',
		(int) 106 => 'Kannaiya Lal',
		(int) 107 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali',
		(int) 108 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
		(int) 109 => 'Anr',
		(int) 110 => 'Vinayak N.Joshi',
		(int) 111 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal',
		(int) 112 => 'Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan',
		(int) 113 => 'Hari Singh's',
		(int) 114 => 'Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's',
		(int) 115 => 'Virendra Kashinath Ravat',
		(int) 116 => 'Janak Raj Ahuja's',
		(int) 117 => 'Mohan Lal',
		(int) 118 => 'Ramesh Gundali',
		(int) 119 => 'Ramesh Ajmers',
		(int) 120 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 121 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 122 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 123 => 'B.L. Asawa',
		(int) 124 => 'Jagdish',
		(int) 125 => 'Parwani',
		(int) 126 => 'Jagdish',
		(int) 127 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 128 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 129 => 'Parwani',
		(int) 130 => 'Dinesh Parwani',
		(int) 131 => 'Amir Ahmed's',
		(int) 132 => 'Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai',
		(int) 133 => 'Kalyan Sahai v. Smt',
		(int) 134 => 'Narangi Bai',
		(int) 135 => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal'
	),
	'CARDINAL' => array(
		(int) 0 => '500/-',
		(int) 1 => '2',
		(int) 2 => '31.10.1991',
		(int) 3 => '4',
		(int) 4 => 'ten',
		(int) 5 => '25.10.2000',
		(int) 6 => '3',
		(int) 7 => '6',
		(int) 8 => '4',
		(int) 9 => '10',
		(int) 10 => '1',
		(int) 11 => 'three',
		(int) 12 => '31.5.2002.6',
		(int) 13 => '1',
		(int) 14 => '30.10.1991',
		(int) 15 => '2',
		(int) 16 => '1',
		(int) 17 => '1',
		(int) 18 => '2',
		(int) 19 => '3',
		(int) 20 => '4',
		(int) 21 => '5',
		(int) 22 => '6',
		(int) 23 => '8).8',
		(int) 24 => '25.10.1986',
		(int) 25 => '500',
		(int) 26 => '3',
		(int) 27 => '1',
		(int) 28 => '9',
		(int) 29 => '10',
		(int) 30 => '11',
		(int) 31 => 'transferee',
		(int) 32 => '3',
		(int) 33 => 'two',
		(int) 34 => '10',
		(int) 35 => '31.10.1991',
		(int) 36 => '6',
		(int) 37 => 'transferee',
		(int) 38 => '25.10.1986',
		(int) 39 => '25.10.1986',
		(int) 40 => '31.10.1991',
		(int) 41 => '1912',
		(int) 42 => '3',
		(int) 43 => '20.9.1985',
		(int) 44 => '1',
		(int) 45 => '1',
		(int) 46 => 'two',
		(int) 47 => '1',
		(int) 48 => '2',
		(int) 49 => '3/4th',
		(int) 50 => '31.5.2002',
		(int) 51 => 'half',
		(int) 52 => '150',
		(int) 53 => '150',
		(int) 54 => '12',
		(int) 55 => '13',
		(int) 56 => '15',
		(int) 57 => '16',
		(int) 58 => 'one',
		(int) 59 => '3/4th',
		(int) 60 => 'two',
		(int) 61 => 'four',
		(int) 62 => '1000',
		(int) 63 => '17',
		(int) 64 => '18',
		(int) 65 => '19',
		(int) 66 => '20',
		(int) 67 => '21',
		(int) 68 => 'thousands',
		(int) 69 => '1',
		(int) 70 => '15',
		(int) 71 => '20',
		(int) 72 => 'two',
		(int) 73 => '4',
		(int) 74 => '1000',
		(int) 75 => '3/4th',
		(int) 76 => '3/4th',
		(int) 77 => '3'9'x',
		(int) 78 => 'thousands',
		(int) 79 => '1',
		(int) 80 => '4',
		(int) 81 => '4',
		(int) 82 => '4',
		(int) 83 => '22',
		(int) 84 => '23',
		(int) 85 => '24',
		(int) 86 => '25',
		(int) 87 => '26',
		(int) 88 => '28',
		(int) 89 => '29',
		(int) 90 => '30',
		(int) 91 => '31',
		(int) 92 => 'four',
		(int) 93 => 'two',
		(int) 94 => 'between other two',
		(int) 95 => '1',
		(int) 96 => '5',
		(int) 97 => 'two',
		(int) 98 => '1',
		(int) 99 => 'one',
		(int) 100 => '32',
		(int) 101 => '4',
		(int) 102 => '19.1.1995',
		(int) 103 => '22',
		(int) 104 => '1.50',
		(int) 105 => 'one',
		(int) 106 => '5',
		(int) 107 => '33',
		(int) 108 => '34',
		(int) 109 => 'one',
		(int) 110 => 'two',
		(int) 111 => '36',
		(int) 112 => 'one',
		(int) 113 => 'two'
	),
	'GPE' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Jaipur',
		(int) 1 => 'Clause',
		(int) 2 => 'Clause',
		(int) 3 => 'T.K.',
		(int) 4 => 'T.K.',
		(int) 5 => 'Sk',
		(int) 6 => 'Smt',
		(int) 7 => 'Clause',
		(int) 8 => 'Clause',
		(int) 9 => 'Clause',
		(int) 10 => 'S.R.',
		(int) 11 => 'S.R.',
		(int) 12 => 'L.Rs',
		(int) 13 => 'S.N. Kapoor',
		(int) 14 => 'Jaipur',
		(int) 15 => 'PW',
		(int) 16 => 'Surendra',
		(int) 17 => 'PW',
		(int) 18 => 'Ganpati Plaza',
		(int) 19 => 'Jaipur',
		(int) 20 => 'Rajasthan',
		(int) 21 => 'Roop Chand',
		(int) 22 => 'Roop Chand's',
		(int) 23 => 'Pandey',
		(int) 24 => 'D.W',
		(int) 25 => 'P.C.',
		(int) 26 => 'Bhogilal',
		(int) 27 => 'S.R.',
		(int) 28 => 'Subramania'
	),
	'TIME' => array(
		(int) 0 => '3 to Section 11'
	),
	'FAC' => array(
		(int) 0 => '30.6.1985',
		(int) 1 => 'Dhirendra Nath Gorai's'
	),
	'PRODUCT' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'Mst',
		(int) 1 => 'LRs',
		(int) 2 => 'Suresh',
		(int) 3 => 'Dinesh'
	),
	'QUANTITY' => array(
		(int) 0 => '300 sq. ft'
	),
	'EVENT' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'PW 8 Sh'
	),
	'PERCENT' => array(
		(int) 0 => '63%',
		(int) 1 => '37%',
		(int) 2 => '63%',
		(int) 3 => '37%'
	)
)
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '765114',
		'acts' => 'Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 14(3); <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 5',
		'appealno' => 'S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 15 of 2001',
		'appellant' => 'Jagdish',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Jagdish Vs. Manoj Kumar Sharma',
		'casenote' => ' -  -  In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. - No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop. 14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. 21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. 22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Amolak Singh v. Madanlal;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' B. Dutta, Senior Counsel and; J.P. Goyal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.M. Ranjan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Rajasthan',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2003-09-23',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' A.C. Goyal, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.C. Goyal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Brief facts giving rise to this first appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit on 21.9.1993 for eviction from the suit shop on the grounds of default in payment of rent, reasonable and bonafide necessity; sub-letting and nuisance with the averments that the shop measuring 15'x 20'ft situated on Moti Lalo Atal Road, Jaipur was let out to the appellant-defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 500/- on certain terms and conditions mentioned in para 2 of the plaint. The tenancy was oral. The defendant did not pay rent from the month of May, 1992. The plaintiff requires the suit shop for his own profession. The plaintiff has no residential house of his own at Jaipur. He wants to construct residential house upon the details of other grounds of eviction, he prayed for decree of eviction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The defendant in his written statement pleaded that the suit shop was let out to his father by plaintiff's father. Denying all the grounds of eviction, it was pleaded that rent upto September, 1990 was paid to Mr. C.N. Sharma, father, of the plaintiff. Thereafter, he was informed vide letter dated 31.10.1991 that rent from October, 1990 may be paid to the plaintiff. Hence he paid the rent to the plaintiff but the plaintiff declined to accept the rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Rejoinder was submitted by the plaintiff. Amended pleadings were also filedby the parties from time to time. '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed ten issues. After recording evidence of the parties, it was held vide judgment dated 25.10.2000 that landlord required the suit shop reasonably and bonafide, and that the comparative hardship would be caused to the landlord, if the decree of eviction is not passed. Issues No. 3 with regard to partial eviction and No. 6 with regard to default in payment of rent were also decided in favour of the landlord. Issues No. 4, 5 and 10 relating to subletting, nuisance and inconsistent use of the shop for the purpose it was let out were decided against the plaintiff. In conclusion, the trial court decreed the suit of the landlord for eviction, hence this appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned senior counsel Mr. B. Dutt appearing for the appellant-tenant raised three points, first point is that the suit for eviction was not maintainable, the second and third points are that issues with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were wrongly decided by the trial court in cursory manner without considering all the evidence. Attention in this regard was drawn to the application moved on behalf of the appellant-tenant on 31.5.2002.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Section 14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(3) Restriction on Eviction: Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. According to learned senior counsel, the suit shop was let out for business purposes and according to the case of the plaintiff-landlord the original landlord was Sh. C.N. Sharma father of the plaintiff who vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 informed the appellant-tenant to pay rent to the plaintiff from 1.10.1990 and thus the plaintiff became the new landlord and fresh terms and conditions were agreed between them as mentioned in para 2 of the plaint and thus the plaintiff had no right to file a suit for eviction on the grounds set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out the tenant, reliance is placed upon. T.K. Lathika v. Seth Karsandas Jamnadas (1), Smt. Menoka Rani Pal v. Smt. Maya Rani Karmakar (2), Govind Narain v. Mohan Singh (3), Ram Saran Sharma v. Kamala Acharya (4), A. Ranganatham Chettl and Ors. v. M. Ethirajulu Nayudu (5), Martin and Harris Limited v. Vith Additional Distt. Judge and Ors. (6), Ram Narayan Sharma v. Shakuntala Gaur, (7), Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh (8).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that initially Sh. Thanwar Das father of the appellant- tenant was the tenant in the year 1979/1980. Sh. Thanwar Das expired on 25.10.1986 and thereafter the appellant-tenant stated paying the rent as tenant to Sh. C.N. Sharma the original landlord and thereafter to the plaintiff on receiving information as such vide letter Ex.10 dated 30.10.1991 and monthly rent of Rs. 500 was never enhanced and no rent note was executed and terms and conditions of the tenancy were not altered and thus no new tenancy came into existence, hence Section 14 (3) of the Act is not attracted. It was next submitted that the suit for eviction was instituted in September, 1993 and no such objection was taken by the appellant-tenant in written statement, during trial and even in the memo of appeal and as such the appellant- tenant waived this right if available to him. He placed reliance upon 1. Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2. Subal Chandra Nath Saha and Ors. v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Ors. (9), SK. Sattar SK. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate (10), V.N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai and Anr. (11) and also relied upon Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra). In T.K. Lathika's case (supra) the original landlord gifted the tenanted premises to his daughter, the transferee landlord. Proviso 3 to Section 11 (3) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act provided that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument. The daughter without waiting for the moratorium period of one year from the date of gift to expire filed eviction petition. Having found two differences in the terms of the old and fresh lease that (i) name of landlord was changed from father to daughter and (ii) rent payable was increased from Rs. 65 per month to Rs. 150 per month. It was held that moratorium period would apply from the date of fresh lease de'ed. This judgment is no instrument of transfer of the suit shop by the original landlord in the name of the plaintiff. A perusal of the letter Ex. 10 dated 31.10.1991 goes to show that Sh. C.N. Sharma, original landlord (HUF), informed the tenant to pay the rent to his son Sh. Manoj Kumar Sharma, the plaintiff, from 1.10.1990 as on account of a family settlement on 27.2.1990, the suit shop had fallen to his share. In para 6 of the written statement, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that the original landlord Sh. C.N. Sharma'did not receive the rent on account of his family reasons and he was informed by pay rent vide this letter to the plaintiff. Ex. 55 is memorandum of family settlement and Ex. 56 is the registered memorandum of family settlement cum partition deed. On perusal of these documents, it is evident that the suit shop was part of the entire properties of HUF and this shop came to the share of the plaintiff on account of family partition and as such it does not amount to any transfer of the property as defined under Section 5 of the <a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a>. Such plea was taken in Sk. Mohd. Choudhari and V.N. Sarin's case (both supra). In V.N. Sarin's case (supra) while dealing with the similar provisions contained in Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the process of partition, therefore, involves the transfer of enjoyment of the properties into an enjoyment in severally by them of the respective properties allotted to their shares. Having regard to this basic character of joint Hindu family property, it cannot be denied that each coparcener has an antecedent title to the said property, though its extent is not determined until partition takes place. That being so, partition really means that whereas initially all the coparceners have subsisting title to the totality of the property of the family jointly, that joint title is by partition transformed into separate titles of the individual coparceners in respect of several items of properties allotted to them respectively. Thus, it cannot be said that the suit shop has been acquired by the plaintiff by transfer and so Section 14(3) of the Act cannot be invoked by the appellant. On the same reasonings as discussed here-inabove, the judgment delivered in Smt. Menoka Rani Pal's case (supra) is also not applicable because the transferee landlady acquired the title of the suit premises by purchase and thus eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement was not allowed in view of the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act. In Govind Narain's case (supra), the terms of the tenancy were changed and new tenancy agreement was entered into or a new lease was executed by the tenant and thus the existing tenancy was deemed to have been surrendered and the fact that tenant continued to remain in possession will be of no consequence and Section 14(3) of the Act would apply meaning thereby the premises will be deemed to have been let out to the tenant from the date of commencement of the new tenancy and not from the date of original tenancy. In the instant case, the suit shop was let out to father of the appellant much before 25.10.1986. On the death of appellant's father on 25.10.1986, the appellant continued to pay the rent to the original landlord and continued to pay the rent at the same rate of Rs. 500 per month to the plaintiff in pursuance of letter Ex.10 dated 31.10.1991. No rent note was executed, rent was not enhanced and not terms and conditions of the tenancy were changed, hence no new tenancy came into existence. Similarly the judgment of this Court delivered in Ram Saran Sharma's case (supra) would also not apply as eviction suit was filed by the new landlord who become absolute owner of the suit properly by virtue of valid gift deed. The decision of Privy Council in. A. Ranganatham Chetti and Others's case (supra) is also not applicable as though the physical possession was continuous from 1912 onwards, the possession from 1.10.1922 was attributable to a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. But the instant case is not of a new tenancy. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra) the respondent No. 3 had purchased the premises on 30.6.1985 and issued a notice to the tenant on 20.9.1985 but filed application for eviction in January, 1986 and the case was taken up for hearing after there years of purchase. The point for consideration was whether the landlord's application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction) Act was not maintainable in view of the proviso to the said section as it was filed before the expiry of there years from the date of purchase of the suit premises by the landlord. It was held that the proviso to Section 21(1) bars entertainment of the application, therefore, the stage at which the Court has to consider whether grounds mentioned in Clause (a) are made out or not will be reached when the Court takes up the application for consideration on merits. In the instant case, Section 14(3) of the Act provides that no suit for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall lie before the expiry of five years. But as stated hereinabove in Marthin's case (supra) the landlord became owner of the suit premises by purchases, thus on the basis of this judgment also, the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant is not acceptable. On the basis of the similar reasoning the judgment delivered in Ram Narayan Sharma's case (supra) is also not applicable as it was also a case of purchaser landlord.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Now another submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that appellant-tenant waived his right even if available to him is taken up. It is not disputed that no such objection was taken in the written statement, during the trial and even in the memo of appeal by the appellant-tenant. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant, Section 14(3) of the Act puts a complete embargo on institution of the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, such question of law can be raised at any stage. In Sardar Singh's case (supra), this Court held that objection under Section 14(3) of the Act can be allowed to be raised in second appeal, despite that such objection was not pressed before first Appellate Court. There is important distinction between the facts of two cases as in the instant case, no such objection was raised even upto the filing of this appeal in this Court while in Sardar Singh's case (supra) such objection was taken in the written statement. Assuming that such objection can be raised in this appeal, the point is whether the appellant-tenant waived this right. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that since the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act create a complete restriction on filing the suit for eviction on the ground of personal requirement before the expiry of five years, no such waiver can be pleaded. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord contended that such a right can be waived. In Dhirendra Nath Gorai's case (supra) the judgment debtor who received the notice of the proclamation of sale, did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or did not object to the non-compliance with Section 35 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act which provide that the Court should specify in the sale proclamation the property to be sold. It was held that non-compliance with Section 35 in specifying the property to be sold is a defect in the proclamation within the meaning of the second proviso to Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C, and such mandatory provision can be waived only if it is not conceived in the public interest but in the interest of the party that waives it. In Martin & Harris Limited's case (supra), it was held that provision of six months notice prior to the filing of application for eviction was mandatory and thus application was premature, but the tenant had later given a go-by to this contention for reasons best known to himself and so he had waived the right of prohibition imposed by statute. It was also held that this prohibition was for protection to the tenant and waiving of such protection by the tenant did not contravene the law. The prohibition was not in public benefit but for his private benefit so he could waive it. In the instant case, the provision contained in Section 14(3) of the Act are for protection of the tenant and the tenant-appellant in the instant case, did not take any objection in this regard till final submissions made in this appeal. Consequently, it must be held that the provision for five years period before filing the suit, though is mandatory and confers protection to the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. In the facts of the present case there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant- Jenant did not think it fit to pursue that point and. on the contrary joined issues on merits and having lost therein and got and adverse decision did not think it fit even to challenge the decision on that ground even while filing an appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, it must be held that the appellant-tenant had waived this right available to him under Section 14(3) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Now second and third objections raised on behalf of the appellant-tenant are taken up. Section 14(3) of the Act reads as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14(2) Restriction on eviction:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord of the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is significant that issue No. 2 with regard to reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff was decided in favour of the plaintiff-landlord by the trial court and findings of the trial court on this issue were not challenged by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-tenant at the time of making final submissions. Learned senior counsel confined his submissions with regard to findings of the trial court on the issue of comparative hardship and partial eviction. It was contended that the trial court has not critically examined the question of hardship and partial eviction; the trial court did not consider the availability of other reasonable accommodation to the parties; there was no sufficient evidence or material on record for the trial court to reach the satisfaction as provided in Section 14(3) of the Act. In the present case, it is clear that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord would be well served if the tenanted premises were partially evicted by the appellant-tenant. He referred the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, who admitted in cross- examination that the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfied with 3/4th portion of the tenanted premises being vacated but the trial court did not consider all these aspects and decided both the question in favour of the plaintiff-landlord in a very cursory manner. Learned senior counsel on the basis of the application submitted on 31.5.2002 under Section 14 of the Act contended that the appellant-tenant will be ready to vacate the half of the tenanted premises under his possession and thus the appellant-tenant is still ready to vacate 150 sq. ft. area for the plaintiff which would be sufficient to satisfy his requirement and in the alternative the appellant is further ready to vacate the entire suit shop for a certain period in case the landlord is desirous to re-build the entire premises in his possession including the suit shop on the condition to reserve his right ore-enter in the building comprising 150 sq. carpet area with such terms of tenancy already existing between the parties and for that a commissioner may be appointed by the Court for sorting out the possibility of division for partial eviction of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance is placed upon Nasirul Haque v. Jitendra Nath Dey (12), Krishna Murari Prasad v. Mitar Singh (13), Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada (14), Satwant Kaur v. Dhund Singh (15), S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan and Ors. (16). In Nasirual Haque's case (supra), it was held that in determining the question of partial eviction the Court should consider the reasonable requirement of the landlord and where it would be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part of the premises. In Krishna Murari Prasad's case (supra), it was held that it is necessary to make enquiry as to indivisibility of suit premises and drawing presumption merely because suit premises consist one room overlooking factor of dimension of room is not proper. In Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's case (supra), it was held that comparative hardship and partial eviction must be considered by the court in order to discharge properly its statutory duty of weighing and assessing the comparative hardship and if the proved requirement of the landlord can be satisfied by partial eviction, partial eviction should only be ordered. In Satwant Kaur's case (supra), it was held that eviction from the entire shop claimed by the landlord for starting motor battery business was not justified and the nature of landlord's business does not require much space, hence partial eviction was upheld. In S.R. Babu's case (supra), it was held that the requirement of the suit premises by the landlord for personal use implies its use not only in the existing condition but also on making necessary repairs to or reconstruction of the same and the court should not pass the order of eviction against a tenant who is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in that building and there is no other building available in the locality for the tenant to carry on such trade or the business. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord while referring the evidence of the parties on the these issued contended that the learned trial Judge having discussed the entire evidence came to this conclusion that the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord for the entire suit shop is not only reasonable but bonafide also and relevant factors with regard to comparative hardship and partial eviction were also considered while considering the issue of requirement and also considered the evidence of the parties while deciding the issues relating to comparative hardship and partial eviction. According to learned counsel for the plaintiff- landlord, the plaintiff is an advocate practicing in various courts since long and he has no office of his own; that he shares the office of his father who is also a practicing advocate and keeping in view the size of the suit shop, its partial eviction is not possible. It was also submitted that the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, with regard to 3/4th portion of the suit shop was in context of only office for the plaintiff-landlord while requirement of the plaintiff was two fold-for the office and for the construction of residential house over the roof of the suit shop and both the requirements were adjudged as reasonable and bonafide by the trial court. He also referred the statement of PW.7 Sh. G.S. Bapna, Chartered Engineer & Valuer who stated, that for four advocates, Munshi, driver, typist, the requirement is 1000 sq. ft. space and he further stated that plaintiff has no conference room; there is no spacejor secretarial work; there is no space for clients to sit and all of them sit in a congested manner; there is no separate chamber for the staff, advocate, for conference room, for clients, for library etc. It was also submitted that the suit shop is in possession of the present appellant since October, 1986 and prior to that it was with his father. Reliance is placed upon Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs and Ors. (17), Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (18), S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS. v. Basant Lal Khatri and Ors. (19), Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. and Co. v. Amrit Lal (20) and M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal (21). In Mst. Bega Begum and Ors.'s case (supra), it was held that it is not doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree of eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiff a decree for eviction. In deciding the extent of the hardship, each parly has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants. In Shiv Sarup Gupia's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the landlord cannot be forced to squeeze into less suitable premises just to protect the tenant's occupancy. In S.N. Kapoor (dead) by LRS's case (supra) while dealing with the comparative hardship it was held that some discretion has to be allowed in favour of the landlord and the court should not impose there own wisdom as to how the landlord should arrange his affairs and ought not to be carried away by sympathy for the tenant. In Firm Mool Chand Megh Raj. & Co.'s case (supra), facts were that the landlord proved his bonafide requirement of shop and the tenant's plea was that he is in possession for 50 years and he is likely to lose thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him. It was held that this was natural hardship not amounting to greater hardship under Section 14(2) of the Act. In M.L. Prabhakar's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the totality of the circumstances including their professions, vocation, style of life, habits and backgrounds.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. 1 have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. The dimensions of the suit shop are 15ft. x 20ft. = 300 sq. ft. Learned trial court considered all the evidence in detail while dealing with the question of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord and further considered the material evidence available on the record while dealing with the issues relating the comparative hardship and partial eviction and rightly decided the points of partial eviction as well as comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff-landlord. This submission cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the trial court that these points were not critically examined and were decided in a very cursory manner. The plaintiff-landlord is a practicing advocate for a number of years. According to his statement, he was a practicing lawyer for last 16 years; that he has no office of his own and no residential house of his own; that he along with his colleagues, staff and clients sits in a portion of the office occupied by his father who is also an advocate; that he is residing with his family members in two rooms accommodation provided by his father; that he has no house of his own at Jaipur and as such he is facing great hardship PW.2 Brij Bihari Sharma, PW. 4 Surendra Kumar Kapoor, PW.5 Vishnu Avtar Sharma, PW.6 Ashok Jasra all clients supported his statement that the accommodation for the office available with the plaintiff is much congested. PW.3 Ramesh Chand Bansal also supported the statement of the plaintiff-landlord that sarva shri Shiv Singh, Jai Singh, Mahesh Chand Sharma, S.N. Sharma, M.L. Vyas, Hihal Chand Jain all the advocates are also working with the plainlif landlord. He has also named Munshi, driver, steno etc. and corroborated the statement of the plaintiff that he has no office of his own, no place for library etc. P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna also supported the statement of the plaintiff with regards to his requirement, hardship and partial eviction. According to his statement, 1000 sq. ft. is required for plaintiff advocate, his associates and the staff. Much stress was put on the statement of PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, father of the plaintiff, that according to his statement the requirement of the plaintiff would suffice if the 3/4th portion of the suit shop is vacated and thus partial eviction is possible. PW.8 Sh. C.N. Sharma stated in cross- examination that minimum requirement for the office of the plaintiff should be 3/4th but definite opinion of this point may be given by architect. But on the basis of the statement of PW. 8 Sh. C.N. Sharma, no such conclusion can be drawn that partial eviction of suit shop is possible. On the basis of the statement of PW 8 Sh; C.N. Sharma, if it is taken that 3/4th portion of the suit shop may serve the purpose of plaintiff-landlord, remaining 1/4th portion of the appellant-tenant. Thus, the appellant-tenant would get the portion of dimension so 3'9'x 5'-75sq. ft. It is nowhere the case of the appellant-tenant that this much portion would serve his purpose. The appellant-tenant Sh. Jagdish stated that in the same area a number of commercial complexes namely Ganpati Plaza, Navjeevan complex, Jaipur Tower, Shekhawati Complex are situated but he is not in a position to have any shop in this area because he is unable lo pay huge amount of pagri and further he is carrying on his business in the suit shop for about a period of 20 years and thus he has earned goodwill and he will suffer a loss of thousands of rupees which the customers owed to him.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Keeping in view the entire discussion made hereinabove, 1 find no ground to interfere with the findings of the trial court that the alternative accommodation is available in nearby area and simply that the appellant-tenant has to pay more rent or it would be difficult for him to recover outstanding amount from the customers are no grounds to hold that comparative hardship would be caused to the tenant instead of landlord. In view of the entire discussion, the application under Section 14(2) of the Act is liable to be rejected for partial eviction on the grounds mentioned in this application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Now cross objections filed by the plaintiff-landlord are taken up. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord has challenged the finding of the trial court on the issues of subletting and nuisance. Learned trial court while dealing with the issue No. 4 regarding subletting came to this conclusion that in absence of specific pleadings, evidence with regard to subletting cannot be taken into consideration and further the plaintiff failed to prove that the appellant-tenant parted with the possession of the suit shop.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides that decree of eviction of tenant may be passed if it is satisfied that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord. In para 4 of the amended plaint, it was pleaded that the tenant is not occupying the shop and he is sub-letting the shop to various persons from time to time and receives money from them. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations in his written statement. In para 4 of the rejoinder, the plaintiff-landlord pleaded that before and after filing of the suit the appellant-tenant let-out the suit shop to Sh. Ramesh Gundali an employee in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur, Sh. Kalyan an employee in Law Department, State of Rajasthan and others persons.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The learned trial Judge cam to this conclusion that subletting to Ramesh Gundali, Kalyan and others persons is not proved at all and evidence in this regard cannot be relied upon in absence of specific pleadings. With regard to subletting to Dinesh, it was observed that he is carrying on business of STD/PCO in partnership of the appellant-tenant in a portion of the suit shop and this it does not amount to subletting. In Amir Ahmed v. Yusuf (22), it was held by Hon'ble D.B. of this Court that merely allowing another person to use premises or its part and conversion of exclusive possession of premises by a tenant into joint possession with a third person does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Similar view was taken in Dev Kumar (died) through LRs. v. Smt. Swaran Lata and Ors. (23). In Smt. Laxmi alias Anandi and Ors. v. C. Setharama Nagarkar and Ors. (24), it was held that the landlord should prove as to when sub-tenancy was created and in absence of that, eviction on such ground cannot be ordered. In Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi (25), it was held that mere presence of persons other than the tenant in shop is no ground to presume subletting. Per contra learned counsel for the plaintiff-land lord contended that the plaintiff-landlord and his witnesses were not cross-examination on this point; that evidence cannot be discarded merely in absence of specific pleadings; that High Court in revision allowed the parties to lead evidence on this point; that subletting and parting with the possession of the part of the shop to Dinesh Parwani was well proved and the factum of partnership between Dinesh Parwani and the appellant-tenant could not be taken to be proved merely on the basis of partnership deed as it was after-thought document and the appellant-tenant did not produce any account of the partnership; that as per telephone rules, business of STD-PCO is not permissible in partnership. He placed reliance upon M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (26), Hari Singh v. Kannaiya Lal (27), Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (28), Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali (D) by LRs. (29), Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Anr. v. Vinayak N.Joshi and Ors. (30), Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal (31) and Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan (32). In M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd's case (supra), it was held that in case of subletting it is difficult for landlord to prove it by direct evidence or whether sub-tenant had paid monetary consideration and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. In Hari Singh's case (supra), it was held that details of subletting can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot Ute a reason to set aside concurrent findings of the fact. In Roop Chand's case (supra), it was held that when the larger part of the premises was let out to a club registered under Companies Act while tenant retains possession of the smaller part of the premises, it would amount that the tenant parted with the possession and is liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. In Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's case (supra), the tenant entered into partnership with his four sons in 1955. Thereafter, the tenant and his two sons retired from the partnership in 1974 when new partnership came between other two sons. It was held that original tenant having no concern with premises or business therein, it was a case of subletting. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat and another's case (supra), court below arrived at concurrent finding of subletting on account of amended version of the plaint stating that pending the suit the defendants have or any of them has inducted defendants No. 1 to 5 unlawfully. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that High Court erred in overturning conclusions of two fact finding courts on the ground that averments regarding subletting was insufficient. In Janak Raj Ahuja's case (supra) the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that through the partnership deed was produced by the tenant but account books and income tax returns were not produced, it was held that partnership was merely camouflage and it was a case of subletting. Similar view was taken in Harbhajan Singh's case (supra). It was further observed that moreover, as per rules of Telegraph Department, there can be no partnership with respect to STD/PCO.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. 1 have considered the rival submission in the light of the judgments, judgment of the trial court and evidence available on the record. The plaintiff-landlord in his statement tried to support the averments made in the plaint, while the appellant-tenant stated that he never let out any portion of the shop to anyone and he never parted with possession of any part of the shop. According to his statement, the persons named by the plaintiff namely Thakur, Mohan Lal, Suresh were his salary paid workers. He further deposed that Ramesh Gundali and Sh. Kalayan were his customers and one Pandey was a typist and another typist Ramesh Ajmers is no doing his typing job in a separate shop. He also explained photos showing the presence of these persons produced by the plaintiff. He admitted in his statement that Dinesh Parwani is doing STD PCO job in the suit sbop but with him as partner and the partnership deed is Ex. A22 and it was executed in January, 1995. He explained that on account of excess work and marketing competition he had to enter into partnership with Dinesh parwani. It was also stated by him that there entire shop is in his possession, although the STD-PCO is in the name of Dinesh Parwani. It was also stated by him that he is an partner of 63% while Dinesh Parwani is a partner of 37%. He has also proved income-tax returns of this partnership firm which are Ex. A23 to Ex. A 32 for the assessment years 1995 to 2000. D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar, D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani, D.W, 4 Dr. B.L. Asawa, D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya and D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani which corroborating the statement of the appellant-tenant categorically stated before the trial court that the suit shop is in possession of the tenant Jagdish and is run by him. D.W. 5 Sh. dinesh Parwani categorically stated before the trial court that the connection of STD-PCO was issued in his name as he was an educated unemployed person and allotment of STD-PCO under rules is permissible to only educated unemployed person and any portion was never sub-let to him and he never paid any rent to the tenant Jagdish. I agree with this submission made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that the details of sub-let can be supplemented through evidence and mere lack of details in pleadings cannot,, be a reason to discard the evidence. I also agree with this submission also that in case of subletting it is difficult for the landlord to prove it by direct evidence or to prove that sub-tenant had paid any rent and the Court may draw its own inference upon the facts of the case. But in the instant case, the trial Judge decided this issue against the plaintiff- landlord not only on account of lack of details in pleadings but also on the ground that there is no such evidence to prove subletting. As a matter of fact, the pleadings of subletting are quite vague and incomplete and even by the evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to supplement the plaintiff-landlord that the tenant from time to time allowed a number of persons as sub-tenants and in amended plaint certain persons were named as sub-tenants but on evidence the plaintiff-landlord failed to prove subletting to any of them. On the oilier hand explanation given by the appellant-tenant corroborated by other witnesses was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. As far as the case of Dinesh Parwani is concerned, it was admitted by the appellant-tenant that STD-PCO connection is in the name of Dinesh Parwani which is going on the suit shop. On perusal of the entire evidence available on the record, the conclusion drawn by the trial court that this STD-PCO business is being carried out in the partnership of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani appears to be sound. A perusal of deed of partnership Ex.A22 executed on 19.1.1995 along with income-tax returns for the assessment years 1995 to 2000 and the oral evidence adduced by the appellant-tenant go to show that this document Ex. A 22 is not after though document, rather it was rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge. According to this deed of partnership, Sh. Dinesh Parwani invested a sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs in this business as part of the capital and further shares of the appellant-tenant and Dinesh Parwani are respectively 63% and 37%. Therefore, merely on account of non-filing account books is not ground to say that this document of deed of partnership is not genuine one further no such conclusion can be drawn on the basis of Telegraph Department Rules that partnership with respect to STD-PCO is barred, although the relevant rules provide that only educated unemployed persons are eligible for allotment of STD- PCO. In view of Amir Ahmed's case (supra), merely allowing another person to carry on business in partnership does not constitute parting with possession under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this issue does not call for any interference by this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Next comes to question of nuisance. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provide that the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction if it is satisfied that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is in consistent with the purpose for which he as admitted to the tenancy of the premises or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein. The term 'nuisance' has not been defined under the Act, 1950. In para 5 of the plaint, it is pleaded that the tenant has allowed a number of persons including the antisocial elements to enter the shop to carry on various activities causing nuisance, they use abusive language and throw filthy material and also put cycles etc. so as to create obstruction in the way and thus are causing continuing nuisance. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant is a man of quarrelsome nature and is creating nuisance regularly making it difficult for the plaintiff-landlord to carry on his profession as an advocate. The appellant-tenant denied all these allegations vide his written statement with this plea that names of such persons have not been given in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. The plaintiff-landlord reiterated all the averments made in the plaint in this regard in the statement before the trial court. It was also stated by him that the appellant-tenant abused him in open and a complaint was got registered with the police. It was also stated by him that the defendant-tenant is parking his motorcycle, scooter etc. so as to create obstruction in approaching his house and office. It was also stated that the defendant-tenant has fixed a number of sign boards and on account of that a number of strangers enter his house to enquiry about typing, photocopies etc-It was also stated by him that only once the defendant-tenant was bound down as provided under Section 107 & 116 Cr.P.C. and in counter he was also bound down under the same provisions at the instance of the defendant-tenant. The appellant-tenant in his statement denied all these allegations and the learned trial Judge haying considered the evidence held that on account of typing work of the defendant-tenant and since it is a commercial area, no case of actionable nuisance is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlord submitted that the trial court has not considered the evidence in proper way as the plaintiff-landlord made a number of complaints against me appellant-tenant regarding nuisance, using abusive language and similar activities of nuisance. He placed reliance upon some judgments. In Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and Ors. (33), it was held that private nuisance is one which interferes with a persons' use and enjoyment of immovable property or some right in respect of it. Suffering of damage must be proved in case of nuisance unless it can be presumed by law to exist. But the damage to amount to actionable nuisance must be substantial or at least of some significance. In other words, if the damage is insignificant or trivial it would not be actionable nuisance. In Bhogilal M. Davay v. S.R. Subramania lyer (34), it was held that on the basis of this evidence that the respondent has been abusing and quarreling and this was admitted by the respondent himself, such acts constitute nuisance. In Re A.S. Vijayaraghavalu Chetti (35), it was held that concurrent finding of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Tribunal were that the petitioner has been the cause of frequent quarrels and has made it impossible for the tenants occupying the other portions of the building to live in the house along with the petitioner, there is no ground to interfere.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant-tenant submitted that admittedly the suit shop is located in a commercial area in the busy market and there can be no nuisance only on account of visitors visiting the suit shop and further typing work etc. cannot be termed as nuisance. It was also submitted that one or two incidents of quarrel, if any, are not sufficient by themselves to constitute any actionable nuisance. Reliance is placed upon Kalyan Sahai v. Smt. Narangi Bai and Ors. (36), it was held by this court that quarrel or hurling of abusive words do not construe any nuisance as required under Section 13(1)(e). Taking similar view by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Amolak Singh v. Madanlal (37), it was held that quarrels between tenant and landlord on some occasions do not amount to nuisance causing interference with comfort of the landlord and there has to be a series of acts and conduct on the part of the tenant so that nuisance can be inferred against him. The mere existence of ill feelings between the landlord and his tenant could not have justified the ejectment in the provision of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. I have considered the rival submissions and the evidence available on the record in the light of the judgments and am of the view that there is not good ground to interfere with the conclusion of the trial court on this issue, although there is some evidence of ill feelings between the landlord and the tenant and one or two incidents of quarrel and exchange of abuses but the same do not amount to any actionable nuisance so as to treat the same as a ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on various issues, the appeal and the cross objections fail and are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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LAW: Section 13, Section 13 of the Act, Section 14, Section 5, Section 14, Section 14(3, Section 21, Section 21(1, Section 13, Section 14(3, Section 14(3, Section 35, Section 35, Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C, Section 14(3, Section 13, Section 14 of the Act, Section 14(2, Section 14(2, Section 13(1)(e, Section 13(1)(e, Section 13(1)(e, Section 107 &, Section 13(1)(e, Section 13(1)(e

ORG: A.C. Goyal, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction, M. Ethirajulu Nayudu, Martin and Harris Limited, Ors, Martin & Harris Limited's, Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control, HUF, HUF, Choudhari, Delhi Rent Control Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the West Bangal Premises Tenancy Act, Court, Privy Council, Martin & Harris Limited's, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leeting, Rent and Eviction, Court, Court, Court, first Appellate Court, Court, Court, Martin & Harris Limited's, Act.10, PW.8 Sh, carpet, Court, Reliance, Nasirul Haque, Ors, Court, PW.8 Sh, G.S. Bapna, Chartered Engineer & Valuer, Munshi, Reliance, Ors, Ors, S.N. Kapoor, Ors, Firm Mool Chand, Co., Ors, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, LRS, Firm Mool, & Co.'s, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Hihal Chand Jain, Munshi, P.W. 7 G.S. Bapna, PW.8 Sh, Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Law Department, State, Dinesh, STD, Court, Prasad, High Court, STD, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Ors, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, High Court, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, Telegraph Department, STD, Thakur, Kalayan, STD, STD, D.W. 2 Punit Kakkar, D.W. 3 Himmat Tanwani, D.W. 5 Montu Bhartiya, D.W. 5 Dinesh Parwani, STD, STD, Court, STD, Dinesh Parwani, STD, Telegraph Department Rules, STD, the Appellate Tribunal, Reliance, Ors, the Punjab & Haryana High Court

NORP: J.1, Lathika, Lathika, Hindu, Brij Bihari Sharma

ORDINAL: first, first, second, third, second, second, second, third, third

DATE: 15'x 20'ft, monthly, the month of May, 1992, September, 1990, October, 1990, 5, 1950, five years, five years, the year 1979/1980, 30.10.1991, monthly, September, 1993, the expiry of one year, one year, 65 per month, 150 per month, 27.2.1990, 55, 56, 1882, 500 per month, January, 1986, years, years, five years, five years, six months, Section 14(3, five years, Section 14(3, 14, October, 1986, 50 years, a number of years, last 16 years, 20 years, 27, 32, 1955, 1974, January, 1995, the assessment years 1995 to 2000, the assessment years 1995 to 2000, 1950, 35, 37

PERSON: Moti Lalo Atal Road, Jaipur, C.N. Sharma, B. Dutt, C.N. Sharma, Ex.10, T.K. Lathika, Seth Karsandas Jamnadas, Rani Pal v. Smt, Maya Rani Karmakar, Govind Narain v., Mohan Singh, Ram Saran Sharma, Kamala Acharya, A. Ranganatham Chettl, Ram Narayan Sharma, Shakuntala Gaur, Sardar Singh v. Prakash Singh, Thanwar Das, Thanwar Das, C.N. Sharma, Ex.10, Dhirendra Nath Gorai 2, Chandra Nath Saha, Sudhir Chandra Ghosh, Mohd, Choudhari, Gundappa Amabadas Bukate, V.N. Sarin v. Ajit, Kumar Poplai, Anr, Rs, Ex, C.N. Sharma, Kumar Sharma, Ex, Mohd, V.N. Sarin's, V.N. Sarin's, Rani Pal's, Govind Narain's, Ex.10, Ram Saran Sharma's, A. Ranganatham Chetti, Marthin, Narayan Sharma's, Sardar Singh's, Sardar Singh's, C.N. Sharma, Jitendra Nath Dey, Krishna Murari Prasad, Mitar Singh, Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v., Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, Satwant Kaur, Dhund Singh, Babu, T.K. Vasudevan, Nasirual Haque's, Krishna Murari Prasad's, Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada's, Satwant Kaur's, C.N. Sharma, Bega Begum, Abdul Ahad Khan, Shiv Sarup Gupta v., Mahesh Chand Gupta, Basant Lal Khatri, Megh Raj, Amrit Lal, M.L. Prabhakar, Rajiv Singal, Bega Begum, Megh Raj, M.L. Prabhakar's, Kumar Kapoor, Vishnu Avtar Sharma, Ashok Jasra, Shiv Singh, Jai Singh, Mahesh Chand Sharma, S.N. Sharma, M.L. Vyas, C.N. Sharma, C.N. Sharma, C.N. Sharma, C.N. Sharma, Jagdish, Navjeevan, Jaipur Tower, Shekhawati Complex, Gundali, cam, Ramesh Gundali, Kalyan, Amir Ahmed v., Yusuf, Hon'ble D.B., Dev Kumar, Swaran Lata, alias Anandi, C. Setharama Nagarkar, Angoori Devi, Dinesh Parwani, Dinesh Parwani, Hari Singh v., Kannaiya Lal, Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai v. Bakerali Fatehali, Virendra Kashinath Ravat, Anr, Vinayak N.Joshi, Janak Raj Ahuja v. Navneet Sehgal, Harbhajan Singh v. Jai Shree Kishan, Hari Singh's, Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai's, Virendra Kashinath Ravat, Janak Raj Ahuja's, Mohan Lal, Ramesh Gundali, Ramesh Ajmers, Dinesh Parwani, Dinesh Parwani, Dinesh Parwani, B.L. Asawa, Jagdish, Parwani, Jagdish, Dinesh Parwani, Dinesh Parwani, Parwani, Dinesh Parwani, Amir Ahmed's, Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai, Kalyan Sahai v. Smt, Narangi Bai, Amolak Singh v. Madanlal

CARDINAL: 500/-, 2, 31.10.1991, 4, ten, 25.10.2000, 3, 6, 4, 10, 1, three, 31.5.2002.6, 1, 30.10.1991, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8).8, 25.10.1986, 500, 3, 1, 9, 10, 11, transferee, 3, two, 10, 31.10.1991, 6, transferee, 25.10.1986, 25.10.1986, 31.10.1991, 1912, 3, 20.9.1985, 1, 1, two, 1, 2, 3/4th, 31.5.2002, half, 150, 150, 12, 13, 15, 16, one, 3/4th, two, four, 1000, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, thousands, 1, 15, 20, two, 4, 1000, 3/4th, 3/4th, 3'9'x, thousands, 1, 4, 4, 4, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, four, two, between other two, 1, 5, two, 1, one, 32, 4, 19.1.1995, 22, 1.50, one, 5, 33, 34, one, two, 36, one, two

GPE: Jaipur, Clause, Clause, T.K., T.K., Sk, Smt, Clause, Clause, Clause, S.R., S.R., L.Rs, S.N. Kapoor, Jaipur, PW, Surendra, PW, Ganpati Plaza, Jaipur, Rajasthan, Roop Chand, Roop Chand's, Pandey, D.W, P.C., Bhogilal, S.R., Subramania

TIME: 3 to Section 11

FAC: 30.6.1985, Dhirendra Nath Gorai's

PRODUCT: Mst, LRs, Suresh, Dinesh

QUANTITY: 300 sq. ft

EVENT: PW 8 Sh

PERCENT: 63%, 37%, 63%, 37%