Semantic Analysis by spaCy
The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors.
Decided On : Dec-11-1991
Court : Andhra Pradesh
Notice (8): Undefined index: topics [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36]Code Context$shops2 = $shops['topics'];$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors. Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 96', (int) 1 => 'Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Radhakrishna Rao', (int) 1 => 'J.1' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the 1st' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '2nd' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'O.P.No', (int) 1 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 2 => 'the Insurance Corporation', (int) 3 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 4 => 'the Insurance Company' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '432542', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/133917/motor-vehicles-act-1939-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1939</a> - Sections 92A and 96', 'appealno' => 'Appeal Against Order No. 99 of 1989', 'appellant' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ - Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee Element of quid pro quo - Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'Kota Subba Rao, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'K. Palaksha Reddy, Adv. for Respondents 1 and 2 and ;R. Ramanujacharyulu, Adv. for Respondent No. 3', 'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-12-11', 'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Radhakrishna Rao, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Radhakrishna Rao, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The claim has been made on account of the death of the son of the 1st petitioner and the father of the 2nd petitioner in the O.P.No. 340/87. The accident that occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle is undisputed. An amount of Rs. 34,000/- and odd has been awarded as compensation. The Insurance company filed the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The contention that has been raised by the Insurance Company is that the vehicle has to be used for carrying goods or for agricultural purpose but the vehicle involved in the accident is used for sprinkling water purpose which is prohibited under Section 96 of the Statute. Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company. Therefore, taking into account Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and the relevant decision of this court, this court fixes liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs.l5,000/-and the remaining amount of compensation awarded, on the owner of the vehicles, i.e., owner of the tractor and trailor. Accordingly the appeal is allowed in part. Nor order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '1993(1)ALT566', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '432542' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 96', (int) 1 => 'Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Radhakrishna Rao', (int) 1 => 'J.1' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the 1st' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '2nd' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'O.P.No', (int) 1 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 2 => 'the Insurance Corporation', (int) 3 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 4 => 'the Insurance Company' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '432542', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/133917/motor-vehicles-act-1939-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1939</a> - Sections 92A and 96', 'appealno' => 'Appeal Against Order No. 99 of 1989', 'appellant' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ - Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee Element of quid pro quo - Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'Kota Subba Rao, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'K. Palaksha Reddy, Adv. for Respondents 1 and 2 and ;R. Ramanujacharyulu, Adv. for Respondent No. 3', 'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-12-11', 'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Radhakrishna Rao, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Radhakrishna Rao, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The claim has been made on account of the death of the son of the 1st petitioner and the father of the 2nd petitioner in the O.P.No. 340/87. The accident that occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle is undisputed. An amount of Rs. 34,000/- and odd has been awarded as compensation. The Insurance company filed the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The contention that has been raised by the Insurance Company is that the vehicle has to be used for carrying goods or for agricultural purpose but the vehicle involved in the accident is used for sprinkling water purpose which is prohibited under Section 96 of the Statute. Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company. Therefore, taking into account Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and the relevant decision of this court, this court fixes liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs.l5,000/-and the remaining amount of compensation awarded, on the owner of the vehicles, i.e., owner of the tractor and trailor. Accordingly the appeal is allowed in part. Nor order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '1993(1)ALT566', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '432542' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/'include - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 36 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Warning (2): Invalid argument supplied for foreach() [APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39]Code Context//$shops = $shops['entities'];foreach ($shops2 as $key => $val) {$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/meta.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors. Semantic Analysis', 'shops' => array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 96', (int) 1 => 'Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Radhakrishna Rao', (int) 1 => 'J.1' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the 1st' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '2nd' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'O.P.No', (int) 1 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 2 => 'the Insurance Corporation', (int) 3 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 4 => 'the Insurance Company' ) ), 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '432542', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/133917/motor-vehicles-act-1939-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1939</a> - Sections 92A and 96', 'appealno' => 'Appeal Against Order No. 99 of 1989', 'appellant' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ - Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee Element of quid pro quo - Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'Kota Subba Rao, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'K. Palaksha Reddy, Adv. for Respondents 1 and 2 and ;R. Ramanujacharyulu, Adv. for Respondent No. 3', 'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-12-11', 'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Radhakrishna Rao, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Radhakrishna Rao, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The claim has been made on account of the death of the son of the 1st petitioner and the father of the 2nd petitioner in the O.P.No. 340/87. The accident that occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle is undisputed. An amount of Rs. 34,000/- and odd has been awarded as compensation. The Insurance company filed the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The contention that has been raised by the Insurance Company is that the vehicle has to be used for carrying goods or for agricultural purpose but the vehicle involved in the accident is used for sprinkling water purpose which is prohibited under Section 96 of the Statute. Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company. Therefore, taking into account Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and the relevant decision of this court, this court fixes liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs.l5,000/-and the remaining amount of compensation awarded, on the owner of the vehicles, i.e., owner of the tractor and trailor. Accordingly the appeal is allowed in part. Nor order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '1993(1)ALT566', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '432542' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors. Semantic Analysis' $shops = array( 'LAW' => array( (int) 0 => 'Section 96', (int) 1 => 'Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act' ), 'PERSON' => array( (int) 0 => 'Radhakrishna Rao', (int) 1 => 'J.1' ), 'DATE' => array( (int) 0 => 'the 1st' ), 'ORDINAL' => array( (int) 0 => '2nd' ), 'ORG' => array( (int) 0 => 'O.P.No', (int) 1 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 2 => 'the Insurance Corporation', (int) 3 => 'the Insurance Company', (int) 4 => 'the Insurance Company' ) ) $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '432542', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/133917/motor-vehicles-act-1939-complete-act">Motor Vehicles Act, 1939</a> - Sections 92A and 96', 'appealno' => 'Appeal Against Order No. 99 of 1989', 'appellant' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'The New India Assurance Company Limited, Branch Manager Vs. Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'casenote' => ' - MAXIMSSections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Ghee as a Live Stock product Held, [Per V.V.S. Rao & N.V. Ramana, JJ - Majority] Since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. Ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(iv) of the Act used the plural products of livestock. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Thus the term ghee is to be interpreted on the basis of expression products of livestock as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purpose of the Act. Consequently it was held that ghee is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as product of livestock for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area. [Per P.S. Narayana, J,(Dissenting)]If livestock or agricultural produce and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the livestock and products of livestock, the ghee being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in definition to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion would be is that the ghee would not fall within ambit of the definitions aforesaid. Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Declaration of notified area Held, It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim, Expressum facit cessare tacitum (When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) would apply. Section 7: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Levy of market fee Element of quid pro quo - Held, Levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of Sttaes taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individual fee payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown that substantial portion of the fee is expended or the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. Expressum facit cessare tacitum Sections 4 & 3: [V.V.S. Rao, N.V. Ramana & P.S. Narayana, JJ] Meaning When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. - Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => 'Kota Subba Rao, Adv.', 'counseldef' => 'K. Palaksha Reddy, Adv. for Respondents 1 and 2 and ;R. Ramanujacharyulu, Adv. for Respondent No. 3', 'court' => 'Andhra Pradesh', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1991-12-11', 'deposition' => 'Appeal allowed', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => 'Radhakrishna Rao, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Radhakrishna Rao, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The claim has been made on account of the death of the son of the 1st petitioner and the father of the 2nd petitioner in the O.P.No. 340/87. The accident that occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle is undisputed. An amount of Rs. 34,000/- and odd has been awarded as compensation. The Insurance company filed the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The contention that has been raised by the Insurance Company is that the vehicle has to be used for carrying goods or for agricultural purpose but the vehicle involved in the accident is used for sprinkling water purpose which is prohibited under Section 96 of the Statute. Under the circumstances, this court feels that the liability can be fixed jointly on the Insurance Corporation as well as the owner of the vehicle but the entire liability cannot be fixed on the Insurance Company. Therefore, taking into account Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and the relevant decision of this court, this court fixes liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs.l5,000/-and the remaining amount of compensation awarded, on the owner of the vehicles, i.e., owner of the tractor and trailor. Accordingly the appeal is allowed in part. Nor order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '1993(1)ALT566', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Boya Sangamma and ors.', 'sub' => 'Motor Vehicles', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $args = array( (int) 0 => '432542' ) $pattern = '/\(((0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])[.](0[1-9]|1[012])[.](17|18|19|20)[0-9]{2}).*\)/' $shops2 = nullinclude - APP/View/Case/meta.ctp, line 39 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
LAW: Section 96, Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act
PERSON: Radhakrishna Rao, J.1
DATE: the 1st
ORDINAL: 2nd
ORG: O.P.No, the Insurance Company, the Insurance Corporation, the Insurance Company, the Insurance Company