Semantic Analysis by spaCy
Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore
Decided On : Nov-29-2001
Court : Madhya Pradesh
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Saraf' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '226', (int) 1 => '227', (int) 2 => '10-10-96', (int) 3 => '30', (int) 4 => 'zero', (int) 5 => '2', (int) 6 => '30', (int) 7 => 'one', (int) 8 => '28', (int) 9 => '28AA', (int) 10 => '22' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'India', (int) 1 => 'Zero', (int) 2 => 'New Delhi's', (int) 3 => 'Zero', (int) 4 => 'Zero', (int) 5 => 'writ.10' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '6-9-2000', (int) 1 => '01500532', (int) 2 => '6-9-2001', (int) 3 => '1995' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs', (int) 1 => 'DGFT', (int) 2 => 'DGFT', (int) 3 => 'Customs', (int) 4 => 'Special Customs Duty/Surcharge', (int) 5 => 'Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee', (int) 6 => 'EPCG', (int) 7 => 'DGFT', (int) 8 => 'Customs', (int) 9 => 'EPCG', (int) 10 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 11 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 12 => 'Court' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'P-19' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '15%', (int) 1 => '15%', (int) 2 => '15%', (int) 3 => '24%', (int) 4 => '15%', (int) 5 => '15%', (int) 6 => '15%' ), 'FAC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs Notifications 111/95' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510500', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227', 'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 2448 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Neo Sack Ltd.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'casenote' => 'Writ - under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived. The letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves'. The petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences. The gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30.7.2001.' Accordingly the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. It is a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.;WP is dismissed. - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. 7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'A.M. Mathur, Sr. Counsel and ;V.P. Saraf, Adv.', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2001-11-29', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'A.M. Sapre, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.M. Sapre, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. By filing this writ under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, the petitioner has sought quashing of what they describe in the relief clause to be a demand letter, dated 6-9-2000, issued by Deputy Commissioner of Customs, LCD., Pithampur (Annexure P-19). Since, the challenge is only/to this impugned letter, it is necessary to reproduce the same infra verbatim to understand the challenge laid and issued urged :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Subject: conversion of EPCG Licence No. 01500532, dated 10-10-96 from Zero duty scheme to 15% duty scheme-reg.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Please refer to DGFT, New Delhi's letter No. 01/36/2/24/AMS/EPCG-11/266, dated 30-7-2001 on the above mentioned subject.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> On your request EPCG Licence has been converted to 15% Duty EPCG Licence from zero duty EPCG Licence by DGFT vide the above referred letter. After this conversion, the governing Customs notification for the said licence has also changed from Customs Notifications 111/95 to 110/95 and consequent upon you are liable to pay the 15% Basic Customs duty and Special Customs Duty/Surcharge on all the goods cleared under above EPCG Licence together with interest @ 24% from the date of clearance of the goods till the date of payment of duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> You are therefore, required to pay the duty together with interest, immediately, under intimation to this office. In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Heard Shri A.M. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.P. Saraf, learned Counsel for petitioners'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner at length with a view to find' but whether any case worth admission of this writ is made out, I am afraid, I find absolutely none. As a consequence, the fate of writ must end with dismissal in limine. Indeed, petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived writ large.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Indeed, at the out set, I may observe, that I have not been able to appreciate as to on what basis the letter impugned in this writ is adverse or has become adverse to petitioner and if so, in what way. Even a cursory reading of the alleged impugned letter (demand letter as per petitioner) would show that it is sent to petitioner on the basis of request made by the petitioner. In effect and in substance, the gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30-7-2001.' The letter then says that since the licence stands converted from Zero duty to that of 15%, the petitioner has to comply its terms by paying 15% basic Customs duty and other statutory dues on all the goods which are to be cleared under the above licence. The petitioners are thus, asked to comply the same as and when the goods are cleared on the basis of the EPCG licence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In my considered opinion the letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves', the petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It is not the case of petitioner that they did not ask for the conversion and yet a wrong letter is being sent. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter. When the challenge is confined to one letter, dated 6-9-2001, then even the inquiry is also confined to the said letter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then urged that there is no provision in the Customs Act for charging any interest and hence, the letter containing charging of interest is without authority of law. The argument is meritless. Sections 28 and 28AA of the Customs Act deals with charging of interest. These provisions were added by Act No. 22 of 1995. Such submission should not have been therefore urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is not really necessary for me to burden this order by writing any more as what is stated above is more than sufficient for dismissal of this writ which has absolutely no merit per se. It is in my opinion a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In view of aforesaid discussion, the petition fails and is dismissed in limine.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(80)ECC67; 2002(139)ELT506(MP)', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'sub' => 'Customs', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '510500' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 1 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 2 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 3 => 'Act No' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'A.M. Sapre', (int) 1 => 'J.1', (int) 2 => 'EPCG Licence No.', (int) 3 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 4 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 5 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 6 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 7 => 'Heard Shri A.M. Mathur', (int) 8 => 'V.P. Saraf' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '226', (int) 1 => '227', (int) 2 => '10-10-96', (int) 3 => '30', (int) 4 => 'zero', (int) 5 => '2', (int) 6 => '30', (int) 7 => 'one', (int) 8 => '28', (int) 9 => '28AA', (int) 10 => '22' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'India', (int) 1 => 'Zero', (int) 2 => 'New Delhi's', (int) 3 => 'Zero', (int) 4 => 'Zero', (int) 5 => 'writ.10' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '6-9-2000', (int) 1 => '01500532', (int) 2 => '6-9-2001', (int) 3 => '1995' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs', (int) 1 => 'DGFT', (int) 2 => 'DGFT', (int) 3 => 'Customs', (int) 4 => 'Special Customs Duty/Surcharge', (int) 5 => 'Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee', (int) 6 => 'EPCG', (int) 7 => 'DGFT', (int) 8 => 'Customs', (int) 9 => 'EPCG', (int) 10 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 11 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 12 => 'Court' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'P-19' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '15%', (int) 1 => '15%', (int) 2 => '15%', (int) 3 => '24%', (int) 4 => '15%', (int) 5 => '15%', (int) 6 => '15%' ), 'FAC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs Notifications 111/95' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510500', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227', 'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 2448 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Neo Sack Ltd.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'casenote' => 'Writ - under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived. The letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves'. The petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences. The gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30.7.2001.' Accordingly the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. It is a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.;WP is dismissed. - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. 7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'A.M. Mathur, Sr. Counsel and ;V.P. Saraf, Adv.', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2001-11-29', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'A.M. Sapre, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.M. Sapre, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. By filing this writ under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, the petitioner has sought quashing of what they describe in the relief clause to be a demand letter, dated 6-9-2000, issued by Deputy Commissioner of Customs, LCD., Pithampur (Annexure P-19). Since, the challenge is only/to this impugned letter, it is necessary to reproduce the same infra verbatim to understand the challenge laid and issued urged :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Subject: conversion of EPCG Licence No. 01500532, dated 10-10-96 from Zero duty scheme to 15% duty scheme-reg.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Please refer to DGFT, New Delhi's letter No. 01/36/2/24/AMS/EPCG-11/266, dated 30-7-2001 on the above mentioned subject.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> On your request EPCG Licence has been converted to 15% Duty EPCG Licence from zero duty EPCG Licence by DGFT vide the above referred letter. After this conversion, the governing Customs notification for the said licence has also changed from Customs Notifications 111/95 to 110/95 and consequent upon you are liable to pay the 15% Basic Customs duty and Special Customs Duty/Surcharge on all the goods cleared under above EPCG Licence together with interest @ 24% from the date of clearance of the goods till the date of payment of duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> You are therefore, required to pay the duty together with interest, immediately, under intimation to this office. In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Heard Shri A.M. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.P. Saraf, learned Counsel for petitioners'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner at length with a view to find' but whether any case worth admission of this writ is made out, I am afraid, I find absolutely none. As a consequence, the fate of writ must end with dismissal in limine. Indeed, petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived writ large.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Indeed, at the out set, I may observe, that I have not been able to appreciate as to on what basis the letter impugned in this writ is adverse or has become adverse to petitioner and if so, in what way. Even a cursory reading of the alleged impugned letter (demand letter as per petitioner) would show that it is sent to petitioner on the basis of request made by the petitioner. In effect and in substance, the gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30-7-2001.' The letter then says that since the licence stands converted from Zero duty to that of 15%, the petitioner has to comply its terms by paying 15% basic Customs duty and other statutory dues on all the goods which are to be cleared under the above licence. The petitioners are thus, asked to comply the same as and when the goods are cleared on the basis of the EPCG licence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In my considered opinion the letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves', the petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It is not the case of petitioner that they did not ask for the conversion and yet a wrong letter is being sent. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter. When the challenge is confined to one letter, dated 6-9-2001, then even the inquiry is also confined to the said letter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then urged that there is no provision in the Customs Act for charging any interest and hence, the letter containing charging of interest is without authority of law. The argument is meritless. Sections 28 and 28AA of the Customs Act deals with charging of interest. These provisions were added by Act No. 22 of 1995. Such submission should not have been therefore urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is not really necessary for me to burden this order by writing any more as what is stated above is more than sufficient for dismissal of this writ which has absolutely no merit per se. It is in my opinion a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In view of aforesaid discussion, the petition fails and is dismissed in limine.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(80)ECC67; 2002(139)ELT506(MP)', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'sub' => 'Customs', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '510500' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Warning (2): Invalid argument supplied for foreach() [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39]Code Context//$shops = $shops['entities'];foreach ($shops2 as $key => $val) {$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 1 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 2 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 3 => 'Act No' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'A.M. Sapre', (int) 1 => 'J.1', (int) 2 => 'EPCG Licence No.', (int) 3 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 4 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 5 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 6 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 7 => 'Heard Shri A.M. Mathur', (int) 8 => 'V.P. Saraf' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '226', (int) 1 => '227', (int) 2 => '10-10-96', (int) 3 => '30', (int) 4 => 'zero', (int) 5 => '2', (int) 6 => '30', (int) 7 => 'one', (int) 8 => '28', (int) 9 => '28AA', (int) 10 => '22' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'India', (int) 1 => 'Zero', (int) 2 => 'New Delhi's', (int) 3 => 'Zero', (int) 4 => 'Zero', (int) 5 => 'writ.10' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '6-9-2000', (int) 1 => '01500532', (int) 2 => '6-9-2001', (int) 3 => '1995' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs', (int) 1 => 'DGFT', (int) 2 => 'DGFT', (int) 3 => 'Customs', (int) 4 => 'Special Customs Duty/Surcharge', (int) 5 => 'Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee', (int) 6 => 'EPCG', (int) 7 => 'DGFT', (int) 8 => 'Customs', (int) 9 => 'EPCG', (int) 10 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 11 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 12 => 'Court' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'P-19' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '15%', (int) 1 => '15%', (int) 2 => '15%', (int) 3 => '24%', (int) 4 => '15%', (int) 5 => '15%', (int) 6 => '15%' ), 'FAC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs Notifications 111/95' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510500', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227', 'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 2448 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Neo Sack Ltd.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'casenote' => 'Writ - under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived. The letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves'. The petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences. The gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30.7.2001.' Accordingly the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. It is a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.;WP is dismissed. - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. 7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'A.M. Mathur, Sr. Counsel and ;V.P. Saraf, Adv.', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2001-11-29', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'A.M. Sapre, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.M. Sapre, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. By filing this writ under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, the petitioner has sought quashing of what they describe in the relief clause to be a demand letter, dated 6-9-2000, issued by Deputy Commissioner of Customs, LCD., Pithampur (Annexure P-19). Since, the challenge is only/to this impugned letter, it is necessary to reproduce the same infra verbatim to understand the challenge laid and issued urged :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Subject: conversion of EPCG Licence No. 01500532, dated 10-10-96 from Zero duty scheme to 15% duty scheme-reg.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Please refer to DGFT, New Delhi's letter No. 01/36/2/24/AMS/EPCG-11/266, dated 30-7-2001 on the above mentioned subject.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> On your request EPCG Licence has been converted to 15% Duty EPCG Licence from zero duty EPCG Licence by DGFT vide the above referred letter. After this conversion, the governing Customs notification for the said licence has also changed from Customs Notifications 111/95 to 110/95 and consequent upon you are liable to pay the 15% Basic Customs duty and Special Customs Duty/Surcharge on all the goods cleared under above EPCG Licence together with interest @ 24% from the date of clearance of the goods till the date of payment of duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> You are therefore, required to pay the duty together with interest, immediately, under intimation to this office. In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Heard Shri A.M. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.P. Saraf, learned Counsel for petitioners'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner at length with a view to find' but whether any case worth admission of this writ is made out, I am afraid, I find absolutely none. As a consequence, the fate of writ must end with dismissal in limine. Indeed, petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived writ large.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Indeed, at the out set, I may observe, that I have not been able to appreciate as to on what basis the letter impugned in this writ is adverse or has become adverse to petitioner and if so, in what way. Even a cursory reading of the alleged impugned letter (demand letter as per petitioner) would show that it is sent to petitioner on the basis of request made by the petitioner. In effect and in substance, the gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30-7-2001.' The letter then says that since the licence stands converted from Zero duty to that of 15%, the petitioner has to comply its terms by paying 15% basic Customs duty and other statutory dues on all the goods which are to be cleared under the above licence. The petitioners are thus, asked to comply the same as and when the goods are cleared on the basis of the EPCG licence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In my considered opinion the letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves', the petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It is not the case of petitioner that they did not ask for the conversion and yet a wrong letter is being sent. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter. When the challenge is confined to one letter, dated 6-9-2001, then even the inquiry is also confined to the said letter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then urged that there is no provision in the Customs Act for charging any interest and hence, the letter containing charging of interest is without authority of law. The argument is meritless. Sections 28 and 28AA of the Customs Act deals with charging of interest. These provisions were added by Act No. 22 of 1995. Such submission should not have been therefore urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is not really necessary for me to burden this order by writing any more as what is stated above is more than sufficient for dismissal of this writ which has absolutely no merit per se. It is in my opinion a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In view of aforesaid discussion, the petition fails and is dismissed in limine.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(80)ECC67; 2002(139)ELT506(MP)', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'sub' => 'Customs', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '510500' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 1 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 2 => 'the Customs Act', (int) 3 => 'Act No' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'A.M. Sapre', (int) 1 => 'J.1', (int) 2 => 'EPCG Licence No.', (int) 3 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 4 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 5 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 6 => 'EPCG Licence', (int) 7 => 'Heard Shri A.M. Mathur', (int) 8 => 'V.P. Saraf' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '226', (int) 1 => '227', (int) 2 => '10-10-96', (int) 3 => '30', (int) 4 => 'zero', (int) 5 => '2', (int) 6 => '30', (int) 7 => 'one', (int) 8 => '28', (int) 9 => '28AA', (int) 10 => '22' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'India', (int) 1 => 'Zero', (int) 2 => 'New Delhi's', (int) 3 => 'Zero', (int) 4 => 'Zero', (int) 5 => 'writ.10' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '6-9-2000', (int) 1 => '01500532', (int) 2 => '6-9-2001', (int) 3 => '1995' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs', (int) 1 => 'DGFT', (int) 2 => 'DGFT', (int) 3 => 'Customs', (int) 4 => 'Special Customs Duty/Surcharge', (int) 5 => 'Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee', (int) 6 => 'EPCG', (int) 7 => 'DGFT', (int) 8 => 'Customs', (int) 9 => 'EPCG', (int) 10 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 11 => 'Learned Counsel', (int) 12 => 'Court' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => 'P-19' ), 'PERCENT' => array( (int) 0 => '15%', (int) 1 => '15%', (int) 2 => '15%', (int) 3 => '24%', (int) 4 => '15%', (int) 5 => '15%', (int) 6 => '15%' ), 'FAC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Customs Notifications 111/95' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '510500', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227', 'appealno' => 'Writ Petition No. 2448 of 2001', 'appellant' => 'Neo Sack Ltd.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Neo Sack Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'casenote' => 'Writ - under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived. The letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves'. The petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences. The gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30.7.2001.' Accordingly the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. It is a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.;WP is dismissed. - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1055. Article 141; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Dismissal of SLP arising from decision of High Court Whether binding precedent Decision of Division Bench in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2007(II) MPJR 229] overruled by Full Bench of same High Court Prior to delivery of decision of Full Bench order passed in Division Bench decision assailed in SLP before Supreme Court Dismissal of SLP by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but High Court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by Apex Court and Larger bench decision in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association, reported in [2003(1) MPJR 158]. Court clarifies that Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361; AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP Articles 226 & 227; [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., Dipak Misra, Abhay Gohil, S. Samvatsar, & S.K. Gangele, JJ] Power to issue writ under Article 226 - [per Majority] The High Courts exercise original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. But, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. Whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of Article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of Courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is worth noting that the power under Article 227 was there in a different manner under the Government of India Act. Power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. The confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. There is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. Both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under Article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior Courts or administrative authorities. The word superintendence has not been used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in Article 227. On a scrutiny of Article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts is a power that is restricted to the Courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. On the contrary the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is not constricted and confined to the Courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. Be it noted, Article 226 as has been engrafted in the Constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. When the Legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the Apex Court. The words of the Section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is always original. -- M.P. SAMAJ KE KAMJOR VARGON KE KRISHI BHUMI HADAPNE SAMBANDHI KUCHAKRON SE PARITRAN TATHA MUKTI ADHINIYAM [3/1977]. Section 2: Writ appeal Maintainability from order of single Judge-When permissible Held, Maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single Judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. It cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. It would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. It cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate Courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The pleadings also assume immense significance. It would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of each case. Dr. Jaidev Siddha v. Jaiprakash Siddha, 2007(2) MPJR (FB) 361: AIR 2007 MP 269 (FB) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of SLP preferred against order reported in Rama and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007 (2) MPJR 229 (DB) (MP)]. - In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner. 7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'A.M. Mathur, Sr. Counsel and ;V.P. Saraf, Adv.', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2001-11-29', 'deposition' => 'Petition dismissed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'A.M. Sapre, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A.M. Sapre, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. By filing this writ under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, the petitioner has sought quashing of what they describe in the relief clause to be a demand letter, dated 6-9-2000, issued by Deputy Commissioner of Customs, LCD., Pithampur (Annexure P-19). Since, the challenge is only/to this impugned letter, it is necessary to reproduce the same infra verbatim to understand the challenge laid and issued urged :-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Subject: conversion of EPCG Licence No. 01500532, dated 10-10-96 from Zero duty scheme to 15% duty scheme-reg.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Please refer to DGFT, New Delhi's letter No. 01/36/2/24/AMS/EPCG-11/266, dated 30-7-2001 on the above mentioned subject.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> On your request EPCG Licence has been converted to 15% Duty EPCG Licence from zero duty EPCG Licence by DGFT vide the above referred letter. After this conversion, the governing Customs notification for the said licence has also changed from Customs Notifications 111/95 to 110/95 and consequent upon you are liable to pay the 15% Basic Customs duty and Special Customs Duty/Surcharge on all the goods cleared under above EPCG Licence together with interest @ 24% from the date of clearance of the goods till the date of payment of duty.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> You are therefore, required to pay the duty together with interest, immediately, under intimation to this office. In case you fail to do so, you shall be liable to action as per the conditions of the Notification and the Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee furnished by you.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Heard Shri A.M. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.P. Saraf, learned Counsel for petitioners'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner at length with a view to find' but whether any case worth admission of this writ is made out, I am afraid, I find absolutely none. As a consequence, the fate of writ must end with dismissal in limine. Indeed, petition does not have any cause of action and it is misconceived writ large.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Indeed, at the out set, I may observe, that I have not been able to appreciate as to on what basis the letter impugned in this writ is adverse or has become adverse to petitioner and if so, in what way. Even a cursory reading of the alleged impugned letter (demand letter as per petitioner) would show that it is sent to petitioner on the basis of request made by the petitioner. In effect and in substance, the gist or purport of the said impugned letter is that 'on the request of petitioner their EPCG licence granted under the Customs Act was converted from Zero duty to that of 15% duty by DGFT vide their letter dated 30-7-2001.' The letter then says that since the licence stands converted from Zero duty to that of 15%, the petitioner has to comply its terms by paying 15% basic Customs duty and other statutory dues on all the goods which are to be cleared under the above licence. The petitioners are thus, asked to comply the same as and when the goods are cleared on the basis of the EPCG licence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. In my considered opinion the letter impugned is neither an order, nor it has an attribute of an order, nor it is a demand based on any order passed against the petitioner. It is only a letter to the petitioner reminding them that as a result of a conversion of EPCG licence, held by the petitioner and the conversion having been done 'on the request of the petitioner themselves', the petitioners will have to follow certain compliances as a necessary consequences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It is not the case of petitioner that they did not ask for the conversion and yet a wrong letter is being sent. I fail to understand that when the petitioner themselves get the conversion done of their licence, then if the authority write a letter to petitioner to comply certain rules and pay duty according to conversion then the authority does not commit any wrong or illegal act, to the detriment of petitioner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Learned Counsel took me to some notifications, I fail to understand its relevancy in referring to these notifications in the context of the impugned letter. When the challenge is confined to one letter, dated 6-9-2001, then even the inquiry is also confined to the said letter.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then urged that there is no provision in the Customs Act for charging any interest and hence, the letter containing charging of interest is without authority of law. The argument is meritless. Sections 28 and 28AA of the Customs Act deals with charging of interest. These provisions were added by Act No. 22 of 1995. Such submission should not have been therefore urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It is not really necessary for me to burden this order by writing any more as what is stated above is more than sufficient for dismissal of this writ which has absolutely no merit per se. It is in my opinion a clear case of abusing the process of Court by filing a writ.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In view of aforesaid discussion, the petition fails and is dismissed in limine.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '2002(80)ECC67; 2002(139)ELT506(MP)', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Commissioner of Cus. and C. Ex., Indore', 'sub' => 'Customs', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '510500' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: the Customs Act, the Customs Act, the Customs Act, Act No
PERSON: A.M. Sapre, J.1, EPCG Licence No., EPCG Licence, EPCG Licence, EPCG Licence, EPCG Licence, Heard Shri A.M. Mathur, V.P. Saraf
CARDINAL: 226, 227, 10-10-96, 30, zero, 2, 30, one, 28, 28AA, 22
GPE: India, Zero, New Delhi's, Zero, Zero, writ.10
DATE: 6-9-2000, 01500532, 6-9-2001, 1995
ORG: Customs, DGFT, DGFT, Customs, Special Customs Duty/Surcharge, Bond/Bank Guarantee/Corporate Guarantee, EPCG, DGFT, Customs, EPCG, Learned Counsel, Learned Counsel, Court
PRODUCT: P-19
PERCENT: 15%, 15%, 15%, 24%, 15%, 15%, 15%
FAC: Customs Notifications 111/95