Semantic Analysis by spaCy
The State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram
Decided On : May-01-1961
Court : Supreme Court of India
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Nathu Ram', 'casenote' => 'The case questioned whether in a joint decree passed in the favour of the respondents, the failure to bring legal representatives on the record, on death of the one of the respondents in appeal, would abate the appeal as a whole -It was held that there was not abatement of appeal against the co-respondents of the deceased as Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for the same but in certain circumstances the appeal could not proceed against them and such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal - [ B.P. Sinha, C.J.,; A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K. Subba Rao and; Jafer Imam, JJ.] These petitions by the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his wife, daughters and soil challenged the constitutional validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 passed by the Madras Legislature soon after the Privy Council had declared the properties in possession of the Sthanee to be Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad had not interest. Section 2 Of the Act, which contained the substantive provision, was as follows:-- "2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which:- (a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or (b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving main. tenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or (c)there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there being, no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the Sthanam, shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which -.he provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Mad. XXII of 1933), shall apply." The question for decision was whether the impugned Act infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by Arts. 4, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Held (per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.) that the three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well- settled principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(1)(f) and could not be saved by Art. 19(5). Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A, the impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article, properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietary and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the estate solely for that purpose and must be limited to it. Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction, it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the amendment. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [19531 S.C.R. 1, con- sidered. There is no substance in the argument that since the impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b) of Art. 31A. That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a) of the Article and since the impugned Act does not contemplate any agrarian reform or seek to regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights appertaining janmam right, leaving all its characteristics intact, it does not come within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution. Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 748, referred to. Fundamental rights have a transcendental position in the Constitution and before an Article embodying a fundamental right can be construed to exclude another every attempt should be made to harmonize them and not until it is found impossible to do so, can one be made to yield to the other. Barring such exceptional cases, any law that infringes any of the fundamental rights must be void. The word 'law' in Art. 31(1) must mean a valid law, and such a law must satisfy two tests, (1) that the legislature must be competent to enact it and (2) that it must not infringe any fundamental rights. A law that deprives a citizen of his property must, therefore, be invalid if it infringes Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Deep Chand v. State Of U. P., [1959] SUPP. (2) S.C.R. 8, and Basheshway Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 528, referred to. Article 31 Of the Constitution, since its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, is no longer a selfcontained Article providing for a subject different from that dealt with by Art. 19, but deals with two different subjects, CIS. (2) and (2A) dealing with acquisition and requisition and cl. (1) with deprivation of property by authority of law, and can no longer be construed on the analogy of Art. 2 1 so as to exclude the operation of Art. 19. The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587, A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Any., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777, held inapplicable. Nor does Art. 31(1) deal with police power. Although such power, as understood in America, is no arbitrary power divorced from social control and public good, there can be no need of importing such a doctrine into the Indian Constitution. The word 'law' used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitation and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The Constitution does not confer on the Indian Parliament the same power which the Parliament of England possesses and while it does contemplate a welfare State, that has to be brought about within its frame-work of the Constitution itself. The correct approach should, therefore, be first to ascertain the fundamental right and then to see whether the law infringes that right. If ex facie it does so, it has to stand the test of Art. 19(5). In certain circumstances, however, deprivation of fundamental right to property may also amount to a reasonable restriction under the Article. Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, [196O] 2 S.C.R. 375, referred to. Individual proprietary rights being ordinarily inviolable unless a clear case is made out for restricting them, there must be a harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared by Art. 19(1) and social control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is implicit in the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard can be laid down and each case must be decided on its own facts. But the restrictions must not be arbitrary and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and shall be in the interest of the general public. State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, [1952] S.C.R. 597, Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper, 14 Law Ed. 510, and The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association and Cleaveland, Ohio v. Topeka City, 22 Law Ed. 455, referred to. Although the redress of a real and genuine grievance of a section of the community may be in public interest, it is impossible to hold that the impugned legislation was either justified or in such public interest. Iswari Prosad v. N. R. Sen, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273, held in- applicable. Marumakkathayam Law is a body of customs and usages that have received judicial recognition, and is fundamentally different from Hindu Law, being a matriarchal system. The family, called tarwad, consists of all the descendants of one common ancestor. It consists of a mother and her male and female children and the children of those female children and so on. Only the senior-most male member can attain the sthanam, which is a position of dignity with specific properties attached to it. When he does so and becomes the Sthanee he ceases to have any interest in the tarwad properties. Occasionally a female member also becomes the Sthanee. Like a Hindu widow or an impartible estate-holder the Sthanee has an absolute interest in the income of the Sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom. A member of the tarwad has no right to maintenance from out of the Sthanam properties nor can such property be converted into tarwad property by the grant of such maintenance by custom or otherwise or intermingling of the Sthanam properties with the tarwad properties by the Sthanee. His position approximates to that of a member separated from a Hindu family and there can be no scope for the application of the doctrine of blending. Like the Sthanee who ceases to have any present proprietary interest in the tarwad, the members of the tarwad also can have no present proprietary interest in the sthanam property. They continue to be blood relations with a contingent right of succession to each others' property that is no more than a spies successions. The right of a subsequently born male member of the tarwad to succeed to the Sthanam and its property is judicially recognised. Case-law reviewed. Per Imam and Sarkar, JJ.-The impugned Act is protected by Art. 31A and is not open to question in the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) Of the Constitution. There is no basis for the contention that Art. 31(1)(a) contemplates a law relating to agrarian reform only. The Article makes no mention of any such reform and there can be no doubt that under it a janmam right may be acquired, extinguished or modified whether the land held in such right is agricultural or not. It is not permissible to refer to the objects and reasons stated in the Bills, by which the Acts amending Art. 31A of the Constitution were introduced, for the construction of the statute and, therefore, the word 'law' in Art. 31A(1) cannot be read in relation to sub-cl. (a) only as a law intended to achieve agrarian reform on the basis of the supposed object of the Legislature in enacting Art. 31A. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. 1 referred to. It is not correct to say that the impugned Act does not effect any modification of janmam rights and therefore it does not come within Art. 31A. When the Article speaks of modification of janmam rights, it does not speak of such rights in the abstract but contemplates the modification of such rights held by a person. It would be as much modification of janmam rights, if such rights held by one person are directed to be held by a number of persons jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are altered. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748, relied on. It is not correct to say that the Legislature in giving the provisions of the impugned Act retrospective operation or in providing that they should prevail notwithstanding any decision of the court to the contrary, was acting judicially and not in a legislative capacity and that the Act was on that ground invalid. The rule obtaining in America that legislative action cannot retract on past controversies and reverse decisions of courts and the relevant American decisions can have no application in India. Piare Dusadh's case, [1944] F.C.R. 61, referred to. - 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent;', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1961-05-01', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K. Subba Rao and; Raghubar Dayal, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Raghubar Dayal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957 is an appeal, by certificate, and raises the question regarding the effect of the abatement of the appeal, by the State of Punjab, against Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, on the State appeal against Nathu Ram, co-respondent. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957 also raise the same question between the same parties. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The facts leading to the appeal are that the Punjab Government acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, for different military purposes, under the Defence of India Act, 1939 (XXXV of 1939). Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, brothers, refused to accept the compensation offered to them by the Collector and applied to the Punjab Government, through the Collector, under r. 6 of the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, 1943, hereinafter called the Rules, as amended by the Notification of the Punjab Government No. 1444-HM-44/19124, dated 10th March, 1944, and published in the Punjab Gazette, Part I, dated 17th March, 1944 (Home Department). The State Government referred the matter to an arbitrator as required under r. 10, who, after enquiry, passed an award ordering the payment of an amount higher than what was offered by the Collector and also ordered the payment of certain amount on account of income-tax which would be paid on the compensation received. The State Government appealed against the award to the High Court of Punjab. During the pendency of the appeal, Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, died. The High Court, holding that the appeal abated against Labhu Ram and that its effect was that the appeal against Nathu Ram also abated, dismissed the appeal. It also dismissed the cross-objections. The State Government applied for a certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court and the High Court granted it, as questions of great private and public importance were involved. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is not disputed that in view of O. XXII, r. 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated against Labhu Ram, deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been, consequently, divergence of opinion in the application of the principle. It will serve no useful purpose to consider the cases. Suffice it to say that when O. XXII, r. 4 does not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent, there can be no question of abatement of the appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the provisions of O. I, r. 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. It follows, therefore, that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The question whether a Court can deal with such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may, however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the Court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. There has been no divergence between the Courts about the Court's proceeding with the appeal between the respondents other than the deceased respondent, when the decree in appeal was not a joint decree in favour of all the respondents. The abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent, in such a case, would make the decree in his favour alone final, and this can, in no circumstances, have a repercussion, on the decision of the controversy between the appellant and the other decree-holders or on the execution of the ultimate decree between them. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The difficulty arises always when there is a joint decree. Here again, the consensus of opinion is that if the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the other respondents also will not be proceeded with and will have to be dismissed as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. Different views exist in the case of joint decrees in favour of respondents whose rights in the subject matter of the decree are specified. One view is that in such cases, the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent will have the result of making the decree affecting his specific interest to be final and that the decree against the other respondents can be suitably dealt with by the appellate Court. We do not consider this view correct. The specification of shares or of interest of the deceased respondent does not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree-holder to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere with the joint right decreed in his favour. The abatement of an appeal means not only that the decree between the appellant and the deceased respondent has become final, but also, as a necessary corollary, that the appellate Court cannot, in any way, modify that decree directly or indirectly. The reason is plain. It is that in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents, the appellate Court cannot determine anything between the appellant and the legal representatives which may affect the rights of the legal representatives under the decree. It is immaterial that the modification which the Court will do is one to which exception can or cannot be taken. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is therefore necessary to determine, on the facts of this case, whether the State appeal could proceed against Nathu Ram. The award of the arbitrator in each of these cases was a joint one, in favour of both the respondents Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. To illustrate the form of the award, we may quote the award for the year 1945-46 in the proceedings leading to Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957. It is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On the basis of the report of S. Lal Singh, Naib Tehsildar (Exhibit P.W. 9/1) and Sheikh Aziz Din, Tehsildar, Exhibit P.W. 9/2, the applicants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,140 on account of rent, plus Rs. 3,872-8-0 on account of Income-tax etc., due to the inclusion of Rs. 6,193-8-0 in their total income, plus such sum as the petitioners have to pay to the Income-tax Department on account of the inclusion of Rs. 4,140 in their income as awarded by this award.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result of the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram is therefore that his legal representatives are entitled to get compensation on the basis of this award, even if they are to be paid separately on calculating their rightful share in the land acquired, for which this compensation is decreed. Such calculation is foreign to the appeal between the State of Punjab and Nathu Ram. The decree in the appeal will have to determine not what Nathu Ram's share in this compensation is, but what is the correct amount of compensation with respect to the land acquired for which this compensation has been awarded by the arbitrator. The subject matter for which the compensation is to be calculated is one and the same. There cannot be different assessments of the amounts of compensation for the same parcel of land. The appeal before the High Court was an appeal against a decree jointly in favour of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot be held to be properly constituted when the appeal against Labhu Ram had abated. To get rid of the joint decree, it was essential for the appellant, the State of Punjab, to implead both the joint-decree holders in the appeal. In the absence of one joint-decree holder, the appeal is not properly framed. It follows the that State appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot proceed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is however contended for the State that according to the entries in the village records, Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram had equal shares in the land acquired and that therefore the appeal against Nathu Ram alone can deal with half the amount of the award. We do not agree. The mere record of specific shares in the revenue records is no guarantee of their correctness. The appellate Court will have to determine the share of Nathu Ram and necessarily the share of Labhu Ram in the absence of his legal representatives. This is not permissible in law. Further, the entire case of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, in their application to the Government for the appointment of an arbitrator, was that the land jointly belonged to them and had been acquired for military purposes, that a certain amount had been paid to them as compensation, that they received that amount under protest and that they were entitled to a larger amount mentioned in the application and also for the income-tax they would have to pay on account of the compensation received being added to their income. Their claim was a joint claim based on the allegation that the land belonged to them jointly. The award and the joint decree are on this basis and the appellate Court cannot decide on the basis of the separate shares. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The State objected before the arbitrator, and urges before us, that under the rules, the joint application of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram should have been treated as separate applications with respect to the correctness of the compensation payable to each of them respectively and that the arbitrator should have made separate awards with respect to such separate claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The necessary corollary of such a contention for the State is that the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram will not make infructuous the appeal against Nathu Ram. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The respondent urges that the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, do not contemplate separate applications by the persons interested in the compensation on account of the acquisition of a particular parcel of land. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. The arbitrator did not agree to deal with the claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram separately. He, however, did not decide the question on the basis of the land belonging jointly to the two brothers as members of the joint Hindu family. He however held that the expression 'a person interested' in r. 3, included all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of the land and that r. 18 permitted the joinder of applications for joint enquiry when each case rested on the same and similar basis and each of the applications included land included in a larger part of land acquired at one time. He also took into consideration that the separation of the applications of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram would involve various difficulties in matters of income-tax. He therefore used his discretion and ordered the application to be proceeded with jointly. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In view of our opinion on the main point, we do not consider it necessary to interpret the rules and decide whether the joint application was maintainable or not. The fact remains that Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram made a joint claim and got a joint decree against the State for compensation. The frame of the appeal is to be with reference to the nature of the decree challenged. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. We therefore see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. This order will govern the other connected appeals, viz., Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Appeal dismissed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1962SC89; [1962]2SCR636', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Nathu Ram', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '639344' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'The State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Raghubar Dayal', (int) 1 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 2 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 3 => 'XXXV', (int) 4 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 5 => 'Gazette', (int) 6 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 7 => 'O. XXII', (int) 8 => 'O. XXII', (int) 9 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 10 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 11 => 'S. Lal Singh', (int) 12 => 'Naib Tehsildar', (int) 13 => 'Sheikh Aziz Din', (int) 14 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 15 => 'Nathu Ram's', (int) 16 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 17 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 18 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 19 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 20 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 21 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 22 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 23 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 24 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 25 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 26 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 27 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 28 => 'Nathu Ram' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '635', (int) 1 => 'one', (int) 2 => '2', (int) 3 => '636 to 641', (int) 4 => '3.', (int) 5 => '6', (int) 6 => 'one', (int) 7 => '4.', (int) 8 => '4', (int) 9 => '4', (int) 10 => '5.', (int) 11 => '9', (int) 12 => '6.', (int) 13 => '8', (int) 14 => 'One', (int) 15 => '9', (int) 16 => '635', (int) 17 => '4,140', (int) 18 => '3,872-8', (int) 19 => '6,193-8', (int) 20 => '4,140', (int) 21 => '10', (int) 22 => 'one', (int) 23 => '11', (int) 24 => 'half', (int) 25 => '12', (int) 26 => '13', (int) 27 => '14', (int) 28 => 'two', (int) 29 => '3', (int) 30 => '18', (int) 31 => 'one', (int) 32 => '15', (int) 33 => '16', (int) 34 => '636 to 641', (int) 35 => '17' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1957', (int) 1 => '1957', (int) 2 => '1939', (int) 3 => '1943', (int) 4 => '1444', (int) 5 => '10th March, 1944', (int) 6 => '17th March, 1944', (int) 7 => 'the year 1945-46', (int) 8 => '1957', (int) 9 => '1957' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 1 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 2 => 'State', (int) 3 => 'the Punjab Government', (int) 4 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 5 => 'the Defence of India Act', (int) 6 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 7 => 'the Punjab Government', (int) 8 => 'the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules', (int) 9 => 'Home Department', (int) 10 => 'The State Government', (int) 11 => 'The State Government', (int) 12 => 'the High Court of Punjab', (int) 13 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 14 => 'The High Court', (int) 15 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 16 => 'The State Government', (int) 17 => 'Court', (int) 18 => 'the High Court', (int) 19 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 20 => 'Court', (int) 21 => 'Court', (int) 22 => 'Court', (int) 23 => 'Court', (int) 24 => 'Court', (int) 25 => 'Court', (int) 26 => 'Court', (int) 27 => 'Court', (int) 28 => 'Court', (int) 29 => 'Court', (int) 30 => 'Court', (int) 31 => 'Court', (int) 32 => 'Court', (int) 33 => 'Court', (int) 34 => 'State', (int) 35 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 36 => 'Civil Appeal No', (int) 37 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 38 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 39 => 'the High Court', (int) 40 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 41 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 42 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 43 => 'State', (int) 44 => 'State', (int) 45 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 46 => 'Court', (int) 47 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 48 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 49 => 'Court', (int) 50 => 'State', (int) 51 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 52 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 53 => 'State', (int) 54 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 55 => 'the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules', (int) 56 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 57 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 58 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 59 => 'State' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'Rules', (int) 1 => 'Hindu' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '639344', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Order I, Rule 9 - Order 22, Rule 4', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'The State of Punjab', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'The State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram', 'casenote' => 'The case questioned whether in a joint decree passed in the favour of the respondents, the failure to bring legal representatives on the record, on death of the one of the respondents in appeal, would abate the appeal as a whole -It was held that there was not abatement of appeal against the co-respondents of the deceased as Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for the same but in certain circumstances the appeal could not proceed against them and such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal - [ B.P. Sinha, C.J.,; A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K. Subba Rao and; Jafer Imam, JJ.] These petitions by the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his wife, daughters and soil challenged the constitutional validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 passed by the Madras Legislature soon after the Privy Council had declared the properties in possession of the Sthanee to be Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad had not interest. Section 2 Of the Act, which contained the substantive provision, was as follows:-- "2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which:- (a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or (b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving main. tenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or (c)there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there being, no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the Sthanam, shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which -.he provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Mad. XXII of 1933), shall apply." The question for decision was whether the impugned Act infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by Arts. 4, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Held (per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.) that the three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well- settled principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(1)(f) and could not be saved by Art. 19(5). Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A, the impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article, properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietary and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the estate solely for that purpose and must be limited to it. Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction, it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the amendment. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [19531 S.C.R. 1, con- sidered. There is no substance in the argument that since the impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b) of Art. 31A. That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a) of the Article and since the impugned Act does not contemplate any agrarian reform or seek to regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights appertaining janmam right, leaving all its characteristics intact, it does not come within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution. Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 748, referred to. Fundamental rights have a transcendental position in the Constitution and before an Article embodying a fundamental right can be construed to exclude another every attempt should be made to harmonize them and not until it is found impossible to do so, can one be made to yield to the other. Barring such exceptional cases, any law that infringes any of the fundamental rights must be void. The word 'law' in Art. 31(1) must mean a valid law, and such a law must satisfy two tests, (1) that the legislature must be competent to enact it and (2) that it must not infringe any fundamental rights. A law that deprives a citizen of his property must, therefore, be invalid if it infringes Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Deep Chand v. State Of U. P., [1959] SUPP. (2) S.C.R. 8, and Basheshway Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 528, referred to. Article 31 Of the Constitution, since its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, is no longer a selfcontained Article providing for a subject different from that dealt with by Art. 19, but deals with two different subjects, CIS. (2) and (2A) dealing with acquisition and requisition and cl. (1) with deprivation of property by authority of law, and can no longer be construed on the analogy of Art. 2 1 so as to exclude the operation of Art. 19. The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587, A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Any., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777, held inapplicable. Nor does Art. 31(1) deal with police power. Although such power, as understood in America, is no arbitrary power divorced from social control and public good, there can be no need of importing such a doctrine into the Indian Constitution. The word 'law' used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitation and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The Constitution does not confer on the Indian Parliament the same power which the Parliament of England possesses and while it does contemplate a welfare State, that has to be brought about within its frame-work of the Constitution itself. The correct approach should, therefore, be first to ascertain the fundamental right and then to see whether the law infringes that right. If ex facie it does so, it has to stand the test of Art. 19(5). In certain circumstances, however, deprivation of fundamental right to property may also amount to a reasonable restriction under the Article. Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, [196O] 2 S.C.R. 375, referred to. Individual proprietary rights being ordinarily inviolable unless a clear case is made out for restricting them, there must be a harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared by Art. 19(1) and social control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is implicit in the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard can be laid down and each case must be decided on its own facts. But the restrictions must not be arbitrary and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and shall be in the interest of the general public. State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, [1952] S.C.R. 597, Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper, 14 Law Ed. 510, and The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association and Cleaveland, Ohio v. Topeka City, 22 Law Ed. 455, referred to. Although the redress of a real and genuine grievance of a section of the community may be in public interest, it is impossible to hold that the impugned legislation was either justified or in such public interest. Iswari Prosad v. N. R. Sen, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273, held in- applicable. Marumakkathayam Law is a body of customs and usages that have received judicial recognition, and is fundamentally different from Hindu Law, being a matriarchal system. The family, called tarwad, consists of all the descendants of one common ancestor. It consists of a mother and her male and female children and the children of those female children and so on. Only the senior-most male member can attain the sthanam, which is a position of dignity with specific properties attached to it. When he does so and becomes the Sthanee he ceases to have any interest in the tarwad properties. Occasionally a female member also becomes the Sthanee. Like a Hindu widow or an impartible estate-holder the Sthanee has an absolute interest in the income of the Sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom. A member of the tarwad has no right to maintenance from out of the Sthanam properties nor can such property be converted into tarwad property by the grant of such maintenance by custom or otherwise or intermingling of the Sthanam properties with the tarwad properties by the Sthanee. His position approximates to that of a member separated from a Hindu family and there can be no scope for the application of the doctrine of blending. Like the Sthanee who ceases to have any present proprietary interest in the tarwad, the members of the tarwad also can have no present proprietary interest in the sthanam property. They continue to be blood relations with a contingent right of succession to each others' property that is no more than a spies successions. The right of a subsequently born male member of the tarwad to succeed to the Sthanam and its property is judicially recognised. Case-law reviewed. Per Imam and Sarkar, JJ.-The impugned Act is protected by Art. 31A and is not open to question in the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) Of the Constitution. There is no basis for the contention that Art. 31(1)(a) contemplates a law relating to agrarian reform only. The Article makes no mention of any such reform and there can be no doubt that under it a janmam right may be acquired, extinguished or modified whether the land held in such right is agricultural or not. It is not permissible to refer to the objects and reasons stated in the Bills, by which the Acts amending Art. 31A of the Constitution were introduced, for the construction of the statute and, therefore, the word 'law' in Art. 31A(1) cannot be read in relation to sub-cl. (a) only as a law intended to achieve agrarian reform on the basis of the supposed object of the Legislature in enacting Art. 31A. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. 1 referred to. It is not correct to say that the impugned Act does not effect any modification of janmam rights and therefore it does not come within Art. 31A. When the Article speaks of modification of janmam rights, it does not speak of such rights in the abstract but contemplates the modification of such rights held by a person. It would be as much modification of janmam rights, if such rights held by one person are directed to be held by a number of persons jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are altered. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748, relied on. It is not correct to say that the Legislature in giving the provisions of the impugned Act retrospective operation or in providing that they should prevail notwithstanding any decision of the court to the contrary, was acting judicially and not in a legislative capacity and that the Act was on that ground invalid. The rule obtaining in America that legislative action cannot retract on past controversies and reverse decisions of courts and the relevant American decisions can have no application in India. Piare Dusadh's case, [1944] F.C.R. 61, referred to. - 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent;', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1961-05-01', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K. Subba Rao and; Raghubar Dayal, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Raghubar Dayal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957 is an appeal, by certificate, and raises the question regarding the effect of the abatement of the appeal, by the State of Punjab, against Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, on the State appeal against Nathu Ram, co-respondent. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957 also raise the same question between the same parties. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The facts leading to the appeal are that the Punjab Government acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, for different military purposes, under the Defence of India Act, 1939 (XXXV of 1939). Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, brothers, refused to accept the compensation offered to them by the Collector and applied to the Punjab Government, through the Collector, under r. 6 of the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, 1943, hereinafter called the Rules, as amended by the Notification of the Punjab Government No. 1444-HM-44/19124, dated 10th March, 1944, and published in the Punjab Gazette, Part I, dated 17th March, 1944 (Home Department). The State Government referred the matter to an arbitrator as required under r. 10, who, after enquiry, passed an award ordering the payment of an amount higher than what was offered by the Collector and also ordered the payment of certain amount on account of income-tax which would be paid on the compensation received. The State Government appealed against the award to the High Court of Punjab. During the pendency of the appeal, Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, died. The High Court, holding that the appeal abated against Labhu Ram and that its effect was that the appeal against Nathu Ram also abated, dismissed the appeal. It also dismissed the cross-objections. The State Government applied for a certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court and the High Court granted it, as questions of great private and public importance were involved. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is not disputed that in view of O. XXII, r. 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated against Labhu Ram, deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been, consequently, divergence of opinion in the application of the principle. It will serve no useful purpose to consider the cases. Suffice it to say that when O. XXII, r. 4 does not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent, there can be no question of abatement of the appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the provisions of O. I, r. 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. It follows, therefore, that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The question whether a Court can deal with such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may, however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the Court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. There has been no divergence between the Courts about the Court's proceeding with the appeal between the respondents other than the deceased respondent, when the decree in appeal was not a joint decree in favour of all the respondents. The abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent, in such a case, would make the decree in his favour alone final, and this can, in no circumstances, have a repercussion, on the decision of the controversy between the appellant and the other decree-holders or on the execution of the ultimate decree between them. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The difficulty arises always when there is a joint decree. Here again, the consensus of opinion is that if the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the other respondents also will not be proceeded with and will have to be dismissed as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. Different views exist in the case of joint decrees in favour of respondents whose rights in the subject matter of the decree are specified. One view is that in such cases, the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent will have the result of making the decree affecting his specific interest to be final and that the decree against the other respondents can be suitably dealt with by the appellate Court. We do not consider this view correct. The specification of shares or of interest of the deceased respondent does not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree-holder to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere with the joint right decreed in his favour. The abatement of an appeal means not only that the decree between the appellant and the deceased respondent has become final, but also, as a necessary corollary, that the appellate Court cannot, in any way, modify that decree directly or indirectly. The reason is plain. It is that in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents, the appellate Court cannot determine anything between the appellant and the legal representatives which may affect the rights of the legal representatives under the decree. It is immaterial that the modification which the Court will do is one to which exception can or cannot be taken. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is therefore necessary to determine, on the facts of this case, whether the State appeal could proceed against Nathu Ram. The award of the arbitrator in each of these cases was a joint one, in favour of both the respondents Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. To illustrate the form of the award, we may quote the award for the year 1945-46 in the proceedings leading to Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957. It is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On the basis of the report of S. Lal Singh, Naib Tehsildar (Exhibit P.W. 9/1) and Sheikh Aziz Din, Tehsildar, Exhibit P.W. 9/2, the applicants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,140 on account of rent, plus Rs. 3,872-8-0 on account of Income-tax etc., due to the inclusion of Rs. 6,193-8-0 in their total income, plus such sum as the petitioners have to pay to the Income-tax Department on account of the inclusion of Rs. 4,140 in their income as awarded by this award.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result of the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram is therefore that his legal representatives are entitled to get compensation on the basis of this award, even if they are to be paid separately on calculating their rightful share in the land acquired, for which this compensation is decreed. Such calculation is foreign to the appeal between the State of Punjab and Nathu Ram. The decree in the appeal will have to determine not what Nathu Ram's share in this compensation is, but what is the correct amount of compensation with respect to the land acquired for which this compensation has been awarded by the arbitrator. The subject matter for which the compensation is to be calculated is one and the same. There cannot be different assessments of the amounts of compensation for the same parcel of land. The appeal before the High Court was an appeal against a decree jointly in favour of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot be held to be properly constituted when the appeal against Labhu Ram had abated. To get rid of the joint decree, it was essential for the appellant, the State of Punjab, to implead both the joint-decree holders in the appeal. In the absence of one joint-decree holder, the appeal is not properly framed. It follows the that State appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot proceed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is however contended for the State that according to the entries in the village records, Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram had equal shares in the land acquired and that therefore the appeal against Nathu Ram alone can deal with half the amount of the award. We do not agree. The mere record of specific shares in the revenue records is no guarantee of their correctness. The appellate Court will have to determine the share of Nathu Ram and necessarily the share of Labhu Ram in the absence of his legal representatives. This is not permissible in law. Further, the entire case of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, in their application to the Government for the appointment of an arbitrator, was that the land jointly belonged to them and had been acquired for military purposes, that a certain amount had been paid to them as compensation, that they received that amount under protest and that they were entitled to a larger amount mentioned in the application and also for the income-tax they would have to pay on account of the compensation received being added to their income. Their claim was a joint claim based on the allegation that the land belonged to them jointly. The award and the joint decree are on this basis and the appellate Court cannot decide on the basis of the separate shares. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The State objected before the arbitrator, and urges before us, that under the rules, the joint application of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram should have been treated as separate applications with respect to the correctness of the compensation payable to each of them respectively and that the arbitrator should have made separate awards with respect to such separate claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The necessary corollary of such a contention for the State is that the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram will not make infructuous the appeal against Nathu Ram. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The respondent urges that the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, do not contemplate separate applications by the persons interested in the compensation on account of the acquisition of a particular parcel of land. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. The arbitrator did not agree to deal with the claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram separately. He, however, did not decide the question on the basis of the land belonging jointly to the two brothers as members of the joint Hindu family. He however held that the expression 'a person interested' in r. 3, included all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of the land and that r. 18 permitted the joinder of applications for joint enquiry when each case rested on the same and similar basis and each of the applications included land included in a larger part of land acquired at one time. He also took into consideration that the separation of the applications of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram would involve various difficulties in matters of income-tax. He therefore used his discretion and ordered the application to be proceeded with jointly. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In view of our opinion on the main point, we do not consider it necessary to interpret the rules and decide whether the joint application was maintainable or not. The fact remains that Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram made a joint claim and got a joint decree against the State for compensation. The frame of the appeal is to be with reference to the nature of the decree challenged. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. We therefore see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. This order will govern the other connected appeals, viz., Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Appeal dismissed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1962SC89; [1962]2SCR636', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Nathu Ram', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '639344' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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Lal Singh', (int) 12 => 'Naib Tehsildar', (int) 13 => 'Sheikh Aziz Din', (int) 14 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 15 => 'Nathu Ram's', (int) 16 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 17 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 18 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 19 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 20 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 21 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 22 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 23 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 24 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 25 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 26 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 27 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 28 => 'Nathu Ram' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '635', (int) 1 => 'one', (int) 2 => '2', (int) 3 => '636 to 641', (int) 4 => '3.', (int) 5 => '6', (int) 6 => 'one', (int) 7 => '4.', (int) 8 => '4', (int) 9 => '4', (int) 10 => '5.', (int) 11 => '9', (int) 12 => '6.', (int) 13 => '8', (int) 14 => 'One', (int) 15 => '9', (int) 16 => '635', (int) 17 => '4,140', (int) 18 => '3,872-8', (int) 19 => '6,193-8', (int) 20 => '4,140', (int) 21 => '10', (int) 22 => 'one', (int) 23 => '11', (int) 24 => 'half', (int) 25 => '12', (int) 26 => '13', (int) 27 => '14', (int) 28 => 'two', (int) 29 => '3', (int) 30 => '18', (int) 31 => 'one', (int) 32 => '15', (int) 33 => '16', (int) 34 => '636 to 641', (int) 35 => '17' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1957', (int) 1 => '1957', (int) 2 => '1939', (int) 3 => '1943', (int) 4 => '1444', (int) 5 => '10th March, 1944', (int) 6 => '17th March, 1944', (int) 7 => 'the year 1945-46', (int) 8 => '1957', (int) 9 => '1957' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 1 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 2 => 'State', (int) 3 => 'the Punjab Government', (int) 4 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 5 => 'the Defence of India Act', (int) 6 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 7 => 'the Punjab Government', (int) 8 => 'the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules', (int) 9 => 'Home Department', (int) 10 => 'The State Government', (int) 11 => 'The State Government', (int) 12 => 'the High Court of Punjab', (int) 13 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 14 => 'The High Court', (int) 15 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 16 => 'The State Government', (int) 17 => 'Court', (int) 18 => 'the High Court', (int) 19 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 20 => 'Court', (int) 21 => 'Court', (int) 22 => 'Court', (int) 23 => 'Court', (int) 24 => 'Court', (int) 25 => 'Court', (int) 26 => 'Court', (int) 27 => 'Court', (int) 28 => 'Court', (int) 29 => 'Court', (int) 30 => 'Court', (int) 31 => 'Court', (int) 32 => 'Court', (int) 33 => 'Court', (int) 34 => 'State', (int) 35 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 36 => 'Civil Appeal No', (int) 37 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 38 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 39 => 'the High Court', (int) 40 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 41 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 42 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 43 => 'State', (int) 44 => 'State', (int) 45 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 46 => 'Court', (int) 47 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 48 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 49 => 'Court', (int) 50 => 'State', (int) 51 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 52 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 53 => 'State', (int) 54 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 55 => 'the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules', (int) 56 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 57 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 58 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 59 => 'State' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'Rules', (int) 1 => 'Hindu' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '639344', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Order I, Rule 9 - Order 22, Rule 4', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'The State of Punjab', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'The State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram', 'casenote' => 'The case questioned whether in a joint decree passed in the favour of the respondents, the failure to bring legal representatives on the record, on death of the one of the respondents in appeal, would abate the appeal as a whole -It was held that there was not abatement of appeal against the co-respondents of the deceased as Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for the same but in certain circumstances the appeal could not proceed against them and such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal - [ B.P. Sinha, C.J.,; A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K. Subba Rao and; Jafer Imam, JJ.] These petitions by the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his wife, daughters and soil challenged the constitutional validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 passed by the Madras Legislature soon after the Privy Council had declared the properties in possession of the Sthanee to be Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad had not interest. Section 2 Of the Act, which contained the substantive provision, was as follows:-- "2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which:- (a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or (b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving main. tenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or (c)there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there being, no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the Sthanam, shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which -.he provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Mad. XXII of 1933), shall apply." The question for decision was whether the impugned Act infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by Arts. 4, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Held (per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.) that the three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well- settled principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(1)(f) and could not be saved by Art. 19(5). Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A, the impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article, properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietary and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the estate solely for that purpose and must be limited to it. Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction, it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the amendment. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [19531 S.C.R. 1, con- sidered. There is no substance in the argument that since the impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b) of Art. 31A. That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a) of the Article and since the impugned Act does not contemplate any agrarian reform or seek to regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights appertaining janmam right, leaving all its characteristics intact, it does not come within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution. Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 748, referred to. Fundamental rights have a transcendental position in the Constitution and before an Article embodying a fundamental right can be construed to exclude another every attempt should be made to harmonize them and not until it is found impossible to do so, can one be made to yield to the other. Barring such exceptional cases, any law that infringes any of the fundamental rights must be void. The word 'law' in Art. 31(1) must mean a valid law, and such a law must satisfy two tests, (1) that the legislature must be competent to enact it and (2) that it must not infringe any fundamental rights. A law that deprives a citizen of his property must, therefore, be invalid if it infringes Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Deep Chand v. State Of U. P., [1959] SUPP. (2) S.C.R. 8, and Basheshway Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 528, referred to. Article 31 Of the Constitution, since its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, is no longer a selfcontained Article providing for a subject different from that dealt with by Art. 19, but deals with two different subjects, CIS. (2) and (2A) dealing with acquisition and requisition and cl. (1) with deprivation of property by authority of law, and can no longer be construed on the analogy of Art. 2 1 so as to exclude the operation of Art. 19. The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587, A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Any., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777, held inapplicable. Nor does Art. 31(1) deal with police power. Although such power, as understood in America, is no arbitrary power divorced from social control and public good, there can be no need of importing such a doctrine into the Indian Constitution. The word 'law' used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitation and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The Constitution does not confer on the Indian Parliament the same power which the Parliament of England possesses and while it does contemplate a welfare State, that has to be brought about within its frame-work of the Constitution itself. The correct approach should, therefore, be first to ascertain the fundamental right and then to see whether the law infringes that right. If ex facie it does so, it has to stand the test of Art. 19(5). In certain circumstances, however, deprivation of fundamental right to property may also amount to a reasonable restriction under the Article. Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, [196O] 2 S.C.R. 375, referred to. Individual proprietary rights being ordinarily inviolable unless a clear case is made out for restricting them, there must be a harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared by Art. 19(1) and social control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is implicit in the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard can be laid down and each case must be decided on its own facts. But the restrictions must not be arbitrary and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and shall be in the interest of the general public. State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, [1952] S.C.R. 597, Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper, 14 Law Ed. 510, and The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association and Cleaveland, Ohio v. Topeka City, 22 Law Ed. 455, referred to. Although the redress of a real and genuine grievance of a section of the community may be in public interest, it is impossible to hold that the impugned legislation was either justified or in such public interest. Iswari Prosad v. N. R. Sen, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273, held in- applicable. Marumakkathayam Law is a body of customs and usages that have received judicial recognition, and is fundamentally different from Hindu Law, being a matriarchal system. The family, called tarwad, consists of all the descendants of one common ancestor. It consists of a mother and her male and female children and the children of those female children and so on. Only the senior-most male member can attain the sthanam, which is a position of dignity with specific properties attached to it. When he does so and becomes the Sthanee he ceases to have any interest in the tarwad properties. Occasionally a female member also becomes the Sthanee. Like a Hindu widow or an impartible estate-holder the Sthanee has an absolute interest in the income of the Sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom. A member of the tarwad has no right to maintenance from out of the Sthanam properties nor can such property be converted into tarwad property by the grant of such maintenance by custom or otherwise or intermingling of the Sthanam properties with the tarwad properties by the Sthanee. His position approximates to that of a member separated from a Hindu family and there can be no scope for the application of the doctrine of blending. Like the Sthanee who ceases to have any present proprietary interest in the tarwad, the members of the tarwad also can have no present proprietary interest in the sthanam property. They continue to be blood relations with a contingent right of succession to each others' property that is no more than a spies successions. The right of a subsequently born male member of the tarwad to succeed to the Sthanam and its property is judicially recognised. Case-law reviewed. Per Imam and Sarkar, JJ.-The impugned Act is protected by Art. 31A and is not open to question in the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) Of the Constitution. There is no basis for the contention that Art. 31(1)(a) contemplates a law relating to agrarian reform only. The Article makes no mention of any such reform and there can be no doubt that under it a janmam right may be acquired, extinguished or modified whether the land held in such right is agricultural or not. It is not permissible to refer to the objects and reasons stated in the Bills, by which the Acts amending Art. 31A of the Constitution were introduced, for the construction of the statute and, therefore, the word 'law' in Art. 31A(1) cannot be read in relation to sub-cl. (a) only as a law intended to achieve agrarian reform on the basis of the supposed object of the Legislature in enacting Art. 31A. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. 1 referred to. It is not correct to say that the impugned Act does not effect any modification of janmam rights and therefore it does not come within Art. 31A. When the Article speaks of modification of janmam rights, it does not speak of such rights in the abstract but contemplates the modification of such rights held by a person. It would be as much modification of janmam rights, if such rights held by one person are directed to be held by a number of persons jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are altered. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748, relied on. It is not correct to say that the Legislature in giving the provisions of the impugned Act retrospective operation or in providing that they should prevail notwithstanding any decision of the court to the contrary, was acting judicially and not in a legislative capacity and that the Act was on that ground invalid. The rule obtaining in America that legislative action cannot retract on past controversies and reverse decisions of courts and the relevant American decisions can have no application in India. Piare Dusadh's case, [1944] F.C.R. 61, referred to. - 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent;', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1961-05-01', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K. Subba Rao and; Raghubar Dayal, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Raghubar Dayal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957 is an appeal, by certificate, and raises the question regarding the effect of the abatement of the appeal, by the State of Punjab, against Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, on the State appeal against Nathu Ram, co-respondent. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957 also raise the same question between the same parties. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The facts leading to the appeal are that the Punjab Government acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, for different military purposes, under the Defence of India Act, 1939 (XXXV of 1939). Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, brothers, refused to accept the compensation offered to them by the Collector and applied to the Punjab Government, through the Collector, under r. 6 of the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, 1943, hereinafter called the Rules, as amended by the Notification of the Punjab Government No. 1444-HM-44/19124, dated 10th March, 1944, and published in the Punjab Gazette, Part I, dated 17th March, 1944 (Home Department). The State Government referred the matter to an arbitrator as required under r. 10, who, after enquiry, passed an award ordering the payment of an amount higher than what was offered by the Collector and also ordered the payment of certain amount on account of income-tax which would be paid on the compensation received. The State Government appealed against the award to the High Court of Punjab. During the pendency of the appeal, Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, died. The High Court, holding that the appeal abated against Labhu Ram and that its effect was that the appeal against Nathu Ram also abated, dismissed the appeal. It also dismissed the cross-objections. The State Government applied for a certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court and the High Court granted it, as questions of great private and public importance were involved. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is not disputed that in view of O. XXII, r. 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated against Labhu Ram, deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been, consequently, divergence of opinion in the application of the principle. It will serve no useful purpose to consider the cases. Suffice it to say that when O. XXII, r. 4 does not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent, there can be no question of abatement of the appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the provisions of O. I, r. 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. It follows, therefore, that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The question whether a Court can deal with such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may, however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the Court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. There has been no divergence between the Courts about the Court's proceeding with the appeal between the respondents other than the deceased respondent, when the decree in appeal was not a joint decree in favour of all the respondents. The abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent, in such a case, would make the decree in his favour alone final, and this can, in no circumstances, have a repercussion, on the decision of the controversy between the appellant and the other decree-holders or on the execution of the ultimate decree between them. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The difficulty arises always when there is a joint decree. Here again, the consensus of opinion is that if the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the other respondents also will not be proceeded with and will have to be dismissed as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. Different views exist in the case of joint decrees in favour of respondents whose rights in the subject matter of the decree are specified. One view is that in such cases, the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent will have the result of making the decree affecting his specific interest to be final and that the decree against the other respondents can be suitably dealt with by the appellate Court. We do not consider this view correct. The specification of shares or of interest of the deceased respondent does not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree-holder to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere with the joint right decreed in his favour. The abatement of an appeal means not only that the decree between the appellant and the deceased respondent has become final, but also, as a necessary corollary, that the appellate Court cannot, in any way, modify that decree directly or indirectly. The reason is plain. It is that in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents, the appellate Court cannot determine anything between the appellant and the legal representatives which may affect the rights of the legal representatives under the decree. It is immaterial that the modification which the Court will do is one to which exception can or cannot be taken. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is therefore necessary to determine, on the facts of this case, whether the State appeal could proceed against Nathu Ram. The award of the arbitrator in each of these cases was a joint one, in favour of both the respondents Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. To illustrate the form of the award, we may quote the award for the year 1945-46 in the proceedings leading to Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957. It is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On the basis of the report of S. Lal Singh, Naib Tehsildar (Exhibit P.W. 9/1) and Sheikh Aziz Din, Tehsildar, Exhibit P.W. 9/2, the applicants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,140 on account of rent, plus Rs. 3,872-8-0 on account of Income-tax etc., due to the inclusion of Rs. 6,193-8-0 in their total income, plus such sum as the petitioners have to pay to the Income-tax Department on account of the inclusion of Rs. 4,140 in their income as awarded by this award.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result of the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram is therefore that his legal representatives are entitled to get compensation on the basis of this award, even if they are to be paid separately on calculating their rightful share in the land acquired, for which this compensation is decreed. Such calculation is foreign to the appeal between the State of Punjab and Nathu Ram. The decree in the appeal will have to determine not what Nathu Ram's share in this compensation is, but what is the correct amount of compensation with respect to the land acquired for which this compensation has been awarded by the arbitrator. The subject matter for which the compensation is to be calculated is one and the same. There cannot be different assessments of the amounts of compensation for the same parcel of land. The appeal before the High Court was an appeal against a decree jointly in favour of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot be held to be properly constituted when the appeal against Labhu Ram had abated. To get rid of the joint decree, it was essential for the appellant, the State of Punjab, to implead both the joint-decree holders in the appeal. In the absence of one joint-decree holder, the appeal is not properly framed. It follows the that State appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot proceed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is however contended for the State that according to the entries in the village records, Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram had equal shares in the land acquired and that therefore the appeal against Nathu Ram alone can deal with half the amount of the award. We do not agree. The mere record of specific shares in the revenue records is no guarantee of their correctness. The appellate Court will have to determine the share of Nathu Ram and necessarily the share of Labhu Ram in the absence of his legal representatives. This is not permissible in law. Further, the entire case of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, in their application to the Government for the appointment of an arbitrator, was that the land jointly belonged to them and had been acquired for military purposes, that a certain amount had been paid to them as compensation, that they received that amount under protest and that they were entitled to a larger amount mentioned in the application and also for the income-tax they would have to pay on account of the compensation received being added to their income. Their claim was a joint claim based on the allegation that the land belonged to them jointly. The award and the joint decree are on this basis and the appellate Court cannot decide on the basis of the separate shares. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The State objected before the arbitrator, and urges before us, that under the rules, the joint application of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram should have been treated as separate applications with respect to the correctness of the compensation payable to each of them respectively and that the arbitrator should have made separate awards with respect to such separate claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The necessary corollary of such a contention for the State is that the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram will not make infructuous the appeal against Nathu Ram. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The respondent urges that the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, do not contemplate separate applications by the persons interested in the compensation on account of the acquisition of a particular parcel of land. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. The arbitrator did not agree to deal with the claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram separately. He, however, did not decide the question on the basis of the land belonging jointly to the two brothers as members of the joint Hindu family. He however held that the expression 'a person interested' in r. 3, included all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of the land and that r. 18 permitted the joinder of applications for joint enquiry when each case rested on the same and similar basis and each of the applications included land included in a larger part of land acquired at one time. He also took into consideration that the separation of the applications of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram would involve various difficulties in matters of income-tax. He therefore used his discretion and ordered the application to be proceeded with jointly. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In view of our opinion on the main point, we do not consider it necessary to interpret the rules and decide whether the joint application was maintainable or not. The fact remains that Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram made a joint claim and got a joint decree against the State for compensation. The frame of the appeal is to be with reference to the nature of the decree challenged. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. We therefore see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. This order will govern the other connected appeals, viz., Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Appeal dismissed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1962SC89; [1962]2SCR636', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Nathu Ram', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '639344' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'The State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Raghubar Dayal', (int) 1 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 2 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 3 => 'XXXV', (int) 4 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 5 => 'Gazette', (int) 6 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 7 => 'O. XXII', (int) 8 => 'O. XXII', (int) 9 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 10 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 11 => 'S. Lal Singh', (int) 12 => 'Naib Tehsildar', (int) 13 => 'Sheikh Aziz Din', (int) 14 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 15 => 'Nathu Ram's', (int) 16 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 17 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 18 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 19 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 20 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 21 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 22 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 23 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 24 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 25 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 26 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 27 => 'Nathu Ram', (int) 28 => 'Nathu Ram' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '635', (int) 1 => 'one', (int) 2 => '2', (int) 3 => '636 to 641', (int) 4 => '3.', (int) 5 => '6', (int) 6 => 'one', (int) 7 => '4.', (int) 8 => '4', (int) 9 => '4', (int) 10 => '5.', (int) 11 => '9', (int) 12 => '6.', (int) 13 => '8', (int) 14 => 'One', (int) 15 => '9', (int) 16 => '635', (int) 17 => '4,140', (int) 18 => '3,872-8', (int) 19 => '6,193-8', (int) 20 => '4,140', (int) 21 => '10', (int) 22 => 'one', (int) 23 => '11', (int) 24 => 'half', (int) 25 => '12', (int) 26 => '13', (int) 27 => '14', (int) 28 => 'two', (int) 29 => '3', (int) 30 => '18', (int) 31 => 'one', (int) 32 => '15', (int) 33 => '16', (int) 34 => '636 to 641', (int) 35 => '17' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1957', (int) 1 => '1957', (int) 2 => '1939', (int) 3 => '1943', (int) 4 => '1444', (int) 5 => '10th March, 1944', (int) 6 => '17th March, 1944', (int) 7 => 'the year 1945-46', (int) 8 => '1957', (int) 9 => '1957' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 1 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 2 => 'State', (int) 3 => 'the Punjab Government', (int) 4 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 5 => 'the Defence of India Act', (int) 6 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 7 => 'the Punjab Government', (int) 8 => 'the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules', (int) 9 => 'Home Department', (int) 10 => 'The State Government', (int) 11 => 'The State Government', (int) 12 => 'the High Court of Punjab', (int) 13 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 14 => 'The High Court', (int) 15 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 16 => 'The State Government', (int) 17 => 'Court', (int) 18 => 'the High Court', (int) 19 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 20 => 'Court', (int) 21 => 'Court', (int) 22 => 'Court', (int) 23 => 'Court', (int) 24 => 'Court', (int) 25 => 'Court', (int) 26 => 'Court', (int) 27 => 'Court', (int) 28 => 'Court', (int) 29 => 'Court', (int) 30 => 'Court', (int) 31 => 'Court', (int) 32 => 'Court', (int) 33 => 'Court', (int) 34 => 'State', (int) 35 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 36 => 'Civil Appeal No', (int) 37 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 38 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 39 => 'the High Court', (int) 40 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 41 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 42 => 'the State of Punjab', (int) 43 => 'State', (int) 44 => 'State', (int) 45 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 46 => 'Court', (int) 47 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 48 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 49 => 'Court', (int) 50 => 'State', (int) 51 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 52 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 53 => 'State', (int) 54 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 55 => 'the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules', (int) 56 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 57 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 58 => 'Labhu Ram', (int) 59 => 'State' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'Rules', (int) 1 => 'Hindu' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '639344', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51117/code-of-civil-procedure-1908-complete-act">Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908</a> - Order I, Rule 9 - Order 22, Rule 4', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'The State of Punjab', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'The State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram', 'casenote' => 'The case questioned whether in a joint decree passed in the favour of the respondents, the failure to bring legal representatives on the record, on death of the one of the respondents in appeal, would abate the appeal as a whole -It was held that there was not abatement of appeal against the co-respondents of the deceased as Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for the same but in certain circumstances the appeal could not proceed against them and such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal - [ B.P. Sinha, C.J.,; A.K. Sarkar,; J.C. Shah,; K. Subba Rao and; Jafer Imam, JJ.] These petitions by the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his wife, daughters and soil challenged the constitutional validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 passed by the Madras Legislature soon after the Privy Council had declared the properties in possession of the Sthanee to be Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad had not interest. Section 2 Of the Act, which contained the substantive provision, was as follows:-- "2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which:- (a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or (b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving main. tenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or (c)there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there being, no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the Sthanam, shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which -.he provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Mad. XXII of 1933), shall apply." The question for decision was whether the impugned Act infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by Arts. 4, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Held (per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.) that the three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well- settled principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(1)(f) and could not be saved by Art. 19(5). Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A, the impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article, properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietary and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the estate solely for that purpose and must be limited to it. Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction, it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the amendment. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [19531 S.C.R. 1, con- sidered. There is no substance in the argument that since the impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b) of Art. 31A. That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a) of the Article and since the impugned Act does not contemplate any agrarian reform or seek to regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights appertaining janmam right, leaving all its characteristics intact, it does not come within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution. Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 748, referred to. Fundamental rights have a transcendental position in the Constitution and before an Article embodying a fundamental right can be construed to exclude another every attempt should be made to harmonize them and not until it is found impossible to do so, can one be made to yield to the other. Barring such exceptional cases, any law that infringes any of the fundamental rights must be void. The word 'law' in Art. 31(1) must mean a valid law, and such a law must satisfy two tests, (1) that the legislature must be competent to enact it and (2) that it must not infringe any fundamental rights. A law that deprives a citizen of his property must, therefore, be invalid if it infringes Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Deep Chand v. State Of U. P., [1959] SUPP. (2) S.C.R. 8, and Basheshway Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 528, referred to. Article 31 Of the Constitution, since its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, is no longer a selfcontained Article providing for a subject different from that dealt with by Art. 19, but deals with two different subjects, CIS. (2) and (2A) dealing with acquisition and requisition and cl. (1) with deprivation of property by authority of law, and can no longer be construed on the analogy of Art. 2 1 so as to exclude the operation of Art. 19. The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587, A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Any., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777, held inapplicable. Nor does Art. 31(1) deal with police power. Although such power, as understood in America, is no arbitrary power divorced from social control and public good, there can be no need of importing such a doctrine into the Indian Constitution. The word 'law' used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitation and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The Constitution does not confer on the Indian Parliament the same power which the Parliament of England possesses and while it does contemplate a welfare State, that has to be brought about within its frame-work of the Constitution itself. The correct approach should, therefore, be first to ascertain the fundamental right and then to see whether the law infringes that right. If ex facie it does so, it has to stand the test of Art. 19(5). In certain circumstances, however, deprivation of fundamental right to property may also amount to a reasonable restriction under the Article. Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, [196O] 2 S.C.R. 375, referred to. Individual proprietary rights being ordinarily inviolable unless a clear case is made out for restricting them, there must be a harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared by Art. 19(1) and social control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is implicit in the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard can be laid down and each case must be decided on its own facts. But the restrictions must not be arbitrary and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and shall be in the interest of the general public. State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, [1952] S.C.R. 597, Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper, 14 Law Ed. 510, and The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association and Cleaveland, Ohio v. Topeka City, 22 Law Ed. 455, referred to. Although the redress of a real and genuine grievance of a section of the community may be in public interest, it is impossible to hold that the impugned legislation was either justified or in such public interest. Iswari Prosad v. N. R. Sen, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273, held in- applicable. Marumakkathayam Law is a body of customs and usages that have received judicial recognition, and is fundamentally different from Hindu Law, being a matriarchal system. The family, called tarwad, consists of all the descendants of one common ancestor. It consists of a mother and her male and female children and the children of those female children and so on. Only the senior-most male member can attain the sthanam, which is a position of dignity with specific properties attached to it. When he does so and becomes the Sthanee he ceases to have any interest in the tarwad properties. Occasionally a female member also becomes the Sthanee. Like a Hindu widow or an impartible estate-holder the Sthanee has an absolute interest in the income of the Sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom. A member of the tarwad has no right to maintenance from out of the Sthanam properties nor can such property be converted into tarwad property by the grant of such maintenance by custom or otherwise or intermingling of the Sthanam properties with the tarwad properties by the Sthanee. His position approximates to that of a member separated from a Hindu family and there can be no scope for the application of the doctrine of blending. Like the Sthanee who ceases to have any present proprietary interest in the tarwad, the members of the tarwad also can have no present proprietary interest in the sthanam property. They continue to be blood relations with a contingent right of succession to each others' property that is no more than a spies successions. The right of a subsequently born male member of the tarwad to succeed to the Sthanam and its property is judicially recognised. Case-law reviewed. Per Imam and Sarkar, JJ.-The impugned Act is protected by Art. 31A and is not open to question in the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) Of the Constitution. There is no basis for the contention that Art. 31(1)(a) contemplates a law relating to agrarian reform only. The Article makes no mention of any such reform and there can be no doubt that under it a janmam right may be acquired, extinguished or modified whether the land held in such right is agricultural or not. It is not permissible to refer to the objects and reasons stated in the Bills, by which the Acts amending Art. 31A of the Constitution were introduced, for the construction of the statute and, therefore, the word 'law' in Art. 31A(1) cannot be read in relation to sub-cl. (a) only as a law intended to achieve agrarian reform on the basis of the supposed object of the Legislature in enacting Art. 31A. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. 1 referred to. It is not correct to say that the impugned Act does not effect any modification of janmam rights and therefore it does not come within Art. 31A. When the Article speaks of modification of janmam rights, it does not speak of such rights in the abstract but contemplates the modification of such rights held by a person. It would be as much modification of janmam rights, if such rights held by one person are directed to be held by a number of persons jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are altered. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748, relied on. It is not correct to say that the Legislature in giving the provisions of the impugned Act retrospective operation or in providing that they should prevail notwithstanding any decision of the court to the contrary, was acting judicially and not in a legislative capacity and that the Act was on that ground invalid. The rule obtaining in America that legislative action cannot retract on past controversies and reverse decisions of courts and the relevant American decisions can have no application in India. Piare Dusadh's case, [1944] F.C.R. 61, referred to. - 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent;', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1961-05-01', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K. Subba Rao and; Raghubar Dayal, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Raghubar Dayal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957 is an appeal, by certificate, and raises the question regarding the effect of the abatement of the appeal, by the State of Punjab, against Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, on the State appeal against Nathu Ram, co-respondent. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957 also raise the same question between the same parties. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The facts leading to the appeal are that the Punjab Government acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, for different military purposes, under the Defence of India Act, 1939 (XXXV of 1939). Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, brothers, refused to accept the compensation offered to them by the Collector and applied to the Punjab Government, through the Collector, under r. 6 of the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, 1943, hereinafter called the Rules, as amended by the Notification of the Punjab Government No. 1444-HM-44/19124, dated 10th March, 1944, and published in the Punjab Gazette, Part I, dated 17th March, 1944 (Home Department). The State Government referred the matter to an arbitrator as required under r. 10, who, after enquiry, passed an award ordering the payment of an amount higher than what was offered by the Collector and also ordered the payment of certain amount on account of income-tax which would be paid on the compensation received. The State Government appealed against the award to the High Court of Punjab. During the pendency of the appeal, Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, died. The High Court, holding that the appeal abated against Labhu Ram and that its effect was that the appeal against Nathu Ram also abated, dismissed the appeal. It also dismissed the cross-objections. The State Government applied for a certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court and the High Court granted it, as questions of great private and public importance were involved. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is not disputed that in view of O. XXII, r. 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated against Labhu Ram, deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been, consequently, divergence of opinion in the application of the principle. It will serve no useful purpose to consider the cases. Suffice it to say that when O. XXII, r. 4 does not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent, there can be no question of abatement of the appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the provisions of O. I, r. 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. It follows, therefore, that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The question whether a Court can deal with such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may, however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the Court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. There has been no divergence between the Courts about the Court's proceeding with the appeal between the respondents other than the deceased respondent, when the decree in appeal was not a joint decree in favour of all the respondents. The abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent, in such a case, would make the decree in his favour alone final, and this can, in no circumstances, have a repercussion, on the decision of the controversy between the appellant and the other decree-holders or on the execution of the ultimate decree between them. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The difficulty arises always when there is a joint decree. Here again, the consensus of opinion is that if the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the other respondents also will not be proceeded with and will have to be dismissed as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. Different views exist in the case of joint decrees in favour of respondents whose rights in the subject matter of the decree are specified. One view is that in such cases, the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent will have the result of making the decree affecting his specific interest to be final and that the decree against the other respondents can be suitably dealt with by the appellate Court. We do not consider this view correct. The specification of shares or of interest of the deceased respondent does not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree-holder to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere with the joint right decreed in his favour. The abatement of an appeal means not only that the decree between the appellant and the deceased respondent has become final, but also, as a necessary corollary, that the appellate Court cannot, in any way, modify that decree directly or indirectly. The reason is plain. It is that in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents, the appellate Court cannot determine anything between the appellant and the legal representatives which may affect the rights of the legal representatives under the decree. It is immaterial that the modification which the Court will do is one to which exception can or cannot be taken. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is therefore necessary to determine, on the facts of this case, whether the State appeal could proceed against Nathu Ram. The award of the arbitrator in each of these cases was a joint one, in favour of both the respondents Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. To illustrate the form of the award, we may quote the award for the year 1945-46 in the proceedings leading to Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957. It is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'On the basis of the report of S. Lal Singh, Naib Tehsildar (Exhibit P.W. 9/1) and Sheikh Aziz Din, Tehsildar, Exhibit P.W. 9/2, the applicants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,140 on account of rent, plus Rs. 3,872-8-0 on account of Income-tax etc., due to the inclusion of Rs. 6,193-8-0 in their total income, plus such sum as the petitioners have to pay to the Income-tax Department on account of the inclusion of Rs. 4,140 in their income as awarded by this award.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The result of the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram is therefore that his legal representatives are entitled to get compensation on the basis of this award, even if they are to be paid separately on calculating their rightful share in the land acquired, for which this compensation is decreed. Such calculation is foreign to the appeal between the State of Punjab and Nathu Ram. The decree in the appeal will have to determine not what Nathu Ram's share in this compensation is, but what is the correct amount of compensation with respect to the land acquired for which this compensation has been awarded by the arbitrator. The subject matter for which the compensation is to be calculated is one and the same. There cannot be different assessments of the amounts of compensation for the same parcel of land. The appeal before the High Court was an appeal against a decree jointly in favour of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot be held to be properly constituted when the appeal against Labhu Ram had abated. To get rid of the joint decree, it was essential for the appellant, the State of Punjab, to implead both the joint-decree holders in the appeal. In the absence of one joint-decree holder, the appeal is not properly framed. It follows the that State appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot proceed. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It is however contended for the State that according to the entries in the village records, Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram had equal shares in the land acquired and that therefore the appeal against Nathu Ram alone can deal with half the amount of the award. We do not agree. The mere record of specific shares in the revenue records is no guarantee of their correctness. The appellate Court will have to determine the share of Nathu Ram and necessarily the share of Labhu Ram in the absence of his legal representatives. This is not permissible in law. Further, the entire case of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, in their application to the Government for the appointment of an arbitrator, was that the land jointly belonged to them and had been acquired for military purposes, that a certain amount had been paid to them as compensation, that they received that amount under protest and that they were entitled to a larger amount mentioned in the application and also for the income-tax they would have to pay on account of the compensation received being added to their income. Their claim was a joint claim based on the allegation that the land belonged to them jointly. The award and the joint decree are on this basis and the appellate Court cannot decide on the basis of the separate shares. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The State objected before the arbitrator, and urges before us, that under the rules, the joint application of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram should have been treated as separate applications with respect to the correctness of the compensation payable to each of them respectively and that the arbitrator should have made separate awards with respect to such separate claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The necessary corollary of such a contention for the State is that the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram will not make infructuous the appeal against Nathu Ram. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The respondent urges that the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, do not contemplate separate applications by the persons interested in the compensation on account of the acquisition of a particular parcel of land. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. The arbitrator did not agree to deal with the claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram separately. He, however, did not decide the question on the basis of the land belonging jointly to the two brothers as members of the joint Hindu family. He however held that the expression 'a person interested' in r. 3, included all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of the land and that r. 18 permitted the joinder of applications for joint enquiry when each case rested on the same and similar basis and each of the applications included land included in a larger part of land acquired at one time. He also took into consideration that the separation of the applications of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram would involve various difficulties in matters of income-tax. He therefore used his discretion and ordered the application to be proceeded with jointly. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. In view of our opinion on the main point, we do not consider it necessary to interpret the rules and decide whether the joint application was maintainable or not. The fact remains that Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram made a joint claim and got a joint decree against the State for compensation. The frame of the appeal is to be with reference to the nature of the decree challenged. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. We therefore see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. This order will govern the other connected appeals, viz., Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Appeal dismissed. </p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1962SC89; [1962]2SCR636', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Nathu Ram', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '639344' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
PERSON: Raghubar Dayal, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, XXXV, Nathu Ram, Gazette, Nathu Ram, O. XXII, O. XXII, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, S. Lal Singh, Naib Tehsildar, Sheikh Aziz Din, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram's, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram, Nathu Ram
CARDINAL: 635, one, 2, 636 to 641, 3., 6, one, 4., 4, 4, 5., 9, 6., 8, One, 9, 635, 4,140, 3,872-8, 6,193-8, 4,140, 10, one, 11, half, 12, 13, 14, two, 3, 18, one, 15, 16, 636 to 641, 17
DATE: 1957, 1957, 1939, 1943, 1444, 10th March, 1944, 17th March, 1944, the year 1945-46, 1957, 1957
ORG: the State of Punjab, Labhu Ram, State, the Punjab Government, Labhu Ram, the Defence of India Act, Labhu Ram, the Punjab Government, the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, Home Department, The State Government, The State Government, the High Court of Punjab, Labhu Ram, The High Court, Labhu Ram, The State Government, Court, the High Court, Labhu Ram, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, Court, State, Labhu Ram, Civil Appeal No, Labhu Ram, the State of Punjab, the High Court, Labhu Ram, Labhu Ram, the State of Punjab, State, State, Labhu Ram, Court, Labhu Ram, Labhu Ram, Court, State, Labhu Ram, Labhu Ram, State, Labhu Ram, the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, Labhu Ram, Labhu Ram, Labhu Ram, State
NORP: Rules, Hindu