Judgment:
(Civil Revision Petition to strike off the plaint in O.S.No.97 of 2012 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Villupuram.)
Second defendant is the revision petitioner. He filed the revision to strike off the plaint in O.S.No.97 of 2012 filed by the first respondent herein for injunction.
2. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the subject matter of the suit in O.S.No.97 of 2012 originally belonged to the third defendant/third respondent herein. The third defendant/third respondent herein agreed to sell the property to the revision petitioner, who is the second defendant in O.S.No.97 of 2012 and also executed the sale deed on 2.1.1993 after receiving consideration and did not turn up for registration. Therefore, the revision petitioner applied to the Registrar for compulsory registration and after enquiry, the sale deed was directed to be registered by order dated 1.12.1994. Thus, the revision petitioner became the owner of the property and he also filed the suit in O.S.No.522 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif, Villupuram against the third defendant herein and one T.Paramasivam, the father of the second respondent herein/first defendant in O.S.No.97 of 2012. The suit was for declaration of title of the revision petitioner herein and also for recovery of possession of the suit property from by the third defendant/third respondent herein and the father of the second respondent herein. That suit was decreed on 14.8.2000 and the father of the second respondent herein filed an appeal in A.S.No.101 of 2000 on the file of the District Court, Villupuram and the appeal was dismissed and the second appeal filed by the father of the second respondent herein in S.A.No.262 of 2002 was also dismissed on 16.4.2008. It is further submitted that the first respondent herein claims to have obtained a registered lease deed dated 25.9.2009 from the first defendant viz., the second respondent herein and under that lease deed, claimed to have been inducted into possession of the suit property by the second respondent herein and on that basis, the first respondent herein filed the suit for injunction and admittedly, the second respondent herein, who is the lessor of the first respondent/plaintiff had no title to the property and the second appeal was dismissed on 16.4.2008 and therefore, on the date of the alleged lease deed, the lessor viz, the second respondent herein had no title and therefore, the possession of the first respondent/plaintiff is unlawful and he can be termed only as a trespasser and the revision petitioner, being the original owner, is entitled to claim possession and the suit for injunction will not lie against the true owner and therefore, the suit is liable to be struck off. He also relied upon the following judgments:-
1. TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD v. MASTER CRAFTS (2011(3) CTC 650)
2. M.NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA ((2011) 3 MLJ 982 (SC))
3. FARIDABAD COMPLEX ADMINISTRATION v. YADU (CDJ 1996 SC 674)
4. TAMIL NADU HANDLOOM WEAVERS' CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY v. S.R.EJAZ (2009(5) CTC 710)
5. LAKSHMI v. PRASANNA MANI ((2011) 7 MLJ 339)
6. SOUTHERN AND RAJAMANI TRANSPORT PRIVATE LIMITED v. R.SRINIVASAN (2010(4) CTC 690)
7. MAHADEO SAVLARAM SHELKE v. THE PUNA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (CDJ 1995 SC 459)
8. K.K.MODI v. K.N.MODI (AIR 1998 SC 1297)
9. SWAMINATHAN v. SRINIVASAGAM ((2003) 3 MLJ 566)
10. DINDIGUL PETTAI SATHANGUDI SHATRIYA NADAR URAVINMURAI v. SELVARAJ (2009(2) CTC 57).
3. Mr.V.Lakshminarayanan, learned counsel appearing for the the first respondent submitted that under the registered lease deed dated 25.9.2009, the first respondent was inducted into possession of the property by the second respondent who is the first defendant in O.S.No.97 of 2012 and admittedly, the first defendant is the owner of the property and therefore, the possession of the first respondent cannot be termed to be unlawful and the first respondent cannot be characterized as a trespasser and even assuming that the revision petitioner has got a decree, he has to execute the same in the manner known to law and the possession of the first respondent cannot be disturbed by the revision petitioner without recourse to law and for that purpose, the injunction suit was filed and the prayer in the injunction suit is also to the effect that the first respondent is entitled to be in possession of the property till he is evicted under due process of law and therefore, till the revision petitioner evicts the first respondent by executing the decree in O.S.No.522 of 1996, the first respondent is entitled to be in possession of the property and he cannot be prevented from filing the suit for injunction. He also submitted that the revision petitioner is entitled to delivery of symbolic possession as provided under Order XXI Rule 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the rights of the parties are to be worked out under Order XXI Rules 95 to 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, the first respondent is in possession of the property under a lease deed executed by the second respondent herein who is the first defendant in the suit and therefore, he is entitled to protect his possession until he is evicted by due process of law and therefore, the plaint cannot be struck off by invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and when alternative remedy is available to the revision petitioner by filing an application to execute the decree passed in O.S.No.522 of 1996, without resorting to such procedure, he cannot file a revision to strike off the plaint and relied upon the following judgments:-
1. RAM LAL v. SITA RAM ((1896) ILR 18 ALL 440))
2. TIRUVENGADA v. VENKATACHALA (AIR 1917 MADRAS 560)
3. IBRAHIM SAHIB v. KONAMMAL (AIR 1923 MADRAS 25)
4. ADYANATH v. KRISHNA PRASAD (AIR 1949 PRIVY COUNCIL 124)
5. CHANDRASEKARAN v. KUNJU VANNIAR (88-LW 216)
6. AMULYA CHANDRA v. HARIDAS BASAK (AIR 1958 TRIPURA 11)
7. ENERCON (INDIA) LTD. MUMBAI v. J.T.MICHEL ANJAB (2005 (2) CTC 365)
8. GANAPATHY SUBRAMANIAN v. S.RAMALINGAM (C.R.P.(PD) No.625 of 2004 date of order : 17.11.2006)
9. VANIYAR NALA SANGAM v. KUMAR (C.R.P.(PD) No.4238 of 2009 date of order : 15.4.2010)
10. REV.R.V.S.S.VETHANAYAGAM v. A.D.J.C.MANOHAR (C.R.P.(PD)(MD) No.1620 of 2009 date of order :23.7.2010)
11. V.KRISHNAMOORTHY v. BALAKRISHNAN (C.R.P.(PD) No.1411 of 2009 date of order : 12.1.2011)
12. K.PONNAMMAL & OTHERS v. V.THAYANBAN & OTHERS (2012-2-LW 193).
4. It is admitted by both the parties that the suit property originally belonged to one Velu Udayar, the third respondent herein and the revision petitioner got a sale deed from the said Velu Udayar on 2.1.1993 and the document was compulsorily registered on 1.12.1994 and prior to that, the father of the second respondent herein viz., T.Paramasivam purchased the property from Velu Udayar, the third respondent herein under a registered sale deed dated 24.2.1993 and put the father of the second respondent viz., T.Paramasivam into possession of property and from that date, the said T.Paramasivam was in possession of the property. It is also admitted in the plaint that the revision petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.522 of 1996 against the third respondent/third defendant and also against the father of the second respondent herein for declaration of title and for recovery of possession and that suit was decreed and in appeal in A.S.No.101 of 2000 and in S.A.No.262 of 2002, the judgment and decree was confirmed. Therefore, the title of the revision petitioner over the suit property has been confirmed by this court in S.A.No.262 of 2002 by judgment dated 16.4.2008. Therefore, from 16.4.2008, the father of the second respondent herein had no title over the property and it is further admitted in the plaint that the father of the second respondent viz., T.Paramasivam executed a Will dated 1.10.2008 in favour of the second respondent herein bequeathing the suit property in his favour and after the death of his father, under the said Will, the second respondent became the absolute owner of the property and he executed a lease deed in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff on 25.9.2009.
5. Therefore, it is seen from the recitals of the plaint that the second respondent claims title to the suit property under the Will executed by his father after the confirmation of the decree by this court on 16.4.2008 and from the second respondent, the first respondent/plaintiff claims the right to be in possession of the property on the basis of the lease deed dated 25.9.2009. Therefore, we will have to see whether the first respondent is entitled to be in possession of the property till he is evicted under due process of law and whether such a suit is maintainable against the true owner.
6. In the judgment in MAHADEO SAVLARAM SHELKE v. THE PUNA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (1995 (3) SCC 33), the Honourable Supreme Court held that a person in unlawful possession has no right to claim injunction against the true owner. The same principle is reiterated in FARIDABAD COMPLEX ADMINISTRATION v. YADU (1997 (3) SCC 491). Further, it is contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the present suit is an attempt to re-litigate the same lis which has attained finality and therefore, it is a clear case of abuse of process of court and that cannot be encouraged.
7. In the judgment reported in (2003) 3 MLJ 566, this court, following the judgment reported in K.K.MODI v. K.N. MODI ((1998) 3 SCC 573), has held that the court has got power to stop vexatious proceedings and when there is a clear abuse of process of court, the court has to view such conduct seriously and the same has to be deleted to save the precious time of the public and the court being wasted.
8. In the judgment reported in 2009 (5) CTC 710, following law laid down in PALANISAMI GOUNDER v. SANKARA RAMANATHAN & 4 OTHERS (1999 (3) LW 897), the learned Judge held that subsequent suit filed at the instance of the judgment debtor in an earlier suit, which was confirmed by the High Court has to be set aside by invoking the jurisdiction of the court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Further, the learned Judge observed as follows in the above judgment which is relevant for this case:-
" 57. The present suit is clearly vexatious and the attempt is nothing but re-litigation. The respondent has scant respect towards the court and the rule of law. His attempt is to continue in possession at any cost. The learned Trial Judge should have rejected the plaint at the earliest opportunity and at least after filing counter by the revision petitioner, opposing the plea raised in the suit as well as in the interlocutory application. ...
59. It is the solemn duty of this court to see that nothing would come in the way of frustrating the recipient of justice from executing the decree. Similarly, the court is expected to filter out and throw all unwanted and vexatious litigations which would be an obstruction to the decree holders in their journey to get justice.
Conclusion:
60. The issue involved in tis revision is a classic example as to how a vexatious litigant would be able to delay the legal process and cause threat to the very justice delivery system by way of unwanted re-litigation. The respondent was attempting to make mockery of the very judicial system. In case litigants like the respondent is permitted to achieve their objective in delaying the execution of a decree passed by the court, which was attained finality, the common man will lose faith in courts as well as in the justice delivery system."
9. The Honourable Supreme Court also held in the judgment reported in AIR 1998 SC 1297 as under:-
" 43. The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell in paragraph 18/19/33 (page 344) explains the phrase "abuse of the process of the court" thus: "This term connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. ....... The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interests of justice may be very material."
44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of courts' discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding."
10. Therefore, from the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and this High Court, it is very clear that in the case of re-litigation, the court should strike off the plaint at the earliest instance and the filing of subsequent suit is a clear abuse of process of court and that should not be encouraged.
11. It is the contention of Mr.Lakshminarayanan that the first respondent/plaintiff cannot be termed as a trespasser and his possession is lawful as he was inducted into possession of the property by the second respondent herein and even though the revision petitioner has got title to the suit property by virtue of the registration of the sale deed and also by the judgment of this court in Second Appeal, he has to execute the decree obtained in O.S.No.522 of 1996 and he cannot evict the first respondent by force and only for that purpose, the prayer is couched in such a manner and till the first respondent is evicted by due process of law, he is entitled to be in possession of the property and also relied upon Order XXI Rule 36 and Order XXI Rules 91 to 102 and also the judgments referred to above.
12. To appreciate the contention, we will have to see whether the possession of the first respondent is lawful and whether the first respondent is entitled to maintain a suit for injunction against the revision petitioner, who is admittedly, the owner of the property. As stated supra, the Honourable Supreme Court held that no injunction will lie against the true owner. In this case, it is admitted by the first respondent that after the second appeal was dismissed, the father of his lessor executed a Will in favour of the lessor and his lessor has derived the title under the Will and executed the lease deed dated 25.9.2009 in his favour. Such a person's possession cannot be termed to be lawful. The other question is can such a person be said to be in settled possession
13. In the judgment in SOPAN SUKHDEO SABLE v. ASSISSTANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER ((2004) 3 SCC 137), it is held as follows:-
" 24. There are two different sets of principles which have to be borne in mind regarding course to be adopted in case of forcible dispossession. Taking up the first aspect, it is true that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he has no right to remain in property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner except by recourse of law. This principle is laid down in Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. That Section says that
"If any person is dispossessed without his consent from immovable property other wise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit."
That a person without title but in "settled" possession -- as against mere fugitive possession -- can get back possession if forcibly dispossessed or rather, if dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law, has been laid down in several cases. It was so held by this Court in Lallu YashwantSingh v. Rao Jagdish Singh (AIR 1968 SC 620), Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao ((1989) 4 SCC 131)(SCC at p.136), Ram Rattan v. State of U.P. ((1977) 1 SCC 188) and State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh ((1989) 2 SCC 505). The leading decision quoted in these rulings is the decision of the Bombay High Court in K.K.Verma v. Union of India (AIR 1954 Bom. 358).
25. Now the other aspect of the matter needs to be noted. Assuming a trespasser ousted can seek restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, can the trespasser seek injunction against the true owner? This question does not entirely depend upon Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, but mainly depends upon certain general principles applicable to the law of injunctions and as to the scope of the exercise of discretion while granting injunction. In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation ((1995) 3 SCC 33), it was held, after referring to Woodroffe: Law relating to injunctions; Goyal, L.C.: Law of injunctions; Bean David: Injunctions; Joyce: Injunctions and other leading articles on the subject that the appellant who was a trespasser in possession could not seek injunction against the true owner. In that context this Court quoted Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi ((1993) 3 SCC 161) wherein it was observed that injunction is discretionary and that:(SCC p.175, para 31)
"Judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court".
26. Reference was also made to DalpatKumar v. Prahlad Singh ((1992) 1 SCC 719) in regard to the meaning of the words "prima facie case" and "balance of convenience" and observed in Mahadeo's case (supra) that:(SCC p.39, para 9)
"9. It is settled law that no injunction could be granted against the true owner at the instance of persons in unlawful possession."
14. In the judgment reported in PREMJI RATANSEY SHAH v UNION OF INDIA ((1994) 5 SCC 547), it is held that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. The courts below should not grant the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of persons who has no interest in the property and even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and injunction cannot be issued in favour of the trespasser or, who came into unlawful possession against the owner.
15. In the judgment in MARIA MARGARIDA SEQUEIRA FERNANDES v. ERASMO JACK DE SEQUEIRA ((2012) 5 SCC 370), the Honourable Supreme Court approved the judgment of the Delhi High Court in THOMAS COOK (INDIA) LTD. v. HOTEL IMPERIAL ((2006) 88 DRJ 545) wherein the learned Judge of Delhi High Court discussed the phrase " due process of law', 'due course of law' and 'recourse to law' and held as follows:-
"28. The expressions 'due process of law', 'due course of law' and 'recourse to law' have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed 'forcibly' by the true owner taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the same thing -- ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly, 'due process of law' or 'due course of law', here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner.
Now, this 'due process' or 'due course' condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the 'bare minimum' requirement of 'due process' or 'due course' of law would stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e., for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the 'recourse to law' stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made with regard to the first party's protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law."
We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi on this issue in the aforesaid case."
16. In the above judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court also laid down the law as follows:-
"(1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property.
(2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand.
(3) The Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant.
(4) The protection of the court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour.
(5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession."
17. In the judgment reported in RAME GOWDA (D) BY LRS. v. M.VARADAPPA NAIDU (D) BY LRS. & ANOTHER (2004-3-LW 143), the Honourable Supreme Court detailed the attributes of settled possession as follows:-
"The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase settled possession does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait-jacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of settled possession:
i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;
ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case;
iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; and
iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession."
18. In this case also, as stated supra, after the revision petitioner got the decree which was confirmed by tis court in Second Appeal, the first respondent/plaintiff derived the right from the second respondent, who had no right to induct any person into possession and the second respondent is in the nature of judgment debtor so far as the revision petitioner is concerned and the second respondent had no right over the property on 25.9.2009 and hence, any lease deed executed by the second respondent in favour of the first respondent and inducting the first respondent into possession of the property will not confer any right to the first respondent and the first respondent cannot claim to be in lawful possession of the property as held by the Supreme Court as his possession is only as that of a trespasser and he is not entitled to get an order of injunction against the revision petitioner.
19. Further, under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 95, where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the judgment debtor or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title created by the judgment debtor subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under Rule 94, the court shall order delivery to the purchaser by removing any person, who refused to vacate the same. This provision will not apply to the facts of this case.
20. Order XXI Rule 96 which deals with delivery of property in occupation of the tenant will also not apply to the facts of the present case as the first respondent was not inducted into possession of the property during the pendency of the litigation in O.S.No.522 of 1996 and admittedly, after the second appeal was dismissed, the first respondent was inducted into possession of the property.
21. Order XXI Rule 97 deals with the resistance or obstruction by any person in possession of the property and as per Order XXI Rule 102, the provisions of Rules 98 and 100 shall not apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of decree for possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after institution of the suit.
22. In this case, the first respondent was inducted into possession not only after the institution of the suit, but also after the decree was confirmed in second appeal on 16.4.2008. Therefore, the first respondent cannot claim to be in lawful possession of the property and he cannot also be heard to contend that he can be evicted only by due process of law and his plaint cannot be struck off by invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court.
23. In the judgment reported in 2010 (4) CTC 690, it has been held as follows:-
"29. From the cumulative reading of the decisions referred to supra, it is easily discernible that Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked by every High Court under the guise of superintendence, on the following grounds:
(a) to prevent abuse of process of law
(b) to prevent miscarriage of justice
(c) to prevent grave injustice
(d) to establish both administrative as well as judicial power of High Court."
24. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent are in respect of a person who is in lawful possession of the property and those judgments cannot be applied to the facts of this case as the possession of the first respondent herein cannot be said to be lawful as admittedly, he was put in possession of the property after the suit was decreed in favour of the revision petitioner and confirmed in the second appeal by this court.
25. Further, though an alternative remedy is available to the revision petitioner, for striking off the suit under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it is a clear case of re-litigation and abuse of process of court and when the facts are not controverted and admitted by the plaintiff/first respondent, the court can exercise the extra ordinary jurisdiction of the court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and strike off the plaint and as a matter of fact, this court and Honourable Supreme Court held that the right conferred under Article 227 must be exercised very sparingly and it is also settled law that when the suit is a clear abuse of process, the suit can be struck off by resorting to the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
26. Hence, the revision petitioner has brought out a clear case to enforce the right under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the first respondent cannot claim to be in possession of the property from a lawful owner and therefore, his possession cannot be termed to be lawful and the first respondent also cannot said to be in settled possession so as to protect his possession and the revision petitioner has got a decree in his favour and after the decree was confirmed in the second appeal, the first respondent/plaintiff was put in possession of the property and therefore, the first respondent is not entitled to the relief of injunction against the revision petitioner.
In the result, the revision is allowed and the plaint in O.S.No.97 of 2012 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Villupuram is struck off from the file. No costs. The connected miscellaneous petition is closed.