Semantic Analysis by spaCy
A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc. Vs. State of Madras
Decided On : Mar-09-1964
Court : Supreme Court of India
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State', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 8 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 9 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 10 => 'Art', (int) 11 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman', (int) 12 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 13 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 14 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 15 => 's. 5(1)(a', (int) 16 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 17 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 18 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 19 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 20 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 21 => 'Art' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'April 13, 1962', (int) 1 => 'May 2, 1962', (int) 2 => '19', (int) 3 => '14', (int) 4 => '14', (int) 5 => '31', (int) 6 => '1962', (int) 7 => '1956', (int) 8 => '1962', (int) 9 => '1961', (int) 10 => '1962', (int) 11 => 'annual', (int) 12 => 'annual', (int) 13 => 'annual', (int) 14 => 'annual', (int) 15 => 'annual', (int) 16 => 'annual', (int) 17 => 'annual', (int) 18 => 'annual', (int) 19 => 'annual', (int) 20 => 'annual', (int) 21 => '1962', (int) 22 => '50', (int) 23 => 's. 5' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'first', (int) 1 => 'second', (int) 2 => 'first', (int) 3 => 'first', (int) 4 => 'first', (int) 5 => 'second', (int) 6 => 'third', (int) 7 => 'first', (int) 8 => 'second', (int) 9 => 'third', (int) 10 => 'first', (int) 11 => 'first' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Kerala', (int) 1 => 'Art', (int) 2 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 3 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 4 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 5 => 'Art', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Art', (int) 8 => 'Art' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Madras' ), 'QUANTITY' => array( (int) 0 => '30 standard acres', (int) 1 => '30 standard acres', (int) 2 => '30 standard acres', (int) 3 => '300 standard acres', (int) 4 => '60 standard acres', (int) 5 => '30 standard acres', (int) 6 => '30 standard acres', (int) 7 => '30 standard acres', (int) 8 => '300 standard acres', (int) 9 => '10 standard acres' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => 'about 4 per cent', (int) 1 => 'about 8 per cent' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640463', 'acts' => 'Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 - Sections 5(1) and 50; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 19 and 31(2)', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc. Vs. State of Madras', 'casenote' => 'Constitution - constitutionality of Act - Sections 5 (1) and 50 of Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 and Articles 14, 19 and 31 (2) of Constitution of India - constitutionality of Act challenged on ground that it violates Articles 14, 19, and 31 (2) - main purpose of Act is to provide for ceiling on land holdings and for payment of compensation for land acquired by Government - Section 5 (1) relating to ceiling area uses double standard and gives artificial definition to family and discriminates between person equally circumstanced, thus violative of Article 14 - principles used to determine amount of compensation under Section 50 are also discriminatory, thus violative of Article 14 - Supreme Court held, working of entire Act depends on Sections 5 and 50 and when these Sections are unconstitutional so whole Act is unconstitutional.<br> - [ A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K.C. Das Gupta,; K. Subba Rao,; K.N. Wanchoo, JJ.] The appellants were detained under r. 30(l) of the Defence of India Rules made by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962. They applied to the Punjab and Bombay High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their case was that ss. 3(2)(15)(i) and 40 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, which were continued under the Act, were unconstitutional and invalid inasmuch as they contravened their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 21, 22(4), (5) and (7) of the Constitution and that, therefore, they should be set at liberty. The High Courts held that the Presidential Order which had been issued on November 3, 1962, under Art. 359(1) of the Constitution, after a declaration of emergency under Art. 352, consequent on the Chinese invasion of India, barred their right to move the said petitions and dismissed them. These appeals raised two common questions in this Court, (1) what was the true scope and effect of the Presidential Order issued under Art. 359(1), and (2) did the bar created by the Order operate in respect of the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code. The Presidential Order was as follows:- "G.S.R. 1464--In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of article 352 thereof on the 26th October 1962 is in force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or order made thereunder." By a later amendment of the Order Art. 14 was incorporated into it. Held:(per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Shah, JJ.) that the proceedings taken by the appellants in the High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were hit by the Presidential Order and must be held to be incompetent. Article 359 of the Constitution was not capable of two interpretations and it was, therefore not necessary to decide the controversy raised by the parties as to whether that Article should be interpreted in favour of the President's power granted by it or the fundamental rights of the citizens. The King (At the Prosecution of Arthur Zadig) v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor, [1943] F.C.R. 49, Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66 and King Emperor v. Vimalabal Deshpande, L.R. 73 1. A. 144, considered. The words 'any court' in Art. 359(1), construed in their plain grammatical meaning, must mean any court of competent jurisdiction including' the Supreme Court and the High Courts before which the rights specified in the Presidential Order can be enforced. It was not correct to say that the use of the words was necessary so as to include such other courts as might be empowered in terms of Art. 32(3). Nor was it correct to say that the words could not include a High Court as its power to issue a writ under Art. 226(1) was discretionary. In judging whether a particular proceeding fell within the purview of the Presidential Order the determining factor was not its form nor the words in which the relief was couched but the substance of it. If in granting the relief the court had to consider whether any of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order, had been contravened, the proceeding was within the Order, whether it was under Art. 32(l) or 226(1) of the Constitution. The right to move the court for writ of habeas corpus under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was now a statutory right and could no longer be claimed under the common law. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Map- pillai, I.L.R. [1939] Mad. 708, Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum L.R. 66 I.A. 222 and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, L.R. 72 I.A. 241, referred to. Since the promulgation of the Constitution the two methods by which a citizen could enforce his right of personal freedom were (i) by a writ under Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(l), or (ii) under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whichever method he adopted if the right he sought to enforce was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution the matter must, come within Art. 359(1) of the Constitution. That the court could exercise its power under s. 491(1)(b) suo motu could make no difference and Arts. 372, 225 or 375 could provide no valid ground of attack. The suspension of the right to move any court, as under the Presidential Order, must necessarily suspend the Court's jurisdiction accordingly. The right to challenge a detention order under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code had been enlarged by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and when a detenu relied upon such rights in his petition under that section he was in substance seeking to enforce his fundamental rights. The prohibition contained in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order must, therefore, apply. The expression "right to move any court" in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order takes in all legal actions, filed or to be filed, in which the specified rights are sought to be enforced and covers all relevant categories of jurisdictions of competent courts under which the said actions would other-wise have been normally entertained and tried. Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commissioner Union Territory of Tripura, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442, referred to. Even though the impugned Act may be invalid by reason of contravention of Arts. 14, 21 and 22, as contended by the appellants, that invalidity could not be challenged during the period prescribed by the Presidential Order and it could not be said that the President could not because of such invalidity issue the order. Where, however, the challenge to the validity of the detention order was based on any right other than those mentioned in the Presidential Order, the detenu's right to move any court could not be suspended by the Presidential Order because the right was outside Art. 359(1). Where again the detention was challenged on the ground that it contravened the mandatory provisions of the relevant act or that it was malafide and was proved to be so and in all cases falling under the other categories of s. 491(1) of the Code excepting those under s. 491(1)(b), the bar of the Presidential Order could have no application. So also the plea that the operative provision of the law under which the order of detention was made suffered from the vice of excessive delegation, was an independent plea not relatable to the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order and its validity had to be examined. The plea that s. 3(2)(15)(i) and s. 40 of the impugned Act suffered from excessive delegation must fail. The legislative policy was broad stated in the preamble and the relevant provisions of ss. 3(1) and 3(2) gave detailed and specific guidance to the rule making authority and it was not correct to say that the Act had by the impugned sections delegated essentially legislative function to that authority. Rule 30(1)(b) which was consistent with the operative provisions of the Act could not also be challenged on that ground. In " The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc. [1951] S.C.R. 747, Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, Bhatanagars and Co. Ltd., v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 701, relied on. The impugned Act could not also he struck down as a piece of colourable legislation because the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was already on the Statute book. The Parliament had power under Entry 9, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and if in view of the grave threat to the security of India it passed the Act, it could not be said to have acted malafide. If the Parliament thought that the executive would not be able to detain citizens reasonably suspected of prejudicial activities by a recourse to the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which provided for the required constitutional safeguards and the impugned Act which it enacted did not, it could not be suggested that it was acting malafide. Even if the impugned Act contravened Arts. 14 and 22 and the detentions thereunder were- invalid, Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order, which were precisely meant to meet such a situation, barred investigation on the merits during the period prescribed by the Order. The proceeding under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code is one pro- ceeding and the sole relief that can be claimed under it is release from the detention. If that could not be claimed because of the Presidential Order it was unreasonable to say that a mere declaration that the impugned Act and the detention thereunder were invalid could be made. Such a - declaration is clearly outside the purview of s. 491(1)(b) of the Code as also of Arts. 226(1) and 32(l) of the Constitution. The period for which the emergency should continue and the restrictions that should be imposed during its continuance are matters that must inevitably be left to the executive. In a democratic state the effective safeguard against any abuse of power in peace as also in emergency is the existence of enlightened, vigilant and vocal public opinion. Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [19421 A.C. 206, referred to. The inviolability of individual freedom and the majesty of law that sustains it are equally governed by the Constitution which has made this Court the custodian of the fundamental rights on the one hand and, on the other, provided for the declaration of the emergency. Consequently, in dealing with the right of a citizen to challenge the validity of his detention, effect must be given to Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it. The right specified in that Article must be held to include such right whether constitutional or constitutionally guaranteed and the words "any court" must include the Supreme Court and the High Court. The Punjab and the Bombay High Courts were, therefore right in their decision that the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were incompetent in so far as they sought to challenge the validity of the detentions on the ground that the Act and the Rules under which the orders were made contravened Arts. 14, 21 and 22(4)(5) and (7) of the Constitution. Per Subba Rao, J. It was clear that s. 3(2)(15)(i) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) made under the Act contravened the relevant provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution and were, therefore, void. Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 840, Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. Under the Constitution, every person has a right to move the Supreme Court, the High Courts or any other court or courts constituted by the Parliament under Art. 32(3) for the enforcement of fundamental rights in the manner prescribed. But while the right to move the Supreme Court is a guaranteed right, the right to move the others is not so. Article 359, properly construed, meant that the bar imposed by the Presidential Order applied not only to the guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court but also the rights to move the other courts under Art. 32 and Art. 226 of the Constitution. There is no new rule of construction peculiar to war measures. It is always the same, whether in peace or in war. The fundamental rule is that the courts have to find out the expressed intention of the Legislature from the words of the enactment itself. Words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless there is ambiguity in the language in which case the court has to adopt that meaning which furthers the intention of the Legislature. A constitutional provision such as Art. 359, however, cannot be given a strained construction to meet a passing phase such as the present emergency. Rex v. Halliday, L.R. [19171 A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, L.R. [1942] A.C. 206, Nakkuda A1i v. jayaratna, L.R. 1951] A.C. 66, Gibbon v. Ogden, (1824) 6 L. Ed. 23, discussed. Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide in its terms and gives a discretionary power to the High Courts. Unlike Arts. 32 and 226, the exercise of the power is not channelled through procedural writs or orders and their technicalities cannot circumscribe the court's discretion. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai, I.L.R. 1939 Mad. 708, Matten v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum, L.R. (1939) 66 I.A. 222, referred to. Section 491 is continued by Art. 372 and -Art. 225 preserves the jurisdiction of the High Court. The power it confers on the High Court is not inconsistent either with Art. 32 or Art. 226 or any other Article of the Constitution and the section cannot, therefore, be said to have been impliedly superseded even to the extent Art. 226 empowers the High Court to give relief in cases of illegal detention. Though remedial in form the section postulates the existence of the substantive right that no person can be deprived of his liberty except in the manner prescribed by law. It assumes the existence of the rule of law and empowers High Court to act suo motu. The rights, substantive and procedural conferred by it arc different from those under Arts. 32 or 226 of the Constitution. It places the onus on the custodian to prove that the detention is legal and although in scrutinising the legality of the detention the court may have to consider whether the law offends any fundamental rights, that cannot make the proceeding one for the enforcement of fundamental rights or the decision anything but one on the unconstitutionality of a law because of infringement of fundamental rights generally. The mode of approach to the High Court under s. 491 of the Code or the nature of the relief given thereunder cannot be equated with those under the Constitution. The absolute discretionary jurisdiction under it cannot be put on a par with the jurisdiction under Art. 226 which is hedged in by constitutional limitations. Alam Khan v. The Crown, (1947) I.L.R. 28 Lahore 274, Ramji Lal v. The Crown, I.L.R..(1949) 11 E.P. 28, King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 144, referred to. While s. 491 gives no right to enforce fundamental rights, operating as it does as a check on arbitrary action, Art. 359 is concerned not with statutory powers but deals with the constitutional right and the constitutional enforcement of it. It was not, therefore, correct to say that Art. 359 would be frustrated if s. 491 was allowed to stand for Parliament might amend that section any time it liked. The expression "right to move any court for enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part 111" in Art. 359 must refer only to the right to move under Art. 32 or Art. 226 for the said specific relief and could not be applied to the exercise of the statutory power of the High Courts under s. 491 of the Code and, consequently, the expression "all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights" must refer to the proceedings initiated in exercise of that right. The detenus could not, therefore, enforce their fundamental rights under Arts. 21, 32 and 14 while the Presidential Order lasted, but that did not affect the High Court's power under s. 491 of the Code. The President's Order cannot bar the detenus from proving even under Arts. 32(l) and 226 that the detentions were not made under the Defence of India Ordinance or the Act as they were outside the Ordinance or the Act or in excess of the power conferred by them or that the detentions were made malafide or in fraudulent exercise of power. - Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala;', 'citingcases' => ' Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala Mentioned ', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1964-03-09', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J.,; K.N. Wanchoo,; N. Rajagopala Ayyangar,; J.C. Shah and; ', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Wanchoo, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These six petitions under Art. 32 of Constitution raise a common question about the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act, No. 58 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was assented to by the President on April 13, 1962 and came into force on publication in the Fort St. George Gazette on May 2, 1962. The constitutionality of the Act is attacked on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution. It is not necessary to set out in full the attack made on the constitutionality of the Act in these petitions. It will be enough if we indicate the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act under Art. 14. The first of these is with respect to s. 5 of the Act which lays down the ceiling area. The second is on s. 50 of the Act read with Sch. III thereof, which provides for compensation. It is urged that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and is therefore open to attack in case it violates Art. 14, 19 or 31. The petitioners in this connection rely on the judgment of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act. Chapter I is preliminary, Section 3 thereof provides for various definitions, some of which we shall refer to later. Chapter II deals with fixation of ceiling on land holdings. Section 5 thereof fixes the ceiling area. The other sections provide for determining surplus land, and s. 18 provides for the acquisition of surplus land which vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. Chapter III provides for ceiling on future acquisition and restriction on certain transfers. Chapter IV provides for the constitution and functions of the land board. Chapter V provides for the constitution and functions of the sugar factory board. Chapter VI provides for compensation. Section 50 thereof read with Sch. III lays down the mode for determining compensation for the land acquired by the Government and other ancillary matters. Chapter VII provides for survey and settlement of lands in the transferred territory which came to the State of Madras by virtue of the States Reorganisation Act of 1956. Chapter VIII provides for cultivating tenants' ceiling area. Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act. Chapter X provides for land tribunals and Chapter XI for appeals and revision. Chapter XII provides for certain penalties and procedure while Chapter XIII provides for disposal of land acquired by the Government under the Act. Chapter XIV deals with miscellaneous provisions, including s. 110, which provides for the framing of rules. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The main purpose of the Act is to provide for a ceiling on land holdings, for determining surplus land which would be acquired by Government and for payment of compensation therefor. The Act is applicable to agricultural land as defined in s. 3(22) and is mainly concerned with persons holding lands in ryotwari settlement or in any other way subject to payment of revenue direct to the Government. It is not in dispute that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and it is in this background that we shall consider the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling area under s. 5 and compensation under s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is first necessary to read certain definitions in s. 3. Section 3(14) defines family as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''family' in relation to a person means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) minor sons and unmarried daughters; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) Minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are dead.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to refer to the explanation of s. 3(14), for present purposes. Section 3(34) is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''person' includes any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 3(45) is as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''surplus land' means the land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area and declared to be surplus land under sections 12, 13 or 14.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 5 is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'5.(1) (a) Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every person and, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members, shall be 30 standard acres. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) The ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of more than five members shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, be 30 standard acres together with an additional 5 standard acres for every member of the family in excess of five. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) For the purposes of this section, all the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (3) (a) In calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanthana family or a Nambudiri Illom shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) In calculating the extent of land held by a family or by an individual person, the share of the family or of the individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not) or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company) shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Explanation - For the purposes of this section - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the share of a member of a family or of an individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanathana family or a Nambudiri Illom, and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the share of a family or of an individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not), or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company), </p><p style="text-align: justify;">shall be deemed to be the extent of land - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) which, in case such share is held on the date of the commencement of this Act, would have been allotted to such member, person or family had such land been partitioned or divided, as the case may be, on such date; or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) which, in case such share is acquired in any manner whatsoever after the date of the commencement of this Act, would be allotted to such member, person or family if a partition or division were to take place on the date of the preparation of the draft statement under sub-section (1) of section 10. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> '(4) . . . . .'. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to consider the rest of s. 5 for present purposes. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The attack on s. 5(1) is that it is hit by Art. 14 inasmuch as it denies equality before the law or equal protection of law to persons similarly situate, and reliance is placed in this connection on the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. In that case this Court was considering the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Kerala Act). The argument is that as in the Kerala Act, so in the present Act, the word 'family' has been given an artificial definition which does not conform to any kind of natural families prevalent in the State, namely, Hindu undivided family, Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanathana family or Nambudiri Illom, and that a double standard has been fixed in s. 5(1) in the matter of providing ceiling. It is therefore urged that the ratio of that decision fully applies to the present Act. Therefore, s. 5(1) should be struck down as violative of Art. 14 in the same manner as s. 58 of the Kerala Act was struck down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. We are of opinion that this contention is correct and the ratio of that case applies with full force to the present case. It was observed in that case that 'where the ceiling is fixed........by a double standard and over and above that the family has been given an artificial definition which does not correspond with a natural family as known to personal law, there is bound to be discrimination resulting from such a provision'. In the present case also 'family' has been given an artificial definition as will immediately be clear on reading s. 3(14), which we have set out above. It is true that this definition of 'family' in s. 3(14) is not exactly the same as in the Kerala Act. Even so there can be no doubt that the definition of the word 'family' in the present case is equally artificial. Further in the Kerala Act s. 58 fixed a double standard for the purpose of ceiling; in the present case s. 5(1)(a) fixes a double standard though there is this distinction that in s. 5(1) the same ceiling is fixed in the case of a person as in the case of a family consisting of not more than five members, namely, 30 standard acres while in the Kerala Act, the ceiling fixed for a family of not more than five was double that for an adult unmarried person. But that in our opinion makes no difference in substance. The provision of s. 5(1) results in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and is thus violate of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This will be clear from a simple example of an undivided Hindu family, which we may give. Take the case of a joint Hindu family consisting of a father, two major sons and two minor sons, and assume that the mother is dead. Assume further that this natural family has 300 standard acres of land. Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. Now apply s. 5(1) to this family. The two major sons being not members of the family because of the artificial definition given to 'family' in s. 3(14) of the Act will be entitled to 30 standard acres each as individuals and the rest of their holding i.e. 30 standard acres in the case of each will be surplus land. But the father and the two minor sons being an artificial family as defined in s. 3(14) will be entitled to 30 standard acres between them and will thus lose 150 standard acres, which will become surplus land. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. Under the Hindu law each member would be entitled to one-fifth share in the 300 standard acres belonging to the family. Under the Act however the two major sons will keep 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons together will keep 30 standard acres which work out to 10 standard acres each. The two major sons will thus lose 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons will lose fifty standard acres each. No justification has been shown on behalf of the State for such discriminatory treatment resulting in the case of members of joint Hindu family; nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. 5(1) of the Act is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Examples can be multiplied with reference to joint Hindu families which would show that discrimination will result on the application of this provision. Similarly we are of opinion that discrimination will result in the case of Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanthana family and a Nambudiri Illom, particularly in the case of the former two where the husband and wife do not belong to the same family. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s. 58 of the Kerala Act so in the case of s. 5(1) of the Act discrimination is writ large on the consequences that follow from s. 5(1). We therefore hold that s. 5(1) is violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. As the section is the basis of Chapter II of the Act, the whole Chapter must fall along with it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Next we come to the provisions as to compensation contained in s. 50 read with Sch. II of the Act. Here again we are of opinion that the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829 case fully applies to the scheme of compensation provided in the Act which is as discriminatory as was the scheme in the Kerala Act. Learned counsel for the respondent however contends that Sch. III does not provide for any cut in the purchase price as was the case in the Kerala Act, and therefore the provisions in the Act are not discriminatory. If we look at the substance of the matter, however, we find that there is really no difference between the provisions for compensation in the Kerala Act and the provisions in respect thereof in the Act, though the provisions in the Act are differently worded. What was done in the Kerala Act was to arrive at the figure of compensation on certain principles, and a cut was then imposed on the figure thus arrived at and this cut progressively increased by slabs of Rs. 15,000. In the present case, a converse method has been adopted and the provision is that first the net annual income is arrived at and thereafter compensation is provided for slabs of Rs. 5,000 each of net income. For the first slab of Rs. 5,000, the compensation is 12 times the net annual income, for the second slab of Rs. 5,000 it is 11 times, for the third slab of Rs. 5,000 it is ten times and thereafter it is nine times. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Let us now work out this slab system. Take four cases where the net annual income is respectively Rs. 5,000, Rs. 10,000, Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000. The first person whose net annual income is Rs. 5,000 will get Rs. 60,000 as compensation, the second person whose net annual income is Rs. 10,000 will get Rs. 1,15,000, the third person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 will get Rs. 1,65,000 and the person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000 will get Rs. 2,10,000. If the same multiplier had been applied as in the case of the first slab of Rs. 5,000 to the other three slabs also, these persons would have got compensation of Rs. 1,20,000, Rs. 1,80,000 and Rs. 2,40,000. This will show that in effect there is a cut of about 4 per cent on the total compensation which corresponds to the purchase price in the Kerala Act in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 10,000, of about 8 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 and about 12 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000. Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act, its effect is the same, namely, as the total net income goes up after the first slab of Rs. 5,000 there is a progressive cut in the total compensation just as was the case in the Kerala Act. The argument that the cut is justified on the same basis as higher rates of income-tax on higher slabs of income has already been rejected by this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's case [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. Therefore, for the reasons given in that case, we are of opinion that the provisions contained in s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act with respect to compensation are discriminatory and violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sections 5 and 50 are the pivotal provisions of the Act, and if they fall, then we are of opinion that the whole Act must be struck down as unconstitutional. The working of the entire Act depends on s. 5 which provides for ceiling and s. 50 which provides for compensation. If these sections are unconstitutional, as we hold they are, the whole Act must fall. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. We therefore allow the petitions and strike down the Act as unconstitutional. The petitions will get their costs from the State of Madras - one set of hearing fee. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Petitions allowed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1964SC1515; [1964]7SCR82', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'State of Madras', 'sub' => 'Constitution', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640463' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc. Vs. 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State', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 8 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 9 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 10 => 'Art', (int) 11 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman', (int) 12 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 13 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 14 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 15 => 's. 5(1)(a', (int) 16 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 17 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 18 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 19 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 20 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 21 => 'Art' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'April 13, 1962', (int) 1 => 'May 2, 1962', (int) 2 => '19', (int) 3 => '14', (int) 4 => '14', (int) 5 => '31', (int) 6 => '1962', (int) 7 => '1956', (int) 8 => '1962', (int) 9 => '1961', (int) 10 => '1962', (int) 11 => 'annual', (int) 12 => 'annual', (int) 13 => 'annual', (int) 14 => 'annual', (int) 15 => 'annual', (int) 16 => 'annual', (int) 17 => 'annual', (int) 18 => 'annual', (int) 19 => 'annual', (int) 20 => 'annual', (int) 21 => '1962', (int) 22 => '50', (int) 23 => 's. 5' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'first', (int) 1 => 'second', (int) 2 => 'first', (int) 3 => 'first', (int) 4 => 'first', (int) 5 => 'second', (int) 6 => 'third', (int) 7 => 'first', (int) 8 => 'second', (int) 9 => 'third', (int) 10 => 'first', (int) 11 => 'first' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Kerala', (int) 1 => 'Art', (int) 2 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 3 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 4 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 5 => 'Art', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Art', (int) 8 => 'Art' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Madras' ), 'QUANTITY' => array( (int) 0 => '30 standard acres', (int) 1 => '30 standard acres', (int) 2 => '30 standard acres', (int) 3 => '300 standard acres', (int) 4 => '60 standard acres', (int) 5 => '30 standard acres', (int) 6 => '30 standard acres', (int) 7 => '30 standard acres', (int) 8 => '300 standard acres', (int) 9 => '10 standard acres' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => 'about 4 per cent', (int) 1 => 'about 8 per cent' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640463', 'acts' => 'Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 - Sections 5(1) and 50; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 19 and 31(2)', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc. Vs. State of Madras', 'casenote' => 'Constitution - constitutionality of Act - Sections 5 (1) and 50 of Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 and Articles 14, 19 and 31 (2) of Constitution of India - constitutionality of Act challenged on ground that it violates Articles 14, 19, and 31 (2) - main purpose of Act is to provide for ceiling on land holdings and for payment of compensation for land acquired by Government - Section 5 (1) relating to ceiling area uses double standard and gives artificial definition to family and discriminates between person equally circumstanced, thus violative of Article 14 - principles used to determine amount of compensation under Section 50 are also discriminatory, thus violative of Article 14 - Supreme Court held, working of entire Act depends on Sections 5 and 50 and when these Sections are unconstitutional so whole Act is unconstitutional.<br> - [ A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K.C. Das Gupta,; K. Subba Rao,; K.N. Wanchoo, JJ.] The appellants were detained under r. 30(l) of the Defence of India Rules made by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962. They applied to the Punjab and Bombay High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their case was that ss. 3(2)(15)(i) and 40 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, which were continued under the Act, were unconstitutional and invalid inasmuch as they contravened their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 21, 22(4), (5) and (7) of the Constitution and that, therefore, they should be set at liberty. The High Courts held that the Presidential Order which had been issued on November 3, 1962, under Art. 359(1) of the Constitution, after a declaration of emergency under Art. 352, consequent on the Chinese invasion of India, barred their right to move the said petitions and dismissed them. These appeals raised two common questions in this Court, (1) what was the true scope and effect of the Presidential Order issued under Art. 359(1), and (2) did the bar created by the Order operate in respect of the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code. The Presidential Order was as follows:- "G.S.R. 1464--In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of article 352 thereof on the 26th October 1962 is in force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or order made thereunder." By a later amendment of the Order Art. 14 was incorporated into it. Held:(per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Shah, JJ.) that the proceedings taken by the appellants in the High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were hit by the Presidential Order and must be held to be incompetent. Article 359 of the Constitution was not capable of two interpretations and it was, therefore not necessary to decide the controversy raised by the parties as to whether that Article should be interpreted in favour of the President's power granted by it or the fundamental rights of the citizens. The King (At the Prosecution of Arthur Zadig) v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor, [1943] F.C.R. 49, Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66 and King Emperor v. Vimalabal Deshpande, L.R. 73 1. A. 144, considered. The words 'any court' in Art. 359(1), construed in their plain grammatical meaning, must mean any court of competent jurisdiction including' the Supreme Court and the High Courts before which the rights specified in the Presidential Order can be enforced. It was not correct to say that the use of the words was necessary so as to include such other courts as might be empowered in terms of Art. 32(3). Nor was it correct to say that the words could not include a High Court as its power to issue a writ under Art. 226(1) was discretionary. In judging whether a particular proceeding fell within the purview of the Presidential Order the determining factor was not its form nor the words in which the relief was couched but the substance of it. If in granting the relief the court had to consider whether any of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order, had been contravened, the proceeding was within the Order, whether it was under Art. 32(l) or 226(1) of the Constitution. The right to move the court for writ of habeas corpus under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was now a statutory right and could no longer be claimed under the common law. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Map- pillai, I.L.R. [1939] Mad. 708, Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum L.R. 66 I.A. 222 and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, L.R. 72 I.A. 241, referred to. Since the promulgation of the Constitution the two methods by which a citizen could enforce his right of personal freedom were (i) by a writ under Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(l), or (ii) under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whichever method he adopted if the right he sought to enforce was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution the matter must, come within Art. 359(1) of the Constitution. That the court could exercise its power under s. 491(1)(b) suo motu could make no difference and Arts. 372, 225 or 375 could provide no valid ground of attack. The suspension of the right to move any court, as under the Presidential Order, must necessarily suspend the Court's jurisdiction accordingly. The right to challenge a detention order under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code had been enlarged by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and when a detenu relied upon such rights in his petition under that section he was in substance seeking to enforce his fundamental rights. The prohibition contained in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order must, therefore, apply. The expression "right to move any court" in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order takes in all legal actions, filed or to be filed, in which the specified rights are sought to be enforced and covers all relevant categories of jurisdictions of competent courts under which the said actions would other-wise have been normally entertained and tried. Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commissioner Union Territory of Tripura, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442, referred to. Even though the impugned Act may be invalid by reason of contravention of Arts. 14, 21 and 22, as contended by the appellants, that invalidity could not be challenged during the period prescribed by the Presidential Order and it could not be said that the President could not because of such invalidity issue the order. Where, however, the challenge to the validity of the detention order was based on any right other than those mentioned in the Presidential Order, the detenu's right to move any court could not be suspended by the Presidential Order because the right was outside Art. 359(1). Where again the detention was challenged on the ground that it contravened the mandatory provisions of the relevant act or that it was malafide and was proved to be so and in all cases falling under the other categories of s. 491(1) of the Code excepting those under s. 491(1)(b), the bar of the Presidential Order could have no application. So also the plea that the operative provision of the law under which the order of detention was made suffered from the vice of excessive delegation, was an independent plea not relatable to the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order and its validity had to be examined. The plea that s. 3(2)(15)(i) and s. 40 of the impugned Act suffered from excessive delegation must fail. The legislative policy was broad stated in the preamble and the relevant provisions of ss. 3(1) and 3(2) gave detailed and specific guidance to the rule making authority and it was not correct to say that the Act had by the impugned sections delegated essentially legislative function to that authority. Rule 30(1)(b) which was consistent with the operative provisions of the Act could not also be challenged on that ground. In " The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc. [1951] S.C.R. 747, Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, Bhatanagars and Co. Ltd., v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 701, relied on. The impugned Act could not also he struck down as a piece of colourable legislation because the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was already on the Statute book. The Parliament had power under Entry 9, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and if in view of the grave threat to the security of India it passed the Act, it could not be said to have acted malafide. If the Parliament thought that the executive would not be able to detain citizens reasonably suspected of prejudicial activities by a recourse to the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which provided for the required constitutional safeguards and the impugned Act which it enacted did not, it could not be suggested that it was acting malafide. Even if the impugned Act contravened Arts. 14 and 22 and the detentions thereunder were- invalid, Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order, which were precisely meant to meet such a situation, barred investigation on the merits during the period prescribed by the Order. The proceeding under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code is one pro- ceeding and the sole relief that can be claimed under it is release from the detention. If that could not be claimed because of the Presidential Order it was unreasonable to say that a mere declaration that the impugned Act and the detention thereunder were invalid could be made. Such a - declaration is clearly outside the purview of s. 491(1)(b) of the Code as also of Arts. 226(1) and 32(l) of the Constitution. The period for which the emergency should continue and the restrictions that should be imposed during its continuance are matters that must inevitably be left to the executive. In a democratic state the effective safeguard against any abuse of power in peace as also in emergency is the existence of enlightened, vigilant and vocal public opinion. Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [19421 A.C. 206, referred to. The inviolability of individual freedom and the majesty of law that sustains it are equally governed by the Constitution which has made this Court the custodian of the fundamental rights on the one hand and, on the other, provided for the declaration of the emergency. Consequently, in dealing with the right of a citizen to challenge the validity of his detention, effect must be given to Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it. The right specified in that Article must be held to include such right whether constitutional or constitutionally guaranteed and the words "any court" must include the Supreme Court and the High Court. The Punjab and the Bombay High Courts were, therefore right in their decision that the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were incompetent in so far as they sought to challenge the validity of the detentions on the ground that the Act and the Rules under which the orders were made contravened Arts. 14, 21 and 22(4)(5) and (7) of the Constitution. Per Subba Rao, J. It was clear that s. 3(2)(15)(i) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) made under the Act contravened the relevant provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution and were, therefore, void. Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 840, Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. Under the Constitution, every person has a right to move the Supreme Court, the High Courts or any other court or courts constituted by the Parliament under Art. 32(3) for the enforcement of fundamental rights in the manner prescribed. But while the right to move the Supreme Court is a guaranteed right, the right to move the others is not so. Article 359, properly construed, meant that the bar imposed by the Presidential Order applied not only to the guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court but also the rights to move the other courts under Art. 32 and Art. 226 of the Constitution. There is no new rule of construction peculiar to war measures. It is always the same, whether in peace or in war. The fundamental rule is that the courts have to find out the expressed intention of the Legislature from the words of the enactment itself. Words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless there is ambiguity in the language in which case the court has to adopt that meaning which furthers the intention of the Legislature. A constitutional provision such as Art. 359, however, cannot be given a strained construction to meet a passing phase such as the present emergency. Rex v. Halliday, L.R. [19171 A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, L.R. [1942] A.C. 206, Nakkuda A1i v. jayaratna, L.R. 1951] A.C. 66, Gibbon v. Ogden, (1824) 6 L. Ed. 23, discussed. Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide in its terms and gives a discretionary power to the High Courts. Unlike Arts. 32 and 226, the exercise of the power is not channelled through procedural writs or orders and their technicalities cannot circumscribe the court's discretion. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai, I.L.R. 1939 Mad. 708, Matten v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum, L.R. (1939) 66 I.A. 222, referred to. Section 491 is continued by Art. 372 and -Art. 225 preserves the jurisdiction of the High Court. The power it confers on the High Court is not inconsistent either with Art. 32 or Art. 226 or any other Article of the Constitution and the section cannot, therefore, be said to have been impliedly superseded even to the extent Art. 226 empowers the High Court to give relief in cases of illegal detention. Though remedial in form the section postulates the existence of the substantive right that no person can be deprived of his liberty except in the manner prescribed by law. It assumes the existence of the rule of law and empowers High Court to act suo motu. The rights, substantive and procedural conferred by it arc different from those under Arts. 32 or 226 of the Constitution. It places the onus on the custodian to prove that the detention is legal and although in scrutinising the legality of the detention the court may have to consider whether the law offends any fundamental rights, that cannot make the proceeding one for the enforcement of fundamental rights or the decision anything but one on the unconstitutionality of a law because of infringement of fundamental rights generally. The mode of approach to the High Court under s. 491 of the Code or the nature of the relief given thereunder cannot be equated with those under the Constitution. The absolute discretionary jurisdiction under it cannot be put on a par with the jurisdiction under Art. 226 which is hedged in by constitutional limitations. Alam Khan v. The Crown, (1947) I.L.R. 28 Lahore 274, Ramji Lal v. The Crown, I.L.R..(1949) 11 E.P. 28, King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 144, referred to. While s. 491 gives no right to enforce fundamental rights, operating as it does as a check on arbitrary action, Art. 359 is concerned not with statutory powers but deals with the constitutional right and the constitutional enforcement of it. It was not, therefore, correct to say that Art. 359 would be frustrated if s. 491 was allowed to stand for Parliament might amend that section any time it liked. The expression "right to move any court for enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part 111" in Art. 359 must refer only to the right to move under Art. 32 or Art. 226 for the said specific relief and could not be applied to the exercise of the statutory power of the High Courts under s. 491 of the Code and, consequently, the expression "all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights" must refer to the proceedings initiated in exercise of that right. The detenus could not, therefore, enforce their fundamental rights under Arts. 21, 32 and 14 while the Presidential Order lasted, but that did not affect the High Court's power under s. 491 of the Code. The President's Order cannot bar the detenus from proving even under Arts. 32(l) and 226 that the detentions were not made under the Defence of India Ordinance or the Act as they were outside the Ordinance or the Act or in excess of the power conferred by them or that the detentions were made malafide or in fraudulent exercise of power. - Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala;', 'citingcases' => ' Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala Mentioned ', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1964-03-09', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J.,; K.N. Wanchoo,; N. Rajagopala Ayyangar,; J.C. Shah and; ', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Wanchoo, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These six petitions under Art. 32 of Constitution raise a common question about the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act, No. 58 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was assented to by the President on April 13, 1962 and came into force on publication in the Fort St. George Gazette on May 2, 1962. The constitutionality of the Act is attacked on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution. It is not necessary to set out in full the attack made on the constitutionality of the Act in these petitions. It will be enough if we indicate the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act under Art. 14. The first of these is with respect to s. 5 of the Act which lays down the ceiling area. The second is on s. 50 of the Act read with Sch. III thereof, which provides for compensation. It is urged that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and is therefore open to attack in case it violates Art. 14, 19 or 31. The petitioners in this connection rely on the judgment of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act. Chapter I is preliminary, Section 3 thereof provides for various definitions, some of which we shall refer to later. Chapter II deals with fixation of ceiling on land holdings. Section 5 thereof fixes the ceiling area. The other sections provide for determining surplus land, and s. 18 provides for the acquisition of surplus land which vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. Chapter III provides for ceiling on future acquisition and restriction on certain transfers. Chapter IV provides for the constitution and functions of the land board. Chapter V provides for the constitution and functions of the sugar factory board. Chapter VI provides for compensation. Section 50 thereof read with Sch. III lays down the mode for determining compensation for the land acquired by the Government and other ancillary matters. Chapter VII provides for survey and settlement of lands in the transferred territory which came to the State of Madras by virtue of the States Reorganisation Act of 1956. Chapter VIII provides for cultivating tenants' ceiling area. Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act. Chapter X provides for land tribunals and Chapter XI for appeals and revision. Chapter XII provides for certain penalties and procedure while Chapter XIII provides for disposal of land acquired by the Government under the Act. Chapter XIV deals with miscellaneous provisions, including s. 110, which provides for the framing of rules. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The main purpose of the Act is to provide for a ceiling on land holdings, for determining surplus land which would be acquired by Government and for payment of compensation therefor. The Act is applicable to agricultural land as defined in s. 3(22) and is mainly concerned with persons holding lands in ryotwari settlement or in any other way subject to payment of revenue direct to the Government. It is not in dispute that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and it is in this background that we shall consider the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling area under s. 5 and compensation under s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is first necessary to read certain definitions in s. 3. Section 3(14) defines family as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''family' in relation to a person means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) minor sons and unmarried daughters; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) Minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are dead.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to refer to the explanation of s. 3(14), for present purposes. Section 3(34) is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''person' includes any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 3(45) is as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''surplus land' means the land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area and declared to be surplus land under sections 12, 13 or 14.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 5 is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'5.(1) (a) Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every person and, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members, shall be 30 standard acres. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) The ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of more than five members shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, be 30 standard acres together with an additional 5 standard acres for every member of the family in excess of five. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) For the purposes of this section, all the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (3) (a) In calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanthana family or a Nambudiri Illom shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) In calculating the extent of land held by a family or by an individual person, the share of the family or of the individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not) or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company) shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Explanation - For the purposes of this section - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the share of a member of a family or of an individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanathana family or a Nambudiri Illom, and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the share of a family or of an individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not), or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company), </p><p style="text-align: justify;">shall be deemed to be the extent of land - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) which, in case such share is held on the date of the commencement of this Act, would have been allotted to such member, person or family had such land been partitioned or divided, as the case may be, on such date; or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) which, in case such share is acquired in any manner whatsoever after the date of the commencement of this Act, would be allotted to such member, person or family if a partition or division were to take place on the date of the preparation of the draft statement under sub-section (1) of section 10. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> '(4) . . . . .'. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to consider the rest of s. 5 for present purposes. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The attack on s. 5(1) is that it is hit by Art. 14 inasmuch as it denies equality before the law or equal protection of law to persons similarly situate, and reliance is placed in this connection on the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. In that case this Court was considering the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Kerala Act). The argument is that as in the Kerala Act, so in the present Act, the word 'family' has been given an artificial definition which does not conform to any kind of natural families prevalent in the State, namely, Hindu undivided family, Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanathana family or Nambudiri Illom, and that a double standard has been fixed in s. 5(1) in the matter of providing ceiling. It is therefore urged that the ratio of that decision fully applies to the present Act. Therefore, s. 5(1) should be struck down as violative of Art. 14 in the same manner as s. 58 of the Kerala Act was struck down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. We are of opinion that this contention is correct and the ratio of that case applies with full force to the present case. It was observed in that case that 'where the ceiling is fixed........by a double standard and over and above that the family has been given an artificial definition which does not correspond with a natural family as known to personal law, there is bound to be discrimination resulting from such a provision'. In the present case also 'family' has been given an artificial definition as will immediately be clear on reading s. 3(14), which we have set out above. It is true that this definition of 'family' in s. 3(14) is not exactly the same as in the Kerala Act. Even so there can be no doubt that the definition of the word 'family' in the present case is equally artificial. Further in the Kerala Act s. 58 fixed a double standard for the purpose of ceiling; in the present case s. 5(1)(a) fixes a double standard though there is this distinction that in s. 5(1) the same ceiling is fixed in the case of a person as in the case of a family consisting of not more than five members, namely, 30 standard acres while in the Kerala Act, the ceiling fixed for a family of not more than five was double that for an adult unmarried person. But that in our opinion makes no difference in substance. The provision of s. 5(1) results in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and is thus violate of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This will be clear from a simple example of an undivided Hindu family, which we may give. Take the case of a joint Hindu family consisting of a father, two major sons and two minor sons, and assume that the mother is dead. Assume further that this natural family has 300 standard acres of land. Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. Now apply s. 5(1) to this family. The two major sons being not members of the family because of the artificial definition given to 'family' in s. 3(14) of the Act will be entitled to 30 standard acres each as individuals and the rest of their holding i.e. 30 standard acres in the case of each will be surplus land. But the father and the two minor sons being an artificial family as defined in s. 3(14) will be entitled to 30 standard acres between them and will thus lose 150 standard acres, which will become surplus land. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. Under the Hindu law each member would be entitled to one-fifth share in the 300 standard acres belonging to the family. Under the Act however the two major sons will keep 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons together will keep 30 standard acres which work out to 10 standard acres each. The two major sons will thus lose 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons will lose fifty standard acres each. No justification has been shown on behalf of the State for such discriminatory treatment resulting in the case of members of joint Hindu family; nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. 5(1) of the Act is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Examples can be multiplied with reference to joint Hindu families which would show that discrimination will result on the application of this provision. Similarly we are of opinion that discrimination will result in the case of Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanthana family and a Nambudiri Illom, particularly in the case of the former two where the husband and wife do not belong to the same family. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s. 58 of the Kerala Act so in the case of s. 5(1) of the Act discrimination is writ large on the consequences that follow from s. 5(1). We therefore hold that s. 5(1) is violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. As the section is the basis of Chapter II of the Act, the whole Chapter must fall along with it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Next we come to the provisions as to compensation contained in s. 50 read with Sch. II of the Act. Here again we are of opinion that the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829 case fully applies to the scheme of compensation provided in the Act which is as discriminatory as was the scheme in the Kerala Act. Learned counsel for the respondent however contends that Sch. III does not provide for any cut in the purchase price as was the case in the Kerala Act, and therefore the provisions in the Act are not discriminatory. If we look at the substance of the matter, however, we find that there is really no difference between the provisions for compensation in the Kerala Act and the provisions in respect thereof in the Act, though the provisions in the Act are differently worded. What was done in the Kerala Act was to arrive at the figure of compensation on certain principles, and a cut was then imposed on the figure thus arrived at and this cut progressively increased by slabs of Rs. 15,000. In the present case, a converse method has been adopted and the provision is that first the net annual income is arrived at and thereafter compensation is provided for slabs of Rs. 5,000 each of net income. For the first slab of Rs. 5,000, the compensation is 12 times the net annual income, for the second slab of Rs. 5,000 it is 11 times, for the third slab of Rs. 5,000 it is ten times and thereafter it is nine times. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Let us now work out this slab system. Take four cases where the net annual income is respectively Rs. 5,000, Rs. 10,000, Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000. The first person whose net annual income is Rs. 5,000 will get Rs. 60,000 as compensation, the second person whose net annual income is Rs. 10,000 will get Rs. 1,15,000, the third person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 will get Rs. 1,65,000 and the person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000 will get Rs. 2,10,000. If the same multiplier had been applied as in the case of the first slab of Rs. 5,000 to the other three slabs also, these persons would have got compensation of Rs. 1,20,000, Rs. 1,80,000 and Rs. 2,40,000. This will show that in effect there is a cut of about 4 per cent on the total compensation which corresponds to the purchase price in the Kerala Act in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 10,000, of about 8 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 and about 12 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000. Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act, its effect is the same, namely, as the total net income goes up after the first slab of Rs. 5,000 there is a progressive cut in the total compensation just as was the case in the Kerala Act. The argument that the cut is justified on the same basis as higher rates of income-tax on higher slabs of income has already been rejected by this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's case [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. Therefore, for the reasons given in that case, we are of opinion that the provisions contained in s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act with respect to compensation are discriminatory and violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sections 5 and 50 are the pivotal provisions of the Act, and if they fall, then we are of opinion that the whole Act must be struck down as unconstitutional. The working of the entire Act depends on s. 5 which provides for ceiling and s. 50 which provides for compensation. If these sections are unconstitutional, as we hold they are, the whole Act must fall. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. We therefore allow the petitions and strike down the Act as unconstitutional. The petitions will get their costs from the State of Madras - one set of hearing fee. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Petitions allowed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1964SC1515; [1964]7SCR82', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'State of Madras', 'sub' => 'Constitution', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '640463' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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State of Madras Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Constitution', (int) 1 => 'Constitution', (int) 2 => 'Section 3', (int) 3 => 'Chapter II', (int) 4 => 'Section 5', (int) 5 => 'Chapter III', (int) 6 => 'Chapter IV', (int) 7 => 'Chapter V', (int) 8 => 'Chapter VII', (int) 9 => 'the States Reorganisation Act', (int) 10 => 'Chapter X', (int) 11 => 'Chapter XI', (int) 12 => 'Chapter XII', (int) 13 => 'Chapter XIII', (int) 14 => 'Constitution', (int) 15 => 'Section 5', (int) 16 => 'section 10', (int) 17 => 'the Kerala Act', (int) 18 => 'the Kerala Act', (int) 19 => 'Constitution', (int) 20 => 'Constitution', (int) 21 => 'Constitution', (int) 22 => 'Chapter II', (int) 23 => 'Chapter must', (int) 24 => 'the Kerala Act', (int) 25 => 'Constitution' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Wanchoo', (int) 1 => 'the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act', (int) 2 => 'Court', (int) 3 => 'Chapter VI', (int) 4 => 'Government', (int) 5 => 'Chapter IX', (int) 6 => 'Court', (int) 7 => 'Court', (int) 8 => 'the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act', (int) 9 => 'State', (int) 10 => 'State', (int) 11 => 'Act', (int) 12 => 'Court', (int) 13 => 'Court' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1', (int) 1 => 'Hindu', (int) 2 => 'Hindu', (int) 3 => 'Hindu', (int) 4 => 'Hindu', (int) 5 => 'Hindu', (int) 6 => 'Hindu', (int) 7 => 'Hindu', (int) 8 => 'Hindu' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'six', (int) 1 => '32', (int) 2 => '58', (int) 3 => '14', (int) 4 => '31(2', (int) 5 => 'two', (int) 6 => '19', (int) 7 => '1', (int) 8 => '829', (int) 9 => '2', (int) 10 => 'two', (int) 11 => '18', (int) 12 => '110', (int) 13 => '3.', (int) 14 => '3(22', (int) 15 => '14', (int) 16 => 'two', (int) 17 => '3', (int) 18 => '12', (int) 19 => '13', (int) 20 => '14', (int) 21 => '5.(1', (int) 22 => '4', (int) 23 => '5', (int) 24 => 'more than five', (int) 25 => 'more than five', (int) 26 => '4', (int) 27 => '5', (int) 28 => 'an additional 5', (int) 29 => 'five', (int) 30 => '2', (int) 31 => '3', (int) 32 => '1', (int) 33 => '4', (int) 34 => '4.', (int) 35 => '5(1', (int) 36 => '14', (int) 37 => '1', (int) 38 => '829', (int) 39 => '5(1', (int) 40 => '5(1', (int) 41 => '14', (int) 42 => '5.', (int) 43 => '5(1', (int) 44 => 'more than five', (int) 45 => 'more than five', (int) 46 => '5(1', (int) 47 => '14', (int) 48 => 'two', (int) 49 => 'two', (int) 50 => 'four', (int) 51 => '5(1', (int) 52 => 'two', (int) 53 => 'two', (int) 54 => '150', (int) 55 => 'five', (int) 56 => 'one-fifth', (int) 57 => 'two', (int) 58 => '30', (int) 59 => 'two', (int) 60 => '30', (int) 61 => 'two', (int) 62 => '30', (int) 63 => 'two', (int) 64 => 'fifty', (int) 65 => '5(1', (int) 66 => '14', (int) 67 => '58', (int) 68 => '5(1', (int) 69 => '5(1', (int) 70 => '5(1', (int) 71 => '14', (int) 72 => '6', (int) 73 => '50', (int) 74 => '1', (int) 75 => '829', (int) 76 => '15,000', (int) 77 => '5,000', (int) 78 => '5,000', (int) 79 => '12', (int) 80 => '5,000', (int) 81 => '11', (int) 82 => '5,000', (int) 83 => 'ten', (int) 84 => 'nine', (int) 85 => 'four', (int) 86 => '5,000', (int) 87 => '10,000', (int) 88 => '15,000', (int) 89 => '20,000', (int) 90 => '5,000', (int) 91 => '60,000', (int) 92 => '10,000', (int) 93 => '1,15,000', (int) 94 => '15,000', (int) 95 => '1,65,000', (int) 96 => '20,000', (int) 97 => '2,10,000', (int) 98 => '5,000', (int) 99 => 'three', (int) 100 => '1,20,000', (int) 101 => '1,80,000', (int) 102 => '2,40,000', (int) 103 => '10,000', (int) 104 => '15,000', (int) 105 => 'about 12', (int) 106 => '20,000', (int) 107 => '5,000', (int) 108 => '1', (int) 109 => '50', (int) 110 => '14', (int) 111 => '8', (int) 112 => '5', (int) 113 => '9', (int) 114 => '10' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Art', (int) 1 => 'George Gazette', (int) 2 => 'Arts', (int) 3 => 'Art', (int) 4 => 'Art', (int) 5 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 8 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 9 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 10 => 'Art', (int) 11 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman', (int) 12 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 13 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 14 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 15 => 's. 5(1)(a', (int) 16 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 17 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 18 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 19 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 20 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 21 => 'Art' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'April 13, 1962', (int) 1 => 'May 2, 1962', (int) 2 => '19', (int) 3 => '14', (int) 4 => '14', (int) 5 => '31', (int) 6 => '1962', (int) 7 => '1956', (int) 8 => '1962', (int) 9 => '1961', (int) 10 => '1962', (int) 11 => 'annual', (int) 12 => 'annual', (int) 13 => 'annual', (int) 14 => 'annual', (int) 15 => 'annual', (int) 16 => 'annual', (int) 17 => 'annual', (int) 18 => 'annual', (int) 19 => 'annual', (int) 20 => 'annual', (int) 21 => '1962', (int) 22 => '50', (int) 23 => 's. 5' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'first', (int) 1 => 'second', (int) 2 => 'first', (int) 3 => 'first', (int) 4 => 'first', (int) 5 => 'second', (int) 6 => 'third', (int) 7 => 'first', (int) 8 => 'second', (int) 9 => 'third', (int) 10 => 'first', (int) 11 => 'first' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Kerala', (int) 1 => 'Art', (int) 2 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 3 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 4 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 5 => 'Art', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Art', (int) 8 => 'Art' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Madras' ), 'QUANTITY' => array( (int) 0 => '30 standard acres', (int) 1 => '30 standard acres', (int) 2 => '30 standard acres', (int) 3 => '300 standard acres', (int) 4 => '60 standard acres', (int) 5 => '30 standard acres', (int) 6 => '30 standard acres', (int) 7 => '30 standard acres', (int) 8 => '300 standard acres', (int) 9 => '10 standard acres' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => 'about 4 per cent', (int) 1 => 'about 8 per cent' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640463', 'acts' => 'Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 - Sections 5(1) and 50; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 19 and 31(2)', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc. Vs. State of Madras', 'casenote' => 'Constitution - constitutionality of Act - Sections 5 (1) and 50 of Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 and Articles 14, 19 and 31 (2) of Constitution of India - constitutionality of Act challenged on ground that it violates Articles 14, 19, and 31 (2) - main purpose of Act is to provide for ceiling on land holdings and for payment of compensation for land acquired by Government - Section 5 (1) relating to ceiling area uses double standard and gives artificial definition to family and discriminates between person equally circumstanced, thus violative of Article 14 - principles used to determine amount of compensation under Section 50 are also discriminatory, thus violative of Article 14 - Supreme Court held, working of entire Act depends on Sections 5 and 50 and when these Sections are unconstitutional so whole Act is unconstitutional.<br> - [ A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K.C. Das Gupta,; K. Subba Rao,; K.N. Wanchoo, JJ.] The appellants were detained under r. 30(l) of the Defence of India Rules made by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962. They applied to the Punjab and Bombay High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their case was that ss. 3(2)(15)(i) and 40 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, which were continued under the Act, were unconstitutional and invalid inasmuch as they contravened their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 21, 22(4), (5) and (7) of the Constitution and that, therefore, they should be set at liberty. The High Courts held that the Presidential Order which had been issued on November 3, 1962, under Art. 359(1) of the Constitution, after a declaration of emergency under Art. 352, consequent on the Chinese invasion of India, barred their right to move the said petitions and dismissed them. These appeals raised two common questions in this Court, (1) what was the true scope and effect of the Presidential Order issued under Art. 359(1), and (2) did the bar created by the Order operate in respect of the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code. The Presidential Order was as follows:- "G.S.R. 1464--In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of article 352 thereof on the 26th October 1962 is in force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or order made thereunder." By a later amendment of the Order Art. 14 was incorporated into it. Held:(per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Shah, JJ.) that the proceedings taken by the appellants in the High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were hit by the Presidential Order and must be held to be incompetent. Article 359 of the Constitution was not capable of two interpretations and it was, therefore not necessary to decide the controversy raised by the parties as to whether that Article should be interpreted in favour of the President's power granted by it or the fundamental rights of the citizens. The King (At the Prosecution of Arthur Zadig) v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor, [1943] F.C.R. 49, Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66 and King Emperor v. Vimalabal Deshpande, L.R. 73 1. A. 144, considered. The words 'any court' in Art. 359(1), construed in their plain grammatical meaning, must mean any court of competent jurisdiction including' the Supreme Court and the High Courts before which the rights specified in the Presidential Order can be enforced. It was not correct to say that the use of the words was necessary so as to include such other courts as might be empowered in terms of Art. 32(3). Nor was it correct to say that the words could not include a High Court as its power to issue a writ under Art. 226(1) was discretionary. In judging whether a particular proceeding fell within the purview of the Presidential Order the determining factor was not its form nor the words in which the relief was couched but the substance of it. If in granting the relief the court had to consider whether any of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order, had been contravened, the proceeding was within the Order, whether it was under Art. 32(l) or 226(1) of the Constitution. The right to move the court for writ of habeas corpus under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was now a statutory right and could no longer be claimed under the common law. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Map- pillai, I.L.R. [1939] Mad. 708, Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum L.R. 66 I.A. 222 and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, L.R. 72 I.A. 241, referred to. Since the promulgation of the Constitution the two methods by which a citizen could enforce his right of personal freedom were (i) by a writ under Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(l), or (ii) under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whichever method he adopted if the right he sought to enforce was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution the matter must, come within Art. 359(1) of the Constitution. That the court could exercise its power under s. 491(1)(b) suo motu could make no difference and Arts. 372, 225 or 375 could provide no valid ground of attack. The suspension of the right to move any court, as under the Presidential Order, must necessarily suspend the Court's jurisdiction accordingly. The right to challenge a detention order under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code had been enlarged by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and when a detenu relied upon such rights in his petition under that section he was in substance seeking to enforce his fundamental rights. The prohibition contained in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order must, therefore, apply. The expression "right to move any court" in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order takes in all legal actions, filed or to be filed, in which the specified rights are sought to be enforced and covers all relevant categories of jurisdictions of competent courts under which the said actions would other-wise have been normally entertained and tried. Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commissioner Union Territory of Tripura, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442, referred to. Even though the impugned Act may be invalid by reason of contravention of Arts. 14, 21 and 22, as contended by the appellants, that invalidity could not be challenged during the period prescribed by the Presidential Order and it could not be said that the President could not because of such invalidity issue the order. Where, however, the challenge to the validity of the detention order was based on any right other than those mentioned in the Presidential Order, the detenu's right to move any court could not be suspended by the Presidential Order because the right was outside Art. 359(1). Where again the detention was challenged on the ground that it contravened the mandatory provisions of the relevant act or that it was malafide and was proved to be so and in all cases falling under the other categories of s. 491(1) of the Code excepting those under s. 491(1)(b), the bar of the Presidential Order could have no application. So also the plea that the operative provision of the law under which the order of detention was made suffered from the vice of excessive delegation, was an independent plea not relatable to the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order and its validity had to be examined. The plea that s. 3(2)(15)(i) and s. 40 of the impugned Act suffered from excessive delegation must fail. The legislative policy was broad stated in the preamble and the relevant provisions of ss. 3(1) and 3(2) gave detailed and specific guidance to the rule making authority and it was not correct to say that the Act had by the impugned sections delegated essentially legislative function to that authority. Rule 30(1)(b) which was consistent with the operative provisions of the Act could not also be challenged on that ground. In " The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc. [1951] S.C.R. 747, Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, Bhatanagars and Co. Ltd., v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 701, relied on. The impugned Act could not also he struck down as a piece of colourable legislation because the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was already on the Statute book. The Parliament had power under Entry 9, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and if in view of the grave threat to the security of India it passed the Act, it could not be said to have acted malafide. If the Parliament thought that the executive would not be able to detain citizens reasonably suspected of prejudicial activities by a recourse to the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which provided for the required constitutional safeguards and the impugned Act which it enacted did not, it could not be suggested that it was acting malafide. Even if the impugned Act contravened Arts. 14 and 22 and the detentions thereunder were- invalid, Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order, which were precisely meant to meet such a situation, barred investigation on the merits during the period prescribed by the Order. The proceeding under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code is one pro- ceeding and the sole relief that can be claimed under it is release from the detention. If that could not be claimed because of the Presidential Order it was unreasonable to say that a mere declaration that the impugned Act and the detention thereunder were invalid could be made. Such a - declaration is clearly outside the purview of s. 491(1)(b) of the Code as also of Arts. 226(1) and 32(l) of the Constitution. The period for which the emergency should continue and the restrictions that should be imposed during its continuance are matters that must inevitably be left to the executive. In a democratic state the effective safeguard against any abuse of power in peace as also in emergency is the existence of enlightened, vigilant and vocal public opinion. Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [19421 A.C. 206, referred to. The inviolability of individual freedom and the majesty of law that sustains it are equally governed by the Constitution which has made this Court the custodian of the fundamental rights on the one hand and, on the other, provided for the declaration of the emergency. Consequently, in dealing with the right of a citizen to challenge the validity of his detention, effect must be given to Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it. The right specified in that Article must be held to include such right whether constitutional or constitutionally guaranteed and the words "any court" must include the Supreme Court and the High Court. The Punjab and the Bombay High Courts were, therefore right in their decision that the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were incompetent in so far as they sought to challenge the validity of the detentions on the ground that the Act and the Rules under which the orders were made contravened Arts. 14, 21 and 22(4)(5) and (7) of the Constitution. Per Subba Rao, J. It was clear that s. 3(2)(15)(i) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) made under the Act contravened the relevant provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution and were, therefore, void. Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 840, Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. Under the Constitution, every person has a right to move the Supreme Court, the High Courts or any other court or courts constituted by the Parliament under Art. 32(3) for the enforcement of fundamental rights in the manner prescribed. But while the right to move the Supreme Court is a guaranteed right, the right to move the others is not so. Article 359, properly construed, meant that the bar imposed by the Presidential Order applied not only to the guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court but also the rights to move the other courts under Art. 32 and Art. 226 of the Constitution. There is no new rule of construction peculiar to war measures. It is always the same, whether in peace or in war. The fundamental rule is that the courts have to find out the expressed intention of the Legislature from the words of the enactment itself. Words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless there is ambiguity in the language in which case the court has to adopt that meaning which furthers the intention of the Legislature. A constitutional provision such as Art. 359, however, cannot be given a strained construction to meet a passing phase such as the present emergency. Rex v. Halliday, L.R. [19171 A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, L.R. [1942] A.C. 206, Nakkuda A1i v. jayaratna, L.R. 1951] A.C. 66, Gibbon v. Ogden, (1824) 6 L. Ed. 23, discussed. Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide in its terms and gives a discretionary power to the High Courts. Unlike Arts. 32 and 226, the exercise of the power is not channelled through procedural writs or orders and their technicalities cannot circumscribe the court's discretion. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai, I.L.R. 1939 Mad. 708, Matten v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum, L.R. (1939) 66 I.A. 222, referred to. Section 491 is continued by Art. 372 and -Art. 225 preserves the jurisdiction of the High Court. The power it confers on the High Court is not inconsistent either with Art. 32 or Art. 226 or any other Article of the Constitution and the section cannot, therefore, be said to have been impliedly superseded even to the extent Art. 226 empowers the High Court to give relief in cases of illegal detention. Though remedial in form the section postulates the existence of the substantive right that no person can be deprived of his liberty except in the manner prescribed by law. It assumes the existence of the rule of law and empowers High Court to act suo motu. The rights, substantive and procedural conferred by it arc different from those under Arts. 32 or 226 of the Constitution. It places the onus on the custodian to prove that the detention is legal and although in scrutinising the legality of the detention the court may have to consider whether the law offends any fundamental rights, that cannot make the proceeding one for the enforcement of fundamental rights or the decision anything but one on the unconstitutionality of a law because of infringement of fundamental rights generally. The mode of approach to the High Court under s. 491 of the Code or the nature of the relief given thereunder cannot be equated with those under the Constitution. The absolute discretionary jurisdiction under it cannot be put on a par with the jurisdiction under Art. 226 which is hedged in by constitutional limitations. Alam Khan v. The Crown, (1947) I.L.R. 28 Lahore 274, Ramji Lal v. The Crown, I.L.R..(1949) 11 E.P. 28, King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 144, referred to. While s. 491 gives no right to enforce fundamental rights, operating as it does as a check on arbitrary action, Art. 359 is concerned not with statutory powers but deals with the constitutional right and the constitutional enforcement of it. It was not, therefore, correct to say that Art. 359 would be frustrated if s. 491 was allowed to stand for Parliament might amend that section any time it liked. The expression "right to move any court for enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part 111" in Art. 359 must refer only to the right to move under Art. 32 or Art. 226 for the said specific relief and could not be applied to the exercise of the statutory power of the High Courts under s. 491 of the Code and, consequently, the expression "all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights" must refer to the proceedings initiated in exercise of that right. The detenus could not, therefore, enforce their fundamental rights under Arts. 21, 32 and 14 while the Presidential Order lasted, but that did not affect the High Court's power under s. 491 of the Code. The President's Order cannot bar the detenus from proving even under Arts. 32(l) and 226 that the detentions were not made under the Defence of India Ordinance or the Act as they were outside the Ordinance or the Act or in excess of the power conferred by them or that the detentions were made malafide or in fraudulent exercise of power. - Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala;', 'citingcases' => ' Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala Mentioned ', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1964-03-09', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J.,; K.N. Wanchoo,; N. Rajagopala Ayyangar,; J.C. Shah and; ', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Wanchoo, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These six petitions under Art. 32 of Constitution raise a common question about the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act, No. 58 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was assented to by the President on April 13, 1962 and came into force on publication in the Fort St. George Gazette on May 2, 1962. The constitutionality of the Act is attacked on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution. It is not necessary to set out in full the attack made on the constitutionality of the Act in these petitions. It will be enough if we indicate the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act under Art. 14. The first of these is with respect to s. 5 of the Act which lays down the ceiling area. The second is on s. 50 of the Act read with Sch. III thereof, which provides for compensation. It is urged that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and is therefore open to attack in case it violates Art. 14, 19 or 31. The petitioners in this connection rely on the judgment of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act. Chapter I is preliminary, Section 3 thereof provides for various definitions, some of which we shall refer to later. Chapter II deals with fixation of ceiling on land holdings. Section 5 thereof fixes the ceiling area. The other sections provide for determining surplus land, and s. 18 provides for the acquisition of surplus land which vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. Chapter III provides for ceiling on future acquisition and restriction on certain transfers. Chapter IV provides for the constitution and functions of the land board. Chapter V provides for the constitution and functions of the sugar factory board. Chapter VI provides for compensation. Section 50 thereof read with Sch. III lays down the mode for determining compensation for the land acquired by the Government and other ancillary matters. Chapter VII provides for survey and settlement of lands in the transferred territory which came to the State of Madras by virtue of the States Reorganisation Act of 1956. Chapter VIII provides for cultivating tenants' ceiling area. Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act. Chapter X provides for land tribunals and Chapter XI for appeals and revision. Chapter XII provides for certain penalties and procedure while Chapter XIII provides for disposal of land acquired by the Government under the Act. Chapter XIV deals with miscellaneous provisions, including s. 110, which provides for the framing of rules. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The main purpose of the Act is to provide for a ceiling on land holdings, for determining surplus land which would be acquired by Government and for payment of compensation therefor. The Act is applicable to agricultural land as defined in s. 3(22) and is mainly concerned with persons holding lands in ryotwari settlement or in any other way subject to payment of revenue direct to the Government. It is not in dispute that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and it is in this background that we shall consider the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling area under s. 5 and compensation under s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is first necessary to read certain definitions in s. 3. Section 3(14) defines family as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''family' in relation to a person means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) minor sons and unmarried daughters; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) Minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are dead.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to refer to the explanation of s. 3(14), for present purposes. Section 3(34) is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''person' includes any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 3(45) is as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''surplus land' means the land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area and declared to be surplus land under sections 12, 13 or 14.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 5 is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'5.(1) (a) Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every person and, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members, shall be 30 standard acres. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) The ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of more than five members shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, be 30 standard acres together with an additional 5 standard acres for every member of the family in excess of five. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) For the purposes of this section, all the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (3) (a) In calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanthana family or a Nambudiri Illom shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) In calculating the extent of land held by a family or by an individual person, the share of the family or of the individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not) or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company) shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Explanation - For the purposes of this section - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the share of a member of a family or of an individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanathana family or a Nambudiri Illom, and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the share of a family or of an individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not), or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company), </p><p style="text-align: justify;">shall be deemed to be the extent of land - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) which, in case such share is held on the date of the commencement of this Act, would have been allotted to such member, person or family had such land been partitioned or divided, as the case may be, on such date; or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) which, in case such share is acquired in any manner whatsoever after the date of the commencement of this Act, would be allotted to such member, person or family if a partition or division were to take place on the date of the preparation of the draft statement under sub-section (1) of section 10. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> '(4) . . . . .'. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to consider the rest of s. 5 for present purposes. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The attack on s. 5(1) is that it is hit by Art. 14 inasmuch as it denies equality before the law or equal protection of law to persons similarly situate, and reliance is placed in this connection on the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. In that case this Court was considering the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Kerala Act). The argument is that as in the Kerala Act, so in the present Act, the word 'family' has been given an artificial definition which does not conform to any kind of natural families prevalent in the State, namely, Hindu undivided family, Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanathana family or Nambudiri Illom, and that a double standard has been fixed in s. 5(1) in the matter of providing ceiling. It is therefore urged that the ratio of that decision fully applies to the present Act. Therefore, s. 5(1) should be struck down as violative of Art. 14 in the same manner as s. 58 of the Kerala Act was struck down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. We are of opinion that this contention is correct and the ratio of that case applies with full force to the present case. It was observed in that case that 'where the ceiling is fixed........by a double standard and over and above that the family has been given an artificial definition which does not correspond with a natural family as known to personal law, there is bound to be discrimination resulting from such a provision'. In the present case also 'family' has been given an artificial definition as will immediately be clear on reading s. 3(14), which we have set out above. It is true that this definition of 'family' in s. 3(14) is not exactly the same as in the Kerala Act. Even so there can be no doubt that the definition of the word 'family' in the present case is equally artificial. Further in the Kerala Act s. 58 fixed a double standard for the purpose of ceiling; in the present case s. 5(1)(a) fixes a double standard though there is this distinction that in s. 5(1) the same ceiling is fixed in the case of a person as in the case of a family consisting of not more than five members, namely, 30 standard acres while in the Kerala Act, the ceiling fixed for a family of not more than five was double that for an adult unmarried person. But that in our opinion makes no difference in substance. The provision of s. 5(1) results in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and is thus violate of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This will be clear from a simple example of an undivided Hindu family, which we may give. Take the case of a joint Hindu family consisting of a father, two major sons and two minor sons, and assume that the mother is dead. Assume further that this natural family has 300 standard acres of land. Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. Now apply s. 5(1) to this family. The two major sons being not members of the family because of the artificial definition given to 'family' in s. 3(14) of the Act will be entitled to 30 standard acres each as individuals and the rest of their holding i.e. 30 standard acres in the case of each will be surplus land. But the father and the two minor sons being an artificial family as defined in s. 3(14) will be entitled to 30 standard acres between them and will thus lose 150 standard acres, which will become surplus land. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. Under the Hindu law each member would be entitled to one-fifth share in the 300 standard acres belonging to the family. Under the Act however the two major sons will keep 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons together will keep 30 standard acres which work out to 10 standard acres each. The two major sons will thus lose 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons will lose fifty standard acres each. No justification has been shown on behalf of the State for such discriminatory treatment resulting in the case of members of joint Hindu family; nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. 5(1) of the Act is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Examples can be multiplied with reference to joint Hindu families which would show that discrimination will result on the application of this provision. Similarly we are of opinion that discrimination will result in the case of Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanthana family and a Nambudiri Illom, particularly in the case of the former two where the husband and wife do not belong to the same family. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s. 58 of the Kerala Act so in the case of s. 5(1) of the Act discrimination is writ large on the consequences that follow from s. 5(1). We therefore hold that s. 5(1) is violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. As the section is the basis of Chapter II of the Act, the whole Chapter must fall along with it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Next we come to the provisions as to compensation contained in s. 50 read with Sch. II of the Act. Here again we are of opinion that the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829 case fully applies to the scheme of compensation provided in the Act which is as discriminatory as was the scheme in the Kerala Act. Learned counsel for the respondent however contends that Sch. III does not provide for any cut in the purchase price as was the case in the Kerala Act, and therefore the provisions in the Act are not discriminatory. If we look at the substance of the matter, however, we find that there is really no difference between the provisions for compensation in the Kerala Act and the provisions in respect thereof in the Act, though the provisions in the Act are differently worded. What was done in the Kerala Act was to arrive at the figure of compensation on certain principles, and a cut was then imposed on the figure thus arrived at and this cut progressively increased by slabs of Rs. 15,000. In the present case, a converse method has been adopted and the provision is that first the net annual income is arrived at and thereafter compensation is provided for slabs of Rs. 5,000 each of net income. For the first slab of Rs. 5,000, the compensation is 12 times the net annual income, for the second slab of Rs. 5,000 it is 11 times, for the third slab of Rs. 5,000 it is ten times and thereafter it is nine times. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Let us now work out this slab system. Take four cases where the net annual income is respectively Rs. 5,000, Rs. 10,000, Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000. The first person whose net annual income is Rs. 5,000 will get Rs. 60,000 as compensation, the second person whose net annual income is Rs. 10,000 will get Rs. 1,15,000, the third person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 will get Rs. 1,65,000 and the person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000 will get Rs. 2,10,000. If the same multiplier had been applied as in the case of the first slab of Rs. 5,000 to the other three slabs also, these persons would have got compensation of Rs. 1,20,000, Rs. 1,80,000 and Rs. 2,40,000. This will show that in effect there is a cut of about 4 per cent on the total compensation which corresponds to the purchase price in the Kerala Act in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 10,000, of about 8 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 and about 12 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000. Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act, its effect is the same, namely, as the total net income goes up after the first slab of Rs. 5,000 there is a progressive cut in the total compensation just as was the case in the Kerala Act. The argument that the cut is justified on the same basis as higher rates of income-tax on higher slabs of income has already been rejected by this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's case [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. Therefore, for the reasons given in that case, we are of opinion that the provisions contained in s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act with respect to compensation are discriminatory and violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sections 5 and 50 are the pivotal provisions of the Act, and if they fall, then we are of opinion that the whole Act must be struck down as unconstitutional. The working of the entire Act depends on s. 5 which provides for ceiling and s. 50 which provides for compensation. If these sections are unconstitutional, as we hold they are, the whole Act must fall. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. We therefore allow the petitions and strike down the Act as unconstitutional. The petitions will get their costs from the State of Madras - one set of hearing fee. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Petitions allowed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1964SC1515; [1964]7SCR82', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'State of Madras', 'sub' => 'Constitution', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640463' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc. Vs. 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State', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 8 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 9 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 10 => 'Art', (int) 11 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman', (int) 12 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 13 => 'Aliyasanathana', (int) 14 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 15 => 's. 5(1)(a', (int) 16 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 17 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 18 => 'Nambudiri Illom', (int) 19 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 20 => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman's', (int) 21 => 'Art' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'April 13, 1962', (int) 1 => 'May 2, 1962', (int) 2 => '19', (int) 3 => '14', (int) 4 => '14', (int) 5 => '31', (int) 6 => '1962', (int) 7 => '1956', (int) 8 => '1962', (int) 9 => '1961', (int) 10 => '1962', (int) 11 => 'annual', (int) 12 => 'annual', (int) 13 => 'annual', (int) 14 => 'annual', (int) 15 => 'annual', (int) 16 => 'annual', (int) 17 => 'annual', (int) 18 => 'annual', (int) 19 => 'annual', (int) 20 => 'annual', (int) 21 => '1962', (int) 22 => '50', (int) 23 => 's. 5' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'first', (int) 1 => 'second', (int) 2 => 'first', (int) 3 => 'first', (int) 4 => 'first', (int) 5 => 'second', (int) 6 => 'third', (int) 7 => 'first', (int) 8 => 'second', (int) 9 => 'third', (int) 10 => 'first', (int) 11 => 'first' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Kerala', (int) 1 => 'Art', (int) 2 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 3 => 'Aliyasanthana', (int) 4 => 'Marumakkattayam', (int) 5 => 'Art', (int) 6 => 'Art', (int) 7 => 'Art', (int) 8 => 'Art' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Madras' ), 'QUANTITY' => array( (int) 0 => '30 standard acres', (int) 1 => '30 standard acres', (int) 2 => '30 standard acres', (int) 3 => '300 standard acres', (int) 4 => '60 standard acres', (int) 5 => '30 standard acres', (int) 6 => '30 standard acres', (int) 7 => '30 standard acres', (int) 8 => '300 standard acres', (int) 9 => '10 standard acres' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => 'about 4 per cent', (int) 1 => 'about 8 per cent' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640463', 'acts' => 'Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 - Sections 5(1) and 50; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 14, 19 and 31(2)', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'A.P. Krishnasami Naidu Etc. Vs. State of Madras', 'casenote' => 'Constitution - constitutionality of Act - Sections 5 (1) and 50 of Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 and Articles 14, 19 and 31 (2) of Constitution of India - constitutionality of Act challenged on ground that it violates Articles 14, 19, and 31 (2) - main purpose of Act is to provide for ceiling on land holdings and for payment of compensation for land acquired by Government - Section 5 (1) relating to ceiling area uses double standard and gives artificial definition to family and discriminates between person equally circumstanced, thus violative of Article 14 - principles used to determine amount of compensation under Section 50 are also discriminatory, thus violative of Article 14 - Supreme Court held, working of entire Act depends on Sections 5 and 50 and when these Sections are unconstitutional so whole Act is unconstitutional.<br> - [ A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K.C. Das Gupta,; K. Subba Rao,; K.N. Wanchoo, JJ.] The appellants were detained under r. 30(l) of the Defence of India Rules made by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962. They applied to the Punjab and Bombay High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their case was that ss. 3(2)(15)(i) and 40 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, which were continued under the Act, were unconstitutional and invalid inasmuch as they contravened their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 21, 22(4), (5) and (7) of the Constitution and that, therefore, they should be set at liberty. The High Courts held that the Presidential Order which had been issued on November 3, 1962, under Art. 359(1) of the Constitution, after a declaration of emergency under Art. 352, consequent on the Chinese invasion of India, barred their right to move the said petitions and dismissed them. These appeals raised two common questions in this Court, (1) what was the true scope and effect of the Presidential Order issued under Art. 359(1), and (2) did the bar created by the Order operate in respect of the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code. The Presidential Order was as follows:- "G.S.R. 1464--In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of article 352 thereof on the 26th October 1962 is in force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or order made thereunder." By a later amendment of the Order Art. 14 was incorporated into it. Held:(per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Shah, JJ.) that the proceedings taken by the appellants in the High Courts under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were hit by the Presidential Order and must be held to be incompetent. Article 359 of the Constitution was not capable of two interpretations and it was, therefore not necessary to decide the controversy raised by the parties as to whether that Article should be interpreted in favour of the President's power granted by it or the fundamental rights of the citizens. The King (At the Prosecution of Arthur Zadig) v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor, [1943] F.C.R. 49, Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66 and King Emperor v. Vimalabal Deshpande, L.R. 73 1. A. 144, considered. The words 'any court' in Art. 359(1), construed in their plain grammatical meaning, must mean any court of competent jurisdiction including' the Supreme Court and the High Courts before which the rights specified in the Presidential Order can be enforced. It was not correct to say that the use of the words was necessary so as to include such other courts as might be empowered in terms of Art. 32(3). Nor was it correct to say that the words could not include a High Court as its power to issue a writ under Art. 226(1) was discretionary. In judging whether a particular proceeding fell within the purview of the Presidential Order the determining factor was not its form nor the words in which the relief was couched but the substance of it. If in granting the relief the court had to consider whether any of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order, had been contravened, the proceeding was within the Order, whether it was under Art. 32(l) or 226(1) of the Constitution. The right to move the court for writ of habeas corpus under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was now a statutory right and could no longer be claimed under the common law. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Map- pillai, I.L.R. [1939] Mad. 708, Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum L.R. 66 I.A. 222 and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, L.R. 72 I.A. 241, referred to. Since the promulgation of the Constitution the two methods by which a citizen could enforce his right of personal freedom were (i) by a writ under Art. 226(1) or Art. 32(l), or (ii) under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whichever method he adopted if the right he sought to enforce was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution the matter must, come within Art. 359(1) of the Constitution. That the court could exercise its power under s. 491(1)(b) suo motu could make no difference and Arts. 372, 225 or 375 could provide no valid ground of attack. The suspension of the right to move any court, as under the Presidential Order, must necessarily suspend the Court's jurisdiction accordingly. The right to challenge a detention order under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code had been enlarged by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and when a detenu relied upon such rights in his petition under that section he was in substance seeking to enforce his fundamental rights. The prohibition contained in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order must, therefore, apply. The expression "right to move any court" in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order takes in all legal actions, filed or to be filed, in which the specified rights are sought to be enforced and covers all relevant categories of jurisdictions of competent courts under which the said actions would other-wise have been normally entertained and tried. Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commissioner Union Territory of Tripura, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442, referred to. Even though the impugned Act may be invalid by reason of contravention of Arts. 14, 21 and 22, as contended by the appellants, that invalidity could not be challenged during the period prescribed by the Presidential Order and it could not be said that the President could not because of such invalidity issue the order. Where, however, the challenge to the validity of the detention order was based on any right other than those mentioned in the Presidential Order, the detenu's right to move any court could not be suspended by the Presidential Order because the right was outside Art. 359(1). Where again the detention was challenged on the ground that it contravened the mandatory provisions of the relevant act or that it was malafide and was proved to be so and in all cases falling under the other categories of s. 491(1) of the Code excepting those under s. 491(1)(b), the bar of the Presidential Order could have no application. So also the plea that the operative provision of the law under which the order of detention was made suffered from the vice of excessive delegation, was an independent plea not relatable to the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential Order and its validity had to be examined. The plea that s. 3(2)(15)(i) and s. 40 of the impugned Act suffered from excessive delegation must fail. The legislative policy was broad stated in the preamble and the relevant provisions of ss. 3(1) and 3(2) gave detailed and specific guidance to the rule making authority and it was not correct to say that the Act had by the impugned sections delegated essentially legislative function to that authority. Rule 30(1)(b) which was consistent with the operative provisions of the Act could not also be challenged on that ground. In " The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc. [1951] S.C.R. 747, Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, Bhatanagars and Co. Ltd., v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 701, relied on. The impugned Act could not also he struck down as a piece of colourable legislation because the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was already on the Statute book. The Parliament had power under Entry 9, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and if in view of the grave threat to the security of India it passed the Act, it could not be said to have acted malafide. If the Parliament thought that the executive would not be able to detain citizens reasonably suspected of prejudicial activities by a recourse to the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which provided for the required constitutional safeguards and the impugned Act which it enacted did not, it could not be suggested that it was acting malafide. Even if the impugned Act contravened Arts. 14 and 22 and the detentions thereunder were- invalid, Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order, which were precisely meant to meet such a situation, barred investigation on the merits during the period prescribed by the Order. The proceeding under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code is one pro- ceeding and the sole relief that can be claimed under it is release from the detention. If that could not be claimed because of the Presidential Order it was unreasonable to say that a mere declaration that the impugned Act and the detention thereunder were invalid could be made. Such a - declaration is clearly outside the purview of s. 491(1)(b) of the Code as also of Arts. 226(1) and 32(l) of the Constitution. The period for which the emergency should continue and the restrictions that should be imposed during its continuance are matters that must inevitably be left to the executive. In a democratic state the effective safeguard against any abuse of power in peace as also in emergency is the existence of enlightened, vigilant and vocal public opinion. Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [19421 A.C. 206, referred to. The inviolability of individual freedom and the majesty of law that sustains it are equally governed by the Constitution which has made this Court the custodian of the fundamental rights on the one hand and, on the other, provided for the declaration of the emergency. Consequently, in dealing with the right of a citizen to challenge the validity of his detention, effect must be given to Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it. The right specified in that Article must be held to include such right whether constitutional or constitutionally guaranteed and the words "any court" must include the Supreme Court and the High Court. The Punjab and the Bombay High Courts were, therefore right in their decision that the applications under s. 491(1)(b) of the Code were incompetent in so far as they sought to challenge the validity of the detentions on the ground that the Act and the Rules under which the orders were made contravened Arts. 14, 21 and 22(4)(5) and (7) of the Constitution. Per Subba Rao, J. It was clear that s. 3(2)(15)(i) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, and r. 30(1)(b) made under the Act contravened the relevant provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution and were, therefore, void. Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 840, Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. Under the Constitution, every person has a right to move the Supreme Court, the High Courts or any other court or courts constituted by the Parliament under Art. 32(3) for the enforcement of fundamental rights in the manner prescribed. But while the right to move the Supreme Court is a guaranteed right, the right to move the others is not so. Article 359, properly construed, meant that the bar imposed by the Presidential Order applied not only to the guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court but also the rights to move the other courts under Art. 32 and Art. 226 of the Constitution. There is no new rule of construction peculiar to war measures. It is always the same, whether in peace or in war. The fundamental rule is that the courts have to find out the expressed intention of the Legislature from the words of the enactment itself. Words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless there is ambiguity in the language in which case the court has to adopt that meaning which furthers the intention of the Legislature. A constitutional provision such as Art. 359, however, cannot be given a strained construction to meet a passing phase such as the present emergency. Rex v. Halliday, L.R. [19171 A.C. 260, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, L.R. [1942] A.C. 206, Nakkuda A1i v. jayaratna, L.R. 1951] A.C. 66, Gibbon v. Ogden, (1824) 6 L. Ed. 23, discussed. Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide in its terms and gives a discretionary power to the High Courts. Unlike Arts. 32 and 226, the exercise of the power is not channelled through procedural writs or orders and their technicalities cannot circumscribe the court's discretion. Girindra Nath Banerjee v. Birendra Nath Pal, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 727, District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai, I.L.R. 1939 Mad. 708, Matten v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum, L.R. (1939) 66 I.A. 222, referred to. Section 491 is continued by Art. 372 and -Art. 225 preserves the jurisdiction of the High Court. The power it confers on the High Court is not inconsistent either with Art. 32 or Art. 226 or any other Article of the Constitution and the section cannot, therefore, be said to have been impliedly superseded even to the extent Art. 226 empowers the High Court to give relief in cases of illegal detention. Though remedial in form the section postulates the existence of the substantive right that no person can be deprived of his liberty except in the manner prescribed by law. It assumes the existence of the rule of law and empowers High Court to act suo motu. The rights, substantive and procedural conferred by it arc different from those under Arts. 32 or 226 of the Constitution. It places the onus on the custodian to prove that the detention is legal and although in scrutinising the legality of the detention the court may have to consider whether the law offends any fundamental rights, that cannot make the proceeding one for the enforcement of fundamental rights or the decision anything but one on the unconstitutionality of a law because of infringement of fundamental rights generally. The mode of approach to the High Court under s. 491 of the Code or the nature of the relief given thereunder cannot be equated with those under the Constitution. The absolute discretionary jurisdiction under it cannot be put on a par with the jurisdiction under Art. 226 which is hedged in by constitutional limitations. Alam Khan v. The Crown, (1947) I.L.R. 28 Lahore 274, Ramji Lal v. The Crown, I.L.R..(1949) 11 E.P. 28, King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 144, referred to. While s. 491 gives no right to enforce fundamental rights, operating as it does as a check on arbitrary action, Art. 359 is concerned not with statutory powers but deals with the constitutional right and the constitutional enforcement of it. It was not, therefore, correct to say that Art. 359 would be frustrated if s. 491 was allowed to stand for Parliament might amend that section any time it liked. The expression "right to move any court for enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part 111" in Art. 359 must refer only to the right to move under Art. 32 or Art. 226 for the said specific relief and could not be applied to the exercise of the statutory power of the High Courts under s. 491 of the Code and, consequently, the expression "all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights" must refer to the proceedings initiated in exercise of that right. The detenus could not, therefore, enforce their fundamental rights under Arts. 21, 32 and 14 while the Presidential Order lasted, but that did not affect the High Court's power under s. 491 of the Code. The President's Order cannot bar the detenus from proving even under Arts. 32(l) and 226 that the detentions were not made under the Defence of India Ordinance or the Act as they were outside the Ordinance or the Act or in excess of the power conferred by them or that the detentions were made malafide or in fraudulent exercise of power. - Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala;', 'citingcases' => ' Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala Mentioned ', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1964-03-09', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J.,; K.N. Wanchoo,; N. Rajagopala Ayyangar,; J.C. Shah and; ', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Wanchoo, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These six petitions under Art. 32 of Constitution raise a common question about the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act, No. 58 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was assented to by the President on April 13, 1962 and came into force on publication in the Fort St. George Gazette on May 2, 1962. The constitutionality of the Act is attacked on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution. It is not necessary to set out in full the attack made on the constitutionality of the Act in these petitions. It will be enough if we indicate the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act under Art. 14. The first of these is with respect to s. 5 of the Act which lays down the ceiling area. The second is on s. 50 of the Act read with Sch. III thereof, which provides for compensation. It is urged that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and is therefore open to attack in case it violates Art. 14, 19 or 31. The petitioners in this connection rely on the judgment of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act. Chapter I is preliminary, Section 3 thereof provides for various definitions, some of which we shall refer to later. Chapter II deals with fixation of ceiling on land holdings. Section 5 thereof fixes the ceiling area. The other sections provide for determining surplus land, and s. 18 provides for the acquisition of surplus land which vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. Chapter III provides for ceiling on future acquisition and restriction on certain transfers. Chapter IV provides for the constitution and functions of the land board. Chapter V provides for the constitution and functions of the sugar factory board. Chapter VI provides for compensation. Section 50 thereof read with Sch. III lays down the mode for determining compensation for the land acquired by the Government and other ancillary matters. Chapter VII provides for survey and settlement of lands in the transferred territory which came to the State of Madras by virtue of the States Reorganisation Act of 1956. Chapter VIII provides for cultivating tenants' ceiling area. Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act. Chapter X provides for land tribunals and Chapter XI for appeals and revision. Chapter XII provides for certain penalties and procedure while Chapter XIII provides for disposal of land acquired by the Government under the Act. Chapter XIV deals with miscellaneous provisions, including s. 110, which provides for the framing of rules. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The main purpose of the Act is to provide for a ceiling on land holdings, for determining surplus land which would be acquired by Government and for payment of compensation therefor. The Act is applicable to agricultural land as defined in s. 3(22) and is mainly concerned with persons holding lands in ryotwari settlement or in any other way subject to payment of revenue direct to the Government. It is not in dispute that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and it is in this background that we shall consider the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling area under s. 5 and compensation under s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is first necessary to read certain definitions in s. 3. Section 3(14) defines family as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''family' in relation to a person means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) minor sons and unmarried daughters; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) Minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are dead.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to refer to the explanation of s. 3(14), for present purposes. Section 3(34) is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''person' includes any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 3(45) is as follows :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">''surplus land' means the land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area and declared to be surplus land under sections 12, 13 or 14.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Section 5 is in these terms :- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'5.(1) (a) Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every person and, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members, shall be 30 standard acres. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) The ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of more than five members shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, be 30 standard acres together with an additional 5 standard acres for every member of the family in excess of five. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (2) For the purposes of this section, all the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (3) (a) In calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanthana family or a Nambudiri Illom shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) In calculating the extent of land held by a family or by an individual person, the share of the family or of the individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not) or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company) shall be taken into account. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Explanation - For the purposes of this section - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the share of a member of a family or of an individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanathana family or a Nambudiri Illom, and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the share of a family or of an individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not), or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company), </p><p style="text-align: justify;">shall be deemed to be the extent of land - </p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) which, in case such share is held on the date of the commencement of this Act, would have been allotted to such member, person or family had such land been partitioned or divided, as the case may be, on such date; or </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) which, in case such share is acquired in any manner whatsoever after the date of the commencement of this Act, would be allotted to such member, person or family if a partition or division were to take place on the date of the preparation of the draft statement under sub-section (1) of section 10. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> '(4) . . . . .'. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is unnecessary to consider the rest of s. 5 for present purposes. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The attack on s. 5(1) is that it is hit by Art. 14 inasmuch as it denies equality before the law or equal protection of law to persons similarly situate, and reliance is placed in this connection on the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. In that case this Court was considering the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Kerala Act). The argument is that as in the Kerala Act, so in the present Act, the word 'family' has been given an artificial definition which does not conform to any kind of natural families prevalent in the State, namely, Hindu undivided family, Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanathana family or Nambudiri Illom, and that a double standard has been fixed in s. 5(1) in the matter of providing ceiling. It is therefore urged that the ratio of that decision fully applies to the present Act. Therefore, s. 5(1) should be struck down as violative of Art. 14 in the same manner as s. 58 of the Kerala Act was struck down. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. We are of opinion that this contention is correct and the ratio of that case applies with full force to the present case. It was observed in that case that 'where the ceiling is fixed........by a double standard and over and above that the family has been given an artificial definition which does not correspond with a natural family as known to personal law, there is bound to be discrimination resulting from such a provision'. In the present case also 'family' has been given an artificial definition as will immediately be clear on reading s. 3(14), which we have set out above. It is true that this definition of 'family' in s. 3(14) is not exactly the same as in the Kerala Act. Even so there can be no doubt that the definition of the word 'family' in the present case is equally artificial. Further in the Kerala Act s. 58 fixed a double standard for the purpose of ceiling; in the present case s. 5(1)(a) fixes a double standard though there is this distinction that in s. 5(1) the same ceiling is fixed in the case of a person as in the case of a family consisting of not more than five members, namely, 30 standard acres while in the Kerala Act, the ceiling fixed for a family of not more than five was double that for an adult unmarried person. But that in our opinion makes no difference in substance. The provision of s. 5(1) results in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and is thus violate of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This will be clear from a simple example of an undivided Hindu family, which we may give. Take the case of a joint Hindu family consisting of a father, two major sons and two minor sons, and assume that the mother is dead. Assume further that this natural family has 300 standard acres of land. Clearly according to the personal law, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. Now apply s. 5(1) to this family. The two major sons being not members of the family because of the artificial definition given to 'family' in s. 3(14) of the Act will be entitled to 30 standard acres each as individuals and the rest of their holding i.e. 30 standard acres in the case of each will be surplus land. But the father and the two minor sons being an artificial family as defined in s. 3(14) will be entitled to 30 standard acres between them and will thus lose 150 standard acres, which will become surplus land. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition of 'family' will result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. Under the Hindu law each member would be entitled to one-fifth share in the 300 standard acres belonging to the family. Under the Act however the two major sons will keep 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons together will keep 30 standard acres which work out to 10 standard acres each. The two major sons will thus lose 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons will lose fifty standard acres each. No justification has been shown on behalf of the State for such discriminatory treatment resulting in the case of members of joint Hindu family; nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly result from the application of s. 5(1) of the Act is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Examples can be multiplied with reference to joint Hindu families which would show that discrimination will result on the application of this provision. Similarly we are of opinion that discrimination will result in the case of Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanthana family and a Nambudiri Illom, particularly in the case of the former two where the husband and wife do not belong to the same family. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s. 58 of the Kerala Act so in the case of s. 5(1) of the Act discrimination is writ large on the consequences that follow from s. 5(1). We therefore hold that s. 5(1) is violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. As the section is the basis of Chapter II of the Act, the whole Chapter must fall along with it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Next we come to the provisions as to compensation contained in s. 50 read with Sch. II of the Act. Here again we are of opinion that the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829 case fully applies to the scheme of compensation provided in the Act which is as discriminatory as was the scheme in the Kerala Act. Learned counsel for the respondent however contends that Sch. III does not provide for any cut in the purchase price as was the case in the Kerala Act, and therefore the provisions in the Act are not discriminatory. If we look at the substance of the matter, however, we find that there is really no difference between the provisions for compensation in the Kerala Act and the provisions in respect thereof in the Act, though the provisions in the Act are differently worded. What was done in the Kerala Act was to arrive at the figure of compensation on certain principles, and a cut was then imposed on the figure thus arrived at and this cut progressively increased by slabs of Rs. 15,000. In the present case, a converse method has been adopted and the provision is that first the net annual income is arrived at and thereafter compensation is provided for slabs of Rs. 5,000 each of net income. For the first slab of Rs. 5,000, the compensation is 12 times the net annual income, for the second slab of Rs. 5,000 it is 11 times, for the third slab of Rs. 5,000 it is ten times and thereafter it is nine times. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Let us now work out this slab system. Take four cases where the net annual income is respectively Rs. 5,000, Rs. 10,000, Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000. The first person whose net annual income is Rs. 5,000 will get Rs. 60,000 as compensation, the second person whose net annual income is Rs. 10,000 will get Rs. 1,15,000, the third person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 will get Rs. 1,65,000 and the person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000 will get Rs. 2,10,000. If the same multiplier had been applied as in the case of the first slab of Rs. 5,000 to the other three slabs also, these persons would have got compensation of Rs. 1,20,000, Rs. 1,80,000 and Rs. 2,40,000. This will show that in effect there is a cut of about 4 per cent on the total compensation which corresponds to the purchase price in the Kerala Act in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 10,000, of about 8 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 and about 12 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 20,000. Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act, its effect is the same, namely, as the total net income goes up after the first slab of Rs. 5,000 there is a progressive cut in the total compensation just as was the case in the Kerala Act. The argument that the cut is justified on the same basis as higher rates of income-tax on higher slabs of income has already been rejected by this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's case [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829. Therefore, for the reasons given in that case, we are of opinion that the provisions contained in s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act with respect to compensation are discriminatory and violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Sections 5 and 50 are the pivotal provisions of the Act, and if they fall, then we are of opinion that the whole Act must be struck down as unconstitutional. The working of the entire Act depends on s. 5 which provides for ceiling and s. 50 which provides for compensation. If these sections are unconstitutional, as we hold they are, the whole Act must fall. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. We therefore allow the petitions and strike down the Act as unconstitutional. The petitions will get their costs from the State of Madras - one set of hearing fee. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Petitions allowed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1964SC1515; [1964]7SCR82', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'State of Madras', 'sub' => 'Constitution', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '640463' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: Constitution, Constitution, Section 3, Chapter II, Section 5, Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V, Chapter VII, the States Reorganisation Act, Chapter X, Chapter XI, Chapter XII, Chapter XIII, Constitution, Section 5, section 10, the Kerala Act, the Kerala Act, Constitution, Constitution, Constitution, Chapter II, Chapter must, the Kerala Act, Constitution
ORG: Wanchoo, the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act, Court, Chapter VI, Government, Chapter IX, Court, Court, the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, State, State, Act, Court, Court
NORP: J.1, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu, Hindu
CARDINAL: six, 32, 58, 14, 31(2, two, 19, 1, 829, 2, two, 18, 110, 3., 3(22, 14, two, 3, 12, 13, 14, 5.(1, 4, 5, more than five, more than five, 4, 5, an additional 5, five, 2, 3, 1, 4, 4., 5(1, 14, 1, 829, 5(1, 5(1, 14, 5., 5(1, more than five, more than five, 5(1, 14, two, two, four, 5(1, two, two, 150, five, one-fifth, two, 30, two, 30, two, 30, two, fifty, 5(1, 14, 58, 5(1, 5(1, 5(1, 14, 6, 50, 1, 829, 15,000, 5,000, 5,000, 12, 5,000, 11, 5,000, ten, nine, four, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, 5,000, 60,000, 10,000, 1,15,000, 15,000, 1,65,000, 20,000, 2,10,000, 5,000, three, 1,20,000, 1,80,000, 2,40,000, 10,000, 15,000, about 12, 20,000, 5,000, 1, 50, 14, 8, 5, 9, 10
PERSON: Art, George Gazette, Arts, Art, Art, Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State, Art, Nambudiri Illom, Aliyasanathana, Nambudiri Illom, Art, Karimbil Kunhikoman, Marumakkattayam, Aliyasanathana, Nambudiri Illom, s. 5(1)(a, Marumakkattayam, Aliyasanthana, Nambudiri Illom, Karimbil Kunhikoman's, Karimbil Kunhikoman's, Art
DATE: April 13, 1962, May 2, 1962, 19, 14, 14, 31, 1962, 1956, 1962, 1961, 1962, annual, annual, annual, annual, annual, annual, annual, annual, annual, annual, 1962, 50, s. 5
ORDINAL: first, second, first, first, first, second, third, first, second, third, first, first
GPE: Kerala, Art, Marumakkattayam, Aliyasanthana, Marumakkattayam, Art, Art, Art, Art
LOC: Madras
QUANTITY: 30 standard acres, 30 standard acres, 30 standard acres, 300 standard acres, 60 standard acres, 30 standard acres, 30 standard acres, 30 standard acres, 300 standard acres, 10 standard acres
MONEY: about 4 per cent, about 8 per cent