Semantic Analysis by spaCy
Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana
Decided On : Jun-27-2002
Court : Orissa
Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]Code Context$shops2 = $shops['topics'];$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Article 49', (int) 1 => 'the Indian Stamp Act', (int) 2 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 3 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Article 49', (int) 5 => 'Madras 42', (int) 6 => 'Article 49' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Bimala Prasad Das', (int) 1 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 2 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 3 => 'Money Suit', (int) 4 => '31.7.1995', (int) 5 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 6 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 7 => 'Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'Court', (int) 10 => 'the Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 11 => 'Bill of Exchange', (int) 12 => 'AIR', (int) 13 => 'AIR', (int) 14 => 'AIR 1981 Allahabad', (int) 15 => 'Court', (int) 16 => 'AIR', (int) 17 => 'the Money Suit No' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '8.5.2001', (int) 1 => '107', (int) 2 => '40', (int) 3 => '31.7.95', (int) 4 => '250', (int) 5 => 'Ten', (int) 6 => '250', (int) 7 => '1,000', (int) 8 => 'Fifteen', (int) 9 => 'Twenty-five', (int) 10 => '13', (int) 11 => '30.4.89', (int) 12 => 'three', (int) 13 => 'one', (int) 14 => '65', (int) 15 => '32', (int) 16 => '31.7.95', (int) 17 => '25.2.89', (int) 18 => '30.4.89', (int) 19 => 'three', (int) 20 => '107' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1991', (int) 1 => '1899', (int) 2 => '25th February, 1989', (int) 3 => '32) 1945', (int) 4 => 'two years', (int) 5 => 'two years'', (int) 6 => '1971', (int) 7 => '58.6', (int) 8 => '1995 TRA-00.', (int) 9 => '1991', (int) 10 => 'a period of', (int) 11 => 'six months' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Schedule', (int) 1 => 'J. K. Nayak', (int) 2 => 'Alamelu Ammal v.', (int) 3 => 'P. Rangai Gounder', (int) 4 => 'Lordships', (int) 5 => 'Andiyapaa Chettiar', (int) 6 => 'Raj Bahadur Singh v.', (int) 7 => 'Aiyappankutty v.', (int) 8 => 'Mathoo Mathai', (int) 9 => 'Madras', (int) 10 => 'Schedule' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Thenappa', (int) 1 => 'Halwai', (int) 2 => 'AIR' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '537006', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 49', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 305 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. ' 7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => ' 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty 49. Promissory note [as defined by Section <a href="javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp(">2(22)</a>] (a) when payable on demand - (i) when the amount or value does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise. (ii) when the amount or value exceeds Rs. 250 but does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise (b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a than on demand Bill of Exchange (No. 13) for the same amount payable otherwise than on demand.'', 'counselplain' => 'S.K. Purohit, P. Mohapatra and K.M.H. Niamati', 'counseldef' => 'R.K. Mohanty, D.K. Mohanty, S.K. Rath, A.P. Bose, S.N. Biswal and P.K. Samantaray', 'court' => 'Orissa', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2002-06-27', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Bimala Prasad Das, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Bimala Prasad Das, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 8.5.2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur in Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 thereby holding that the promissory note is insufficiently stamped and directing the plaintiff to impound the document by making payment of deficit stamp duty along with penalty by the next date.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The ground on which the challenge has been made to the aforesaid order is that the non-mention of the words 'to the order or bearer on demand' is irrelevant and thus this promissory note will come under category No. (iii) of Article 49 of Schedule-I of the Indian <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> (in short 'the Act') and is thus properly stamped with 40 paise revenue stamp. It is also further alleged that the applicability of Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act is erroneous. The learned counsel for the petitioner draws my attention to the order dated 31.7.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur wherein it was held that the document in question conforms the characteristic of a promissory note thereby rejecting the claim of the defendant that the document does not conform to the characteristic of a promissory note either in form or in substance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after rejection of the application dated 3.7.95 there was no occasion on the part of the trial Court to rehear the application and pass the impugned order. In this context I may at the outset say that even if an application was not filed, it is also the duty of the Court to examine whether the document sought to be admitted into evidence was validly stamped or not. That apart my attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the opposite party to the fact that another application was filed by the learned counsel for the defendant to hold that the document in question was insufficiently stamped. However, this Court is only to examine whether the Civil Judge (Senior Division) is correct to hold that the document in question is to be stamped as provided in Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act in order to let the said document admitted into evidence, as question regarding whether the document is a promissory note or not has already been decided by the order dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge. For sake of convenience it is profitable to quote the provision of Article 49 of the Schedule appended to the Act which reads:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty</p><p style="text-align: justify;">49. Promissory note</p><p style="text-align: justify;">[as defined by Section 2(22)]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) when payable on demand - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) when the amount or value</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) when the amount or</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> value exceeds Rs. 250 but</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> than on demand Bill of Exchange (No.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13) for the same amount </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> payable otherwise than</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. This is a case where it appears from the order passed by the learned trial Judge that the defendant has promised to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- to Mr. J. K. Nayak, the plaintiff, within 25th February, 1989 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- by 30.4.89 in three instalments. The document contains the promise to pay certain cash to a definite person at a fixed or determinable time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the decision in AIR (32) 1945 Madras 42 (Alamelu Ammal v. P. Rangai Gounder) where their Lordships held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx If the debt could be demanded at any time within two years, then the words 'within two years' would have no meaning at all. It seems clear to me that these words were introduced to give the debtor time within which to pay the debt and that within that time the promisee could not enforce the debt. It follows that the promissory note is not one payable on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The aforesaid decision was followed in the case of Thenappa Chettiar v. Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Halwai reported in AIR 1981 Allahabad 58.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In a decision reported in AIR 1995 TRA-00. 65 (Aiyappankutty v. Mathoo Mathai and others) the Court while relying on the decision in AIR (32) Madras 42 (supra) held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx The words 'payable on demand' occurring in a promissory note mean payable 'at once.' forthwith' or 'immediately' and a promissory note payable on a specified date or after a specified period or within a certain time can hence be considered only as a promissory note payable otherwise than on demand. A promissory note payable on demand is payable without any demand and the true import of the words 'on demand' is that the debt is due and payable immediately.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- within 30.4.89 in three instalments. The said document cannot be construed to be a promissory note payable on demand and it certainly falls within the category 'when payable otherwise on demand'. Therefore, unless it is stamped as required under Article 49 (b) of the Schedule-I appended to the Act, it is inadmissible in evidence. Accordingly I do not find any irregularity in the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge to interfere with the same. But at the same time. I direct the learned trial Judge to conclude the Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 within a period of six months after the impounding proceeding is over.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(II)OLR316', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '537006' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Article 49', (int) 1 => 'the Indian Stamp Act', (int) 2 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 3 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Article 49', (int) 5 => 'Madras 42', (int) 6 => 'Article 49' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Bimala Prasad Das', (int) 1 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 2 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 3 => 'Money Suit', (int) 4 => '31.7.1995', (int) 5 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 6 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 7 => 'Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'Court', (int) 10 => 'the Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 11 => 'Bill of Exchange', (int) 12 => 'AIR', (int) 13 => 'AIR', (int) 14 => 'AIR 1981 Allahabad', (int) 15 => 'Court', (int) 16 => 'AIR', (int) 17 => 'the Money Suit No' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '8.5.2001', (int) 1 => '107', (int) 2 => '40', (int) 3 => '31.7.95', (int) 4 => '250', (int) 5 => 'Ten', (int) 6 => '250', (int) 7 => '1,000', (int) 8 => 'Fifteen', (int) 9 => 'Twenty-five', (int) 10 => '13', (int) 11 => '30.4.89', (int) 12 => 'three', (int) 13 => 'one', (int) 14 => '65', (int) 15 => '32', (int) 16 => '31.7.95', (int) 17 => '25.2.89', (int) 18 => '30.4.89', (int) 19 => 'three', (int) 20 => '107' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1991', (int) 1 => '1899', (int) 2 => '25th February, 1989', (int) 3 => '32) 1945', (int) 4 => 'two years', (int) 5 => 'two years'', (int) 6 => '1971', (int) 7 => '58.6', (int) 8 => '1995 TRA-00.', (int) 9 => '1991', (int) 10 => 'a period of', (int) 11 => 'six months' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Schedule', (int) 1 => 'J. K. Nayak', (int) 2 => 'Alamelu Ammal v.', (int) 3 => 'P. Rangai Gounder', (int) 4 => 'Lordships', (int) 5 => 'Andiyapaa Chettiar', (int) 6 => 'Raj Bahadur Singh v.', (int) 7 => 'Aiyappankutty v.', (int) 8 => 'Mathoo Mathai', (int) 9 => 'Madras', (int) 10 => 'Schedule' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Thenappa', (int) 1 => 'Halwai', (int) 2 => 'AIR' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '537006', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 49', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 305 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. ' 7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => ' 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty 49. Promissory note [as defined by Section <a href="javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp(">2(22)</a>] (a) when payable on demand - (i) when the amount or value does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise. (ii) when the amount or value exceeds Rs. 250 but does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise (b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a than on demand Bill of Exchange (No. 13) for the same amount payable otherwise than on demand.'', 'counselplain' => 'S.K. Purohit, P. Mohapatra and K.M.H. Niamati', 'counseldef' => 'R.K. Mohanty, D.K. Mohanty, S.K. Rath, A.P. Bose, S.N. Biswal and P.K. Samantaray', 'court' => 'Orissa', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2002-06-27', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Bimala Prasad Das, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Bimala Prasad Das, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 8.5.2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur in Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 thereby holding that the promissory note is insufficiently stamped and directing the plaintiff to impound the document by making payment of deficit stamp duty along with penalty by the next date.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The ground on which the challenge has been made to the aforesaid order is that the non-mention of the words 'to the order or bearer on demand' is irrelevant and thus this promissory note will come under category No. (iii) of Article 49 of Schedule-I of the Indian <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> (in short 'the Act') and is thus properly stamped with 40 paise revenue stamp. It is also further alleged that the applicability of Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act is erroneous. The learned counsel for the petitioner draws my attention to the order dated 31.7.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur wherein it was held that the document in question conforms the characteristic of a promissory note thereby rejecting the claim of the defendant that the document does not conform to the characteristic of a promissory note either in form or in substance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after rejection of the application dated 3.7.95 there was no occasion on the part of the trial Court to rehear the application and pass the impugned order. In this context I may at the outset say that even if an application was not filed, it is also the duty of the Court to examine whether the document sought to be admitted into evidence was validly stamped or not. That apart my attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the opposite party to the fact that another application was filed by the learned counsel for the defendant to hold that the document in question was insufficiently stamped. However, this Court is only to examine whether the Civil Judge (Senior Division) is correct to hold that the document in question is to be stamped as provided in Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act in order to let the said document admitted into evidence, as question regarding whether the document is a promissory note or not has already been decided by the order dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge. For sake of convenience it is profitable to quote the provision of Article 49 of the Schedule appended to the Act which reads:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty</p><p style="text-align: justify;">49. Promissory note</p><p style="text-align: justify;">[as defined by Section 2(22)]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) when payable on demand - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) when the amount or value</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) when the amount or</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> value exceeds Rs. 250 but</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> than on demand Bill of Exchange (No.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13) for the same amount </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> payable otherwise than</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. This is a case where it appears from the order passed by the learned trial Judge that the defendant has promised to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- to Mr. J. K. Nayak, the plaintiff, within 25th February, 1989 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- by 30.4.89 in three instalments. The document contains the promise to pay certain cash to a definite person at a fixed or determinable time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the decision in AIR (32) 1945 Madras 42 (Alamelu Ammal v. P. Rangai Gounder) where their Lordships held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx If the debt could be demanded at any time within two years, then the words 'within two years' would have no meaning at all. It seems clear to me that these words were introduced to give the debtor time within which to pay the debt and that within that time the promisee could not enforce the debt. It follows that the promissory note is not one payable on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The aforesaid decision was followed in the case of Thenappa Chettiar v. Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Halwai reported in AIR 1981 Allahabad 58.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In a decision reported in AIR 1995 TRA-00. 65 (Aiyappankutty v. Mathoo Mathai and others) the Court while relying on the decision in AIR (32) Madras 42 (supra) held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx The words 'payable on demand' occurring in a promissory note mean payable 'at once.' forthwith' or 'immediately' and a promissory note payable on a specified date or after a specified period or within a certain time can hence be considered only as a promissory note payable otherwise than on demand. A promissory note payable on demand is payable without any demand and the true import of the words 'on demand' is that the debt is due and payable immediately.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- within 30.4.89 in three instalments. The said document cannot be construed to be a promissory note payable on demand and it certainly falls within the category 'when payable otherwise on demand'. Therefore, unless it is stamped as required under Article 49 (b) of the Schedule-I appended to the Act, it is inadmissible in evidence. Accordingly I do not find any irregularity in the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge to interfere with the same. But at the same time. I direct the learned trial Judge to conclude the Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 within a period of six months after the impounding proceeding is over.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(II)OLR316', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '537006' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Warning (2): Invalid argument supplied for foreach() [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39]Code Context//$shops = $shops['entities'];foreach ($shops2 as $key => $val) {$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Article 49', (int) 1 => 'the Indian Stamp Act', (int) 2 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 3 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Article 49', (int) 5 => 'Madras 42', (int) 6 => 'Article 49' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Bimala Prasad Das', (int) 1 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 2 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 3 => 'Money Suit', (int) 4 => '31.7.1995', (int) 5 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 6 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 7 => 'Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'Court', (int) 10 => 'the Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 11 => 'Bill of Exchange', (int) 12 => 'AIR', (int) 13 => 'AIR', (int) 14 => 'AIR 1981 Allahabad', (int) 15 => 'Court', (int) 16 => 'AIR', (int) 17 => 'the Money Suit No' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '8.5.2001', (int) 1 => '107', (int) 2 => '40', (int) 3 => '31.7.95', (int) 4 => '250', (int) 5 => 'Ten', (int) 6 => '250', (int) 7 => '1,000', (int) 8 => 'Fifteen', (int) 9 => 'Twenty-five', (int) 10 => '13', (int) 11 => '30.4.89', (int) 12 => 'three', (int) 13 => 'one', (int) 14 => '65', (int) 15 => '32', (int) 16 => '31.7.95', (int) 17 => '25.2.89', (int) 18 => '30.4.89', (int) 19 => 'three', (int) 20 => '107' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1991', (int) 1 => '1899', (int) 2 => '25th February, 1989', (int) 3 => '32) 1945', (int) 4 => 'two years', (int) 5 => 'two years'', (int) 6 => '1971', (int) 7 => '58.6', (int) 8 => '1995 TRA-00.', (int) 9 => '1991', (int) 10 => 'a period of', (int) 11 => 'six months' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Schedule', (int) 1 => 'J. K. Nayak', (int) 2 => 'Alamelu Ammal v.', (int) 3 => 'P. Rangai Gounder', (int) 4 => 'Lordships', (int) 5 => 'Andiyapaa Chettiar', (int) 6 => 'Raj Bahadur Singh v.', (int) 7 => 'Aiyappankutty v.', (int) 8 => 'Mathoo Mathai', (int) 9 => 'Madras', (int) 10 => 'Schedule' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Thenappa', (int) 1 => 'Halwai', (int) 2 => 'AIR' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '537006', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 49', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 305 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. ' 7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => ' 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty 49. Promissory note [as defined by Section <a href="javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp(">2(22)</a>] (a) when payable on demand - (i) when the amount or value does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise. (ii) when the amount or value exceeds Rs. 250 but does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise (b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a than on demand Bill of Exchange (No. 13) for the same amount payable otherwise than on demand.'', 'counselplain' => 'S.K. Purohit, P. Mohapatra and K.M.H. Niamati', 'counseldef' => 'R.K. Mohanty, D.K. Mohanty, S.K. Rath, A.P. Bose, S.N. Biswal and P.K. Samantaray', 'court' => 'Orissa', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2002-06-27', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Bimala Prasad Das, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Bimala Prasad Das, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 8.5.2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur in Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 thereby holding that the promissory note is insufficiently stamped and directing the plaintiff to impound the document by making payment of deficit stamp duty along with penalty by the next date.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The ground on which the challenge has been made to the aforesaid order is that the non-mention of the words 'to the order or bearer on demand' is irrelevant and thus this promissory note will come under category No. (iii) of Article 49 of Schedule-I of the Indian <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> (in short 'the Act') and is thus properly stamped with 40 paise revenue stamp. It is also further alleged that the applicability of Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act is erroneous. The learned counsel for the petitioner draws my attention to the order dated 31.7.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur wherein it was held that the document in question conforms the characteristic of a promissory note thereby rejecting the claim of the defendant that the document does not conform to the characteristic of a promissory note either in form or in substance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after rejection of the application dated 3.7.95 there was no occasion on the part of the trial Court to rehear the application and pass the impugned order. In this context I may at the outset say that even if an application was not filed, it is also the duty of the Court to examine whether the document sought to be admitted into evidence was validly stamped or not. That apart my attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the opposite party to the fact that another application was filed by the learned counsel for the defendant to hold that the document in question was insufficiently stamped. However, this Court is only to examine whether the Civil Judge (Senior Division) is correct to hold that the document in question is to be stamped as provided in Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act in order to let the said document admitted into evidence, as question regarding whether the document is a promissory note or not has already been decided by the order dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge. For sake of convenience it is profitable to quote the provision of Article 49 of the Schedule appended to the Act which reads:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty</p><p style="text-align: justify;">49. Promissory note</p><p style="text-align: justify;">[as defined by Section 2(22)]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) when payable on demand - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) when the amount or value</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) when the amount or</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> value exceeds Rs. 250 but</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> than on demand Bill of Exchange (No.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13) for the same amount </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> payable otherwise than</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. This is a case where it appears from the order passed by the learned trial Judge that the defendant has promised to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- to Mr. J. K. Nayak, the plaintiff, within 25th February, 1989 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- by 30.4.89 in three instalments. The document contains the promise to pay certain cash to a definite person at a fixed or determinable time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the decision in AIR (32) 1945 Madras 42 (Alamelu Ammal v. P. Rangai Gounder) where their Lordships held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx If the debt could be demanded at any time within two years, then the words 'within two years' would have no meaning at all. It seems clear to me that these words were introduced to give the debtor time within which to pay the debt and that within that time the promisee could not enforce the debt. It follows that the promissory note is not one payable on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The aforesaid decision was followed in the case of Thenappa Chettiar v. Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Halwai reported in AIR 1981 Allahabad 58.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In a decision reported in AIR 1995 TRA-00. 65 (Aiyappankutty v. Mathoo Mathai and others) the Court while relying on the decision in AIR (32) Madras 42 (supra) held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx The words 'payable on demand' occurring in a promissory note mean payable 'at once.' forthwith' or 'immediately' and a promissory note payable on a specified date or after a specified period or within a certain time can hence be considered only as a promissory note payable otherwise than on demand. A promissory note payable on demand is payable without any demand and the true import of the words 'on demand' is that the debt is due and payable immediately.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- within 30.4.89 in three instalments. The said document cannot be construed to be a promissory note payable on demand and it certainly falls within the category 'when payable otherwise on demand'. Therefore, unless it is stamped as required under Article 49 (b) of the Schedule-I appended to the Act, it is inadmissible in evidence. Accordingly I do not find any irregularity in the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge to interfere with the same. But at the same time. I direct the learned trial Judge to conclude the Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 within a period of six months after the impounding proceeding is over.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(II)OLR316', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '537006' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Article 49', (int) 1 => 'the Indian Stamp Act', (int) 2 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 3 => 'Article 49 of the Act', (int) 4 => 'Article 49', (int) 5 => 'Madras 42', (int) 6 => 'Article 49' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Bimala Prasad Das', (int) 1 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 2 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 3 => 'Money Suit', (int) 4 => '31.7.1995', (int) 5 => 'Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 6 => 'Sambalpur', (int) 7 => 'Court', (int) 8 => 'Court', (int) 9 => 'Court', (int) 10 => 'the Civil Judge (Senior Division', (int) 11 => 'Bill of Exchange', (int) 12 => 'AIR', (int) 13 => 'AIR', (int) 14 => 'AIR 1981 Allahabad', (int) 15 => 'Court', (int) 16 => 'AIR', (int) 17 => 'the Money Suit No' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '8.5.2001', (int) 1 => '107', (int) 2 => '40', (int) 3 => '31.7.95', (int) 4 => '250', (int) 5 => 'Ten', (int) 6 => '250', (int) 7 => '1,000', (int) 8 => 'Fifteen', (int) 9 => 'Twenty-five', (int) 10 => '13', (int) 11 => '30.4.89', (int) 12 => 'three', (int) 13 => 'one', (int) 14 => '65', (int) 15 => '32', (int) 16 => '31.7.95', (int) 17 => '25.2.89', (int) 18 => '30.4.89', (int) 19 => 'three', (int) 20 => '107' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1991', (int) 1 => '1899', (int) 2 => '25th February, 1989', (int) 3 => '32) 1945', (int) 4 => 'two years', (int) 5 => 'two years'', (int) 6 => '1971', (int) 7 => '58.6', (int) 8 => '1995 TRA-00.', (int) 9 => '1991', (int) 10 => 'a period of', (int) 11 => 'six months' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Schedule', (int) 1 => 'J. K. Nayak', (int) 2 => 'Alamelu Ammal v.', (int) 3 => 'P. Rangai Gounder', (int) 4 => 'Lordships', (int) 5 => 'Andiyapaa Chettiar', (int) 6 => 'Raj Bahadur Singh v.', (int) 7 => 'Aiyappankutty v.', (int) 8 => 'Mathoo Mathai', (int) 9 => 'Madras', (int) 10 => 'Schedule' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Thenappa', (int) 1 => 'Halwai', (int) 2 => 'AIR' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '537006', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> - Sections 49', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 305 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Jogendra Kumar Naik Vs. Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. ' 7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => ' 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty 49. Promissory note [as defined by Section <a href="javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp(">2(22)</a>] (a) when payable on demand - (i) when the amount or value does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise. (ii) when the amount or value exceeds Rs. 250 but does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise (b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a than on demand Bill of Exchange (No. 13) for the same amount payable otherwise than on demand.'', 'counselplain' => 'S.K. Purohit, P. Mohapatra and K.M.H. Niamati', 'counseldef' => 'R.K. Mohanty, D.K. Mohanty, S.K. Rath, A.P. Bose, S.N. Biswal and P.K. Samantaray', 'court' => 'Orissa', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2002-06-27', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Bimala Prasad Das, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Bimala Prasad Das, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This revision is directed against the order dated 8.5.2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur in Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 thereby holding that the promissory note is insufficiently stamped and directing the plaintiff to impound the document by making payment of deficit stamp duty along with penalty by the next date.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The ground on which the challenge has been made to the aforesaid order is that the non-mention of the words 'to the order or bearer on demand' is irrelevant and thus this promissory note will come under category No. (iii) of Article 49 of Schedule-I of the Indian <a href="/act/51696/indian-stamp-act-1899-complete-act">Stamp Act, 1899</a> (in short 'the Act') and is thus properly stamped with 40 paise revenue stamp. It is also further alleged that the applicability of Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act is erroneous. The learned counsel for the petitioner draws my attention to the order dated 31.7.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sambalpur wherein it was held that the document in question conforms the characteristic of a promissory note thereby rejecting the claim of the defendant that the document does not conform to the characteristic of a promissory note either in form or in substance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after rejection of the application dated 3.7.95 there was no occasion on the part of the trial Court to rehear the application and pass the impugned order. In this context I may at the outset say that even if an application was not filed, it is also the duty of the Court to examine whether the document sought to be admitted into evidence was validly stamped or not. That apart my attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the opposite party to the fact that another application was filed by the learned counsel for the defendant to hold that the document in question was insufficiently stamped. However, this Court is only to examine whether the Civil Judge (Senior Division) is correct to hold that the document in question is to be stamped as provided in Clause (b) of Article 49 of the Act in order to let the said document admitted into evidence, as question regarding whether the document is a promissory note or not has already been decided by the order dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge. For sake of convenience it is profitable to quote the provision of Article 49 of the Schedule appended to the Act which reads:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 'Description of instrument Proper stamp duty</p><p style="text-align: justify;">49. Promissory note</p><p style="text-align: justify;">[as defined by Section 2(22)]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) when payable on demand - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (i) when the amount or value</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 250; Ten naye paise.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (ii) when the amount or</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> value exceeds Rs. 250 but</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> does not exceed Rs. 1,000; Fifteen naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (iii) in any other case Twenty-five naye paise</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) when payable otherwise The same duty as a</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> than on demand Bill of Exchange (No.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 13) for the same amount </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> payable otherwise than</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. This is a case where it appears from the order passed by the learned trial Judge that the defendant has promised to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- to Mr. J. K. Nayak, the plaintiff, within 25th February, 1989 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- by 30.4.89 in three instalments. The document contains the promise to pay certain cash to a definite person at a fixed or determinable time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the decision in AIR (32) 1945 Madras 42 (Alamelu Ammal v. P. Rangai Gounder) where their Lordships held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx If the debt could be demanded at any time within two years, then the words 'within two years' would have no meaning at all. It seems clear to me that these words were introduced to give the debtor time within which to pay the debt and that within that time the promisee could not enforce the debt. It follows that the promissory note is not one payable on demand.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The aforesaid decision was followed in the case of Thenappa Chettiar v. Andiyapaa Chettiar reported in AIR 1971 Madras 290 as well as in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Halwai reported in AIR 1981 Allahabad 58.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. In a decision reported in AIR 1995 TRA-00. 65 (Aiyappankutty v. Mathoo Mathai and others) the Court while relying on the decision in AIR (32) Madras 42 (supra) held as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'xx xx xx The words 'payable on demand' occurring in a promissory note mean payable 'at once.' forthwith' or 'immediately' and a promissory note payable on a specified date or after a specified period or within a certain time can hence be considered only as a promissory note payable otherwise than on demand. A promissory note payable on demand is payable without any demand and the true import of the words 'on demand' is that the debt is due and payable immediately.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Looking into the recitals made in the promissory note, it transpires from the order-sheet dated 31.7.95 of the learned trial Judge as well as from the impugned order that this is a case where money shall be payable within 25.2.89 and rest amount of Rs. 85,000/- within 30.4.89 in three instalments. The said document cannot be construed to be a promissory note payable on demand and it certainly falls within the category 'when payable otherwise on demand'. Therefore, unless it is stamped as required under Article 49 (b) of the Schedule-I appended to the Act, it is inadmissible in evidence. Accordingly I do not find any irregularity in the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge to interfere with the same. But at the same time. I direct the learned trial Judge to conclude the Money Suit No. 107 of 1991 within a period of six months after the impounding proceeding is over.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(II)OLR316', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kanhu Charan Moharana', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '537006' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: Article 49, the Indian Stamp Act, Article 49 of the Act, Article 49 of the Act, Article 49, Madras 42, Article 49
ORG: Bimala Prasad Das, Civil Judge (Senior Division, Sambalpur, Money Suit, 31.7.1995, Civil Judge (Senior Division, Sambalpur, Court, Court, Court, the Civil Judge (Senior Division, Bill of Exchange, AIR, AIR, AIR 1981 Allahabad, Court, AIR, the Money Suit No
NORP: J.1
CARDINAL: 8.5.2001, 107, 40, 31.7.95, 250, Ten, 250, 1,000, Fifteen, Twenty-five, 13, 30.4.89, three, one, 65, 32, 31.7.95, 25.2.89, 30.4.89, three, 107
DATE: 1991, 1899, 25th February, 1989, 32) 1945, two years, two years', 1971, 58.6, 1995 TRA-00., 1991, a period of, six months
PERSON: Schedule, J. K. Nayak, Alamelu Ammal v., P. Rangai Gounder, Lordships, Andiyapaa Chettiar, Raj Bahadur Singh v., Aiyappankutty v., Mathoo Mathai, Madras, Schedule
GPE: Thenappa, Halwai, AIR