Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

Decided On : Jul-24-2001

Court : Madhya Pradesh

Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]
Code Context


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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50934/negotiable-instruments-act-1881-complete-act">Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881</a> - Sections 138; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 2, 4, 4(1), 4(2), 42, 142, 320, 320(9) and 482; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 320(9); <a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 345; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a>; <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a> - Sections 20; Penal Law; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 141',
			'appealno' => 'Misc. Criminal Case No. 3872/2000',
			'appellant' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - Compoundable Offence - Sections 320 and 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(Cr.PC) and Sections138 and 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act - Appellants made application for compounding of offence committed by appellant No. 2 under Section 138 of Act and for which he was convicted by Trial Court - Compounding of offence claimed on ground that dispute was amicable settled between payee (appellant No. 1) and drawer (appellant No. 2) of cheque - Competent Court held that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable and no permission could be granted to compound the same - Hence, present petition - Whether offence under Section 138 of Act can be permitted to be compounded? - Held, on perusal of provision of Act, it seen that offence under Section 138 of Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with provisions of Cr.PC subject to limitations provided by Section 142 of Act - Since Act makes no provision for compounding of offences, Section 320 of Cr.PC shall govern present question and bar contained under Section 320(9) of Cr.PC shall operate against composition of offence - Thus, there is no doubt that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable - Permission to compound offence was rightly refused by Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC - With above observations, petition dismissed - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 147; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Liability of Insurer - Third party insurance  Held, The insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of Chapter XI of the Act, particularly Section 147 thereof. Thus, any person other than the insurer and the insured who are parties to the insurance policy is a third party. The insurer, however, would not be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. Hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. An employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. But merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless Section 147 of the Act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. Section 147 (1)(b) of the Act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. Even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1)of Section 147 of the Act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1`) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. 
Sections 147 & 96 & M.P. M.V. Rules, 1994, Rule 97; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Control of Transport vehicles  M.P. Rules relate to provisions of control of transport vehicles and it cannot be adopted for interpreting Sections 147 and 145 of the M.V. Act to hold the insurer liable for death or bodily injury suffered by passenger. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. -  2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. , in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. 12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant -payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '(Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.K. Vyas, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Girish Desai, Dy. Advocate General',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2001-07-24',
			'deposition' => 'Misc. criminal case dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'N.K. Jain, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. A short but imporlant question of law arises for determination in this petition is as to whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, 'the Act') can be permitted to be compounded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The case giving rise to this petition is pending in Appeal (No. 68/2000) before the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Mhow, who vide Order dated 23-9-2000 has declined joint prayer made by the complainant-payee and the accused drawee (the petitioners herein) to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act for which matter is convicted by the Trial Magistrate. The learned ASJ has held that the offence under Section 138 is not compoun-dable and no permission to compound the same can be accorded in view of the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Interestingly both the complainant petitioner No. 1 and accused -petitioner No. 2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. Shri S.K. Vyas, learned counsel for accused (petitioner No. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. Learned counsel has also referred to Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Cr.PC (1898) which contained an express provision that the offences under other laws are not compoundable. It was thus contended that the omission of any such provision in the new Code, goes to show that the prohibition against composition of the offences under other laws is taken away by the new Code. Reliance is placed on a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. Mohan Reddy, (1996) 1 CCR 516. Learned counsel has also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of O.P. Dholakia, a short notice of which is reported in 2000 (I) MPWN 178, where permission to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act was accorded by the Apex Court in an appeal pending before it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As against it, Shri Girish Desai, learned Dy. Advocate General for respondent-State strongly defended the decision of the Appellate Court below and submitted that subject to the limitations provided under Section 42 of the Act, the offence under Section 138 is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code. Section 320, it is contended, shall govern composition of the offences under the special laws unless these laws contain some special provision for permitting such composition. I feel persuaded by the argument.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 138 makes the dishonour of cheques for insufficiency of funds etc., in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. Section 142 provides for taking cognizance of the offence only on a written complaint made by the payee within the prescribed time limit. It also provides as to by which Court the offence can be tried i.e., the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. However, the Act is silent as to the procedure to be followes for trial of the offences and the other connected matters. The Act also does not provide for compounding the offence. Under the circumstance, as provided by Section 4 (2) of the Code, the offence under Section 138 of the Act has to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided in Section 142 already referred to hereinbefore. Section 4 of the Code makes this position abundantly clear and thus reads :'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.--</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The conjoint effect of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 is that the offences whether under the Penal Code or under any other law, have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code unless there be an enactment regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying and otherwise dealing with such offences in which case such an enactment will prevail over the Code. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. Such provisions are to be found in the Code for instance, Chapters XIV to XXIII. Chapter XIV in fact lays down general provisions as to the inquiry and trial and include Section 320 dealing with compounding of offences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It will be thus seen that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided by Section 142 of the Act. Since the Act makes no provision for compounding the offences, Section 320 of the Code shall govern question of its composition and the bar contained under Sub-section (9) shall operate against composition of the offence. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not confined only to the offences under the I.P. Code. It is useful to read here the definition of the term 'offence' given in clause (n) of Section 2 of the Code which is as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(n) 'offence' means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. A bare reading of the aforesaid definition makes it abundantly clear that 'offence' is a comprehensive term embrassing every act committed or omitted in violation of a Penal Law forbidding or commanding it. The term offence occurring in the Code is thus not confined to the offences under the I.P. Code and includes any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that Section 320 of the Code embrasses only the offences made punishable under the I.P. Code or that its provisions have no application to the offences against other laws. The preposition laid down in M. Mohan Reddy (supra) by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in my respectful opinion, does not represent the correct position of law. The Full Bench of the same High Court in a subsequent decision in Smt. Ghousia Sultana (1996 Cr.LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is true that under Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Code 1898, all offences under the special laws were made not compoundable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No such specific provision is now contained in the new Code. But the omission does not indicate that Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not applicable to the offences under the special laws. From the observations of 41st Report of the Law Commission it is clear that the matter was left to the legislature concerned to decide as a matter of policy, whether and to what extent offences under the special laws should be made compoundable. So, in absence of any specific provision in the statute itself in that behalf, Section 320 of the Code shall govern the question of composition of such offences under the special laws.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In O.P. Dholakia (supra), the Apex Court, it appears allowed composition of offence under Section 138 of the Act in the appeal pending before it. It may however, be submitted that no ratio decidendi as such is laid down by their Lordships in this decision. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the country. However, a decision which is not express and does not proceed on a consideration of the issue cannot be deemed to be a taw declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141 [See: State of U.P. v. Synthetics, (1991) 4 SCC 139]. From the aforesaid citation in O.P. Dholakia, it is not clear that the question of law with which we are confronted here, was raised before the Court or at all perceived by their Lordships while according permission to compound the offence under Section 138.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In another decision in Ram Lal (AIR 1999 SC 895) it was held:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is apparent that when the decision in Mahesh Chand (AIR 1988 SC 2111) (supra) was rendered attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid legal prohibition. Nor was attention of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in Y. Suresh Babu [1987 (2) JT (SC) 361] (supra) drawn. Hence those were decisions rendered per incuriam. We hold that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable even with the permission of the Court cannot be compounded at all'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 2983/97 (Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors), decided on 1-9-1999.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. There can be thus no manner of doubt that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not compoundable. Permission to compound the offence was rightly refused by the Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant - payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence. The complainant petitioner No. 1, through his counsel has made a categorical statement before this Court that he shall not oppose any such prayer which may be made by the accused before the Court below nor press for any sentence to be passed against the latter. The Appellate Court below shall keep all these factors in mind while deciding the appeal finally particularly in the matter of sentence. 13. With the observations as aforesaid, this petition is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Misc. Criminal Case dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		(int) 25 => '1',
		(int) 26 => '1',
		(int) 27 => '13'
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	'DATE' => array(
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		(int) 1 => '1996',
		(int) 2 => '2000',
		(int) 3 => '1996',
		(int) 4 => '2973',
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		(int) 6 => '1987'
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	'FAC' => array(
		(int) 0 => 'M. Mohan Reddy'
	),
	'PRODUCT' => array(
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	'GPE' => array(
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		(int) 1 => 'O.P. Dholakia',
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		'id' => '508610',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50934/negotiable-instruments-act-1881-complete-act">Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881</a> - Sections 138; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 2, 4, 4(1), 4(2), 42, 142, 320, 320(9) and 482; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 320(9); <a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 345; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a>; <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a> - Sections 20; Penal Law; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 141',
		'appealno' => 'Misc. Criminal Case No. 3872/2000',
		'appellant' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - Compoundable Offence - Sections 320 and 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(Cr.PC) and Sections138 and 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act - Appellants made application for compounding of offence committed by appellant No. 2 under Section 138 of Act and for which he was convicted by Trial Court - Compounding of offence claimed on ground that dispute was amicable settled between payee (appellant No. 1) and drawer (appellant No. 2) of cheque - Competent Court held that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable and no permission could be granted to compound the same - Hence, present petition - Whether offence under Section 138 of Act can be permitted to be compounded? - Held, on perusal of provision of Act, it seen that offence under Section 138 of Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with provisions of Cr.PC subject to limitations provided by Section 142 of Act - Since Act makes no provision for compounding of offences, Section 320 of Cr.PC shall govern present question and bar contained under Section 320(9) of Cr.PC shall operate against composition of offence - Thus, there is no doubt that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable - Permission to compound offence was rightly refused by Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC - With above observations, petition dismissed - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 147; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Liability of Insurer - Third party insurance  Held, The insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of Chapter XI of the Act, particularly Section 147 thereof. Thus, any person other than the insurer and the insured who are parties to the insurance policy is a third party. The insurer, however, would not be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. Hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. An employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. But merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless Section 147 of the Act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. Section 147 (1)(b) of the Act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. Even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1)of Section 147 of the Act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1`) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. 
Sections 147 & 96 & M.P. M.V. Rules, 1994, Rule 97; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Control of Transport vehicles  M.P. Rules relate to provisions of control of transport vehicles and it cannot be adopted for interpreting Sections 147 and 145 of the M.V. Act to hold the insurer liable for death or bodily injury suffered by passenger. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. -  2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. , in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. 12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant -payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '(Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.K. Vyas, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Girish Desai, Dy. Advocate General',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2001-07-24',
		'deposition' => 'Misc. criminal case dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'N.K. Jain, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. A short but imporlant question of law arises for determination in this petition is as to whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, 'the Act') can be permitted to be compounded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The case giving rise to this petition is pending in Appeal (No. 68/2000) before the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Mhow, who vide Order dated 23-9-2000 has declined joint prayer made by the complainant-payee and the accused drawee (the petitioners herein) to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act for which matter is convicted by the Trial Magistrate. The learned ASJ has held that the offence under Section 138 is not compoun-dable and no permission to compound the same can be accorded in view of the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Interestingly both the complainant petitioner No. 1 and accused -petitioner No. 2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. Shri S.K. Vyas, learned counsel for accused (petitioner No. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. Learned counsel has also referred to Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Cr.PC (1898) which contained an express provision that the offences under other laws are not compoundable. It was thus contended that the omission of any such provision in the new Code, goes to show that the prohibition against composition of the offences under other laws is taken away by the new Code. Reliance is placed on a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. Mohan Reddy, (1996) 1 CCR 516. Learned counsel has also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of O.P. Dholakia, a short notice of which is reported in 2000 (I) MPWN 178, where permission to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act was accorded by the Apex Court in an appeal pending before it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As against it, Shri Girish Desai, learned Dy. Advocate General for respondent-State strongly defended the decision of the Appellate Court below and submitted that subject to the limitations provided under Section 42 of the Act, the offence under Section 138 is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code. Section 320, it is contended, shall govern composition of the offences under the special laws unless these laws contain some special provision for permitting such composition. I feel persuaded by the argument.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 138 makes the dishonour of cheques for insufficiency of funds etc., in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. Section 142 provides for taking cognizance of the offence only on a written complaint made by the payee within the prescribed time limit. It also provides as to by which Court the offence can be tried i.e., the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. However, the Act is silent as to the procedure to be followes for trial of the offences and the other connected matters. The Act also does not provide for compounding the offence. Under the circumstance, as provided by Section 4 (2) of the Code, the offence under Section 138 of the Act has to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided in Section 142 already referred to hereinbefore. Section 4 of the Code makes this position abundantly clear and thus reads :'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.--</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The conjoint effect of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 is that the offences whether under the Penal Code or under any other law, have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code unless there be an enactment regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying and otherwise dealing with such offences in which case such an enactment will prevail over the Code. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. Such provisions are to be found in the Code for instance, Chapters XIV to XXIII. Chapter XIV in fact lays down general provisions as to the inquiry and trial and include Section 320 dealing with compounding of offences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It will be thus seen that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided by Section 142 of the Act. Since the Act makes no provision for compounding the offences, Section 320 of the Code shall govern question of its composition and the bar contained under Sub-section (9) shall operate against composition of the offence. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not confined only to the offences under the I.P. Code. It is useful to read here the definition of the term 'offence' given in clause (n) of Section 2 of the Code which is as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(n) 'offence' means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. A bare reading of the aforesaid definition makes it abundantly clear that 'offence' is a comprehensive term embrassing every act committed or omitted in violation of a Penal Law forbidding or commanding it. The term offence occurring in the Code is thus not confined to the offences under the I.P. Code and includes any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that Section 320 of the Code embrasses only the offences made punishable under the I.P. Code or that its provisions have no application to the offences against other laws. The preposition laid down in M. Mohan Reddy (supra) by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in my respectful opinion, does not represent the correct position of law. The Full Bench of the same High Court in a subsequent decision in Smt. Ghousia Sultana (1996 Cr.LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is true that under Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Code 1898, all offences under the special laws were made not compoundable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No such specific provision is now contained in the new Code. But the omission does not indicate that Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not applicable to the offences under the special laws. From the observations of 41st Report of the Law Commission it is clear that the matter was left to the legislature concerned to decide as a matter of policy, whether and to what extent offences under the special laws should be made compoundable. So, in absence of any specific provision in the statute itself in that behalf, Section 320 of the Code shall govern the question of composition of such offences under the special laws.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In O.P. Dholakia (supra), the Apex Court, it appears allowed composition of offence under Section 138 of the Act in the appeal pending before it. It may however, be submitted that no ratio decidendi as such is laid down by their Lordships in this decision. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the country. However, a decision which is not express and does not proceed on a consideration of the issue cannot be deemed to be a taw declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141 [See: State of U.P. v. Synthetics, (1991) 4 SCC 139]. From the aforesaid citation in O.P. Dholakia, it is not clear that the question of law with which we are confronted here, was raised before the Court or at all perceived by their Lordships while according permission to compound the offence under Section 138.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In another decision in Ram Lal (AIR 1999 SC 895) it was held:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is apparent that when the decision in Mahesh Chand (AIR 1988 SC 2111) (supra) was rendered attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid legal prohibition. Nor was attention of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in Y. Suresh Babu [1987 (2) JT (SC) 361] (supra) drawn. Hence those were decisions rendered per incuriam. We hold that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable even with the permission of the Court cannot be compounded at all'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 2983/97 (Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors), decided on 1-9-1999.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. There can be thus no manner of doubt that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not compoundable. Permission to compound the offence was rightly refused by the Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant - payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence. The complainant petitioner No. 1, through his counsel has made a categorical statement before this Court that he shall not oppose any such prayer which may be made by the accused before the Court below nor press for any sentence to be passed against the latter. The Appellate Court below shall keep all these factors in mind while deciding the appeal finally particularly in the matter of sentence. 13. With the observations as aforesaid, this petition is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Misc. Criminal Case dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'FAC' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'M. Mohan Reddy'
		),
		'PRODUCT' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'The Full Bench'
		),
		'GPE' => array(
			(int) 0 => 'Smt',
			(int) 1 => 'O.P. Dholakia',
			(int) 2 => 'Mahesh Chand',
			(int) 3 => 'M.Cr'
		)
	),
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '508610',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50934/negotiable-instruments-act-1881-complete-act">Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881</a> - Sections 138; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 2, 4, 4(1), 4(2), 42, 142, 320, 320(9) and 482; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 320(9); <a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 345; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a>; <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a> - Sections 20; Penal Law; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 141',
			'appealno' => 'Misc. Criminal Case No. 3872/2000',
			'appellant' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh',
			'casenote' => 'Criminal - Compoundable Offence - Sections 320 and 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(Cr.PC) and Sections138 and 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act - Appellants made application for compounding of offence committed by appellant No. 2 under Section 138 of Act and for which he was convicted by Trial Court - Compounding of offence claimed on ground that dispute was amicable settled between payee (appellant No. 1) and drawer (appellant No. 2) of cheque - Competent Court held that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable and no permission could be granted to compound the same - Hence, present petition - Whether offence under Section 138 of Act can be permitted to be compounded? - Held, on perusal of provision of Act, it seen that offence under Section 138 of Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with provisions of Cr.PC subject to limitations provided by Section 142 of Act - Since Act makes no provision for compounding of offences, Section 320 of Cr.PC shall govern present question and bar contained under Section 320(9) of Cr.PC shall operate against composition of offence - Thus, there is no doubt that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable - Permission to compound offence was rightly refused by Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC - With above observations, petition dismissed - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 147; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Liability of Insurer - Third party insurance  Held, The insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of Chapter XI of the Act, particularly Section 147 thereof. Thus, any person other than the insurer and the insured who are parties to the insurance policy is a third party. The insurer, however, would not be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. Hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. An employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. But merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless Section 147 of the Act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. Section 147 (1)(b) of the Act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. Even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1)of Section 147 of the Act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1`) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. 
Sections 147 & 96 & M.P. M.V. Rules, 1994, Rule 97; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Control of Transport vehicles  M.P. Rules relate to provisions of control of transport vehicles and it cannot be adopted for interpreting Sections 147 and 145 of the M.V. Act to hold the insurer liable for death or bodily injury suffered by passenger. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. -  2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. , in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. 12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant -payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '(Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'S.K. Vyas, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'Girish Desai, Dy. Advocate General',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2001-07-24',
			'deposition' => 'Misc. criminal case dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'N.K. Jain, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. A short but imporlant question of law arises for determination in this petition is as to whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, 'the Act') can be permitted to be compounded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The case giving rise to this petition is pending in Appeal (No. 68/2000) before the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Mhow, who vide Order dated 23-9-2000 has declined joint prayer made by the complainant-payee and the accused drawee (the petitioners herein) to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act for which matter is convicted by the Trial Magistrate. The learned ASJ has held that the offence under Section 138 is not compoun-dable and no permission to compound the same can be accorded in view of the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Interestingly both the complainant petitioner No. 1 and accused -petitioner No. 2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. Shri S.K. Vyas, learned counsel for accused (petitioner No. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. Learned counsel has also referred to Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Cr.PC (1898) which contained an express provision that the offences under other laws are not compoundable. It was thus contended that the omission of any such provision in the new Code, goes to show that the prohibition against composition of the offences under other laws is taken away by the new Code. Reliance is placed on a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. Mohan Reddy, (1996) 1 CCR 516. Learned counsel has also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of O.P. Dholakia, a short notice of which is reported in 2000 (I) MPWN 178, where permission to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act was accorded by the Apex Court in an appeal pending before it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As against it, Shri Girish Desai, learned Dy. Advocate General for respondent-State strongly defended the decision of the Appellate Court below and submitted that subject to the limitations provided under Section 42 of the Act, the offence under Section 138 is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code. Section 320, it is contended, shall govern composition of the offences under the special laws unless these laws contain some special provision for permitting such composition. I feel persuaded by the argument.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 138 makes the dishonour of cheques for insufficiency of funds etc., in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. Section 142 provides for taking cognizance of the offence only on a written complaint made by the payee within the prescribed time limit. It also provides as to by which Court the offence can be tried i.e., the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. However, the Act is silent as to the procedure to be followes for trial of the offences and the other connected matters. The Act also does not provide for compounding the offence. Under the circumstance, as provided by Section 4 (2) of the Code, the offence under Section 138 of the Act has to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided in Section 142 already referred to hereinbefore. Section 4 of the Code makes this position abundantly clear and thus reads :'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.--</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The conjoint effect of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 is that the offences whether under the Penal Code or under any other law, have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code unless there be an enactment regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying and otherwise dealing with such offences in which case such an enactment will prevail over the Code. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. Such provisions are to be found in the Code for instance, Chapters XIV to XXIII. Chapter XIV in fact lays down general provisions as to the inquiry and trial and include Section 320 dealing with compounding of offences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It will be thus seen that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided by Section 142 of the Act. Since the Act makes no provision for compounding the offences, Section 320 of the Code shall govern question of its composition and the bar contained under Sub-section (9) shall operate against composition of the offence. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not confined only to the offences under the I.P. Code. It is useful to read here the definition of the term 'offence' given in clause (n) of Section 2 of the Code which is as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(n) 'offence' means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. A bare reading of the aforesaid definition makes it abundantly clear that 'offence' is a comprehensive term embrassing every act committed or omitted in violation of a Penal Law forbidding or commanding it. The term offence occurring in the Code is thus not confined to the offences under the I.P. Code and includes any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that Section 320 of the Code embrasses only the offences made punishable under the I.P. Code or that its provisions have no application to the offences against other laws. The preposition laid down in M. Mohan Reddy (supra) by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in my respectful opinion, does not represent the correct position of law. The Full Bench of the same High Court in a subsequent decision in Smt. Ghousia Sultana (1996 Cr.LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is true that under Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Code 1898, all offences under the special laws were made not compoundable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No such specific provision is now contained in the new Code. But the omission does not indicate that Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not applicable to the offences under the special laws. From the observations of 41st Report of the Law Commission it is clear that the matter was left to the legislature concerned to decide as a matter of policy, whether and to what extent offences under the special laws should be made compoundable. So, in absence of any specific provision in the statute itself in that behalf, Section 320 of the Code shall govern the question of composition of such offences under the special laws.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In O.P. Dholakia (supra), the Apex Court, it appears allowed composition of offence under Section 138 of the Act in the appeal pending before it. It may however, be submitted that no ratio decidendi as such is laid down by their Lordships in this decision. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the country. However, a decision which is not express and does not proceed on a consideration of the issue cannot be deemed to be a taw declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141 [See: State of U.P. v. Synthetics, (1991) 4 SCC 139]. From the aforesaid citation in O.P. Dholakia, it is not clear that the question of law with which we are confronted here, was raised before the Court or at all perceived by their Lordships while according permission to compound the offence under Section 138.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In another decision in Ram Lal (AIR 1999 SC 895) it was held:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is apparent that when the decision in Mahesh Chand (AIR 1988 SC 2111) (supra) was rendered attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid legal prohibition. Nor was attention of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in Y. Suresh Babu [1987 (2) JT (SC) 361] (supra) drawn. Hence those were decisions rendered per incuriam. We hold that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable even with the permission of the Court cannot be compounded at all'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 2983/97 (Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors), decided on 1-9-1999.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. There can be thus no manner of doubt that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not compoundable. Permission to compound the offence was rightly refused by the Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant - payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence. The complainant petitioner No. 1, through his counsel has made a categorical statement before this Court that he shall not oppose any such prayer which may be made by the accused before the Court below nor press for any sentence to be passed against the latter. The Appellate Court below shall keep all these factors in mind while deciding the appeal finally particularly in the matter of sentence. 13. With the observations as aforesaid, this petition is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Misc. Criminal Case dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2001CriLJ4608; 2001(4)MPHT337; 2001(3)MPLJ259',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Madhya Pradesh',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
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$title_for_layout = 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh Semantic Analysis'
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '508610',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50934/negotiable-instruments-act-1881-complete-act">Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881</a> - Sections 138; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 2, 4, 4(1), 4(2), 42, 142, 320, 320(9) and 482; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 320(9); <a href="/act/133280/code-of-criminal-procedure-1898-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1898</a> - Sections 345; <a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a>; <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a> - Sections 20; Penal Law; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 141',
		'appealno' => 'Misc. Criminal Case No. 3872/2000',
		'appellant' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Prakashchandra Chaudhary and anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh',
		'casenote' => 'Criminal - Compoundable Offence - Sections 320 and 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(Cr.PC) and Sections138 and 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act - Appellants made application for compounding of offence committed by appellant No. 2 under Section 138 of Act and for which he was convicted by Trial Court - Compounding of offence claimed on ground that dispute was amicable settled between payee (appellant No. 1) and drawer (appellant No. 2) of cheque - Competent Court held that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable and no permission could be granted to compound the same - Hence, present petition - Whether offence under Section 138 of Act can be permitted to be compounded? - Held, on perusal of provision of Act, it seen that offence under Section 138 of Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with provisions of Cr.PC subject to limitations provided by Section 142 of Act - Since Act makes no provision for compounding of offences, Section 320 of Cr.PC shall govern present question and bar contained under Section 320(9) of Cr.PC shall operate against composition of offence - Thus, there is no doubt that offence under Section 138 of Act is not compoundable - Permission to compound offence was rightly refused by Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC - With above observations, petition dismissed - MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
[C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 147; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Liability of Insurer - Third party insurance  Held, The insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of Chapter XI of the Act, particularly Section 147 thereof. Thus, any person other than the insurer and the insured who are parties to the insurance policy is a third party. The insurer, however, would not be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. Hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under Section 147 of the Act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. An employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. But merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless Section 147 of the Act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. Section 147 (1)(b) of the Act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. Even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1)of Section 147 of the Act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the Proviso to sub-section (1`) of Section 147 of the Act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. 
Sections 147 & 96 & M.P. M.V. Rules, 1994, Rule 97; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Control of Transport vehicles  M.P. Rules relate to provisions of control of transport vehicles and it cannot be adopted for interpreting Sections 147 and 145 of the M.V. Act to hold the insurer liable for death or bodily injury suffered by passenger. [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Sarvanlal, 2004 (4) MPHT 404 (D.B) Overruled]. -  2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. , in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. 12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant -payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '(Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'S.K. Vyas, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'Girish Desai, Dy. Advocate General',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2001-07-24',
		'deposition' => 'Misc. criminal case dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'N.K. Jain, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">N.K. Jain, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. A short but imporlant question of law arises for determination in this petition is as to whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, 'the Act') can be permitted to be compounded.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The case giving rise to this petition is pending in Appeal (No. 68/2000) before the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Mhow, who vide Order dated 23-9-2000 has declined joint prayer made by the complainant-payee and the accused drawee (the petitioners herein) to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act for which matter is convicted by the Trial Magistrate. The learned ASJ has held that the offence under Section 138 is not compoun-dable and no permission to compound the same can be accorded in view of the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Interestingly both the complainant petitioner No. 1 and accused -petitioner No. 2 have come up before this Court under Section 482 of the Code seeking permission to compound the offence and it is submitted that the entire claim of the complainant-payee stands satisfied by the settlement arrived at between the parties. Shri S.K. Vyas, learned counsel for accused (petitioner No. 2) has submitted that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is a personal offence not against the society at larger and since claim of the payee is satisfied fully by the drawer, no useful purpose would be served by sentencing the latter to any punishment. It is further contended that the bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code applies to the offences under the Indian Penal Code only and not to the offences under special laws like the one in hand. Learned counsel has also referred to Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Cr.PC (1898) which contained an express provision that the offences under other laws are not compoundable. It was thus contended that the omission of any such provision in the new Code, goes to show that the prohibition against composition of the offences under other laws is taken away by the new Code. Reliance is placed on a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M. Mohan Reddy, (1996) 1 CCR 516. Learned counsel has also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of O.P. Dholakia, a short notice of which is reported in 2000 (I) MPWN 178, where permission to compound the offence under Section 138 of the Act was accorded by the Apex Court in an appeal pending before it.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">As against it, Shri Girish Desai, learned Dy. Advocate General for respondent-State strongly defended the decision of the Appellate Court below and submitted that subject to the limitations provided under Section 42 of the Act, the offence under Section 138 is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code. Section 320, it is contended, shall govern composition of the offences under the special laws unless these laws contain some special provision for permitting such composition. I feel persuaded by the argument.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 138 makes the dishonour of cheques for insufficiency of funds etc., in the account of the drawer, punishable subject to certain conditions regarding demand by the payee and failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount of cheque, as stipulated in the proviso to that Section. Section 142 provides for taking cognizance of the offence only on a written complaint made by the payee within the prescribed time limit. It also provides as to by which Court the offence can be tried i.e., the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. However, the Act is silent as to the procedure to be followes for trial of the offences and the other connected matters. The Act also does not provide for compounding the offence. Under the circumstance, as provided by Section 4 (2) of the Code, the offence under Section 138 of the Act has to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided in Section 142 already referred to hereinbefore. Section 4 of the Code makes this position abundantly clear and thus reads :'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.--</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The conjoint effect of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 is that the offences whether under the Penal Code or under any other law, have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code unless there be an enactment regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying and otherwise dealing with such offences in which case such an enactment will prevail over the Code. The words 'otherwise dealt with' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly refer to such dealing with offences as is provided in the provisions of the Code apart from the provisions of investigation, inquiry or trial. Such provisions are to be found in the Code for instance, Chapters XIV to XXIII. Chapter XIV in fact lays down general provisions as to the inquiry and trial and include Section 320 dealing with compounding of offences.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. It will be thus seen that the offence under Section 138 of the Act is to be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Code subject to the limitations provided by Section 142 of the Act. Since the Act makes no provision for compounding the offences, Section 320 of the Code shall govern question of its composition and the bar contained under Sub-section (9) shall operate against composition of the offence. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not confined only to the offences under the I.P. Code. It is useful to read here the definition of the term 'offence' given in clause (n) of Section 2 of the Code which is as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(n) 'offence' means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the <a href="/act/50865/cattle-trespass-act-1871-complete-act">Cattle Trespass Act, 1871</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. A bare reading of the aforesaid definition makes it abundantly clear that 'offence' is a comprehensive term embrassing every act committed or omitted in violation of a Penal Law forbidding or commanding it. The term offence occurring in the Code is thus not confined to the offences under the I.P. Code and includes any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that Section 320 of the Code embrasses only the offences made punishable under the I.P. Code or that its provisions have no application to the offences against other laws. The preposition laid down in M. Mohan Reddy (supra) by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in my respectful opinion, does not represent the correct position of law. The Full Bench of the same High Court in a subsequent decision in Smt. Ghousia Sultana (1996 Cr.LJ 2973) has clearly held that the offences which are not declared compoundable under Section 320 of the Code cannot be allowed to be compounded even by taking recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is true that under Section 345 and the IInd Schedule of the old Code 1898, all offences under the special laws were made not compoundable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">No such specific provision is now contained in the new Code. But the omission does not indicate that Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is not applicable to the offences under the special laws. From the observations of 41st Report of the Law Commission it is clear that the matter was left to the legislature concerned to decide as a matter of policy, whether and to what extent offences under the special laws should be made compoundable. So, in absence of any specific provision in the statute itself in that behalf, Section 320 of the Code shall govern the question of composition of such offences under the special laws.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In O.P. Dholakia (supra), the Apex Court, it appears allowed composition of offence under Section 138 of the Act in the appeal pending before it. It may however, be submitted that no ratio decidendi as such is laid down by their Lordships in this decision. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the country. However, a decision which is not express and does not proceed on a consideration of the issue cannot be deemed to be a taw declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141 [See: State of U.P. v. Synthetics, (1991) 4 SCC 139]. From the aforesaid citation in O.P. Dholakia, it is not clear that the question of law with which we are confronted here, was raised before the Court or at all perceived by their Lordships while according permission to compound the offence under Section 138.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. In another decision in Ram Lal (AIR 1999 SC 895) it was held:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'It is apparent that when the decision in Mahesh Chand (AIR 1988 SC 2111) (supra) was rendered attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid legal prohibition. Nor was attention of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in Y. Suresh Babu [1987 (2) JT (SC) 361] (supra) drawn. Hence those were decisions rendered per incuriam. We hold that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable even with the permission of the Court cannot be compounded at all'.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 2983/97 (Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors), decided on 1-9-1999.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. There can be thus no manner of doubt that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not compoundable. Permission to compound the offence was rightly refused by the Appellate Court below and no such permission can be accorded by this Court also even by taking recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Before I say omega, it may be stated that the fact that the parties have arrived to a settlement and the entire claim of the complainant - payee stands satisfied, is an important factor to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court below while deciding the question of sentence. The complainant petitioner No. 1, through his counsel has made a categorical statement before this Court that he shall not oppose any such prayer which may be made by the accused before the Court below nor press for any sentence to be passed against the latter. The Appellate Court below shall keep all these factors in mind while deciding the appeal finally particularly in the matter of sentence. 13. With the observations as aforesaid, this petition is dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Misc. Criminal Case dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'pubs' => '2001CriLJ4608; 2001(4)MPHT337; 2001(3)MPLJ259',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Madhya Pradesh',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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LAW: Section 138, Section 138, Section 138, Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482, Section 138, Section 320 of the Code, the Indian Penal Code, Section 345, Section 138, Section 42, Section 138, Section 4, Section 138, Section 142, Section 4 of the Code, the Indian Penal Code, the Indian Penal Code, Section 4, the Penal Code, Section 4, Section 138, Section 142 of the Act, Section 320 of the Code, Section 320, the I.P. Code, Section 2 of the Code, Section 20, the Cattle Trespass Act, the I.P. Code, Section 320 of the Code, the I.P. Code, Section 320 of the Code, Section 482, Section 345, Section 320, Section 320 of the Code, Section 138, Article 141 of the Constitution, Article 141, Section 138.10, Section 138, the Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 482

ORG: Jain, the Trial Magistrate, ASJ, Court, Reliance, Andhra Pradesh High Court, CCR, the Supreme Court, O.P. Dholakia, the Apex Court, Appellate Court, Court, the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Judicial Magistrate, XXIII, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court, 41st Report of the Law Commission, O.P. Dholakia, the Apex Court, Lordships, the Supreme Court, U.P. v. Synthetics, Court, Lordships, AIR 1999 SC 895, AIR 1988 SC 2111, SC, Court, Court, Deepak Dawar and, M.P. and Ors, Appellate Court, Court, Appellate Court, Court, Court, Appellate Court

NORP: J.1

PERSON: Mhow, Order, S.K. Vyas, Cr, M. Mohan Reddy, Chapters XIV, Chapter XIV, Ghousia Sultana, Ram Lal, Y. Suresh Babu, Misc

CARDINAL: 23, 9, 1, 2, 2, 9, 1, 516, 178, 2, 4, 1, 5, 1, 2, 2, 9, 9, 1871.7, 9, 4, 139, 2, 361, 2983/97, 1, 1, 13

DATE: 1898, 1996, 2000, 1996, 2973, 1991, 1987

ORDINAL: First

FAC: M. Mohan Reddy

PRODUCT: The Full Bench

GPE: Smt, O.P. Dholakia, Mahesh Chand, M.Cr