Semantic Analysis by spaCy
Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
Decided On : Aug-06-1991
Court : Madhya Pradesh
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Appeal No. 1146 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh', 'casenote' => ' - MADHYA PRADESH NAGAR TATHA GRAM NIVESH ADHINIYAM (23 OF 1973)Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishna Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Proviso prescribing time limit Held, Object of amendment is to remove hardship caused to citizens and to provide time limit to consider objections and suggestion and to provide a deeming clause so that the Authority would act in quite promptitude. Proviso unequivocal, categorical and unambiguous and does not permit any other kind of construction but a singular one. Section 50 (4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso is not retrospective. Scheme already finalised will not lapse and has to be completed within the time span provided under Proviso. No vested right accrues in favour of Authority on commencement of process of preparation of scheme, which cannot be impaired by introducing Proviso. Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso uses the term shall be deemed to have lapsed. It does not convey that scheme gets automatically lapsed. - The appellant thereafter made good his escape.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Jai Prakash v. State;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'S.C. Datt, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'Dilip Naik, Deputy Adv. General', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-08-06', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.K. Seth and ;S.K. Chawla, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Chawla, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal by an accused challenging his conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted thereunder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. It was not disputed that on 30-5-1986 at a trijunction of roads called Baram Baba Ka Tigadda, in village Khamria, police-station Kumhari, district Damoh, a quarrel had taken place between deceased Halka and appellant Narayan. The time then was day time around 2.30 P.M. During the course of that quarrel appellant Narayan inflicted a knife blow on the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The prosecution case was that on account of previous enmity between the deceased and the appellant, the appellant stopped the deceased while the latter was at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda and was going to his own house. The appellant also took out a knife and inflicted knife blows on the deceased. One Ganga (P.W.2) tried to intervene but he was pushed and tripped on the ground by the appellant. The appellant then fled away from the scene. Deceased Halka died at the spot. The postmortem examination (Ex.P-11) revealed that the deceased had sustained a contusion 3'x 1/2 ' on the left side of his face, another contusion 1 1/2 x 1/2 on the right side of his face with fracture of the right mandible bone, ecchymosis in the eye and an incised injury 1 1/2' x `1/2 x cavity deep on the left side of chest at the level of nipple. On dissection of the body below the said incised injury, it was found that the wound had gone deep into the left ventricle of the heart and measured 1 1/2' x1/2'. The fift ribwas also found cut and large amount of clotted blood was present in the pericardial cavity. The death was due to injury to the heart.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The police got medically examined Ganga (P.W.2) as also appellant Narayan. Ganga (P.W.2) was found to have sustained a bruise 2' x 1' on the left knee, another contusion 1' x 1' on left shoulder and thirdly a contusion 2' x 1' on the back of his neck vide injury report, Ex.P-9. Appellant Narayan was found to have sustained an abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his right forearm, another abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his left leg and a bruise 2' x 1' on his left chest, vide injury report, Ex.P-10. On these allegations, the prosecution case was that the appellant had committed the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence of appellant Narayan was that the deceased was holding a lathi and started assaulting the appellant with it. As many as three lathi blows were dealt by the deceased on the appellant. In that situation, the appellant in order to save himself from further assault, had to inflict a single knife blow on the deceased. As soon as the deceased fell down, the appellant tried to run away but was obstructed by Ganga (P.W.2). The appellant had then to push Ganga (P.W.2) who fell down. The appellant thereafter made good his escape.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Learned Sessions Judge, Damoh, who tried the case, held the prosecution story to be established. The plea of right of private defence was held to be not made out. The appellant was held guilty of the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Shri S. C. Datt, learned counsel for the appellant, raised only one point. It was argued by him that the incident had taken place suddenly without any premeditation on the part of the appellant. There was a scuffle between the deceased and the apellant whereafter the appellant happened to inflict a single knife injury on the deceased at the spur of moment and in the heat of passion. In the circumstances the offence which the appellant had at the most committed was under Section 304, part II, Indian Penal Code and not under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. In support of his argument Shri Datt sought to seek support from the decisions reporded in Jagrupsingh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 155, Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 55, Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 125, Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185, Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 463, Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2122.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The prosecution case rested on the eye-witness account given by Bhura (P.W.I), Ganga (P.W.2), Gouribai (P.W.3), Bhagwandas (P.W.4) and Harcharan (P.W.5). A detailed examination of their evidence is not necessary, so much as to find out if the incident involving the appellant had really taken place, as to find out the circumstances in which that incident had taken place. It was not clear as to what was the immediate cause of the quarrel. Harcharan (P.W.5) was the only witness who endeavoured to say on the point. According to him, the appellant was sitting on a platform at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda. Seeing him, the appellant for no rhyme or reason clung to him. When he protested, the appellant released him but seeing the deceased pass along that place, the appellant rushed towards the deceased and caught him by the collar of his shirt. This would make it appear as if the appellant was seized with a catching mania. Continuing further, the witness deposed that the appellant then demanded a sum of rupees twenty thousand from the deceased. The deceased tried to rescue himself by saying that he would give the money at his house. It is not known why the appellant should have demanded such a fat sum from the deceased in the first place. The witness tried to explain that the appellant had been previously prosecuted for assault on the deceased (sic) the appellant had been acquitted. Even if this were true, it is difficult to gulp the idea that an acquitted accused for that reason would demand a fat sum of rupees twenty thousand and the complanant, i.e., the deceased would also express his willingness to pay that sum if only the appellant accompanied him to his house.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is ample indication in the evidence to show that quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had taken place unexpectedly on a chance meeting. The deceased was absolutely unarmed. He did not have any kind of lathi with him. The quarrel developed into an actual fight in which both grappled with each other and in the process also fell down resulting in contusions to the deceased on his face and abrasions to the appellant on his limbs. The story told by some of the eye-witnesses that the appellant had grappling with Ganga (P.W.2) and both had fallen down, was a definite improvement over the initial story that the appellant after the incident at the time of running away had given Ganga simply a push in consequence of which Ganga only had fallen and not the appellant. Earlier the appellant in the course of grappling with the deceased had inflicted a knife blow, and only a single blow, on the chest of the deceased. The appellant did not persist in the assault.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question is what offence was committed by the appellant. It is often glibly argued that since the accused had caused but a single injury, he cannot be held guilty of murder. The argument may in some cases hit upon correctly. But it is wrong to place the argument on a pedestal of law or even to accept it as a rule of thumb. The true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate, A is bound hand and foot. B comes and placing his revolver against the head of A, shoots A in his head killing him instantaneously. Here there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of B in shooting A was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within clause (1) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Taking another instance, B sneaks into the bed room of his enemy A while the latter is asleep in his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of A, B forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of A and runs away. A dies shortly thereafter. The injury to A was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that B intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of B within clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It may be mentioned that even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part I of Section 304, Indian Penal Code if the case of the accused is such as to fall within clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to as to fall within clause (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Again, the intention or knowledge or the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code. It would be an offence under part I of that section, if the case fell within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under part II of Section 304 if the case fell within 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. To come back to the case of single injury, it may on medical examination be found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the circumstances of the case are such that it can also be held that the said particular injury was intended, clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, will be attracted and the offence would be murder. The leading case on clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, is Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465. The latest case is that of Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi) Administration, (1991) 2 SCC 32, wherein the Supreme Court after reviewing the entire case law held that even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, requirements of clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. In that decision, in the. wake of an altercation and exchange of hot words, but not a fight, a single kiroan blow was thrust in the chest of the deceased by the appellant, penetrating the heart and causing instantaneous death of the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that the offence was murder. But if single injury of the above kind is inflicted under circumstances making it likely that the particular bodily injury actually found to be present was not intended, for example, where the accused without serious prior enmity, acted without premeditation suddenly at the spur of the moment during the course of a scuffle with the deceased, rendering the aiming of the particular injury found present to be improbable, the offence would not be murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code, albeit the injury may be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is the ratio of the decisions relied upon by Shri Datt referred to in paragraph 7 of this judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Coming back to the present case, as already found by us, the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant was not anticipated and had taken place suddenly upon their chance meeting. The immediate cause of the quarrel could not be known. The deceased was not standing away and steady during the quarrel. On the other hand, grappling was taking place between the appellant and the deceased reasonably raising the possibility that the appellant could not have aimed his knife at a particular part of the body of the deceased, namely, the left side of his chest where the blow landed. The appellant did not persist in the assault. He had no particular motive to kill the deceased. The chest injury was undoubtedly sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. But in the above circumstances it cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the appellant intended to inflict that particular injury. The knife blow was undoubtedly dealt forcibly causing a penetrating wound inside the heart. As such, the appellant can safely be credited with the knowledge that he was likely by the said blow to cause death, attracting 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, thereby making the act of the appellant punishable under Part II of Section 304, Indian Penal Code. The offence committed by the appellant was not one under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, but one under Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. It was submitted by Shri Datt on behalf of the appellant, and not challenged by the Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State, that the appellant, taking into consideration undertrial detention, has already undergone actual sentence of five years and some months and considering the remissions which the appellant must have earned, he has undergone not less than seven years of sentence. The sentence so far undergone, in our opinion, would more than amply meet the ends of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is altered from Section 302, Indian Penal Code, to Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code and he is sentenced to the period already undergone. As a result, he shall be released immediately if not required in any other connection.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '1992(0)MPLJ120', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'State of Madhya Pradesh', 'sub' => 'Criminal', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '505478' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav Vs. 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Appeal No. 1146 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh', 'casenote' => ' - MADHYA PRADESH NAGAR TATHA GRAM NIVESH ADHINIYAM (23 OF 1973)Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishna Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Proviso prescribing time limit Held, Object of amendment is to remove hardship caused to citizens and to provide time limit to consider objections and suggestion and to provide a deeming clause so that the Authority would act in quite promptitude. Proviso unequivocal, categorical and unambiguous and does not permit any other kind of construction but a singular one. Section 50 (4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso is not retrospective. Scheme already finalised will not lapse and has to be completed within the time span provided under Proviso. No vested right accrues in favour of Authority on commencement of process of preparation of scheme, which cannot be impaired by introducing Proviso. Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso uses the term shall be deemed to have lapsed. It does not convey that scheme gets automatically lapsed. - The appellant thereafter made good his escape.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Jai Prakash v. State;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'S.C. Datt, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'Dilip Naik, Deputy Adv. General', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-08-06', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.K. Seth and ;S.K. Chawla, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Chawla, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal by an accused challenging his conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted thereunder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. It was not disputed that on 30-5-1986 at a trijunction of roads called Baram Baba Ka Tigadda, in village Khamria, police-station Kumhari, district Damoh, a quarrel had taken place between deceased Halka and appellant Narayan. The time then was day time around 2.30 P.M. During the course of that quarrel appellant Narayan inflicted a knife blow on the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The prosecution case was that on account of previous enmity between the deceased and the appellant, the appellant stopped the deceased while the latter was at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda and was going to his own house. The appellant also took out a knife and inflicted knife blows on the deceased. One Ganga (P.W.2) tried to intervene but he was pushed and tripped on the ground by the appellant. The appellant then fled away from the scene. Deceased Halka died at the spot. The postmortem examination (Ex.P-11) revealed that the deceased had sustained a contusion 3'x 1/2 ' on the left side of his face, another contusion 1 1/2 x 1/2 on the right side of his face with fracture of the right mandible bone, ecchymosis in the eye and an incised injury 1 1/2' x `1/2 x cavity deep on the left side of chest at the level of nipple. On dissection of the body below the said incised injury, it was found that the wound had gone deep into the left ventricle of the heart and measured 1 1/2' x1/2'. The fift ribwas also found cut and large amount of clotted blood was present in the pericardial cavity. The death was due to injury to the heart.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The police got medically examined Ganga (P.W.2) as also appellant Narayan. Ganga (P.W.2) was found to have sustained a bruise 2' x 1' on the left knee, another contusion 1' x 1' on left shoulder and thirdly a contusion 2' x 1' on the back of his neck vide injury report, Ex.P-9. Appellant Narayan was found to have sustained an abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his right forearm, another abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his left leg and a bruise 2' x 1' on his left chest, vide injury report, Ex.P-10. On these allegations, the prosecution case was that the appellant had committed the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence of appellant Narayan was that the deceased was holding a lathi and started assaulting the appellant with it. As many as three lathi blows were dealt by the deceased on the appellant. In that situation, the appellant in order to save himself from further assault, had to inflict a single knife blow on the deceased. As soon as the deceased fell down, the appellant tried to run away but was obstructed by Ganga (P.W.2). The appellant had then to push Ganga (P.W.2) who fell down. The appellant thereafter made good his escape.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Learned Sessions Judge, Damoh, who tried the case, held the prosecution story to be established. The plea of right of private defence was held to be not made out. The appellant was held guilty of the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Shri S. C. Datt, learned counsel for the appellant, raised only one point. It was argued by him that the incident had taken place suddenly without any premeditation on the part of the appellant. There was a scuffle between the deceased and the apellant whereafter the appellant happened to inflict a single knife injury on the deceased at the spur of moment and in the heat of passion. In the circumstances the offence which the appellant had at the most committed was under Section 304, part II, Indian Penal Code and not under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. In support of his argument Shri Datt sought to seek support from the decisions reporded in Jagrupsingh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 155, Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 55, Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 125, Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185, Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 463, Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2122.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The prosecution case rested on the eye-witness account given by Bhura (P.W.I), Ganga (P.W.2), Gouribai (P.W.3), Bhagwandas (P.W.4) and Harcharan (P.W.5). A detailed examination of their evidence is not necessary, so much as to find out if the incident involving the appellant had really taken place, as to find out the circumstances in which that incident had taken place. It was not clear as to what was the immediate cause of the quarrel. Harcharan (P.W.5) was the only witness who endeavoured to say on the point. According to him, the appellant was sitting on a platform at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda. Seeing him, the appellant for no rhyme or reason clung to him. When he protested, the appellant released him but seeing the deceased pass along that place, the appellant rushed towards the deceased and caught him by the collar of his shirt. This would make it appear as if the appellant was seized with a catching mania. Continuing further, the witness deposed that the appellant then demanded a sum of rupees twenty thousand from the deceased. The deceased tried to rescue himself by saying that he would give the money at his house. It is not known why the appellant should have demanded such a fat sum from the deceased in the first place. The witness tried to explain that the appellant had been previously prosecuted for assault on the deceased (sic) the appellant had been acquitted. Even if this were true, it is difficult to gulp the idea that an acquitted accused for that reason would demand a fat sum of rupees twenty thousand and the complanant, i.e., the deceased would also express his willingness to pay that sum if only the appellant accompanied him to his house.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is ample indication in the evidence to show that quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had taken place unexpectedly on a chance meeting. The deceased was absolutely unarmed. He did not have any kind of lathi with him. The quarrel developed into an actual fight in which both grappled with each other and in the process also fell down resulting in contusions to the deceased on his face and abrasions to the appellant on his limbs. The story told by some of the eye-witnesses that the appellant had grappling with Ganga (P.W.2) and both had fallen down, was a definite improvement over the initial story that the appellant after the incident at the time of running away had given Ganga simply a push in consequence of which Ganga only had fallen and not the appellant. Earlier the appellant in the course of grappling with the deceased had inflicted a knife blow, and only a single blow, on the chest of the deceased. The appellant did not persist in the assault.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question is what offence was committed by the appellant. It is often glibly argued that since the accused had caused but a single injury, he cannot be held guilty of murder. The argument may in some cases hit upon correctly. But it is wrong to place the argument on a pedestal of law or even to accept it as a rule of thumb. The true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate, A is bound hand and foot. B comes and placing his revolver against the head of A, shoots A in his head killing him instantaneously. Here there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of B in shooting A was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within clause (1) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Taking another instance, B sneaks into the bed room of his enemy A while the latter is asleep in his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of A, B forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of A and runs away. A dies shortly thereafter. The injury to A was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that B intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of B within clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It may be mentioned that even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part I of Section 304, Indian Penal Code if the case of the accused is such as to fall within clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to as to fall within clause (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Again, the intention or knowledge or the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code. It would be an offence under part I of that section, if the case fell within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under part II of Section 304 if the case fell within 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. To come back to the case of single injury, it may on medical examination be found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the circumstances of the case are such that it can also be held that the said particular injury was intended, clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, will be attracted and the offence would be murder. The leading case on clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, is Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465. The latest case is that of Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi) Administration, (1991) 2 SCC 32, wherein the Supreme Court after reviewing the entire case law held that even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, requirements of clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. In that decision, in the. wake of an altercation and exchange of hot words, but not a fight, a single kiroan blow was thrust in the chest of the deceased by the appellant, penetrating the heart and causing instantaneous death of the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that the offence was murder. But if single injury of the above kind is inflicted under circumstances making it likely that the particular bodily injury actually found to be present was not intended, for example, where the accused without serious prior enmity, acted without premeditation suddenly at the spur of the moment during the course of a scuffle with the deceased, rendering the aiming of the particular injury found present to be improbable, the offence would not be murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code, albeit the injury may be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is the ratio of the decisions relied upon by Shri Datt referred to in paragraph 7 of this judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Coming back to the present case, as already found by us, the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant was not anticipated and had taken place suddenly upon their chance meeting. The immediate cause of the quarrel could not be known. The deceased was not standing away and steady during the quarrel. On the other hand, grappling was taking place between the appellant and the deceased reasonably raising the possibility that the appellant could not have aimed his knife at a particular part of the body of the deceased, namely, the left side of his chest where the blow landed. The appellant did not persist in the assault. He had no particular motive to kill the deceased. The chest injury was undoubtedly sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. But in the above circumstances it cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the appellant intended to inflict that particular injury. The knife blow was undoubtedly dealt forcibly causing a penetrating wound inside the heart. As such, the appellant can safely be credited with the knowledge that he was likely by the said blow to cause death, attracting 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, thereby making the act of the appellant punishable under Part II of Section 304, Indian Penal Code. The offence committed by the appellant was not one under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, but one under Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. It was submitted by Shri Datt on behalf of the appellant, and not challenged by the Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State, that the appellant, taking into consideration undertrial detention, has already undergone actual sentence of five years and some months and considering the remissions which the appellant must have earned, he has undergone not less than seven years of sentence. The sentence so far undergone, in our opinion, would more than amply meet the ends of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is altered from Section 302, Indian Penal Code, to Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code and he is sentenced to the period already undergone. As a result, he shall be released immediately if not required in any other connection.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '1992(0)MPLJ120', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'State of Madhya Pradesh', 'sub' => 'Criminal', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '505478' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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Appeal No. 1146 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh', 'casenote' => ' - MADHYA PRADESH NAGAR TATHA GRAM NIVESH ADHINIYAM (23 OF 1973)Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishna Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Proviso prescribing time limit Held, Object of amendment is to remove hardship caused to citizens and to provide time limit to consider objections and suggestion and to provide a deeming clause so that the Authority would act in quite promptitude. Proviso unequivocal, categorical and unambiguous and does not permit any other kind of construction but a singular one. Section 50 (4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso is not retrospective. Scheme already finalised will not lapse and has to be completed within the time span provided under Proviso. No vested right accrues in favour of Authority on commencement of process of preparation of scheme, which cannot be impaired by introducing Proviso. Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso uses the term shall be deemed to have lapsed. It does not convey that scheme gets automatically lapsed. - The appellant thereafter made good his escape.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Jai Prakash v. State;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'S.C. Datt, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'Dilip Naik, Deputy Adv. General', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-08-06', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.K. Seth and ;S.K. Chawla, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Chawla, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal by an accused challenging his conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted thereunder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. It was not disputed that on 30-5-1986 at a trijunction of roads called Baram Baba Ka Tigadda, in village Khamria, police-station Kumhari, district Damoh, a quarrel had taken place between deceased Halka and appellant Narayan. The time then was day time around 2.30 P.M. During the course of that quarrel appellant Narayan inflicted a knife blow on the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The prosecution case was that on account of previous enmity between the deceased and the appellant, the appellant stopped the deceased while the latter was at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda and was going to his own house. The appellant also took out a knife and inflicted knife blows on the deceased. One Ganga (P.W.2) tried to intervene but he was pushed and tripped on the ground by the appellant. The appellant then fled away from the scene. Deceased Halka died at the spot. The postmortem examination (Ex.P-11) revealed that the deceased had sustained a contusion 3'x 1/2 ' on the left side of his face, another contusion 1 1/2 x 1/2 on the right side of his face with fracture of the right mandible bone, ecchymosis in the eye and an incised injury 1 1/2' x `1/2 x cavity deep on the left side of chest at the level of nipple. On dissection of the body below the said incised injury, it was found that the wound had gone deep into the left ventricle of the heart and measured 1 1/2' x1/2'. The fift ribwas also found cut and large amount of clotted blood was present in the pericardial cavity. The death was due to injury to the heart.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The police got medically examined Ganga (P.W.2) as also appellant Narayan. Ganga (P.W.2) was found to have sustained a bruise 2' x 1' on the left knee, another contusion 1' x 1' on left shoulder and thirdly a contusion 2' x 1' on the back of his neck vide injury report, Ex.P-9. Appellant Narayan was found to have sustained an abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his right forearm, another abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his left leg and a bruise 2' x 1' on his left chest, vide injury report, Ex.P-10. On these allegations, the prosecution case was that the appellant had committed the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence of appellant Narayan was that the deceased was holding a lathi and started assaulting the appellant with it. As many as three lathi blows were dealt by the deceased on the appellant. In that situation, the appellant in order to save himself from further assault, had to inflict a single knife blow on the deceased. As soon as the deceased fell down, the appellant tried to run away but was obstructed by Ganga (P.W.2). The appellant had then to push Ganga (P.W.2) who fell down. The appellant thereafter made good his escape.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Learned Sessions Judge, Damoh, who tried the case, held the prosecution story to be established. The plea of right of private defence was held to be not made out. The appellant was held guilty of the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Shri S. C. Datt, learned counsel for the appellant, raised only one point. It was argued by him that the incident had taken place suddenly without any premeditation on the part of the appellant. There was a scuffle between the deceased and the apellant whereafter the appellant happened to inflict a single knife injury on the deceased at the spur of moment and in the heat of passion. In the circumstances the offence which the appellant had at the most committed was under Section 304, part II, Indian Penal Code and not under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. In support of his argument Shri Datt sought to seek support from the decisions reporded in Jagrupsingh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 155, Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 55, Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 125, Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185, Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 463, Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2122.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The prosecution case rested on the eye-witness account given by Bhura (P.W.I), Ganga (P.W.2), Gouribai (P.W.3), Bhagwandas (P.W.4) and Harcharan (P.W.5). A detailed examination of their evidence is not necessary, so much as to find out if the incident involving the appellant had really taken place, as to find out the circumstances in which that incident had taken place. It was not clear as to what was the immediate cause of the quarrel. Harcharan (P.W.5) was the only witness who endeavoured to say on the point. According to him, the appellant was sitting on a platform at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda. Seeing him, the appellant for no rhyme or reason clung to him. When he protested, the appellant released him but seeing the deceased pass along that place, the appellant rushed towards the deceased and caught him by the collar of his shirt. This would make it appear as if the appellant was seized with a catching mania. Continuing further, the witness deposed that the appellant then demanded a sum of rupees twenty thousand from the deceased. The deceased tried to rescue himself by saying that he would give the money at his house. It is not known why the appellant should have demanded such a fat sum from the deceased in the first place. The witness tried to explain that the appellant had been previously prosecuted for assault on the deceased (sic) the appellant had been acquitted. Even if this were true, it is difficult to gulp the idea that an acquitted accused for that reason would demand a fat sum of rupees twenty thousand and the complanant, i.e., the deceased would also express his willingness to pay that sum if only the appellant accompanied him to his house.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is ample indication in the evidence to show that quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had taken place unexpectedly on a chance meeting. The deceased was absolutely unarmed. He did not have any kind of lathi with him. The quarrel developed into an actual fight in which both grappled with each other and in the process also fell down resulting in contusions to the deceased on his face and abrasions to the appellant on his limbs. The story told by some of the eye-witnesses that the appellant had grappling with Ganga (P.W.2) and both had fallen down, was a definite improvement over the initial story that the appellant after the incident at the time of running away had given Ganga simply a push in consequence of which Ganga only had fallen and not the appellant. Earlier the appellant in the course of grappling with the deceased had inflicted a knife blow, and only a single blow, on the chest of the deceased. The appellant did not persist in the assault.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question is what offence was committed by the appellant. It is often glibly argued that since the accused had caused but a single injury, he cannot be held guilty of murder. The argument may in some cases hit upon correctly. But it is wrong to place the argument on a pedestal of law or even to accept it as a rule of thumb. The true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate, A is bound hand and foot. B comes and placing his revolver against the head of A, shoots A in his head killing him instantaneously. Here there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of B in shooting A was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within clause (1) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Taking another instance, B sneaks into the bed room of his enemy A while the latter is asleep in his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of A, B forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of A and runs away. A dies shortly thereafter. The injury to A was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that B intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of B within clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It may be mentioned that even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part I of Section 304, Indian Penal Code if the case of the accused is such as to fall within clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to as to fall within clause (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Again, the intention or knowledge or the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code. It would be an offence under part I of that section, if the case fell within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under part II of Section 304 if the case fell within 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. To come back to the case of single injury, it may on medical examination be found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the circumstances of the case are such that it can also be held that the said particular injury was intended, clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, will be attracted and the offence would be murder. The leading case on clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, is Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465. The latest case is that of Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi) Administration, (1991) 2 SCC 32, wherein the Supreme Court after reviewing the entire case law held that even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, requirements of clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. In that decision, in the. wake of an altercation and exchange of hot words, but not a fight, a single kiroan blow was thrust in the chest of the deceased by the appellant, penetrating the heart and causing instantaneous death of the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that the offence was murder. But if single injury of the above kind is inflicted under circumstances making it likely that the particular bodily injury actually found to be present was not intended, for example, where the accused without serious prior enmity, acted without premeditation suddenly at the spur of the moment during the course of a scuffle with the deceased, rendering the aiming of the particular injury found present to be improbable, the offence would not be murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code, albeit the injury may be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is the ratio of the decisions relied upon by Shri Datt referred to in paragraph 7 of this judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Coming back to the present case, as already found by us, the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant was not anticipated and had taken place suddenly upon their chance meeting. The immediate cause of the quarrel could not be known. The deceased was not standing away and steady during the quarrel. On the other hand, grappling was taking place between the appellant and the deceased reasonably raising the possibility that the appellant could not have aimed his knife at a particular part of the body of the deceased, namely, the left side of his chest where the blow landed. The appellant did not persist in the assault. He had no particular motive to kill the deceased. The chest injury was undoubtedly sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. But in the above circumstances it cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the appellant intended to inflict that particular injury. The knife blow was undoubtedly dealt forcibly causing a penetrating wound inside the heart. As such, the appellant can safely be credited with the knowledge that he was likely by the said blow to cause death, attracting 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, thereby making the act of the appellant punishable under Part II of Section 304, Indian Penal Code. The offence committed by the appellant was not one under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, but one under Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. It was submitted by Shri Datt on behalf of the appellant, and not challenged by the Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State, that the appellant, taking into consideration undertrial detention, has already undergone actual sentence of five years and some months and considering the remissions which the appellant must have earned, he has undergone not less than seven years of sentence. The sentence so far undergone, in our opinion, would more than amply meet the ends of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is altered from Section 302, Indian Penal Code, to Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code and he is sentenced to the period already undergone. As a result, he shall be released immediately if not required in any other connection.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '1992(0)MPLJ120', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'State of Madhya Pradesh', 'sub' => 'Criminal', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '505478' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 302', (int) 1 => 'Section 304', (int) 2 => 'Section 302', (int) 3 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 4 => 'Section 300', (int) 5 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 6 => 'Section 300', (int) 7 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 8 => 'Section 300', (int) 9 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 10 => 'Section 300', (int) 11 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 12 => 'Section 304', (int) 13 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 14 => 'Section 300', (int) 15 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 16 => 'Section 300', (int) 17 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 18 => 'Section 299', (int) 19 => 'Section 300', (int) 20 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 21 => 'Section 304', (int) 22 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 23 => 'Section 299', (int) 24 => 'Section 299', (int) 25 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 26 => 'Section 300', (int) 27 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 28 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 29 => 'Section 304', (int) 30 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 31 => 'Section 299', (int) 32 => 'Section 304', (int) 33 => 'Indian Penal Code', (int) 34 => 'Section 302', (int) 35 => 'Section 304', (int) 36 => 'Section 302', (int) 37 => 'Section 304' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'S.K. Chawla', (int) 1 => 'thereunder.2', (int) 2 => 'Baram Baba Ka Tigadda', (int) 3 => 'Halka', (int) 4 => 'Halka', (int) 5 => 'Ganga', (int) 6 => 'Shri S. C. Datt', (int) 7 => 'Shri Datt', (int) 8 => 'Rai v. State of', (int) 9 => 'Ram v. State', (int) 10 => 'Tholan v. State of', (int) 11 => 'Tamil Nadu', (int) 12 => 'Kartar Singh v. State of', (int) 13 => 'Bhura', (int) 14 => 'Gouribai', (int) 15 => 'Bhagwandas', (int) 16 => 'Virsa Singh v. State of', (int) 17 => 'Jai Prakash', (int) 18 => 'Shri Datt', (int) 19 => 'Shri Datt' ), 'NORP' => array( (int) 0 => 'J.1', (int) 1 => 'P.W.5', (int) 2 => 'Indian' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => '30-5-1986', (int) 1 => 'only 2nd', (int) 2 => '1991', (int) 3 => 'five years', (int) 4 => 'some months', (int) 5 => 'less than seven years' ), 'GPE' => array( (int) 0 => 'Khamria', (int) 1 => 'Kumhari', (int) 2 => 'Narayan', (int) 3 => 'Ganga', (int) 4 => 'Ganga', (int) 5 => 'Narayan', (int) 6 => 'Narayan', (int) 7 => 'Ganga', (int) 8 => 'Ganga', (int) 9 => 'Jagrupsingh v. State', (int) 10 => 'Haryana', (int) 11 => 'Singh v. State of Punjab', (int) 12 => 'Haryana', (int) 13 => 'Singh v. State of Punjab', (int) 14 => 'Ganga', (int) 15 => 'Harcharan', (int) 16 => 'Ganga', (int) 17 => 'Ganga', (int) 18 => 'Ganga', (int) 19 => 'caused.11' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'Damoh', (int) 1 => 'Narayan', (int) 2 => 'Ex.P-9', (int) 3 => 'Narayan', (int) 4 => 'Damoh', (int) 5 => 'AIR 1981', (int) 6 => 'SC', (int) 7 => 'AIR 1982', (int) 8 => 'SC', (int) 9 => 'AIR 1982', (int) 10 => 'AIR 1983', (int) 11 => 'AIR 1983', (int) 12 => 'SC', (int) 13 => 'AIR 1984', (int) 14 => 'SC', (int) 15 => 'AIR 1988', (int) 16 => 'SC', (int) 17 => 'P.W.I', (int) 18 => 'Indian Penal Code.12', (int) 19 => 'AIR 1958', (int) 20 => 'SC', (int) 21 => 'Delhi) Administration', (int) 22 => 'the Supreme Court', (int) 23 => 'the Supreme Court', (int) 24 => 'State' ), 'FAC' => array( (int) 0 => 'Baram Baba Ka Tigadda', (int) 1 => 'Baram Baba Ka Tigadda' ), 'CARDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'One', (int) 1 => '3'x 1/2 '', (int) 2 => '1 1/2', (int) 3 => '1/2', (int) 4 => '1 1/2', (int) 5 => '1/2', (int) 6 => '1 1/2', (int) 7 => '1', (int) 8 => '2', (int) 9 => '2', (int) 10 => '1/2', (int) 11 => '2', (int) 12 => '1/2', (int) 13 => 'As many as three', (int) 14 => 'only one', (int) 15 => 'II', (int) 16 => '155', (int) 17 => '125', (int) 18 => '185', (int) 19 => '2122.8', (int) 20 => 'twenty thousand', (int) 21 => 'twenty thousand', (int) 22 => '1', (int) 23 => '4', (int) 24 => '1', (int) 25 => '1', (int) 26 => '4', (int) 27 => 'one', (int) 28 => 'five', (int) 29 => '1', (int) 30 => '3', (int) 31 => '3rdly', (int) 32 => '465', (int) 33 => '2', (int) 34 => '7' ), 'PRODUCT' => array( (int) 0 => '759' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => 'first', (int) 1 => '3rd', (int) 2 => '2nd', (int) 3 => '3rd', (int) 4 => '3rd' ), 'MONEY' => array( (int) 0 => '3rdly to Section 300' ), 'TIME' => array( (int) 0 => '3rdly to Section 300' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '505478', 'acts' => 'Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 299, 300, 302 and 304', 'appealno' => 'Cri. Appeal No. 1146 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Narayan S/O Meghraj Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh', 'casenote' => ' - MADHYA PRADESH NAGAR TATHA GRAM NIVESH ADHINIYAM (23 OF 1973)Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishna Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Proviso prescribing time limit Held, Object of amendment is to remove hardship caused to citizens and to provide time limit to consider objections and suggestion and to provide a deeming clause so that the Authority would act in quite promptitude. Proviso unequivocal, categorical and unambiguous and does not permit any other kind of construction but a singular one. Section 50 (4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso is not retrospective. Scheme already finalised will not lapse and has to be completed within the time span provided under Proviso. No vested right accrues in favour of Authority on commencement of process of preparation of scheme, which cannot be impaired by introducing Proviso. Section 50(4) Proviso (As inserted by Act of 2004): [Dipak Misra, Krishn Kumar Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Preparation of Town Development Scheme Held, Proviso uses the term shall be deemed to have lapsed. It does not convey that scheme gets automatically lapsed. - The appellant thereafter made good his escape.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Jai Prakash v. State;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'S.C. Datt, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'Dilip Naik, Deputy Adv. General', 'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-08-06', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'S.K. Seth and ;S.K. Chawla, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.K. Chawla, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is an appeal by an accused challenging his conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted thereunder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. It was not disputed that on 30-5-1986 at a trijunction of roads called Baram Baba Ka Tigadda, in village Khamria, police-station Kumhari, district Damoh, a quarrel had taken place between deceased Halka and appellant Narayan. The time then was day time around 2.30 P.M. During the course of that quarrel appellant Narayan inflicted a knife blow on the deceased.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The prosecution case was that on account of previous enmity between the deceased and the appellant, the appellant stopped the deceased while the latter was at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda and was going to his own house. The appellant also took out a knife and inflicted knife blows on the deceased. One Ganga (P.W.2) tried to intervene but he was pushed and tripped on the ground by the appellant. The appellant then fled away from the scene. Deceased Halka died at the spot. The postmortem examination (Ex.P-11) revealed that the deceased had sustained a contusion 3'x 1/2 ' on the left side of his face, another contusion 1 1/2 x 1/2 on the right side of his face with fracture of the right mandible bone, ecchymosis in the eye and an incised injury 1 1/2' x `1/2 x cavity deep on the left side of chest at the level of nipple. On dissection of the body below the said incised injury, it was found that the wound had gone deep into the left ventricle of the heart and measured 1 1/2' x1/2'. The fift ribwas also found cut and large amount of clotted blood was present in the pericardial cavity. The death was due to injury to the heart.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The police got medically examined Ganga (P.W.2) as also appellant Narayan. Ganga (P.W.2) was found to have sustained a bruise 2' x 1' on the left knee, another contusion 1' x 1' on left shoulder and thirdly a contusion 2' x 1' on the back of his neck vide injury report, Ex.P-9. Appellant Narayan was found to have sustained an abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his right forearm, another abrasion 2' x 1/2' on his left leg and a bruise 2' x 1' on his left chest, vide injury report, Ex.P-10. On these allegations, the prosecution case was that the appellant had committed the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The defence of appellant Narayan was that the deceased was holding a lathi and started assaulting the appellant with it. As many as three lathi blows were dealt by the deceased on the appellant. In that situation, the appellant in order to save himself from further assault, had to inflict a single knife blow on the deceased. As soon as the deceased fell down, the appellant tried to run away but was obstructed by Ganga (P.W.2). The appellant had then to push Ganga (P.W.2) who fell down. The appellant thereafter made good his escape.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Learned Sessions Judge, Damoh, who tried the case, held the prosecution story to be established. The plea of right of private defence was held to be not made out. The appellant was held guilty of the offence of murder.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Shri S. C. Datt, learned counsel for the appellant, raised only one point. It was argued by him that the incident had taken place suddenly without any premeditation on the part of the appellant. There was a scuffle between the deceased and the apellant whereafter the appellant happened to inflict a single knife injury on the deceased at the spur of moment and in the heat of passion. In the circumstances the offence which the appellant had at the most committed was under Section 304, part II, Indian Penal Code and not under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. In support of his argument Shri Datt sought to seek support from the decisions reporded in Jagrupsingh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 155, Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 55, Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 125, Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185, Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 463, Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2122.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The prosecution case rested on the eye-witness account given by Bhura (P.W.I), Ganga (P.W.2), Gouribai (P.W.3), Bhagwandas (P.W.4) and Harcharan (P.W.5). A detailed examination of their evidence is not necessary, so much as to find out if the incident involving the appellant had really taken place, as to find out the circumstances in which that incident had taken place. It was not clear as to what was the immediate cause of the quarrel. Harcharan (P.W.5) was the only witness who endeavoured to say on the point. According to him, the appellant was sitting on a platform at Baram Baba Ka Tigadda. Seeing him, the appellant for no rhyme or reason clung to him. When he protested, the appellant released him but seeing the deceased pass along that place, the appellant rushed towards the deceased and caught him by the collar of his shirt. This would make it appear as if the appellant was seized with a catching mania. Continuing further, the witness deposed that the appellant then demanded a sum of rupees twenty thousand from the deceased. The deceased tried to rescue himself by saying that he would give the money at his house. It is not known why the appellant should have demanded such a fat sum from the deceased in the first place. The witness tried to explain that the appellant had been previously prosecuted for assault on the deceased (sic) the appellant had been acquitted. Even if this were true, it is difficult to gulp the idea that an acquitted accused for that reason would demand a fat sum of rupees twenty thousand and the complanant, i.e., the deceased would also express his willingness to pay that sum if only the appellant accompanied him to his house.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. There is ample indication in the evidence to show that quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had taken place unexpectedly on a chance meeting. The deceased was absolutely unarmed. He did not have any kind of lathi with him. The quarrel developed into an actual fight in which both grappled with each other and in the process also fell down resulting in contusions to the deceased on his face and abrasions to the appellant on his limbs. The story told by some of the eye-witnesses that the appellant had grappling with Ganga (P.W.2) and both had fallen down, was a definite improvement over the initial story that the appellant after the incident at the time of running away had given Ganga simply a push in consequence of which Ganga only had fallen and not the appellant. Earlier the appellant in the course of grappling with the deceased had inflicted a knife blow, and only a single blow, on the chest of the deceased. The appellant did not persist in the assault.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question is what offence was committed by the appellant. It is often glibly argued that since the accused had caused but a single injury, he cannot be held guilty of murder. The argument may in some cases hit upon correctly. But it is wrong to place the argument on a pedestal of law or even to accept it as a rule of thumb. The true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate, A is bound hand and foot. B comes and placing his revolver against the head of A, shoots A in his head killing him instantaneously. Here there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of B in shooting A was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within clause (1) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Taking another instance, B sneaks into the bed room of his enemy A while the latter is asleep in his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of A, B forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of A and runs away. A dies shortly thereafter. The injury to A was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that B intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of B within clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. It may be mentioned that even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part I of Section 304, Indian Penal Code if the case of the accused is such as to fall within clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to as to fall within clause (4) of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Again, the intention or knowledge or the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code. It would be an offence under part I of that section, if the case fell within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under part II of Section 304 if the case fell within 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. To come back to the case of single injury, it may on medical examination be found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the circumstances of the case are such that it can also be held that the said particular injury was intended, clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, will be attracted and the offence would be murder. The leading case on clause 3rdly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, is Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465. The latest case is that of Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi) Administration, (1991) 2 SCC 32, wherein the Supreme Court after reviewing the entire case law held that even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, requirements of clause 3rdly to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. In that decision, in the. wake of an altercation and exchange of hot words, but not a fight, a single kiroan blow was thrust in the chest of the deceased by the appellant, penetrating the heart and causing instantaneous death of the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that the offence was murder. But if single injury of the above kind is inflicted under circumstances making it likely that the particular bodily injury actually found to be present was not intended, for example, where the accused without serious prior enmity, acted without premeditation suddenly at the spur of the moment during the course of a scuffle with the deceased, rendering the aiming of the particular injury found present to be improbable, the offence would not be murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Indian Penal Code, albeit the injury may be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is the ratio of the decisions relied upon by Shri Datt referred to in paragraph 7 of this judgment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Coming back to the present case, as already found by us, the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant was not anticipated and had taken place suddenly upon their chance meeting. The immediate cause of the quarrel could not be known. The deceased was not standing away and steady during the quarrel. On the other hand, grappling was taking place between the appellant and the deceased reasonably raising the possibility that the appellant could not have aimed his knife at a particular part of the body of the deceased, namely, the left side of his chest where the blow landed. The appellant did not persist in the assault. He had no particular motive to kill the deceased. The chest injury was undoubtedly sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. But in the above circumstances it cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the appellant intended to inflict that particular injury. The knife blow was undoubtedly dealt forcibly causing a penetrating wound inside the heart. As such, the appellant can safely be credited with the knowledge that he was likely by the said blow to cause death, attracting 3rd part of Section 299, Indian Penal Code, thereby making the act of the appellant punishable under Part II of Section 304, Indian Penal Code. The offence committed by the appellant was not one under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, but one under Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. It was submitted by Shri Datt on behalf of the appellant, and not challenged by the Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State, that the appellant, taking into consideration undertrial detention, has already undergone actual sentence of five years and some months and considering the remissions which the appellant must have earned, he has undergone not less than seven years of sentence. The sentence so far undergone, in our opinion, would more than amply meet the ends of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is altered from Section 302, Indian Penal Code, to Section 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code and he is sentenced to the period already undergone. 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LAW: Section 302, Section 304, Section 302, Indian Penal Code, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Section 304, Indian Penal Code, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Section 299, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Section 304, Indian Penal Code, Section 299, Section 299, Indian Penal Code, Section 300, Indian Penal Code, Indian Penal Code, Section 304, Indian Penal Code, Section 299, Section 304, Indian Penal Code, Section 302, Section 304, Section 302, Section 304
PERSON: S.K. Chawla, thereunder.2, Baram Baba Ka Tigadda, Halka, Halka, Ganga, Shri S. C. Datt, Shri Datt, Rai v. State of, Ram v. State, Tholan v. State of, Tamil Nadu, Kartar Singh v. State of, Bhura, Gouribai, Bhagwandas, Virsa Singh v. State of, Jai Prakash, Shri Datt, Shri Datt
NORP: J.1, P.W.5, Indian
DATE: 30-5-1986, only 2nd, 1991, five years, some months, less than seven years
GPE: Khamria, Kumhari, Narayan, Ganga, Ganga, Narayan, Narayan, Ganga, Ganga, Jagrupsingh v. State, Haryana, Singh v. State of Punjab, Haryana, Singh v. State of Punjab, Ganga, Harcharan, Ganga, Ganga, Ganga, caused.11
ORG: Damoh, Narayan, Ex.P-9, Narayan, Damoh, AIR 1981, SC, AIR 1982, SC, AIR 1982, AIR 1983, AIR 1983, SC, AIR 1984, SC, AIR 1988, SC, P.W.I, Indian Penal Code.12, AIR 1958, SC, Delhi) Administration, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, State
FAC: Baram Baba Ka Tigadda, Baram Baba Ka Tigadda
CARDINAL: One, 3'x 1/2 ', 1 1/2, 1/2, 1 1/2, 1/2, 1 1/2, 1, 2, 2, 1/2, 2, 1/2, As many as three, only one, II, 155, 125, 185, 2122.8, twenty thousand, twenty thousand, 1, 4, 1, 1, 4, one, five, 1, 3, 3rdly, 465, 2, 7
PRODUCT: 759
ORDINAL: first, 3rd, 2nd, 3rd, 3rd
MONEY: 3rdly to Section 300
TIME: 3rdly to Section 300