Semantic Analysis by spaCy
Jarnail Singh Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.
Decided On : Mar-11-1997
Court : Punjab and Haryana
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Union of India (Uoi) and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana - Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab. Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920. HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] -- Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act, she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. - 6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'.This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' S.P. Laler and; R.S. Manhas, Advs.', 'counseldef' => ' S.K. Pipat, Sr. Standing Counsel and; Sanjiv Pandit, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1997-03-11', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' G.C. Garg and; Swatanter Kumar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Swatanter Kumar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. What is the ambit and scope of expression 'attributable to and aggravated by military service' appearing in para 173 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961 is the precise question that falls for consideration before this Court, in the present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was selected as Sepoy in the Indian Army on 8.9.1988 and consequently became subject to the provisions of the Indian Army Act and other rules and regulations. On 21.4.1991, the petitioner proceeded on casual leave and he was to return on 28.4.1991. Unfortunately, the right hand of. the petitioner was crushed at home when he was operating wheat thresher. This injury resulted in amputation of his right hand and consequent disability to the petitioner. The authorities concerned invalided the petitioner out of Army service on 30.12.1991. The petitioner raised a claim for grant of disability pension, which was declined by the respondents vide order dated 17.9.1992 (Annexure P-3 to the petition). The petitioner preferred an appeal against this order on 4.12.1992, but the same was rejected by the respondents on 17.5.1994 resulting in filing of the present petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The reason given by the respondents for rejecting the request of the petitioner for grant of disability pension in the order, Annexure P-3 which has been impugned by the petitioner in this writ petition, are as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It has been decided by the Pension Sanctioning Authority that the disability from which you suffered during service in the Army and on which your claim is based :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Is not attributable to military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Does not fulfil the following conditions, namely, it existed before and has remained aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) Is attributable to/aggravated by military service but assessed at less than 20%. ID rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly no disability pension is admissible to you under rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The provisions of law which have a bearing on the matter in issue in that writ petition are Paras 173 and 175 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961. Rule 2 of Appendix II and Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casuality -Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel, 1982. It will be appropriate to reproduce these provisions for proper appreciation of the contentions raised by respective parties :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'173. Unless otherwise specifically provided a disability pension consisting of service element and disability element may be granted to an individual who is invalided out of service on account of disability which is attributable to or aggravated by military service in non-battle casualty and is assessed at 20 per cent or over.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question whether a disability is attributable to or aggravated by a military service shall be determined under the rule in Appendix II.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'175. If the disability of an individual in wholly or partly due to his serious negligence or misconduct, the amount of disability pension otherwise admissible may be reduced at the discretion of the competent authority.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Rule 2 in Appendix II reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Disablement or death shall be accepted as due to military service provided it is certified by appropriate medical authority that :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the disablement is due to a wound, injury or disease which</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) is attributable to military service; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) existed before or arose during military service and has been and remains aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">XX XX XX XX XX '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casualty Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel 1982 reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In respect of accidents or injuries, the following rules shall be observed-:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Injuries sustained when that man is 'on duty' so defined shall be deemed to have resulted from military service, but in cases of injuries due to serious negligence/misconduct the question of reducing the disability pension will be considered.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) In cases of self-inflicted injuries whilst on duty, attributability shall not be considered unless it is established that service factors were responsible for such action, in cases where attributability is conceded, the question of grant of disability pension at full or at reduced rate will be considered.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Firstly we have to consider, whether the period of casual leave of a person subject to Army Act can be termed as period on duty or not? Secondly, whether every injury suffered by such person during the period of his casual leave arising from any kind of act, omission of commission, would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. In the case of Smt. Charanjit Kaur v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-2)107 P.L.R. 663 (S.C.), where the husband of the petitioner who was commissioned as Lieutenant in the Indian Army and was subsequently promoted as Major, had died in mysterious circumstances, the Court while awarding compensation and treating him on duty held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the aforesaid facts, the conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the officer died while in service in mysterious circumstances and his death is attributable to and aggravated by the military service. The responsibility of his death is prima-facie traceable to the action of criminal omissions and commissions on the part of the concerned authorities. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Krishan Dahiya v. Union of India and Anr., (1996-3)114 P.L.R. 468, where Hawaldar in the Army Medical Corps suffered an injury while on casual leave and he was travelling in a private vehicle, was treated to be on duty, after detailed discussion the Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'2. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that an officer, subject to the Army Act, while he is on casual leave in considered to be on duty. Moreover, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149, and a Division bench judgment of this Court in Chatroo Ram v. Secretary Defence and Ors., 1991(1) S.L.R. 678, it cannot be even disputed that an officer subject to the Army Act while on casual leave is to be treated on duty.'-----------------------------. If a person subject to Army Act is considered to be on duty while on casual leave, it could not make any difference, whether he travels from duty station to leave station on his own expense or public expense as that cannot be the sine qua non for determining whether the person is on duty or not. He referred to a judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as Harbans Singh v. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1971 Delhi 227, wherein the officer in that case was to travel from Walong in N.E.F.A., his duty station, to Patiala, his leave station. He had travelled from Walong to Johart and from Johart to Calcutta by air at public expenses. From Calcutta to Ambala Cantt, he travelled on form D and from there, he travelled on road by his own scooter to his leave station Patiala. It was while travelling on scooter from Ambala to Patiala that he met with an accident which resulted in his disability. The High Court held that though he was travelling at his own expense and by his own conveyance during the part of his journey from Patiala to Rajpura, he was still to be treated to be on duty and entitled to disability pension.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">------------------. Can it be said that he is not on duty because he was not travelling at public expense. To our mind the answer has to be that still he would be entitled to be treated as on duty.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Still in another case of Ex. GNR Gaj Raj v. Union of India,3 1996(4) R.SJ. 17, the Court took the same view and held that the member of armed force while on casual leave can be considered on duty for the purpose of pensionary benefits and in that case held that it is to be attributable to military service. Similar view was expressed by Division Bench of this Court in CWP 2535 of 1995, R.V. Suvaranan v. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not on duty at the time when he met with an accident. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner was on duty and the injury sustained by him in the course of accident was attributable to military service.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a very recent case of Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149 wherein the proprietor who was proceeding on casual leave from his duty station met with an accident while boarding the bus at the railway station, held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The question for our consideration is whether the appellant is entitled to the disability pension. We agree with the contention of Mr. B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being in regular army there is no reason why he should not be treated as on duty when he was on casual leave. No Army Regulation or Rule has been brought to our notice to show that the appellant is not entitled to disability pension. It is rather not disputed that an Army personnel on casual leave is treated to be on duty. We see no justification whatsoever in denying the disability pension to the appellant.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. This from the consistent view taken by various Courts including the Hon'ble Apex Court, it appears to us that the first question has to be answered against the respondents as it is really no longer res-integra and has been fairly and elaborately answered in the above pronouncements. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that a person subject to the provisions of the Army Act, even if proceeds on casual leave, would be treated on duty and would be entitled to the benefits accruing therefrom in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Necessary corollary to our afore-mentioned conclusion is that second question posed by us above whether every injury suffered by a member of the Armed Forced irrespective of its nature and origin can be termed 'attributable to or aggravated by military service.' In order to consider this basic question one has to refer and read the above stated provisions objectively while not loosing the sight of their purpose and object. Constantly regulations 173 and 175 indicate the legislative intention towards a liberal construction of these provisions. The above regulations and the provisions read in their correct perspective certainly imply that rule making authority intended to give very wider scope to the concept of payment of disability pension.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Para 173 afore-mentioned is the substantive enabling provision which provides for grant of disability pension to a member of the force subject to the condition of disability being more than 20 percent and is attributable to or aggravated by Military service. Para 175 must be read in conjunction with para 173 which is the principle regulation controlling the subject. The scheme of these regulations shows that para 175 is in aid to para 173. The case for claim of disability pension must satisfy the ingredients stated in para 173. It is then alone that para 175 would become operative. Para 175 only elaborates the application of para 173 by providing that even negligence or misconduct on the part of a member of the armed forces may not frustrate the claim by such person under Rule 173. Upon the harmonious construction of these two provisions meaningful interpretation would be that the remote nexus to the attributability and aggravation of disability by military service even if accompanied by the element of negligence or misconduct on the part of the member of the force would not by itself frustrate the right of the member to raise such a claim. However, the authority in discretion may apply, cut or reduce the amount of disability pension within the limited scope of para 175.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Clause 9 of the Appendix II even does not place onus on the claimant to prove the condition of entitlement and any benefit of reasonable doubt would accrue in favour of the applicant and not against him. The member of the armed force being on duty would have to satisfy only concept of attributability as explained above, but no strict proof has to be established. Merely some remote nexus to the military service would be sufficient to sustain such a claim. The afore-mentioned provisions certainly indicate that liberal construction has to be afforded to this expression, but equally important is that such liberal construction should be in consonance with the object and purpose sought to be achieved by these provisions. We are of considered view that the injury suffered by a member of the armed force must be directly or indirectly attributable to or aggravated by military service. May be remotely but it must find its origin from the nature and scope of the duties and discipline of the force. Obviously, a person on casual leave would not be performing his normal duties but the even which results in infliction of injury to the member of the force must be ancillary to the recognised sphere of military duty and discipline. The injury causing disability, therefore, must springs from such event of circumstances which falls within expected standard of functioning of disciplined members of the armed forces. The expression attributable to military service has to be understood in its wide spectrum, but this understanding must find its limit within the principle of prudence and reasonableness. If the injury suffered by the member of the armed force is the result of an act alien to the sphere of military service or in no way be connected to his being on duty as understood in the above sense, it would not be legislative intention or nor to our mind would be permissible approach to generalise the statement that every injury suffered during such period would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The expression 'attribute' means to ascribe, assign, consider as belonging that which is inherent in or in or inseparable from (The Chamber Dictionary 1994 Edition). Attributability means attribution to its principle source. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. It may be appropriate to refer to the meaning described in the Butterwords 'Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Volume 1: A-C which is as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'These words have been considered in a number of cases and I do not wish to add to the explanations and definitions which have been given. Counsel for Mr. Walsh submits that it is a wider concept than 'directly caused by', or 'caused by or resulting from', but he accepts that it involves some nexus between the effect and the alleged cause. He suggest that 'owing to' or 'a material contributory cause' or 'a material cause in some way contributing to the effect' may be synonymous. Lord Raid in Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd (1972) 2 ALL. ER 1135, said: '.... 'attributable'. That means capable of being attributed. 'Attribute' has a number of cognate meanings; you can attribute a quality to a person or thing, you can attribute a product to a source or author, you can attribute an effect to a cause. The essential element is connection of some kind. 'Suffice it to say that these are plain English words involving some casual connection between the loss of employment and that to which the loss is said to be attributable. However, this connection need not be that of a sole, dominant, direct or proximate cause and effect. A contributory casual connection is quite sufficient. Walsh v. Rother District Council (1978) I ER 510 at 514, per Donaldson J.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The act, omission or commission which results in injury to the member of the force and consequential disability must relate to military service in the some manner or the other. In other words, the act must flow as a matter of necessity from military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. As noticed in the aforesaid case a member of the force who proceeds on casual leave or returns from casual leave or while on casual leave goes to get a ticket or warrant for his return etc. suffers an injury which ultimately results in invalidating from Army, of the member of the force, that could be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. While on the other hand a person who may be doing some act at home which even remotely does not fall within the scope of his duties of functions as a member of the force nor is remotely connected with the function of the military service and expected standard and way of living of such member of the force cannot be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. For example a person who gets drunk while on casual leave fights with his neighbours, inflict injuries or suffer injuries, resulting in some disability to him as a result of which he is invalided out of Army with some extent of disability, to our mind cannot be said to be a disability attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Aggravation of a disease in the provisions of Section 29 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act, 1971 has been explained in the case of Commonwealth v. Johnston, (180) 31 ALR 445 in the following manner:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Although it may be possible to attribute a meaning of growing worse to the term 'aggravation' in the abstract, it is not possible to construe aggravation of a disease in Section 29 as meaning a growing worse of a disease to which nothing but the natural progress of the disease has contributed. Something else must contribute an increased gravity to the employee's disease, a gravity over and beyond what the natural progress of the disease produces.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The expression 'attributable to or aggravated by military service' must be read ejusdem generis with Rule 2 in Appendix II and opening line of regulation 173. It must be read in conjunction with the scheme of these provisions and has to be given purposeful meaning. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'. This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. Francis De Costa and Anr., (1996) 6 SCC 1 observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The injury suffered by the respondent in the instant case did not arise in any way out of his employment. Unless it can be said that his employment began as soon as he set out for the factory from his home, it cannot be said that the injury was caused by an accident 'arising out of..... his employment.' A road accident may happen any where at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have arisen out of employment, unless it can be shown that the employee was doing something incidental to his employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">By using the words 'arising out of... his employment, the legislature gave a restrictive meaning to 'employment injury'. The injury must be of such an extent as can be attributed to an accident or an occupational disease arising out of his employment. 'Out of, in this context, must mean caused by employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a casual connection with the employment, and (3) the accident was suffered in the course of employment. In the instant case the employee was unable to prove that the accident had any casual connection with the work he was going at the factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The injury or disability must be incidental to military service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh, 1997(1) S.L.R. 98 while declining to interfere with the judgment of the High Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In each case, when a disability pension is sought for and made a claim, it must be. affirmatively established, as a fact, as to whether the injury sustained was due to military service or was aggravated which contributed to invalidation for the military service. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was not totally correct in reaching that conclusion. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not think that it is an appropriate case for interference.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. On proper analysis of the above discussion the position that emerges is that an accident or injury suffered by a member of the armed forces must have some causal connection to the aggravation or attributability to military service and at least should arise from such activity of the member of the force as he is expected to maintain or do in his day-to-day life as a member of the force. The nexus between the two is not apparently one so as to cover every injury or accident. The hazards of Army service cannot be stretched to the extent of unlawful and entirely unconnected acts or omissions on the part of the member of the force even when he is on leave. The fine line of distinction has to be drawn between the matters connected, aggravated or attributable to military service and the matters entirely alien to such service. What falls ex-facie in the domain of an entirely private act which may even extend to the sphere of undesirable and unlawful activity of such member, cannot be treated as legitimate basis for claiming the relief under these provisions. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force. At least remote attributability to service and expected standards of behaviour and living, of the member of the force appears to be the condition precedent to claim under Rule 173. The act of omission and commission on the part of the member of the force must satisfy the test of prudence, reasonableness and expected standards of behaviour.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. We may elucidate the above principle by giving a very simple example that if a person on casual leave and subject to this act goes to canteen to buy things or takes his children for treatment to hospital and on the way meets with an accident, may be arising out of his negligence or contributory negligence, suffers injuries causing permanent disability, in our view, would be entitled to claim the benefit under Rule 173. Similarly a person who joins army is not found to be suffering from any disease, but subsequently suffers from an disease which renders him liable for being invalidated out of army on such ill-health, such a disease would be attributable and/or aggravated by military service and would entitle him to take benefit of these regulations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Thus, to sustain a claim of disability pension, the member of the armed force must be able to show a normal nexus between the act, omission or commission resulting in an injury to the person and the normal expected standard of duties and way of life expected from member of such disciplined force. It is so primarily for the reason that no unlawful activity or commission can valid support a lawful claim. Violation of expected standards cannot form a fair ground for raising a claim under these provisions. Every rule is expected to be understood so as'to be implemented lawfully and to achieve its object, but equally true is that no lawful activity can be brought to the aid of an unlawful act and that too by stretching the rules of present kind because it may ultimatrly result in abuse of the benefit sought to be granted by such rule. It has to be understood that no straight jacket formula could be provided for such cases and each case has to be judged on its own merits. We have attempted to provide certain guiding principles which could help the authorities concerned while deciding such a claim. .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the present case we are not able to see that working in the fields or keeping him occupied in agricultural activity of occupation, during casual leave would be an act attributable to military service. An independent occupation privately undertaken by him cannot be said to be squarely falling in line with the views expressed by us above. May be the petitioner is entitled to other benefits but we are afraid that he cannot avail the benefit of Rule 173.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. We are unable to find this silver lining of nexus between the injury suffered by the petitioner in the present case and nature of functions which would bring the same within the expression 'attributable to military service'. Consequently, we dismiss this writ petition, however, without any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(1997)116PLR580', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.', 'sub' => 'Service', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '629719' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Jarnail Singh Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Army Act', (int) 1 => 'the Army Act', (int) 2 => 'the Army Act', (int) 3 => 'Rule 173', (int) 4 => 'Section 29', (int) 5 => 'Section 29', (int) 6 => 'Rule 173', (int) 7 => 'Rule 173' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Swatanter Kumar', (int) 1 => 'J.1', (int) 2 => 'Articles 226/227', (int) 3 => 'Sepoy', (int) 4 => 'Charanjit Kaur', (int) 5 => 'Shri Krishan Dahiya v.', (int) 6 => 'Anr', (int) 7 => 'Joginder Singh v. 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Union of India', (int) 34 => 'Hon'ble Supreme Court', (int) 35 => 'No Army Regulation or Rule', (int) 36 => 'Army', (int) 37 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 38 => 'Armed Forced', (int) 39 => 'The Chamber Dictionary 1994 Edition', (int) 40 => 'the Butterwords 'Words', (int) 41 => 'Phrases Legally Defined', (int) 42 => 'Central Asbestos Co.', (int) 43 => 'Suffice', (int) 44 => 'Rother District Council', (int) 45 => 'Donaldson J.'The', (int) 46 => 'Army', (int) 47 => 'Army', (int) 48 => 'Commonwealth', (int) 49 => 'the Employee State Insurance Act', (int) 50 => 'The Supreme Court', (int) 51 => 'ESI Corporation', (int) 52 => 'The Hon'ble Supreme Court', (int) 53 => 'Union of India', (int) 54 => 'the High Court', (int) 55 => 'the High Court', (int) 56 => 'Army' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1961', (int) 1 => '21.4.1991', (int) 2 => '28.4.1991', (int) 3 => '30.12.1991', (int) 4 => '17.9.1992', (int) 5 => '4.12.1992', (int) 6 => '1961', (int) 7 => '1982', (int) 8 => '1982', (int) 9 => '1994-2)107', (int) 10 => '1996-3)114', (int) 11 => '1971', (int) 12 => '2535 of 1995', (int) 13 => '1972', (int) 14 => '1135', (int) 15 => '1978', (int) 16 => '1971', (int) 17 => ''16', (int) 18 => '1948', (int) 19 => '1996', (int) 20 => ''11', (int) 21 => '98', (int) 22 => ''18' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'P-3', (int) 1 => 'P-3', (int) 2 => 'Calcutta', (int) 3 => 'Para 175', (int) 4 => 'Para 175' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => 'less than 20%', (int) 1 => 'more than 20 percent' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => '20 per cent' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'Appendix', (int) 1 => 'Harbans', (int) 2 => 'follows:-'These' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'XX', (int) 1 => 'India', (int) 2 => 'S.C.', (int) 3 => 'New Delhi', (int) 4 => 'A.I.R.', (int) 5 => 'Walong', (int) 6 => 'N.E.F.A.', (int) 7 => 'Walong', (int) 8 => 'Johart', (int) 9 => 'Johart', (int) 10 => 'Patiala', (int) 11 => 'Patiala', (int) 12 => 'India' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'Firstly', (int) 1 => 'Secondly', (int) 2 => 'first', (int) 3 => 'first', (int) 4 => 'second' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Hawaldar' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'Defence and Ors' ), 'FAC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Delhi 227', (int) 1 => 'the Railway Station' ), 'LANGUAGE' => array( (int) 0 => 'English', (int) 1 => 'English' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '629719', 'acts' => 'Army Pension Regulations, 1961 - Regulations 173 and 175; <a href="/act/51232/army-act-1950-complete-act">Army Act, 1950</a>; Army Pension Regulations, 1951 - Regulation 173', 'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petition No. 10170 of 1996', 'appellant' => 'Jarnail Singh', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Jarnail Singh Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana - Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab. Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920. HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] -- Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act, she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. - 6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'.This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' S.P. Laler and; R.S. Manhas, Advs.', 'counseldef' => ' S.K. Pipat, Sr. Standing Counsel and; Sanjiv Pandit, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1997-03-11', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' G.C. Garg and; Swatanter Kumar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Swatanter Kumar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. What is the ambit and scope of expression 'attributable to and aggravated by military service' appearing in para 173 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961 is the precise question that falls for consideration before this Court, in the present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was selected as Sepoy in the Indian Army on 8.9.1988 and consequently became subject to the provisions of the Indian Army Act and other rules and regulations. On 21.4.1991, the petitioner proceeded on casual leave and he was to return on 28.4.1991. Unfortunately, the right hand of. the petitioner was crushed at home when he was operating wheat thresher. This injury resulted in amputation of his right hand and consequent disability to the petitioner. The authorities concerned invalided the petitioner out of Army service on 30.12.1991. The petitioner raised a claim for grant of disability pension, which was declined by the respondents vide order dated 17.9.1992 (Annexure P-3 to the petition). The petitioner preferred an appeal against this order on 4.12.1992, but the same was rejected by the respondents on 17.5.1994 resulting in filing of the present petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The reason given by the respondents for rejecting the request of the petitioner for grant of disability pension in the order, Annexure P-3 which has been impugned by the petitioner in this writ petition, are as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It has been decided by the Pension Sanctioning Authority that the disability from which you suffered during service in the Army and on which your claim is based :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Is not attributable to military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Does not fulfil the following conditions, namely, it existed before and has remained aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) Is attributable to/aggravated by military service but assessed at less than 20%. ID rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly no disability pension is admissible to you under rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The provisions of law which have a bearing on the matter in issue in that writ petition are Paras 173 and 175 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961. Rule 2 of Appendix II and Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casuality -Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel, 1982. It will be appropriate to reproduce these provisions for proper appreciation of the contentions raised by respective parties :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'173. Unless otherwise specifically provided a disability pension consisting of service element and disability element may be granted to an individual who is invalided out of service on account of disability which is attributable to or aggravated by military service in non-battle casualty and is assessed at 20 per cent or over.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question whether a disability is attributable to or aggravated by a military service shall be determined under the rule in Appendix II.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'175. If the disability of an individual in wholly or partly due to his serious negligence or misconduct, the amount of disability pension otherwise admissible may be reduced at the discretion of the competent authority.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Rule 2 in Appendix II reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Disablement or death shall be accepted as due to military service provided it is certified by appropriate medical authority that :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the disablement is due to a wound, injury or disease which</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) is attributable to military service; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) existed before or arose during military service and has been and remains aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">XX XX XX XX XX '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casualty Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel 1982 reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In respect of accidents or injuries, the following rules shall be observed-:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Injuries sustained when that man is 'on duty' so defined shall be deemed to have resulted from military service, but in cases of injuries due to serious negligence/misconduct the question of reducing the disability pension will be considered.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) In cases of self-inflicted injuries whilst on duty, attributability shall not be considered unless it is established that service factors were responsible for such action, in cases where attributability is conceded, the question of grant of disability pension at full or at reduced rate will be considered.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Firstly we have to consider, whether the period of casual leave of a person subject to Army Act can be termed as period on duty or not? Secondly, whether every injury suffered by such person during the period of his casual leave arising from any kind of act, omission of commission, would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. In the case of Smt. Charanjit Kaur v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-2)107 P.L.R. 663 (S.C.), where the husband of the petitioner who was commissioned as Lieutenant in the Indian Army and was subsequently promoted as Major, had died in mysterious circumstances, the Court while awarding compensation and treating him on duty held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the aforesaid facts, the conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the officer died while in service in mysterious circumstances and his death is attributable to and aggravated by the military service. The responsibility of his death is prima-facie traceable to the action of criminal omissions and commissions on the part of the concerned authorities. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Krishan Dahiya v. Union of India and Anr., (1996-3)114 P.L.R. 468, where Hawaldar in the Army Medical Corps suffered an injury while on casual leave and he was travelling in a private vehicle, was treated to be on duty, after detailed discussion the Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'2. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that an officer, subject to the Army Act, while he is on casual leave in considered to be on duty. Moreover, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149, and a Division bench judgment of this Court in Chatroo Ram v. Secretary Defence and Ors., 1991(1) S.L.R. 678, it cannot be even disputed that an officer subject to the Army Act while on casual leave is to be treated on duty.'-----------------------------. If a person subject to Army Act is considered to be on duty while on casual leave, it could not make any difference, whether he travels from duty station to leave station on his own expense or public expense as that cannot be the sine qua non for determining whether the person is on duty or not. He referred to a judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as Harbans Singh v. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1971 Delhi 227, wherein the officer in that case was to travel from Walong in N.E.F.A., his duty station, to Patiala, his leave station. He had travelled from Walong to Johart and from Johart to Calcutta by air at public expenses. From Calcutta to Ambala Cantt, he travelled on form D and from there, he travelled on road by his own scooter to his leave station Patiala. It was while travelling on scooter from Ambala to Patiala that he met with an accident which resulted in his disability. The High Court held that though he was travelling at his own expense and by his own conveyance during the part of his journey from Patiala to Rajpura, he was still to be treated to be on duty and entitled to disability pension.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">------------------. Can it be said that he is not on duty because he was not travelling at public expense. To our mind the answer has to be that still he would be entitled to be treated as on duty.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Still in another case of Ex. GNR Gaj Raj v. Union of India,3 1996(4) R.SJ. 17, the Court took the same view and held that the member of armed force while on casual leave can be considered on duty for the purpose of pensionary benefits and in that case held that it is to be attributable to military service. Similar view was expressed by Division Bench of this Court in CWP 2535 of 1995, R.V. Suvaranan v. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not on duty at the time when he met with an accident. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner was on duty and the injury sustained by him in the course of accident was attributable to military service.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a very recent case of Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149 wherein the proprietor who was proceeding on casual leave from his duty station met with an accident while boarding the bus at the railway station, held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The question for our consideration is whether the appellant is entitled to the disability pension. We agree with the contention of Mr. B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being in regular army there is no reason why he should not be treated as on duty when he was on casual leave. No Army Regulation or Rule has been brought to our notice to show that the appellant is not entitled to disability pension. It is rather not disputed that an Army personnel on casual leave is treated to be on duty. We see no justification whatsoever in denying the disability pension to the appellant.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. This from the consistent view taken by various Courts including the Hon'ble Apex Court, it appears to us that the first question has to be answered against the respondents as it is really no longer res-integra and has been fairly and elaborately answered in the above pronouncements. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that a person subject to the provisions of the Army Act, even if proceeds on casual leave, would be treated on duty and would be entitled to the benefits accruing therefrom in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Necessary corollary to our afore-mentioned conclusion is that second question posed by us above whether every injury suffered by a member of the Armed Forced irrespective of its nature and origin can be termed 'attributable to or aggravated by military service.' In order to consider this basic question one has to refer and read the above stated provisions objectively while not loosing the sight of their purpose and object. Constantly regulations 173 and 175 indicate the legislative intention towards a liberal construction of these provisions. The above regulations and the provisions read in their correct perspective certainly imply that rule making authority intended to give very wider scope to the concept of payment of disability pension.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Para 173 afore-mentioned is the substantive enabling provision which provides for grant of disability pension to a member of the force subject to the condition of disability being more than 20 percent and is attributable to or aggravated by Military service. Para 175 must be read in conjunction with para 173 which is the principle regulation controlling the subject. The scheme of these regulations shows that para 175 is in aid to para 173. The case for claim of disability pension must satisfy the ingredients stated in para 173. It is then alone that para 175 would become operative. Para 175 only elaborates the application of para 173 by providing that even negligence or misconduct on the part of a member of the armed forces may not frustrate the claim by such person under Rule 173. Upon the harmonious construction of these two provisions meaningful interpretation would be that the remote nexus to the attributability and aggravation of disability by military service even if accompanied by the element of negligence or misconduct on the part of the member of the force would not by itself frustrate the right of the member to raise such a claim. However, the authority in discretion may apply, cut or reduce the amount of disability pension within the limited scope of para 175.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Clause 9 of the Appendix II even does not place onus on the claimant to prove the condition of entitlement and any benefit of reasonable doubt would accrue in favour of the applicant and not against him. The member of the armed force being on duty would have to satisfy only concept of attributability as explained above, but no strict proof has to be established. Merely some remote nexus to the military service would be sufficient to sustain such a claim. The afore-mentioned provisions certainly indicate that liberal construction has to be afforded to this expression, but equally important is that such liberal construction should be in consonance with the object and purpose sought to be achieved by these provisions. We are of considered view that the injury suffered by a member of the armed force must be directly or indirectly attributable to or aggravated by military service. May be remotely but it must find its origin from the nature and scope of the duties and discipline of the force. Obviously, a person on casual leave would not be performing his normal duties but the even which results in infliction of injury to the member of the force must be ancillary to the recognised sphere of military duty and discipline. The injury causing disability, therefore, must springs from such event of circumstances which falls within expected standard of functioning of disciplined members of the armed forces. The expression attributable to military service has to be understood in its wide spectrum, but this understanding must find its limit within the principle of prudence and reasonableness. If the injury suffered by the member of the armed force is the result of an act alien to the sphere of military service or in no way be connected to his being on duty as understood in the above sense, it would not be legislative intention or nor to our mind would be permissible approach to generalise the statement that every injury suffered during such period would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The expression 'attribute' means to ascribe, assign, consider as belonging that which is inherent in or in or inseparable from (The Chamber Dictionary 1994 Edition). Attributability means attribution to its principle source. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. It may be appropriate to refer to the meaning described in the Butterwords 'Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Volume 1: A-C which is as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'These words have been considered in a number of cases and I do not wish to add to the explanations and definitions which have been given. Counsel for Mr. Walsh submits that it is a wider concept than 'directly caused by', or 'caused by or resulting from', but he accepts that it involves some nexus between the effect and the alleged cause. He suggest that 'owing to' or 'a material contributory cause' or 'a material cause in some way contributing to the effect' may be synonymous. Lord Raid in Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd (1972) 2 ALL. ER 1135, said: '.... 'attributable'. That means capable of being attributed. 'Attribute' has a number of cognate meanings; you can attribute a quality to a person or thing, you can attribute a product to a source or author, you can attribute an effect to a cause. The essential element is connection of some kind. 'Suffice it to say that these are plain English words involving some casual connection between the loss of employment and that to which the loss is said to be attributable. However, this connection need not be that of a sole, dominant, direct or proximate cause and effect. A contributory casual connection is quite sufficient. Walsh v. Rother District Council (1978) I ER 510 at 514, per Donaldson J.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The act, omission or commission which results in injury to the member of the force and consequential disability must relate to military service in the some manner or the other. In other words, the act must flow as a matter of necessity from military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. As noticed in the aforesaid case a member of the force who proceeds on casual leave or returns from casual leave or while on casual leave goes to get a ticket or warrant for his return etc. suffers an injury which ultimately results in invalidating from Army, of the member of the force, that could be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. While on the other hand a person who may be doing some act at home which even remotely does not fall within the scope of his duties of functions as a member of the force nor is remotely connected with the function of the military service and expected standard and way of living of such member of the force cannot be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. For example a person who gets drunk while on casual leave fights with his neighbours, inflict injuries or suffer injuries, resulting in some disability to him as a result of which he is invalided out of Army with some extent of disability, to our mind cannot be said to be a disability attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Aggravation of a disease in the provisions of Section 29 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act, 1971 has been explained in the case of Commonwealth v. Johnston, (180) 31 ALR 445 in the following manner:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Although it may be possible to attribute a meaning of growing worse to the term 'aggravation' in the abstract, it is not possible to construe aggravation of a disease in Section 29 as meaning a growing worse of a disease to which nothing but the natural progress of the disease has contributed. Something else must contribute an increased gravity to the employee's disease, a gravity over and beyond what the natural progress of the disease produces.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The expression 'attributable to or aggravated by military service' must be read ejusdem generis with Rule 2 in Appendix II and opening line of regulation 173. It must be read in conjunction with the scheme of these provisions and has to be given purposeful meaning. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'. This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. Francis De Costa and Anr., (1996) 6 SCC 1 observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The injury suffered by the respondent in the instant case did not arise in any way out of his employment. Unless it can be said that his employment began as soon as he set out for the factory from his home, it cannot be said that the injury was caused by an accident 'arising out of..... his employment.' A road accident may happen any where at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have arisen out of employment, unless it can be shown that the employee was doing something incidental to his employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">By using the words 'arising out of... his employment, the legislature gave a restrictive meaning to 'employment injury'. The injury must be of such an extent as can be attributed to an accident or an occupational disease arising out of his employment. 'Out of, in this context, must mean caused by employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a casual connection with the employment, and (3) the accident was suffered in the course of employment. In the instant case the employee was unable to prove that the accident had any casual connection with the work he was going at the factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The injury or disability must be incidental to military service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh, 1997(1) S.L.R. 98 while declining to interfere with the judgment of the High Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In each case, when a disability pension is sought for and made a claim, it must be. affirmatively established, as a fact, as to whether the injury sustained was due to military service or was aggravated which contributed to invalidation for the military service. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was not totally correct in reaching that conclusion. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not think that it is an appropriate case for interference.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. On proper analysis of the above discussion the position that emerges is that an accident or injury suffered by a member of the armed forces must have some causal connection to the aggravation or attributability to military service and at least should arise from such activity of the member of the force as he is expected to maintain or do in his day-to-day life as a member of the force. The nexus between the two is not apparently one so as to cover every injury or accident. The hazards of Army service cannot be stretched to the extent of unlawful and entirely unconnected acts or omissions on the part of the member of the force even when he is on leave. The fine line of distinction has to be drawn between the matters connected, aggravated or attributable to military service and the matters entirely alien to such service. What falls ex-facie in the domain of an entirely private act which may even extend to the sphere of undesirable and unlawful activity of such member, cannot be treated as legitimate basis for claiming the relief under these provisions. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force. At least remote attributability to service and expected standards of behaviour and living, of the member of the force appears to be the condition precedent to claim under Rule 173. The act of omission and commission on the part of the member of the force must satisfy the test of prudence, reasonableness and expected standards of behaviour.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. We may elucidate the above principle by giving a very simple example that if a person on casual leave and subject to this act goes to canteen to buy things or takes his children for treatment to hospital and on the way meets with an accident, may be arising out of his negligence or contributory negligence, suffers injuries causing permanent disability, in our view, would be entitled to claim the benefit under Rule 173. Similarly a person who joins army is not found to be suffering from any disease, but subsequently suffers from an disease which renders him liable for being invalidated out of army on such ill-health, such a disease would be attributable and/or aggravated by military service and would entitle him to take benefit of these regulations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Thus, to sustain a claim of disability pension, the member of the armed force must be able to show a normal nexus between the act, omission or commission resulting in an injury to the person and the normal expected standard of duties and way of life expected from member of such disciplined force. It is so primarily for the reason that no unlawful activity or commission can valid support a lawful claim. Violation of expected standards cannot form a fair ground for raising a claim under these provisions. Every rule is expected to be understood so as'to be implemented lawfully and to achieve its object, but equally true is that no lawful activity can be brought to the aid of an unlawful act and that too by stretching the rules of present kind because it may ultimatrly result in abuse of the benefit sought to be granted by such rule. It has to be understood that no straight jacket formula could be provided for such cases and each case has to be judged on its own merits. We have attempted to provide certain guiding principles which could help the authorities concerned while deciding such a claim. .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the present case we are not able to see that working in the fields or keeping him occupied in agricultural activity of occupation, during casual leave would be an act attributable to military service. An independent occupation privately undertaken by him cannot be said to be squarely falling in line with the views expressed by us above. May be the petitioner is entitled to other benefits but we are afraid that he cannot avail the benefit of Rule 173.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. We are unable to find this silver lining of nexus between the injury suffered by the petitioner in the present case and nature of functions which would bring the same within the expression 'attributable to military service'. 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Union of India (Uoi) and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana - Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab. Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920. HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] -- Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act, she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. - 6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'.This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' S.P. Laler and; R.S. Manhas, Advs.', 'counseldef' => ' S.K. Pipat, Sr. Standing Counsel and; Sanjiv Pandit, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1997-03-11', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' G.C. Garg and; Swatanter Kumar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Swatanter Kumar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. What is the ambit and scope of expression 'attributable to and aggravated by military service' appearing in para 173 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961 is the precise question that falls for consideration before this Court, in the present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was selected as Sepoy in the Indian Army on 8.9.1988 and consequently became subject to the provisions of the Indian Army Act and other rules and regulations. On 21.4.1991, the petitioner proceeded on casual leave and he was to return on 28.4.1991. Unfortunately, the right hand of. the petitioner was crushed at home when he was operating wheat thresher. This injury resulted in amputation of his right hand and consequent disability to the petitioner. The authorities concerned invalided the petitioner out of Army service on 30.12.1991. The petitioner raised a claim for grant of disability pension, which was declined by the respondents vide order dated 17.9.1992 (Annexure P-3 to the petition). The petitioner preferred an appeal against this order on 4.12.1992, but the same was rejected by the respondents on 17.5.1994 resulting in filing of the present petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The reason given by the respondents for rejecting the request of the petitioner for grant of disability pension in the order, Annexure P-3 which has been impugned by the petitioner in this writ petition, are as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It has been decided by the Pension Sanctioning Authority that the disability from which you suffered during service in the Army and on which your claim is based :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Is not attributable to military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Does not fulfil the following conditions, namely, it existed before and has remained aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) Is attributable to/aggravated by military service but assessed at less than 20%. ID rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly no disability pension is admissible to you under rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The provisions of law which have a bearing on the matter in issue in that writ petition are Paras 173 and 175 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961. Rule 2 of Appendix II and Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casuality -Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel, 1982. It will be appropriate to reproduce these provisions for proper appreciation of the contentions raised by respective parties :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'173. Unless otherwise specifically provided a disability pension consisting of service element and disability element may be granted to an individual who is invalided out of service on account of disability which is attributable to or aggravated by military service in non-battle casualty and is assessed at 20 per cent or over.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question whether a disability is attributable to or aggravated by a military service shall be determined under the rule in Appendix II.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'175. If the disability of an individual in wholly or partly due to his serious negligence or misconduct, the amount of disability pension otherwise admissible may be reduced at the discretion of the competent authority.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Rule 2 in Appendix II reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Disablement or death shall be accepted as due to military service provided it is certified by appropriate medical authority that :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the disablement is due to a wound, injury or disease which</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) is attributable to military service; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) existed before or arose during military service and has been and remains aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">XX XX XX XX XX '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casualty Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel 1982 reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In respect of accidents or injuries, the following rules shall be observed-:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Injuries sustained when that man is 'on duty' so defined shall be deemed to have resulted from military service, but in cases of injuries due to serious negligence/misconduct the question of reducing the disability pension will be considered.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) In cases of self-inflicted injuries whilst on duty, attributability shall not be considered unless it is established that service factors were responsible for such action, in cases where attributability is conceded, the question of grant of disability pension at full or at reduced rate will be considered.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Firstly we have to consider, whether the period of casual leave of a person subject to Army Act can be termed as period on duty or not? Secondly, whether every injury suffered by such person during the period of his casual leave arising from any kind of act, omission of commission, would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. In the case of Smt. Charanjit Kaur v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-2)107 P.L.R. 663 (S.C.), where the husband of the petitioner who was commissioned as Lieutenant in the Indian Army and was subsequently promoted as Major, had died in mysterious circumstances, the Court while awarding compensation and treating him on duty held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the aforesaid facts, the conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the officer died while in service in mysterious circumstances and his death is attributable to and aggravated by the military service. The responsibility of his death is prima-facie traceable to the action of criminal omissions and commissions on the part of the concerned authorities. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Krishan Dahiya v. Union of India and Anr., (1996-3)114 P.L.R. 468, where Hawaldar in the Army Medical Corps suffered an injury while on casual leave and he was travelling in a private vehicle, was treated to be on duty, after detailed discussion the Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'2. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that an officer, subject to the Army Act, while he is on casual leave in considered to be on duty. Moreover, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149, and a Division bench judgment of this Court in Chatroo Ram v. Secretary Defence and Ors., 1991(1) S.L.R. 678, it cannot be even disputed that an officer subject to the Army Act while on casual leave is to be treated on duty.'-----------------------------. If a person subject to Army Act is considered to be on duty while on casual leave, it could not make any difference, whether he travels from duty station to leave station on his own expense or public expense as that cannot be the sine qua non for determining whether the person is on duty or not. He referred to a judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as Harbans Singh v. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1971 Delhi 227, wherein the officer in that case was to travel from Walong in N.E.F.A., his duty station, to Patiala, his leave station. He had travelled from Walong to Johart and from Johart to Calcutta by air at public expenses. From Calcutta to Ambala Cantt, he travelled on form D and from there, he travelled on road by his own scooter to his leave station Patiala. It was while travelling on scooter from Ambala to Patiala that he met with an accident which resulted in his disability. The High Court held that though he was travelling at his own expense and by his own conveyance during the part of his journey from Patiala to Rajpura, he was still to be treated to be on duty and entitled to disability pension.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">------------------. Can it be said that he is not on duty because he was not travelling at public expense. To our mind the answer has to be that still he would be entitled to be treated as on duty.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Still in another case of Ex. GNR Gaj Raj v. Union of India,3 1996(4) R.SJ. 17, the Court took the same view and held that the member of armed force while on casual leave can be considered on duty for the purpose of pensionary benefits and in that case held that it is to be attributable to military service. Similar view was expressed by Division Bench of this Court in CWP 2535 of 1995, R.V. Suvaranan v. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not on duty at the time when he met with an accident. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner was on duty and the injury sustained by him in the course of accident was attributable to military service.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a very recent case of Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149 wherein the proprietor who was proceeding on casual leave from his duty station met with an accident while boarding the bus at the railway station, held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The question for our consideration is whether the appellant is entitled to the disability pension. We agree with the contention of Mr. B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being in regular army there is no reason why he should not be treated as on duty when he was on casual leave. No Army Regulation or Rule has been brought to our notice to show that the appellant is not entitled to disability pension. It is rather not disputed that an Army personnel on casual leave is treated to be on duty. We see no justification whatsoever in denying the disability pension to the appellant.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. This from the consistent view taken by various Courts including the Hon'ble Apex Court, it appears to us that the first question has to be answered against the respondents as it is really no longer res-integra and has been fairly and elaborately answered in the above pronouncements. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that a person subject to the provisions of the Army Act, even if proceeds on casual leave, would be treated on duty and would be entitled to the benefits accruing therefrom in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Necessary corollary to our afore-mentioned conclusion is that second question posed by us above whether every injury suffered by a member of the Armed Forced irrespective of its nature and origin can be termed 'attributable to or aggravated by military service.' In order to consider this basic question one has to refer and read the above stated provisions objectively while not loosing the sight of their purpose and object. Constantly regulations 173 and 175 indicate the legislative intention towards a liberal construction of these provisions. The above regulations and the provisions read in their correct perspective certainly imply that rule making authority intended to give very wider scope to the concept of payment of disability pension.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Para 173 afore-mentioned is the substantive enabling provision which provides for grant of disability pension to a member of the force subject to the condition of disability being more than 20 percent and is attributable to or aggravated by Military service. Para 175 must be read in conjunction with para 173 which is the principle regulation controlling the subject. The scheme of these regulations shows that para 175 is in aid to para 173. The case for claim of disability pension must satisfy the ingredients stated in para 173. It is then alone that para 175 would become operative. Para 175 only elaborates the application of para 173 by providing that even negligence or misconduct on the part of a member of the armed forces may not frustrate the claim by such person under Rule 173. Upon the harmonious construction of these two provisions meaningful interpretation would be that the remote nexus to the attributability and aggravation of disability by military service even if accompanied by the element of negligence or misconduct on the part of the member of the force would not by itself frustrate the right of the member to raise such a claim. However, the authority in discretion may apply, cut or reduce the amount of disability pension within the limited scope of para 175.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Clause 9 of the Appendix II even does not place onus on the claimant to prove the condition of entitlement and any benefit of reasonable doubt would accrue in favour of the applicant and not against him. The member of the armed force being on duty would have to satisfy only concept of attributability as explained above, but no strict proof has to be established. Merely some remote nexus to the military service would be sufficient to sustain such a claim. The afore-mentioned provisions certainly indicate that liberal construction has to be afforded to this expression, but equally important is that such liberal construction should be in consonance with the object and purpose sought to be achieved by these provisions. We are of considered view that the injury suffered by a member of the armed force must be directly or indirectly attributable to or aggravated by military service. May be remotely but it must find its origin from the nature and scope of the duties and discipline of the force. Obviously, a person on casual leave would not be performing his normal duties but the even which results in infliction of injury to the member of the force must be ancillary to the recognised sphere of military duty and discipline. The injury causing disability, therefore, must springs from such event of circumstances which falls within expected standard of functioning of disciplined members of the armed forces. The expression attributable to military service has to be understood in its wide spectrum, but this understanding must find its limit within the principle of prudence and reasonableness. If the injury suffered by the member of the armed force is the result of an act alien to the sphere of military service or in no way be connected to his being on duty as understood in the above sense, it would not be legislative intention or nor to our mind would be permissible approach to generalise the statement that every injury suffered during such period would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The expression 'attribute' means to ascribe, assign, consider as belonging that which is inherent in or in or inseparable from (The Chamber Dictionary 1994 Edition). Attributability means attribution to its principle source. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. It may be appropriate to refer to the meaning described in the Butterwords 'Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Volume 1: A-C which is as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'These words have been considered in a number of cases and I do not wish to add to the explanations and definitions which have been given. Counsel for Mr. Walsh submits that it is a wider concept than 'directly caused by', or 'caused by or resulting from', but he accepts that it involves some nexus between the effect and the alleged cause. He suggest that 'owing to' or 'a material contributory cause' or 'a material cause in some way contributing to the effect' may be synonymous. Lord Raid in Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd (1972) 2 ALL. ER 1135, said: '.... 'attributable'. That means capable of being attributed. 'Attribute' has a number of cognate meanings; you can attribute a quality to a person or thing, you can attribute a product to a source or author, you can attribute an effect to a cause. The essential element is connection of some kind. 'Suffice it to say that these are plain English words involving some casual connection between the loss of employment and that to which the loss is said to be attributable. However, this connection need not be that of a sole, dominant, direct or proximate cause and effect. A contributory casual connection is quite sufficient. Walsh v. Rother District Council (1978) I ER 510 at 514, per Donaldson J.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The act, omission or commission which results in injury to the member of the force and consequential disability must relate to military service in the some manner or the other. In other words, the act must flow as a matter of necessity from military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. As noticed in the aforesaid case a member of the force who proceeds on casual leave or returns from casual leave or while on casual leave goes to get a ticket or warrant for his return etc. suffers an injury which ultimately results in invalidating from Army, of the member of the force, that could be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. While on the other hand a person who may be doing some act at home which even remotely does not fall within the scope of his duties of functions as a member of the force nor is remotely connected with the function of the military service and expected standard and way of living of such member of the force cannot be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. For example a person who gets drunk while on casual leave fights with his neighbours, inflict injuries or suffer injuries, resulting in some disability to him as a result of which he is invalided out of Army with some extent of disability, to our mind cannot be said to be a disability attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Aggravation of a disease in the provisions of Section 29 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act, 1971 has been explained in the case of Commonwealth v. Johnston, (180) 31 ALR 445 in the following manner:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Although it may be possible to attribute a meaning of growing worse to the term 'aggravation' in the abstract, it is not possible to construe aggravation of a disease in Section 29 as meaning a growing worse of a disease to which nothing but the natural progress of the disease has contributed. Something else must contribute an increased gravity to the employee's disease, a gravity over and beyond what the natural progress of the disease produces.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The expression 'attributable to or aggravated by military service' must be read ejusdem generis with Rule 2 in Appendix II and opening line of regulation 173. It must be read in conjunction with the scheme of these provisions and has to be given purposeful meaning. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'. This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. Francis De Costa and Anr., (1996) 6 SCC 1 observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The injury suffered by the respondent in the instant case did not arise in any way out of his employment. Unless it can be said that his employment began as soon as he set out for the factory from his home, it cannot be said that the injury was caused by an accident 'arising out of..... his employment.' A road accident may happen any where at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have arisen out of employment, unless it can be shown that the employee was doing something incidental to his employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">By using the words 'arising out of... his employment, the legislature gave a restrictive meaning to 'employment injury'. The injury must be of such an extent as can be attributed to an accident or an occupational disease arising out of his employment. 'Out of, in this context, must mean caused by employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a casual connection with the employment, and (3) the accident was suffered in the course of employment. In the instant case the employee was unable to prove that the accident had any casual connection with the work he was going at the factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The injury or disability must be incidental to military service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh, 1997(1) S.L.R. 98 while declining to interfere with the judgment of the High Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In each case, when a disability pension is sought for and made a claim, it must be. affirmatively established, as a fact, as to whether the injury sustained was due to military service or was aggravated which contributed to invalidation for the military service. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was not totally correct in reaching that conclusion. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not think that it is an appropriate case for interference.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. On proper analysis of the above discussion the position that emerges is that an accident or injury suffered by a member of the armed forces must have some causal connection to the aggravation or attributability to military service and at least should arise from such activity of the member of the force as he is expected to maintain or do in his day-to-day life as a member of the force. The nexus between the two is not apparently one so as to cover every injury or accident. The hazards of Army service cannot be stretched to the extent of unlawful and entirely unconnected acts or omissions on the part of the member of the force even when he is on leave. The fine line of distinction has to be drawn between the matters connected, aggravated or attributable to military service and the matters entirely alien to such service. What falls ex-facie in the domain of an entirely private act which may even extend to the sphere of undesirable and unlawful activity of such member, cannot be treated as legitimate basis for claiming the relief under these provisions. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force. At least remote attributability to service and expected standards of behaviour and living, of the member of the force appears to be the condition precedent to claim under Rule 173. The act of omission and commission on the part of the member of the force must satisfy the test of prudence, reasonableness and expected standards of behaviour.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. We may elucidate the above principle by giving a very simple example that if a person on casual leave and subject to this act goes to canteen to buy things or takes his children for treatment to hospital and on the way meets with an accident, may be arising out of his negligence or contributory negligence, suffers injuries causing permanent disability, in our view, would be entitled to claim the benefit under Rule 173. Similarly a person who joins army is not found to be suffering from any disease, but subsequently suffers from an disease which renders him liable for being invalidated out of army on such ill-health, such a disease would be attributable and/or aggravated by military service and would entitle him to take benefit of these regulations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Thus, to sustain a claim of disability pension, the member of the armed force must be able to show a normal nexus between the act, omission or commission resulting in an injury to the person and the normal expected standard of duties and way of life expected from member of such disciplined force. It is so primarily for the reason that no unlawful activity or commission can valid support a lawful claim. Violation of expected standards cannot form a fair ground for raising a claim under these provisions. Every rule is expected to be understood so as'to be implemented lawfully and to achieve its object, but equally true is that no lawful activity can be brought to the aid of an unlawful act and that too by stretching the rules of present kind because it may ultimatrly result in abuse of the benefit sought to be granted by such rule. It has to be understood that no straight jacket formula could be provided for such cases and each case has to be judged on its own merits. We have attempted to provide certain guiding principles which could help the authorities concerned while deciding such a claim. .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the present case we are not able to see that working in the fields or keeping him occupied in agricultural activity of occupation, during casual leave would be an act attributable to military service. An independent occupation privately undertaken by him cannot be said to be squarely falling in line with the views expressed by us above. May be the petitioner is entitled to other benefits but we are afraid that he cannot avail the benefit of Rule 173.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. We are unable to find this silver lining of nexus between the injury suffered by the petitioner in the present case and nature of functions which would bring the same within the expression 'attributable to military service'. Consequently, we dismiss this writ petition, however, without any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(1997)116PLR580', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.', 'sub' => 'Service', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '629719' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Jarnail Singh Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Army Act', (int) 1 => 'the Army Act', (int) 2 => 'the Army Act', (int) 3 => 'Rule 173', (int) 4 => 'Section 29', (int) 5 => 'Section 29', (int) 6 => 'Rule 173', (int) 7 => 'Rule 173' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Swatanter Kumar', (int) 1 => 'J.1', (int) 2 => 'Articles 226/227', (int) 3 => 'Sepoy', (int) 4 => 'Charanjit Kaur', (int) 5 => 'Shri Krishan Dahiya v.', (int) 6 => 'Anr', (int) 7 => 'Joginder Singh v. 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Union of India', (int) 34 => 'Hon'ble Supreme Court', (int) 35 => 'No Army Regulation or Rule', (int) 36 => 'Army', (int) 37 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 38 => 'Armed Forced', (int) 39 => 'The Chamber Dictionary 1994 Edition', (int) 40 => 'the Butterwords 'Words', (int) 41 => 'Phrases Legally Defined', (int) 42 => 'Central Asbestos Co.', (int) 43 => 'Suffice', (int) 44 => 'Rother District Council', (int) 45 => 'Donaldson J.'The', (int) 46 => 'Army', (int) 47 => 'Army', (int) 48 => 'Commonwealth', (int) 49 => 'the Employee State Insurance Act', (int) 50 => 'The Supreme Court', (int) 51 => 'ESI Corporation', (int) 52 => 'The Hon'ble Supreme Court', (int) 53 => 'Union of India', (int) 54 => 'the High Court', (int) 55 => 'the High Court', (int) 56 => 'Army' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1961', (int) 1 => '21.4.1991', (int) 2 => '28.4.1991', (int) 3 => '30.12.1991', (int) 4 => '17.9.1992', (int) 5 => '4.12.1992', (int) 6 => '1961', (int) 7 => '1982', (int) 8 => '1982', (int) 9 => '1994-2)107', (int) 10 => '1996-3)114', (int) 11 => '1971', (int) 12 => '2535 of 1995', (int) 13 => '1972', (int) 14 => '1135', (int) 15 => '1978', (int) 16 => '1971', (int) 17 => ''16', (int) 18 => '1948', (int) 19 => '1996', (int) 20 => ''11', (int) 21 => '98', (int) 22 => ''18' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'P-3', (int) 1 => 'P-3', (int) 2 => 'Calcutta', (int) 3 => 'Para 175', (int) 4 => 'Para 175' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => 'less than 20%', (int) 1 => 'more than 20 percent' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => '20 per cent' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'Appendix', (int) 1 => 'Harbans', (int) 2 => 'follows:-'These' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'XX', (int) 1 => 'India', (int) 2 => 'S.C.', (int) 3 => 'New Delhi', (int) 4 => 'A.I.R.', (int) 5 => 'Walong', (int) 6 => 'N.E.F.A.', (int) 7 => 'Walong', (int) 8 => 'Johart', (int) 9 => 'Johart', (int) 10 => 'Patiala', (int) 11 => 'Patiala', (int) 12 => 'India' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'Firstly', (int) 1 => 'Secondly', (int) 2 => 'first', (int) 3 => 'first', (int) 4 => 'second' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Hawaldar' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'Defence and Ors' ), 'FAC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Delhi 227', (int) 1 => 'the Railway Station' ), 'LANGUAGE' => array( (int) 0 => 'English', (int) 1 => 'English' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '629719', 'acts' => 'Army Pension Regulations, 1961 - Regulations 173 and 175; <a href="/act/51232/army-act-1950-complete-act">Army Act, 1950</a>; Army Pension Regulations, 1951 - Regulation 173', 'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petition No. 10170 of 1996', 'appellant' => 'Jarnail Singh', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Jarnail Singh Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana - Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab. Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920. HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] -- Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act, she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. - 6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'.This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' S.P. Laler and; R.S. Manhas, Advs.', 'counseldef' => ' S.K. Pipat, Sr. Standing Counsel and; Sanjiv Pandit, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1997-03-11', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' G.C. Garg and; Swatanter Kumar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Swatanter Kumar, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. What is the ambit and scope of expression 'attributable to and aggravated by military service' appearing in para 173 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961 is the precise question that falls for consideration before this Court, in the present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was selected as Sepoy in the Indian Army on 8.9.1988 and consequently became subject to the provisions of the Indian Army Act and other rules and regulations. On 21.4.1991, the petitioner proceeded on casual leave and he was to return on 28.4.1991. Unfortunately, the right hand of. the petitioner was crushed at home when he was operating wheat thresher. This injury resulted in amputation of his right hand and consequent disability to the petitioner. The authorities concerned invalided the petitioner out of Army service on 30.12.1991. The petitioner raised a claim for grant of disability pension, which was declined by the respondents vide order dated 17.9.1992 (Annexure P-3 to the petition). The petitioner preferred an appeal against this order on 4.12.1992, but the same was rejected by the respondents on 17.5.1994 resulting in filing of the present petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The reason given by the respondents for rejecting the request of the petitioner for grant of disability pension in the order, Annexure P-3 which has been impugned by the petitioner in this writ petition, are as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It has been decided by the Pension Sanctioning Authority that the disability from which you suffered during service in the Army and on which your claim is based :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Is not attributable to military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) Does not fulfil the following conditions, namely, it existed before and has remained aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(c) Is attributable to/aggravated by military service but assessed at less than 20%. ID rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly no disability pension is admissible to you under rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The provisions of law which have a bearing on the matter in issue in that writ petition are Paras 173 and 175 of the Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961. Rule 2 of Appendix II and Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casuality -Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel, 1982. It will be appropriate to reproduce these provisions for proper appreciation of the contentions raised by respective parties :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'173. Unless otherwise specifically provided a disability pension consisting of service element and disability element may be granted to an individual who is invalided out of service on account of disability which is attributable to or aggravated by military service in non-battle casualty and is assessed at 20 per cent or over.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The question whether a disability is attributable to or aggravated by a military service shall be determined under the rule in Appendix II.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'175. If the disability of an individual in wholly or partly due to his serious negligence or misconduct, the amount of disability pension otherwise admissible may be reduced at the discretion of the competent authority.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Rule 2 in Appendix II reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Disablement or death shall be accepted as due to military service provided it is certified by appropriate medical authority that :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the disablement is due to a wound, injury or disease which</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) is attributable to military service; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) existed before or arose during military service and has been and remains aggravated thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">XX XX XX XX XX '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Para 13 of Entitlement Rules to Casualty Pensionary Awards to the Armed Forces Personnel 1982 reads as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'13. In respect of accidents or injuries, the following rules shall be observed-:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) Injuries sustained when that man is 'on duty' so defined shall be deemed to have resulted from military service, but in cases of injuries due to serious negligence/misconduct the question of reducing the disability pension will be considered.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) In cases of self-inflicted injuries whilst on duty, attributability shall not be considered unless it is established that service factors were responsible for such action, in cases where attributability is conceded, the question of grant of disability pension at full or at reduced rate will be considered.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Firstly we have to consider, whether the period of casual leave of a person subject to Army Act can be termed as period on duty or not? Secondly, whether every injury suffered by such person during the period of his casual leave arising from any kind of act, omission of commission, would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service or not?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. With regard to first question there could be hardly any controversy as the matter has been well settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as of this Court. In the case of Smt. Charanjit Kaur v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-2)107 P.L.R. 663 (S.C.), where the husband of the petitioner who was commissioned as Lieutenant in the Indian Army and was subsequently promoted as Major, had died in mysterious circumstances, the Court while awarding compensation and treating him on duty held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the aforesaid facts, the conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the officer died while in service in mysterious circumstances and his death is attributable to and aggravated by the military service. The responsibility of his death is prima-facie traceable to the action of criminal omissions and commissions on the part of the concerned authorities. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to suitable compensation as well as to the Special Family Pension and the Children Allowance according to the relevant Rules.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Krishan Dahiya v. Union of India and Anr., (1996-3)114 P.L.R. 468, where Hawaldar in the Army Medical Corps suffered an injury while on casual leave and he was travelling in a private vehicle, was treated to be on duty, after detailed discussion the Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'2. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that an officer, subject to the Army Act, while he is on casual leave in considered to be on duty. Moreover, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149, and a Division bench judgment of this Court in Chatroo Ram v. Secretary Defence and Ors., 1991(1) S.L.R. 678, it cannot be even disputed that an officer subject to the Army Act while on casual leave is to be treated on duty.'-----------------------------. If a person subject to Army Act is considered to be on duty while on casual leave, it could not make any difference, whether he travels from duty station to leave station on his own expense or public expense as that cannot be the sine qua non for determining whether the person is on duty or not. He referred to a judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as Harbans Singh v. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1971 Delhi 227, wherein the officer in that case was to travel from Walong in N.E.F.A., his duty station, to Patiala, his leave station. He had travelled from Walong to Johart and from Johart to Calcutta by air at public expenses. From Calcutta to Ambala Cantt, he travelled on form D and from there, he travelled on road by his own scooter to his leave station Patiala. It was while travelling on scooter from Ambala to Patiala that he met with an accident which resulted in his disability. The High Court held that though he was travelling at his own expense and by his own conveyance during the part of his journey from Patiala to Rajpura, he was still to be treated to be on duty and entitled to disability pension.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">------------------. Can it be said that he is not on duty because he was not travelling at public expense. To our mind the answer has to be that still he would be entitled to be treated as on duty.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Still in another case of Ex. GNR Gaj Raj v. Union of India,3 1996(4) R.SJ. 17, the Court took the same view and held that the member of armed force while on casual leave can be considered on duty for the purpose of pensionary benefits and in that case held that it is to be attributable to military service. Similar view was expressed by Division Bench of this Court in CWP 2535 of 1995, R.V. Suvaranan v. Union of India sad others, decided on 11.9.1995 and held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Further the petitioner was going to the Railway Station at the time of accident for the purpose of purchasing return journey ticket to join the duty. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not on duty at the time when he met with an accident. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner was on duty and the injury sustained by him in the course of accident was attributable to military service.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a very recent case of Joginder Singh v. Union of India, 1996(2) S.L.R. 149 wherein the proprietor who was proceeding on casual leave from his duty station met with an accident while boarding the bus at the railway station, held as under :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The question for our consideration is whether the appellant is entitled to the disability pension. We agree with the contention of Mr. B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being in regular army there is no reason why he should not be treated as on duty when he was on casual leave. No Army Regulation or Rule has been brought to our notice to show that the appellant is not entitled to disability pension. It is rather not disputed that an Army personnel on casual leave is treated to be on duty. We see no justification whatsoever in denying the disability pension to the appellant.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. This from the consistent view taken by various Courts including the Hon'ble Apex Court, it appears to us that the first question has to be answered against the respondents as it is really no longer res-integra and has been fairly and elaborately answered in the above pronouncements. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that a person subject to the provisions of the Army Act, even if proceeds on casual leave, would be treated on duty and would be entitled to the benefits accruing therefrom in accordance with law.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Necessary corollary to our afore-mentioned conclusion is that second question posed by us above whether every injury suffered by a member of the Armed Forced irrespective of its nature and origin can be termed 'attributable to or aggravated by military service.' In order to consider this basic question one has to refer and read the above stated provisions objectively while not loosing the sight of their purpose and object. Constantly regulations 173 and 175 indicate the legislative intention towards a liberal construction of these provisions. The above regulations and the provisions read in their correct perspective certainly imply that rule making authority intended to give very wider scope to the concept of payment of disability pension.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Para 173 afore-mentioned is the substantive enabling provision which provides for grant of disability pension to a member of the force subject to the condition of disability being more than 20 percent and is attributable to or aggravated by Military service. Para 175 must be read in conjunction with para 173 which is the principle regulation controlling the subject. The scheme of these regulations shows that para 175 is in aid to para 173. The case for claim of disability pension must satisfy the ingredients stated in para 173. It is then alone that para 175 would become operative. Para 175 only elaborates the application of para 173 by providing that even negligence or misconduct on the part of a member of the armed forces may not frustrate the claim by such person under Rule 173. Upon the harmonious construction of these two provisions meaningful interpretation would be that the remote nexus to the attributability and aggravation of disability by military service even if accompanied by the element of negligence or misconduct on the part of the member of the force would not by itself frustrate the right of the member to raise such a claim. However, the authority in discretion may apply, cut or reduce the amount of disability pension within the limited scope of para 175.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Clause 9 of the Appendix II even does not place onus on the claimant to prove the condition of entitlement and any benefit of reasonable doubt would accrue in favour of the applicant and not against him. The member of the armed force being on duty would have to satisfy only concept of attributability as explained above, but no strict proof has to be established. Merely some remote nexus to the military service would be sufficient to sustain such a claim. The afore-mentioned provisions certainly indicate that liberal construction has to be afforded to this expression, but equally important is that such liberal construction should be in consonance with the object and purpose sought to be achieved by these provisions. We are of considered view that the injury suffered by a member of the armed force must be directly or indirectly attributable to or aggravated by military service. May be remotely but it must find its origin from the nature and scope of the duties and discipline of the force. Obviously, a person on casual leave would not be performing his normal duties but the even which results in infliction of injury to the member of the force must be ancillary to the recognised sphere of military duty and discipline. The injury causing disability, therefore, must springs from such event of circumstances which falls within expected standard of functioning of disciplined members of the armed forces. The expression attributable to military service has to be understood in its wide spectrum, but this understanding must find its limit within the principle of prudence and reasonableness. If the injury suffered by the member of the armed force is the result of an act alien to the sphere of military service or in no way be connected to his being on duty as understood in the above sense, it would not be legislative intention or nor to our mind would be permissible approach to generalise the statement that every injury suffered during such period would necessarily be attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The expression 'attribute' means to ascribe, assign, consider as belonging that which is inherent in or in or inseparable from (The Chamber Dictionary 1994 Edition). Attributability means attribution to its principle source. It may not be possible to precisely define the expression 'attributable' which could apply as a matter of principle to the cases of the present kind. But this expression has now been well understood and explained in various pronouncements even in English Law. It may be appropriate to refer to the meaning described in the Butterwords 'Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Volume 1: A-C which is as follows:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'These words have been considered in a number of cases and I do not wish to add to the explanations and definitions which have been given. Counsel for Mr. Walsh submits that it is a wider concept than 'directly caused by', or 'caused by or resulting from', but he accepts that it involves some nexus between the effect and the alleged cause. He suggest that 'owing to' or 'a material contributory cause' or 'a material cause in some way contributing to the effect' may be synonymous. Lord Raid in Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd (1972) 2 ALL. ER 1135, said: '.... 'attributable'. That means capable of being attributed. 'Attribute' has a number of cognate meanings; you can attribute a quality to a person or thing, you can attribute a product to a source or author, you can attribute an effect to a cause. The essential element is connection of some kind. 'Suffice it to say that these are plain English words involving some casual connection between the loss of employment and that to which the loss is said to be attributable. However, this connection need not be that of a sole, dominant, direct or proximate cause and effect. A contributory casual connection is quite sufficient. Walsh v. Rother District Council (1978) I ER 510 at 514, per Donaldson J.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The act, omission or commission which results in injury to the member of the force and consequential disability must relate to military service in the some manner or the other. In other words, the act must flow as a matter of necessity from military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. As noticed in the aforesaid case a member of the force who proceeds on casual leave or returns from casual leave or while on casual leave goes to get a ticket or warrant for his return etc. suffers an injury which ultimately results in invalidating from Army, of the member of the force, that could be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. While on the other hand a person who may be doing some act at home which even remotely does not fall within the scope of his duties of functions as a member of the force nor is remotely connected with the function of the military service and expected standard and way of living of such member of the force cannot be termed as an injury or disability attributable to military service. For example a person who gets drunk while on casual leave fights with his neighbours, inflict injuries or suffer injuries, resulting in some disability to him as a result of which he is invalided out of Army with some extent of disability, to our mind cannot be said to be a disability attributable to or aggravated by military service.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. Aggravation of a disease in the provisions of Section 29 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act, 1971 has been explained in the case of Commonwealth v. Johnston, (180) 31 ALR 445 in the following manner:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Although it may be possible to attribute a meaning of growing worse to the term 'aggravation' in the abstract, it is not possible to construe aggravation of a disease in Section 29 as meaning a growing worse of a disease to which nothing but the natural progress of the disease has contributed. Something else must contribute an increased gravity to the employee's disease, a gravity over and beyond what the natural progress of the disease produces.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. The expression 'attributable to or aggravated by military service' must be read ejusdem generis with Rule 2 in Appendix II and opening line of regulation 173. It must be read in conjunction with the scheme of these provisions and has to be given purposeful meaning. To understand this phrase better it may be appropriate to make reference to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of his employment'. This expression occurs in the provisions of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948. The Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr v. Francis De Costa and Anr., (1996) 6 SCC 1 observed as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The injury suffered by the respondent in the instant case did not arise in any way out of his employment. Unless it can be said that his employment began as soon as he set out for the factory from his home, it cannot be said that the injury was caused by an accident 'arising out of..... his employment.' A road accident may happen any where at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have arisen out of employment, unless it can be shown that the employee was doing something incidental to his employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">By using the words 'arising out of... his employment, the legislature gave a restrictive meaning to 'employment injury'. The injury must be of such an extent as can be attributed to an accident or an occupational disease arising out of his employment. 'Out of, in this context, must mean caused by employment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a casual connection with the employment, and (3) the accident was suffered in the course of employment. In the instant case the employee was unable to prove that the accident had any casual connection with the work he was going at the factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The injury or disability must be incidental to military service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Baljit Singh, 1997(1) S.L.R. 98 while declining to interfere with the judgment of the High Court held as under:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In each case, when a disability pension is sought for and made a claim, it must be. affirmatively established, as a fact, as to whether the injury sustained was due to military service or was aggravated which contributed to invalidation for the military service. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was not totally correct in reaching that conclusion. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not think that it is an appropriate case for interference.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. On proper analysis of the above discussion the position that emerges is that an accident or injury suffered by a member of the armed forces must have some causal connection to the aggravation or attributability to military service and at least should arise from such activity of the member of the force as he is expected to maintain or do in his day-to-day life as a member of the force. The nexus between the two is not apparently one so as to cover every injury or accident. The hazards of Army service cannot be stretched to the extent of unlawful and entirely unconnected acts or omissions on the part of the member of the force even when he is on leave. The fine line of distinction has to be drawn between the matters connected, aggravated or attributable to military service and the matters entirely alien to such service. What falls ex-facie in the domain of an entirely private act which may even extend to the sphere of undesirable and unlawful activity of such member, cannot be treated as legitimate basis for claiming the relief under these provisions. At best, the member of the force can claim disability pension if he suffers disability from an injury while on casual leave even if it arises from some negligence or mis-conduct on the part of the member of the force, so far it has some connection and nexus to the nature of the force. At least remote attributability to service and expected standards of behaviour and living, of the member of the force appears to be the condition precedent to claim under Rule 173. The act of omission and commission on the part of the member of the force must satisfy the test of prudence, reasonableness and expected standards of behaviour.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. We may elucidate the above principle by giving a very simple example that if a person on casual leave and subject to this act goes to canteen to buy things or takes his children for treatment to hospital and on the way meets with an accident, may be arising out of his negligence or contributory negligence, suffers injuries causing permanent disability, in our view, would be entitled to claim the benefit under Rule 173. Similarly a person who joins army is not found to be suffering from any disease, but subsequently suffers from an disease which renders him liable for being invalidated out of army on such ill-health, such a disease would be attributable and/or aggravated by military service and would entitle him to take benefit of these regulations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Thus, to sustain a claim of disability pension, the member of the armed force must be able to show a normal nexus between the act, omission or commission resulting in an injury to the person and the normal expected standard of duties and way of life expected from member of such disciplined force. It is so primarily for the reason that no unlawful activity or commission can valid support a lawful claim. Violation of expected standards cannot form a fair ground for raising a claim under these provisions. Every rule is expected to be understood so as'to be implemented lawfully and to achieve its object, but equally true is that no lawful activity can be brought to the aid of an unlawful act and that too by stretching the rules of present kind because it may ultimatrly result in abuse of the benefit sought to be granted by such rule. It has to be understood that no straight jacket formula could be provided for such cases and each case has to be judged on its own merits. We have attempted to provide certain guiding principles which could help the authorities concerned while deciding such a claim. .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the present case we are not able to see that working in the fields or keeping him occupied in agricultural activity of occupation, during casual leave would be an act attributable to military service. An independent occupation privately undertaken by him cannot be said to be squarely falling in line with the views expressed by us above. May be the petitioner is entitled to other benefits but we are afraid that he cannot avail the benefit of Rule 173.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. We are unable to find this silver lining of nexus between the injury suffered by the petitioner in the present case and nature of functions which would bring the same within the expression 'attributable to military service'. Consequently, we dismiss this writ petition, however, without any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(1997)116PLR580', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.', 'sub' => 'Service', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '629719' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: the Army Act, the Army Act, the Army Act, Rule 173, Section 29, Section 29, Rule 173, Rule 173
PERSON: Swatanter Kumar, J.1, Articles 226/227, Sepoy, Charanjit Kaur, Shri Krishan Dahiya v., Anr, Joginder Singh v. Union, Chatroo Ram, Patiala, Ambala Cantt, Patiala, Ambala, Rajpura, GNR Gaj Raj v. Union of India,3 1996(4, R.SJ, Joginder Singh v. Union, S.L.R., B. Kanta Rao, Walsh, Raid, Dodd, Walsh, Rule 2, Anr, Francis De Costa, Anr, Anr, Baljit Singh, S.L.R.
CARDINAL: 173, 17.5.1994, 173, 175, 2, 663, 1996(2, 149, 1991(1, 678, 17, 11.9.1995, 1996(2, 149, 173, 175, 173, 173, 175, 173, 173, 175, 173, two, 175.12, 9, 1, 2, 514, 180, 31, 173, 6, 1, 2, 3, two, 173.22
ORG: the Pension Regulation for the Army, Court, the Indian Army, the Indian Army Act, Army, the Pension Sanctioning Authority, Army, Army, Casuality -Pensionary Awards, the Armed Forces Personnel, the Armed Forces Personnel, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Court, Smt, Union of India and Ors, the Indian Army, Major, Court, Court, Union of India, Army Medical Corps, Court, the Apex Court, Division, Court, Army Act, the Delhi High Court, Ministry of Defence, Calcutta, The High Court, Court, Division Bench, Court, R.V. Suvaranan v. Union of India, Hon'ble Supreme Court, No Army Regulation or Rule, Army, the Hon'ble Apex Court, Armed Forced, The Chamber Dictionary 1994 Edition, the Butterwords 'Words, Phrases Legally Defined, Central Asbestos Co., Suffice, Rother District Council, Donaldson J.'The, Army, Army, Commonwealth, the Employee State Insurance Act, The Supreme Court, ESI Corporation, The Hon'ble Supreme Court, Union of India, the High Court, the High Court, Army
DATE: 1961, 21.4.1991, 28.4.1991, 30.12.1991, 17.9.1992, 4.12.1992, 1961, 1982, 1982, 1994-2)107, 1996-3)114, 1971, 2535 of 1995, 1972, 1135, 1978, 1971, '16, 1948, 1996, '11, 98, '18
PRODUCT: P-3, P-3, Calcutta, Para 175, Para 175
PERCENT: less than 20%, more than 20 percent
MONEY: 20 per cent
NORP: Appendix, Harbans, follows:-'These
GPE: XX, India, S.C., New Delhi, A.I.R., Walong, N.E.F.A., Walong, Johart, Johart, Patiala, Patiala, India
ORDINAL: Firstly, Secondly, first, first, second
LOC: Hawaldar
WORK_OF_ART: Defence and Ors
FAC: Delhi 227, the Railway Station
LANGUAGE: English, English