Semantic Analysis by spaCy
Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors.
Decided On : Aug-30-1999
Court : Madhya Pradesh
Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]Code Context$shops2 = $shops['topics'];$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors. Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'S.P. Srivastava', (int) 1 => 'Kallu', (int) 2 => 'Rs', (int) 3 => 'Kallu', (int) 4 => 'interference therein.12' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal', (int) 1 => 'Letters Patent Appeal', (int) 2 => 'Tribunal', (int) 3 => 'Tribunal', (int) 4 => 'Tribunal', (int) 5 => 'Tribunal', (int) 6 => 'Tribunal', (int) 7 => 'Tribunal', (int) 8 => 'Kamata Prasad', (int) 9 => 'Tribunal', (int) 10 => 'the Apex Court', (int) 11 => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control', (int) 12 => 'Ors', (int) 13 => 'Court', (int) 14 => 'inevitable.10', (int) 15 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 16 => 'Tribunal', (int) 17 => 'Tribunal' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '5,39,000/-', (int) 1 => '25,000/-', (int) 2 => '25,000/-', (int) 3 => '1', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '3', (int) 6 => '500/-', (int) 7 => '3', (int) 8 => 'two' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the impugned order.3', (int) 1 => 'about 45 to 50 years', (int) 2 => '1,000/- per month', (int) 3 => 'about 24 years', (int) 4 => '25,000/-only.6', (int) 5 => '1995]1SCR75' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single', (int) 1 => 'Single' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510630', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Pappu', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors.', 'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. stood clearly violated. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1999-08-30', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.P. Srivastava and; N.G. Karambelkar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.P. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. Perused the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The claimant-appellant feels aggrieved by an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whereunder as against his claim for a compensation of an amount of Rs. 5,39,000/- on the ground of death of his father in the motor accident, he had been awarded a sum of only Rs. 25,000/- against the owner and the driver exonerating the insurer. He had filed an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act confining his claim to Rs. 90,000/- only, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Being aggrieved the claimant-appellant has now come up in Letters Patent Appeal seeking reversal of the impugned order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has affirmed the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal determining the amount of compensation at a figure of Rs. 25,000/- recoverable from respondents No. 1 and 2, owner and driver respectively exonerating the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of the compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Tribunal in its impugned order has found that the accident resulting in the death of the father of the appellant had occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the tractor which was the offending vehicle. It has further been found that Kallu, the deceased was aged about 45 to 50 years at the time of his death and his income as a labourer has been determined at a figure of Rs. 1,000/- per month. The appellant was found to be the only dependent of the deceased. For the purposes of computation of the net income per annum after excluding Rs. 500/- per month towards personal expenditure the amount of yearly income has been determined to be at a figure of Rs. 6,000/-. The Tribunal further found that the deceased had not left any widow, minor children or his parents. His only successor-in-interest was the appellant who was aged about 24 years and was a married person having children. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that it could not be established that the appellant was in any manner dependent upon the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In the aforesaid circumstances the Tribunal has proceeded to determine the quantum of compensation holding that guidelines referred to in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be taken to be relevant. The quantum of compensation to which the appellant was found entitled has been determined to be Rs. 25,000/-only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. In either case, however, the terms and conditions; subject to which the offending vehicle had been insured; stood clearly violated. The Tribunal found an additional ground to have been established for exonerating the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation which was to the effect that the offending vehicle had been used for business purposes, carrying the bricks from the bricked-klin of Kamata Prasad Shivhare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings returned by the Tribunal against the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned the appellant has claimed enhancement by awarding an additional amount of Rs. 65,000/- as indicated in the memo of appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in : [1995]1SCR75 had indicated that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expense incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further observed that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">whenever a Tribunal or Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. However/all such elements are required to be viewed with objective standards. While assessing damage, the Court cannot base its opinion merely on speculation or fancy though conjectures to some extent is inevitable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court indicated hereinabove, we are not inclined to interfere in the findings returned against the petitioner by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of quantum of compensation is concerned suffice it to say that the learned Counsel for the appellant has not disputed that the cover-note in respect of the insurance of the offending vehicle which had been filed on record and relied upon by the appellant had been duly proved. Even, this cover-note indicated that the offending vehicle had been insured subject to the condition that it was not to be used for any purpose other than the agricultural purposes. The insurance-policy which had been exhibited as Ex. D-1 also indicated that the insurance of the offending vehicle was subject to the aforesaid condition. On the facts found by the Tribunal it was apparent that the offending vehicle was being used at the time of the accident in clear breach of the terms and conditions subject to which the insurer had undertaken to discharge the liability fastened on the owner of the offending vehicle. The findings returned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid connection do not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify interference therein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'I(2000)ACC22', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Omprakash and Two ors.', 'sub' => 'Insurance;Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '510630' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'S.P. Srivastava', (int) 1 => 'Kallu', (int) 2 => 'Rs', (int) 3 => 'Kallu', (int) 4 => 'interference therein.12' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal', (int) 1 => 'Letters Patent Appeal', (int) 2 => 'Tribunal', (int) 3 => 'Tribunal', (int) 4 => 'Tribunal', (int) 5 => 'Tribunal', (int) 6 => 'Tribunal', (int) 7 => 'Tribunal', (int) 8 => 'Kamata Prasad', (int) 9 => 'Tribunal', (int) 10 => 'the Apex Court', (int) 11 => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control', (int) 12 => 'Ors', (int) 13 => 'Court', (int) 14 => 'inevitable.10', (int) 15 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 16 => 'Tribunal', (int) 17 => 'Tribunal' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '5,39,000/-', (int) 1 => '25,000/-', (int) 2 => '25,000/-', (int) 3 => '1', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '3', (int) 6 => '500/-', (int) 7 => '3', (int) 8 => 'two' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the impugned order.3', (int) 1 => 'about 45 to 50 years', (int) 2 => '1,000/- per month', (int) 3 => 'about 24 years', (int) 4 => '25,000/-only.6', (int) 5 => '1995]1SCR75' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single', (int) 1 => 'Single' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510630', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Pappu', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors.', 'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. stood clearly violated. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1999-08-30', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.P. Srivastava and; N.G. Karambelkar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.P. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. Perused the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The claimant-appellant feels aggrieved by an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whereunder as against his claim for a compensation of an amount of Rs. 5,39,000/- on the ground of death of his father in the motor accident, he had been awarded a sum of only Rs. 25,000/- against the owner and the driver exonerating the insurer. He had filed an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act confining his claim to Rs. 90,000/- only, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Being aggrieved the claimant-appellant has now come up in Letters Patent Appeal seeking reversal of the impugned order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has affirmed the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal determining the amount of compensation at a figure of Rs. 25,000/- recoverable from respondents No. 1 and 2, owner and driver respectively exonerating the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of the compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Tribunal in its impugned order has found that the accident resulting in the death of the father of the appellant had occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the tractor which was the offending vehicle. It has further been found that Kallu, the deceased was aged about 45 to 50 years at the time of his death and his income as a labourer has been determined at a figure of Rs. 1,000/- per month. The appellant was found to be the only dependent of the deceased. For the purposes of computation of the net income per annum after excluding Rs. 500/- per month towards personal expenditure the amount of yearly income has been determined to be at a figure of Rs. 6,000/-. The Tribunal further found that the deceased had not left any widow, minor children or his parents. His only successor-in-interest was the appellant who was aged about 24 years and was a married person having children. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that it could not be established that the appellant was in any manner dependent upon the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In the aforesaid circumstances the Tribunal has proceeded to determine the quantum of compensation holding that guidelines referred to in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be taken to be relevant. The quantum of compensation to which the appellant was found entitled has been determined to be Rs. 25,000/-only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. In either case, however, the terms and conditions; subject to which the offending vehicle had been insured; stood clearly violated. The Tribunal found an additional ground to have been established for exonerating the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation which was to the effect that the offending vehicle had been used for business purposes, carrying the bricks from the bricked-klin of Kamata Prasad Shivhare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings returned by the Tribunal against the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned the appellant has claimed enhancement by awarding an additional amount of Rs. 65,000/- as indicated in the memo of appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in : [1995]1SCR75 had indicated that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expense incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further observed that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">whenever a Tribunal or Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. However/all such elements are required to be viewed with objective standards. While assessing damage, the Court cannot base its opinion merely on speculation or fancy though conjectures to some extent is inevitable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court indicated hereinabove, we are not inclined to interfere in the findings returned against the petitioner by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of quantum of compensation is concerned suffice it to say that the learned Counsel for the appellant has not disputed that the cover-note in respect of the insurance of the offending vehicle which had been filed on record and relied upon by the appellant had been duly proved. Even, this cover-note indicated that the offending vehicle had been insured subject to the condition that it was not to be used for any purpose other than the agricultural purposes. The insurance-policy which had been exhibited as Ex. D-1 also indicated that the insurance of the offending vehicle was subject to the aforesaid condition. On the facts found by the Tribunal it was apparent that the offending vehicle was being used at the time of the accident in clear breach of the terms and conditions subject to which the insurer had undertaken to discharge the liability fastened on the owner of the offending vehicle. The findings returned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid connection do not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify interference therein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'I(2000)ACC22', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Omprakash and Two ors.', 'sub' => 'Insurance;Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '510630' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Warning (2): Invalid argument supplied for foreach() [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39]Code Context//$shops = $shops['entities'];foreach ($shops2 as $key => $val) {$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors. Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'S.P. Srivastava', (int) 1 => 'Kallu', (int) 2 => 'Rs', (int) 3 => 'Kallu', (int) 4 => 'interference therein.12' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal', (int) 1 => 'Letters Patent Appeal', (int) 2 => 'Tribunal', (int) 3 => 'Tribunal', (int) 4 => 'Tribunal', (int) 5 => 'Tribunal', (int) 6 => 'Tribunal', (int) 7 => 'Tribunal', (int) 8 => 'Kamata Prasad', (int) 9 => 'Tribunal', (int) 10 => 'the Apex Court', (int) 11 => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control', (int) 12 => 'Ors', (int) 13 => 'Court', (int) 14 => 'inevitable.10', (int) 15 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 16 => 'Tribunal', (int) 17 => 'Tribunal' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '5,39,000/-', (int) 1 => '25,000/-', (int) 2 => '25,000/-', (int) 3 => '1', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '3', (int) 6 => '500/-', (int) 7 => '3', (int) 8 => 'two' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the impugned order.3', (int) 1 => 'about 45 to 50 years', (int) 2 => '1,000/- per month', (int) 3 => 'about 24 years', (int) 4 => '25,000/-only.6', (int) 5 => '1995]1SCR75' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single', (int) 1 => 'Single' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510630', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Pappu', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors.', 'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. stood clearly violated. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1999-08-30', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.P. Srivastava and; N.G. Karambelkar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.P. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. Perused the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The claimant-appellant feels aggrieved by an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whereunder as against his claim for a compensation of an amount of Rs. 5,39,000/- on the ground of death of his father in the motor accident, he had been awarded a sum of only Rs. 25,000/- against the owner and the driver exonerating the insurer. He had filed an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act confining his claim to Rs. 90,000/- only, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Being aggrieved the claimant-appellant has now come up in Letters Patent Appeal seeking reversal of the impugned order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has affirmed the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal determining the amount of compensation at a figure of Rs. 25,000/- recoverable from respondents No. 1 and 2, owner and driver respectively exonerating the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of the compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Tribunal in its impugned order has found that the accident resulting in the death of the father of the appellant had occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the tractor which was the offending vehicle. It has further been found that Kallu, the deceased was aged about 45 to 50 years at the time of his death and his income as a labourer has been determined at a figure of Rs. 1,000/- per month. The appellant was found to be the only dependent of the deceased. For the purposes of computation of the net income per annum after excluding Rs. 500/- per month towards personal expenditure the amount of yearly income has been determined to be at a figure of Rs. 6,000/-. The Tribunal further found that the deceased had not left any widow, minor children or his parents. His only successor-in-interest was the appellant who was aged about 24 years and was a married person having children. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that it could not be established that the appellant was in any manner dependent upon the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In the aforesaid circumstances the Tribunal has proceeded to determine the quantum of compensation holding that guidelines referred to in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be taken to be relevant. The quantum of compensation to which the appellant was found entitled has been determined to be Rs. 25,000/-only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. In either case, however, the terms and conditions; subject to which the offending vehicle had been insured; stood clearly violated. The Tribunal found an additional ground to have been established for exonerating the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation which was to the effect that the offending vehicle had been used for business purposes, carrying the bricks from the bricked-klin of Kamata Prasad Shivhare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings returned by the Tribunal against the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned the appellant has claimed enhancement by awarding an additional amount of Rs. 65,000/- as indicated in the memo of appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in : [1995]1SCR75 had indicated that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expense incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further observed that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">whenever a Tribunal or Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. However/all such elements are required to be viewed with objective standards. While assessing damage, the Court cannot base its opinion merely on speculation or fancy though conjectures to some extent is inevitable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court indicated hereinabove, we are not inclined to interfere in the findings returned against the petitioner by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of quantum of compensation is concerned suffice it to say that the learned Counsel for the appellant has not disputed that the cover-note in respect of the insurance of the offending vehicle which had been filed on record and relied upon by the appellant had been duly proved. Even, this cover-note indicated that the offending vehicle had been insured subject to the condition that it was not to be used for any purpose other than the agricultural purposes. The insurance-policy which had been exhibited as Ex. D-1 also indicated that the insurance of the offending vehicle was subject to the aforesaid condition. On the facts found by the Tribunal it was apparent that the offending vehicle was being used at the time of the accident in clear breach of the terms and conditions subject to which the insurer had undertaken to discharge the liability fastened on the owner of the offending vehicle. The findings returned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid connection do not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify interference therein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'I(2000)ACC22', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Omprakash and Two ors.', 'sub' => 'Insurance;Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '510630' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act', (int) 1 => 'Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'S.P. Srivastava', (int) 1 => 'Kallu', (int) 2 => 'Rs', (int) 3 => 'Kallu', (int) 4 => 'interference therein.12' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal', (int) 1 => 'Letters Patent Appeal', (int) 2 => 'Tribunal', (int) 3 => 'Tribunal', (int) 4 => 'Tribunal', (int) 5 => 'Tribunal', (int) 6 => 'Tribunal', (int) 7 => 'Tribunal', (int) 8 => 'Kamata Prasad', (int) 9 => 'Tribunal', (int) 10 => 'the Apex Court', (int) 11 => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control', (int) 12 => 'Ors', (int) 13 => 'Court', (int) 14 => 'inevitable.10', (int) 15 => 'the Hon'ble Apex Court', (int) 16 => 'Tribunal', (int) 17 => 'Tribunal' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '5,39,000/-', (int) 1 => '25,000/-', (int) 2 => '25,000/-', (int) 3 => '1', (int) 4 => '2', (int) 5 => '3', (int) 6 => '500/-', (int) 7 => '3', (int) 8 => 'two' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the impugned order.3', (int) 1 => 'about 45 to 50 years', (int) 2 => '1,000/- per month', (int) 3 => 'about 24 years', (int) 4 => '25,000/-only.6', (int) 5 => '1995]1SCR75' ), 'WORK_OF_ART' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal' ), 'LOC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Single', (int) 1 => 'Single' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510630', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Pappu', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Pappu Vs. Omprakash and Two ors.', 'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. stood clearly violated. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1999-08-30', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.P. Srivastava and; N.G. Karambelkar, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.P. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. Perused the record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The claimant-appellant feels aggrieved by an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whereunder as against his claim for a compensation of an amount of Rs. 5,39,000/- on the ground of death of his father in the motor accident, he had been awarded a sum of only Rs. 25,000/- against the owner and the driver exonerating the insurer. He had filed an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act confining his claim to Rs. 90,000/- only, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Being aggrieved the claimant-appellant has now come up in Letters Patent Appeal seeking reversal of the impugned order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order has affirmed the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal determining the amount of compensation at a figure of Rs. 25,000/- recoverable from respondents No. 1 and 2, owner and driver respectively exonerating the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of the compensation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The Tribunal in its impugned order has found that the accident resulting in the death of the father of the appellant had occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the tractor which was the offending vehicle. It has further been found that Kallu, the deceased was aged about 45 to 50 years at the time of his death and his income as a labourer has been determined at a figure of Rs. 1,000/- per month. The appellant was found to be the only dependent of the deceased. For the purposes of computation of the net income per annum after excluding Rs. 500/- per month towards personal expenditure the amount of yearly income has been determined to be at a figure of Rs. 6,000/-. The Tribunal further found that the deceased had not left any widow, minor children or his parents. His only successor-in-interest was the appellant who was aged about 24 years and was a married person having children. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that it could not be established that the appellant was in any manner dependent upon the income of the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In the aforesaid circumstances the Tribunal has proceeded to determine the quantum of compensation holding that guidelines referred to in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be taken to be relevant. The quantum of compensation to which the appellant was found entitled has been determined to be Rs. 25,000/-only.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer, respondent No. 3, from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation was concerned the Tribunal had clearly found that the tractor at the time of accident was being used for a non-agricultural purpose. Kallu, the deceased as well as the appellant were found to have been travelling in the trolley, and had been allowed to travel either as a passenger on payment of fare or as a gratuitous passenger. In either case, however, the terms and conditions; subject to which the offending vehicle had been insured; stood clearly violated. The Tribunal found an additional ground to have been established for exonerating the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of compensation which was to the effect that the offending vehicle had been used for business purposes, carrying the bricks from the bricked-klin of Kamata Prasad Shivhare.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings returned by the Tribunal against the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge on the question in regard to the quantum of compensation as well as the question relating to exoneration of the insurer in regard to liability in payment of compensation. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned the appellant has claimed enhancement by awarding an additional amount of Rs. 65,000/- as indicated in the memo of appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in : [1995]1SCR75 had indicated that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expense incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was further observed that-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">whenever a Tribunal or Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. However/all such elements are required to be viewed with objective standards. While assessing damage, the Court cannot base its opinion merely on speculation or fancy though conjectures to some extent is inevitable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court indicated hereinabove, we are not inclined to interfere in the findings returned against the petitioner by the learned Single Judge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as the question in regard to the exoneration of the insurer from the liability in regard to the payment of quantum of compensation is concerned suffice it to say that the learned Counsel for the appellant has not disputed that the cover-note in respect of the insurance of the offending vehicle which had been filed on record and relied upon by the appellant had been duly proved. Even, this cover-note indicated that the offending vehicle had been insured subject to the condition that it was not to be used for any purpose other than the agricultural purposes. The insurance-policy which had been exhibited as Ex. D-1 also indicated that the insurance of the offending vehicle was subject to the aforesaid condition. On the facts found by the Tribunal it was apparent that the offending vehicle was being used at the time of the accident in clear breach of the terms and conditions subject to which the insurer had undertaken to discharge the liability fastened on the owner of the offending vehicle. The findings returned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid connection do not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify interference therein.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'I(2000)ACC22', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Omprakash and Two ors.', 'sub' => 'Insurance;Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '510630' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act
PERSON: S.P. Srivastava, Kallu, Rs, Kallu, interference therein.12
NORP: J.1
ORG: the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Letters Patent Appeal, Tribunal, Tribunal, Tribunal, Tribunal, Tribunal, Tribunal, Kamata Prasad, Tribunal, the Apex Court, R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control, Ors, Court, inevitable.10, the Hon'ble Apex Court, Tribunal, Tribunal
CARDINAL: 5,39,000/-, 25,000/-, 25,000/-, 1, 2, 3, 500/-, 3, two
PRODUCT: Single
DATE: the impugned order.3, about 45 to 50 years, 1,000/- per month, about 24 years, 25,000/-only.6, 1995]1SCR75
WORK_OF_ART: the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
LOC: Single, Single