Semantic Analysis by spaCy
Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr Vs. Income Tax Officer
Decided On : May-11-2000
Court : Madhya Pradesh
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Petn. No. 1053 of 1988 11 May 2000', 'appellant' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr Vs. Income Tax Officer', 'casenote' => 'Counsels: P.M Choudhary, for the Assessee R.L. Jain, for the Revenue In the Madhya Pradesh High Court : Indore Bench N.K. Jain, J. - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs. - The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. 6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :147. if- (a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year). 7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) , failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer. [1961]41ITR191(SC) ,while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' P.M Choudhary, <i>for the Assessee</i> R.L. Jain, <i>for the Revenue</i>', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2000-05-11', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => '', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N. K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner who is an assessee both under the Income Tax Act and Wealth Tax Act, by the petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question two notices both dated 18-3-1988 (vide Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent. The Income Tax Officer M-Ward, Circle-I, Indore, under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act, (as it stood before the amendment of 1987), calling upon the petitioner to submit fresh return of his income for assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86.<p style="text-align: justify;">2. At the outset it may be noted that the practice of this court has been not to interfere in such matters at the stage of issuance of notices and leave the aggrieved party first to answer such notices and exhaust alternative remedies provided under the ordinary law before invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226/227. However, in the instance case, it is noticed that the present petition stands admitted way back in 1988 and the petitioner has challenged the very jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer Indore to issue the impugned notices. I, therefore, proceed to examine the merits of the case so as to find out whether any ground as envisaged under section 147(a) existed for exercising jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision.<p style="text-align: justify;">3. Factual metrix of the case lies in a narrow compass. Petitioner Late Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (he has died during the pendency of this petition and in now represented by his son Debashish), was assessed for the assessment year 1984-85 and 1985-86 by the Income Tax Officer, Indore, vide his orders dated 20-11-1984 and 28-9-1987 (Annexures P/9 and P/10). The order (P/9) was passed under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act while (P/10) was made under section 143(1) of the Act. The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. The copies of the sale deeds together with valuation reports (vide Annexures P/3, P/4, P/6 and P/7) were also annexed to these computations. The returns were duly acknowledged by the Income Tax Officer vide acknowledgments P/5 and P/8. The Income Tax Officer finally passed orders P/9 and P/10.<p style="text-align: justify;">4. The dispute centres around the capital gains received by the petitioner by way of sale of his immovable properties. The respondent while issuing impugned notices (P/11 and P/12), has recorded his reasons (vide Annexures R/1 and R/2) that the income from sale of immovable properties shown by the petitioner was not disclosed fully and truly inasmuch as the sales in question were made in favour of his own close relations and that the prevailing market price of the properties was much more than that was indicated in the sale deeds and the returns. The learned Income Tax Officer drew the aforesaid inference on the basis of certain facts discovered by him while assessing the petitioner under the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment year 1983-84.<p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have heard Shri P. M. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.L. Jain, learned counsel for respondent.<p style="text-align: justify;">6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">147. ' if-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx</p><p style="text-align: justify;">he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).<p style="text-align: justify;">7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act two conditions must be satisfied :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment ; and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) that he must have reason to believe that such income escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) to make the return under section 139 of the Act; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for his assessment for that year.<p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the present case we are concerned only with the condition (ii)(b) i.e., failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer.<p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case, the petitioner had not only disclosed the facts relating to sale of his immovable properties but also filed true copies of the sale deeds along with his returns and computation sheets. The sale deeds contained all necessary particulars i.e., full description of the properties sold, the names and other particulars of the purchasers and the sale price for which the sale was affected. All basic and primary facts were placed before the Income Tax Officer for making the assessments for relevant years. Whether or not the sale price indicated in the sale deeds was correct and commensurate to the prevailing market price of such property, was a question of inquiry and inference to be made by the Income Tax Officer. Certainly the petitioner was not expected to say that the price indicated in the sale deeds was much lower than the actual market value of the property.<p style="text-align: justify;">10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. : [1961]41ITR191(SC) , while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. What facts were material and necessary for assessment differed from case to case. In every assessment proceeding, the assessing authority would, for the purpose of computing or determining the proper tax due from an assessee, require to know all the facts which help him in coming to the correct conclusion. From the primary facts in his possession, whether on disclosure by the assessee, or discovered by him on the basis of the facts disclosed, or otherwise, the assessing authority had to draw inferences as regards certain other facts; and ultimately from the primary facts and the further facts inferred from them, the authority had to draw the proper legal inferences and ascertain, on a correct interpretation of the taxing enactment, the proper tax leviable. So far as primary facts were concerned, it was the assessee's duty to disclose all of them including particular entries in account books, particular portions of documents, and documents and other evidence which could have been discovered by the assessing authority, from the documents and other evidence disclosed. The duty however did not, extend beyond the full and truthful disclosure of all primary facts. Once all the primary facts were before the assessing authority, it was for him to decide what inferences of facts could be reasonably drawn and what legal inferences had ultimately to be drawn. It was not for anybody else-far less the assessee-to tell the assessing authority what inferences, whether of facts or law, should be drawn.'<p style="text-align: justify;">11. Division Bench of this court in Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer : [1983]144ITR180(MP) , while dealing with a similar provision of section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Held, that the petitioner had disclosed the valuation of her lands on the basis of her earlier valuations and had also disclosed the facts about sales of parcels of land during the previous years relevant to the assessment year in question. If the Wealth Tax Officer doubted the correctness of the valuation, it was open to the department to get the same valued by its own valuer or to have recorded evidence about the real market value of the lands on the valuation date. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid.'<p style="text-align: justify;">12. As already pointed out, the petitioner in the instant case had disclosed all primary and basic facts while submitting his returns for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. In case the Income Tax Officer entertained any doubt as to the correctness of the sale price indicated in the said deeds, it was open to the revenue to get the same valued by its own valuer or make other enquiries necessary to ascertain the correct valuation. Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the omission with effect from 1-4-1988, gave ample powers to the assessing authority to make necessary enquiries and substitute a fair market value of the capital assets on the dates of such transfers. So far as the petitioner is concerned, his only obligation was to place the necessary basic facts before the Income Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the properties sold by him. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) are quashed. No order is, however, made as to the costs of this petition. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner after verification.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2000)162CTR(MP)386', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'income Tax Officer', 'sub' => 'Direct Taxation', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '511150' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr Vs. 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Petn. No. 1053 of 1988 11 May 2000', 'appellant' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr Vs. Income Tax Officer', 'casenote' => 'Counsels: P.M Choudhary, for the Assessee R.L. Jain, for the Revenue In the Madhya Pradesh High Court : Indore Bench N.K. Jain, J. - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs. - The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. 6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :147. if- (a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year). 7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) , failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer. [1961]41ITR191(SC) ,while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' P.M Choudhary, <i>for the Assessee</i> R.L. Jain, <i>for the Revenue</i>', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2000-05-11', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => '', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N. K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner who is an assessee both under the Income Tax Act and Wealth Tax Act, by the petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question two notices both dated 18-3-1988 (vide Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent. The Income Tax Officer M-Ward, Circle-I, Indore, under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act, (as it stood before the amendment of 1987), calling upon the petitioner to submit fresh return of his income for assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86.<p style="text-align: justify;">2. At the outset it may be noted that the practice of this court has been not to interfere in such matters at the stage of issuance of notices and leave the aggrieved party first to answer such notices and exhaust alternative remedies provided under the ordinary law before invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226/227. However, in the instance case, it is noticed that the present petition stands admitted way back in 1988 and the petitioner has challenged the very jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer Indore to issue the impugned notices. I, therefore, proceed to examine the merits of the case so as to find out whether any ground as envisaged under section 147(a) existed for exercising jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision.<p style="text-align: justify;">3. Factual metrix of the case lies in a narrow compass. Petitioner Late Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (he has died during the pendency of this petition and in now represented by his son Debashish), was assessed for the assessment year 1984-85 and 1985-86 by the Income Tax Officer, Indore, vide his orders dated 20-11-1984 and 28-9-1987 (Annexures P/9 and P/10). The order (P/9) was passed under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act while (P/10) was made under section 143(1) of the Act. The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. The copies of the sale deeds together with valuation reports (vide Annexures P/3, P/4, P/6 and P/7) were also annexed to these computations. The returns were duly acknowledged by the Income Tax Officer vide acknowledgments P/5 and P/8. The Income Tax Officer finally passed orders P/9 and P/10.<p style="text-align: justify;">4. The dispute centres around the capital gains received by the petitioner by way of sale of his immovable properties. The respondent while issuing impugned notices (P/11 and P/12), has recorded his reasons (vide Annexures R/1 and R/2) that the income from sale of immovable properties shown by the petitioner was not disclosed fully and truly inasmuch as the sales in question were made in favour of his own close relations and that the prevailing market price of the properties was much more than that was indicated in the sale deeds and the returns. The learned Income Tax Officer drew the aforesaid inference on the basis of certain facts discovered by him while assessing the petitioner under the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment year 1983-84.<p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have heard Shri P. M. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.L. Jain, learned counsel for respondent.<p style="text-align: justify;">6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">147. ' if-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx</p><p style="text-align: justify;">he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).<p style="text-align: justify;">7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act two conditions must be satisfied :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment ; and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) that he must have reason to believe that such income escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) to make the return under section 139 of the Act; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for his assessment for that year.<p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the present case we are concerned only with the condition (ii)(b) i.e., failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer.<p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case, the petitioner had not only disclosed the facts relating to sale of his immovable properties but also filed true copies of the sale deeds along with his returns and computation sheets. The sale deeds contained all necessary particulars i.e., full description of the properties sold, the names and other particulars of the purchasers and the sale price for which the sale was affected. All basic and primary facts were placed before the Income Tax Officer for making the assessments for relevant years. Whether or not the sale price indicated in the sale deeds was correct and commensurate to the prevailing market price of such property, was a question of inquiry and inference to be made by the Income Tax Officer. Certainly the petitioner was not expected to say that the price indicated in the sale deeds was much lower than the actual market value of the property.<p style="text-align: justify;">10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. : [1961]41ITR191(SC) , while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. What facts were material and necessary for assessment differed from case to case. In every assessment proceeding, the assessing authority would, for the purpose of computing or determining the proper tax due from an assessee, require to know all the facts which help him in coming to the correct conclusion. From the primary facts in his possession, whether on disclosure by the assessee, or discovered by him on the basis of the facts disclosed, or otherwise, the assessing authority had to draw inferences as regards certain other facts; and ultimately from the primary facts and the further facts inferred from them, the authority had to draw the proper legal inferences and ascertain, on a correct interpretation of the taxing enactment, the proper tax leviable. So far as primary facts were concerned, it was the assessee's duty to disclose all of them including particular entries in account books, particular portions of documents, and documents and other evidence which could have been discovered by the assessing authority, from the documents and other evidence disclosed. The duty however did not, extend beyond the full and truthful disclosure of all primary facts. Once all the primary facts were before the assessing authority, it was for him to decide what inferences of facts could be reasonably drawn and what legal inferences had ultimately to be drawn. It was not for anybody else-far less the assessee-to tell the assessing authority what inferences, whether of facts or law, should be drawn.'<p style="text-align: justify;">11. Division Bench of this court in Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer : [1983]144ITR180(MP) , while dealing with a similar provision of section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Held, that the petitioner had disclosed the valuation of her lands on the basis of her earlier valuations and had also disclosed the facts about sales of parcels of land during the previous years relevant to the assessment year in question. If the Wealth Tax Officer doubted the correctness of the valuation, it was open to the department to get the same valued by its own valuer or to have recorded evidence about the real market value of the lands on the valuation date. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid.'<p style="text-align: justify;">12. As already pointed out, the petitioner in the instant case had disclosed all primary and basic facts while submitting his returns for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. In case the Income Tax Officer entertained any doubt as to the correctness of the sale price indicated in the said deeds, it was open to the revenue to get the same valued by its own valuer or make other enquiries necessary to ascertain the correct valuation. Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the omission with effect from 1-4-1988, gave ample powers to the assessing authority to make necessary enquiries and substitute a fair market value of the capital assets on the dates of such transfers. So far as the petitioner is concerned, his only obligation was to place the necessary basic facts before the Income Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the properties sold by him. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) are quashed. No order is, however, made as to the costs of this petition. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner after verification.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2000)162CTR(MP)386', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'income Tax Officer', 'sub' => 'Direct Taxation', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '511150' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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Jain', (int) 1 => 'Kumar Dey', (int) 2 => 'Debashish', (int) 3 => 'P/2', (int) 4 => 'P/4', (int) 5 => 'R/2', (int) 6 => 'Shri P. M. Choudhary', (int) 7 => 'Shri R.L. Jain' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '226', (int) 1 => '227', (int) 2 => 'two', (int) 3 => '18-3-1988', (int) 4 => '28', (int) 5 => '1-4-1989', (int) 6 => '147', (int) 7 => '148', (int) 8 => '153', (int) 9 => '148', (int) 10 => '153', (int) 11 => 'two', (int) 12 => '1961]41ITR191(SC', (int) 13 => '1983]144ITR180(MP', (int) 14 => '1-4-1988', (int) 15 => 'two', (int) 16 => 'two' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'India', (int) 1 => 'Smt' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1987', (int) 1 => 'years 1984-85', (int) 2 => '1985-86.2', (int) 3 => '1988', (int) 4 => 'the assessment year 1984-85', (int) 5 => '1985-86', (int) 6 => '20-11-1984', (int) 7 => 'two years', (int) 8 => 'year 1983-84.5', (int) 9 => '1987', (int) 10 => 'that year', (int) 11 => 'that year', (int) 12 => 'the assessment year', (int) 13 => '1922', (int) 14 => 'that year'', (int) 15 => ''11', (int) 16 => '1957', (int) 17 => 'the previous years', (int) 18 => 'years', (int) 19 => ''12', (int) 20 => 'years 1984-85', (int) 21 => '1985-86', (int) 22 => 'years' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'first' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '511150', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => 'Writ Misc. Petn. No. 1053 of 1988 11 May 2000', 'appellant' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr Vs. Income Tax Officer', 'casenote' => 'Counsels: P.M Choudhary, for the Assessee R.L. Jain, for the Revenue In the Madhya Pradesh High Court : Indore Bench N.K. Jain, J. - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs. - The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. 6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :147. if- (a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year). 7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) , failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer. [1961]41ITR191(SC) ,while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' P.M Choudhary, <i>for the Assessee</i> R.L. Jain, <i>for the Revenue</i>', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2000-05-11', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => '', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N. K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner who is an assessee both under the Income Tax Act and Wealth Tax Act, by the petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question two notices both dated 18-3-1988 (vide Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent. The Income Tax Officer M-Ward, Circle-I, Indore, under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act, (as it stood before the amendment of 1987), calling upon the petitioner to submit fresh return of his income for assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86.<p style="text-align: justify;">2. At the outset it may be noted that the practice of this court has been not to interfere in such matters at the stage of issuance of notices and leave the aggrieved party first to answer such notices and exhaust alternative remedies provided under the ordinary law before invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226/227. However, in the instance case, it is noticed that the present petition stands admitted way back in 1988 and the petitioner has challenged the very jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer Indore to issue the impugned notices. I, therefore, proceed to examine the merits of the case so as to find out whether any ground as envisaged under section 147(a) existed for exercising jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision.<p style="text-align: justify;">3. Factual metrix of the case lies in a narrow compass. Petitioner Late Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (he has died during the pendency of this petition and in now represented by his son Debashish), was assessed for the assessment year 1984-85 and 1985-86 by the Income Tax Officer, Indore, vide his orders dated 20-11-1984 and 28-9-1987 (Annexures P/9 and P/10). The order (P/9) was passed under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act while (P/10) was made under section 143(1) of the Act. The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. The copies of the sale deeds together with valuation reports (vide Annexures P/3, P/4, P/6 and P/7) were also annexed to these computations. The returns were duly acknowledged by the Income Tax Officer vide acknowledgments P/5 and P/8. The Income Tax Officer finally passed orders P/9 and P/10.<p style="text-align: justify;">4. The dispute centres around the capital gains received by the petitioner by way of sale of his immovable properties. The respondent while issuing impugned notices (P/11 and P/12), has recorded his reasons (vide Annexures R/1 and R/2) that the income from sale of immovable properties shown by the petitioner was not disclosed fully and truly inasmuch as the sales in question were made in favour of his own close relations and that the prevailing market price of the properties was much more than that was indicated in the sale deeds and the returns. The learned Income Tax Officer drew the aforesaid inference on the basis of certain facts discovered by him while assessing the petitioner under the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment year 1983-84.<p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have heard Shri P. M. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.L. Jain, learned counsel for respondent.<p style="text-align: justify;">6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">147. ' if-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx</p><p style="text-align: justify;">he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).<p style="text-align: justify;">7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act two conditions must be satisfied :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment ; and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) that he must have reason to believe that such income escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) to make the return under section 139 of the Act; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for his assessment for that year.<p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the present case we are concerned only with the condition (ii)(b) i.e., failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer.<p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case, the petitioner had not only disclosed the facts relating to sale of his immovable properties but also filed true copies of the sale deeds along with his returns and computation sheets. The sale deeds contained all necessary particulars i.e., full description of the properties sold, the names and other particulars of the purchasers and the sale price for which the sale was affected. All basic and primary facts were placed before the Income Tax Officer for making the assessments for relevant years. Whether or not the sale price indicated in the sale deeds was correct and commensurate to the prevailing market price of such property, was a question of inquiry and inference to be made by the Income Tax Officer. Certainly the petitioner was not expected to say that the price indicated in the sale deeds was much lower than the actual market value of the property.<p style="text-align: justify;">10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. : [1961]41ITR191(SC) , while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. What facts were material and necessary for assessment differed from case to case. In every assessment proceeding, the assessing authority would, for the purpose of computing or determining the proper tax due from an assessee, require to know all the facts which help him in coming to the correct conclusion. From the primary facts in his possession, whether on disclosure by the assessee, or discovered by him on the basis of the facts disclosed, or otherwise, the assessing authority had to draw inferences as regards certain other facts; and ultimately from the primary facts and the further facts inferred from them, the authority had to draw the proper legal inferences and ascertain, on a correct interpretation of the taxing enactment, the proper tax leviable. So far as primary facts were concerned, it was the assessee's duty to disclose all of them including particular entries in account books, particular portions of documents, and documents and other evidence which could have been discovered by the assessing authority, from the documents and other evidence disclosed. The duty however did not, extend beyond the full and truthful disclosure of all primary facts. Once all the primary facts were before the assessing authority, it was for him to decide what inferences of facts could be reasonably drawn and what legal inferences had ultimately to be drawn. It was not for anybody else-far less the assessee-to tell the assessing authority what inferences, whether of facts or law, should be drawn.'<p style="text-align: justify;">11. Division Bench of this court in Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer : [1983]144ITR180(MP) , while dealing with a similar provision of section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Held, that the petitioner had disclosed the valuation of her lands on the basis of her earlier valuations and had also disclosed the facts about sales of parcels of land during the previous years relevant to the assessment year in question. If the Wealth Tax Officer doubted the correctness of the valuation, it was open to the department to get the same valued by its own valuer or to have recorded evidence about the real market value of the lands on the valuation date. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid.'<p style="text-align: justify;">12. As already pointed out, the petitioner in the instant case had disclosed all primary and basic facts while submitting his returns for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. In case the Income Tax Officer entertained any doubt as to the correctness of the sale price indicated in the said deeds, it was open to the revenue to get the same valued by its own valuer or make other enquiries necessary to ascertain the correct valuation. Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the omission with effect from 1-4-1988, gave ample powers to the assessing authority to make necessary enquiries and substitute a fair market value of the capital assets on the dates of such transfers. So far as the petitioner is concerned, his only obligation was to place the necessary basic facts before the Income Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the properties sold by him. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) are quashed. No order is, however, made as to the costs of this petition. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner after verification.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2000)162CTR(MP)386', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'income Tax Officer', 'sub' => 'Direct Taxation', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '511150' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr Vs. 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Jain', (int) 1 => 'Kumar Dey', (int) 2 => 'Debashish', (int) 3 => 'P/2', (int) 4 => 'P/4', (int) 5 => 'R/2', (int) 6 => 'Shri P. M. Choudhary', (int) 7 => 'Shri R.L. Jain' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '226', (int) 1 => '227', (int) 2 => 'two', (int) 3 => '18-3-1988', (int) 4 => '28', (int) 5 => '1-4-1989', (int) 6 => '147', (int) 7 => '148', (int) 8 => '153', (int) 9 => '148', (int) 10 => '153', (int) 11 => 'two', (int) 12 => '1961]41ITR191(SC', (int) 13 => '1983]144ITR180(MP', (int) 14 => '1-4-1988', (int) 15 => 'two', (int) 16 => 'two' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'India', (int) 1 => 'Smt' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '1987', (int) 1 => 'years 1984-85', (int) 2 => '1985-86.2', (int) 3 => '1988', (int) 4 => 'the assessment year 1984-85', (int) 5 => '1985-86', (int) 6 => '20-11-1984', (int) 7 => 'two years', (int) 8 => 'year 1983-84.5', (int) 9 => '1987', (int) 10 => 'that year', (int) 11 => 'that year', (int) 12 => 'the assessment year', (int) 13 => '1922', (int) 14 => 'that year'', (int) 15 => ''11', (int) 16 => '1957', (int) 17 => 'the previous years', (int) 18 => 'years', (int) 19 => ''12', (int) 20 => 'years 1984-85', (int) 21 => '1985-86', (int) 22 => 'years' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'first' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '511150', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => 'Writ Misc. Petn. No. 1053 of 1988 11 May 2000', 'appellant' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (Decd.) Through Lr Vs. Income Tax Officer', 'casenote' => 'Counsels: P.M Choudhary, for the Assessee R.L. Jain, for the Revenue In the Madhya Pradesh High Court : Indore Bench N.K. Jain, J. - Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act has a very wide connotation. As the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. Keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. It does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. Section 65(76b) of Finance Act used the words but it does not include. Thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. By virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. It is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. Regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the Finance Act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(f) of the 1944 Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the C.B.E.C. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the Act. It would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. In the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. Colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. Thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. This is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. If the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act, 1944. As per the M.P. Country Spirits Rules as well as Clause 6 of the Tender Conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. Therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 Central Excise Act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in Section 65(76b) of the Finance Act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs. - The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. 6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :147. if- (a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year). 7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) , failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer. [1961]41ITR191(SC) ,while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' P.M Choudhary, <i>for the Assessee</i> R.L. Jain, <i>for the Revenue</i>', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2000-05-11', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => '', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N. K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner who is an assessee both under the Income Tax Act and Wealth Tax Act, by the petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question two notices both dated 18-3-1988 (vide Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent. The Income Tax Officer M-Ward, Circle-I, Indore, under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act, (as it stood before the amendment of 1987), calling upon the petitioner to submit fresh return of his income for assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86.<p style="text-align: justify;">2. At the outset it may be noted that the practice of this court has been not to interfere in such matters at the stage of issuance of notices and leave the aggrieved party first to answer such notices and exhaust alternative remedies provided under the ordinary law before invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226/227. However, in the instance case, it is noticed that the present petition stands admitted way back in 1988 and the petitioner has challenged the very jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer Indore to issue the impugned notices. I, therefore, proceed to examine the merits of the case so as to find out whether any ground as envisaged under section 147(a) existed for exercising jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision.<p style="text-align: justify;">3. Factual metrix of the case lies in a narrow compass. Petitioner Late Dr. Santosh Kumar Dey (he has died during the pendency of this petition and in now represented by his son Debashish), was assessed for the assessment year 1984-85 and 1985-86 by the Income Tax Officer, Indore, vide his orders dated 20-11-1984 and 28-9-1987 (Annexures P/9 and P/10). The order (P/9) was passed under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act while (P/10) was made under section 143(1) of the Act. The returns submitted by the petitioner for the aforesaid two years were accompanied by the computations of the income (vide Annexures P/1 and P/2) which clearly showed the capital gains received by the petitioner by sale of his immovable properties. The copies of the sale deeds together with valuation reports (vide Annexures P/3, P/4, P/6 and P/7) were also annexed to these computations. The returns were duly acknowledged by the Income Tax Officer vide acknowledgments P/5 and P/8. The Income Tax Officer finally passed orders P/9 and P/10.<p style="text-align: justify;">4. The dispute centres around the capital gains received by the petitioner by way of sale of his immovable properties. The respondent while issuing impugned notices (P/11 and P/12), has recorded his reasons (vide Annexures R/1 and R/2) that the income from sale of immovable properties shown by the petitioner was not disclosed fully and truly inasmuch as the sales in question were made in favour of his own close relations and that the prevailing market price of the properties was much more than that was indicated in the sale deeds and the returns. The learned Income Tax Officer drew the aforesaid inference on the basis of certain facts discovered by him while assessing the petitioner under the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment year 1983-84.<p style="text-align: justify;">5. I have heard Shri P. M. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.L. Jain, learned counsel for respondent.<p style="text-align: justify;">6. Relevant clause (a) of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1987 (with effect from 1-4-1989 read as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">147. ' if-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) the assessing officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the assessing officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx</p><p style="text-align: justify;">he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).<p style="text-align: justify;">7. A reading of the aforesaid provision would show that for assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer to initiate proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act two conditions must be satisfied :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) that the Income Tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment ; and</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) that he must have reason to believe that such income escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) to make the return under section 139 of the Act; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for his assessment for that year.<p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the present case we are concerned only with the condition (ii)(b) i.e., failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts necessary for the assessment inasmuch as it is this failure which is attributed to the petitioner by the Income Tax Officer.<p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case, the petitioner had not only disclosed the facts relating to sale of his immovable properties but also filed true copies of the sale deeds along with his returns and computation sheets. The sale deeds contained all necessary particulars i.e., full description of the properties sold, the names and other particulars of the purchasers and the sale price for which the sale was affected. All basic and primary facts were placed before the Income Tax Officer for making the assessments for relevant years. Whether or not the sale price indicated in the sale deeds was correct and commensurate to the prevailing market price of such property, was a question of inquiry and inference to be made by the Income Tax Officer. Certainly the petitioner was not expected to say that the price indicated in the sale deeds was much lower than the actual market value of the property.<p style="text-align: justify;">10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. : [1961]41ITR191(SC) , while construing a similar provision of section 34 of the old Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'(ii) That the words 'omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year' used in section 34 postulated a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. What facts were material and necessary for assessment differed from case to case. In every assessment proceeding, the assessing authority would, for the purpose of computing or determining the proper tax due from an assessee, require to know all the facts which help him in coming to the correct conclusion. From the primary facts in his possession, whether on disclosure by the assessee, or discovered by him on the basis of the facts disclosed, or otherwise, the assessing authority had to draw inferences as regards certain other facts; and ultimately from the primary facts and the further facts inferred from them, the authority had to draw the proper legal inferences and ascertain, on a correct interpretation of the taxing enactment, the proper tax leviable. So far as primary facts were concerned, it was the assessee's duty to disclose all of them including particular entries in account books, particular portions of documents, and documents and other evidence which could have been discovered by the assessing authority, from the documents and other evidence disclosed. The duty however did not, extend beyond the full and truthful disclosure of all primary facts. Once all the primary facts were before the assessing authority, it was for him to decide what inferences of facts could be reasonably drawn and what legal inferences had ultimately to be drawn. It was not for anybody else-far less the assessee-to tell the assessing authority what inferences, whether of facts or law, should be drawn.'<p style="text-align: justify;">11. Division Bench of this court in Smt. Prabha Rajya Lakshmi v. Wealth Tax Officer : [1983]144ITR180(MP) , while dealing with a similar provision of section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, held :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Held, that the petitioner had disclosed the valuation of her lands on the basis of her earlier valuations and had also disclosed the facts about sales of parcels of land during the previous years relevant to the assessment year in question. If the Wealth Tax Officer doubted the correctness of the valuation, it was open to the department to get the same valued by its own valuer or to have recorded evidence about the real market value of the lands on the valuation date. As the petitioner had placed all the primary facts before the Wealth Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the agricultural lands, there was no failure on the part of the petitioner which would give jurisdiction to the Wealth Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 17(1)(a). Therefore, the notices issued by the Wealth Tax Officer were not valid.'<p style="text-align: justify;">12. As already pointed out, the petitioner in the instant case had disclosed all primary and basic facts while submitting his returns for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86. In case the Income Tax Officer entertained any doubt as to the correctness of the sale price indicated in the said deeds, it was open to the revenue to get the same valued by its own valuer or make other enquiries necessary to ascertain the correct valuation. Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, as it stood before the omission with effect from 1-4-1988, gave ample powers to the assessing authority to make necessary enquiries and substitute a fair market value of the capital assets on the dates of such transfers. So far as the petitioner is concerned, his only obligation was to place the necessary basic facts before the Income Tax Officer for the relevant assessment years with regard to the value of the properties sold by him. The petitioner having done so, there was no failure on his part which would give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(a). The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) issued by respondent-Income Tax Officer are, therefore, liable to be quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;">13. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The two notices (Annexures P/11 and P/12) are quashed. No order is, however, made as to the costs of this petition. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner after verification.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2000)162CTR(MP)386', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'income Tax Officer', 'sub' => 'Direct Taxation', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '511150' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: the Income Tax Act, the Income Tax Act, article 226/227, the Income Tax Act, section 143(1, the Wealth Tax Act, section 147, the Income Tax Act, the Income Tax Act, section 34, Indian Income Tax Act, section 34, the Wealth Tax Act, Section 52, the Income Tax Act
ORG: ORDERN, vide Annexures, the Income Tax Officer, Indore, Income Tax, the Income Tax Officer, Income Tax, the Supreme Court, Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd., Prabha Rajya Lakshmi
PERSON: K. Jain, Kumar Dey, Debashish, P/2, P/4, R/2, Shri P. M. Choudhary, Shri R.L. Jain
CARDINAL: 226, 227, two, 18-3-1988, 28, 1-4-1989, 147, 148, 153, 148, 153, two, 1961]41ITR191(SC, 1983]144ITR180(MP, 1-4-1988, two, two
GPE: India, Smt
DATE: 1987, years 1984-85, 1985-86.2, 1988, the assessment year 1984-85, 1985-86, 20-11-1984, two years, year 1983-84.5, 1987, that year, that year, the assessment year, 1922, that year', '11, 1957, the previous years, years, '12, years 1984-85, 1985-86, years
ORDINAL: first