(THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 and 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DATED 26.2.2002 PUBLISHED IN THE KARNATAKA GAZETTE DATED 28.2.2002 AT ANNEXURE-B AND ALSO QUASH THE FINAL NOTIFICATION DATED 3.12.2002 PUBLISHED IN THE KARNATAKA GAZETTE DATED 3.12.2002 AT ANNEXURE-C IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONERS LANDS ARE CONCERNED UNDER SECTION 17 AND 19 OF THE KUDA ACT RESPECTIVELY.)
The petitioning land-owners' grievance in W.P.Nos.394/2008, 9966/2008, 1914/2007, 2447/2008, 2733/2008, 1915/2007, 17000/2008 and 17052-17054/2008, 37548-37549/2009, 25570-25572/2009, 5490-5491/2009, 2348-2458/2011, 11927-11947/2011, 14351-14352/2011, 39034/2010 and 39035/2010, 34369-34383/2010, 41507-41519/2010 and 41676-41695/2010 and 41520-41526/2010 is over the issuance of the preliminary notification, dated 26.2.2002 and the final notification, dated 3.12.2002 issued under Sections 17(1) and 19(1) respectively of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 ('KUDA' for short), in so far as they pertain to the petitioners' lands. The acquisition of the land measuring 394 acres 35 guntas is for the benefit of Hassan Urban Development Authority ('HUDA' - 79 - for short) for the formation of Sri S.M.Krishna Nagar ('SMKN' for short) Layout. Some of the petitioning land-owners have also sought the declaration that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. Further, some of them have also sought the quashing of the bulk allotments made to organizations like Nisarga Educational Trust, Karnataka State Cricket Association ('KSCA' for short), Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation ('KSRTC' for short), Netaji Rural Development Trust, etc.
2. W.P.No.361/2008 is filed by Netaji Rural Development Trust (R), in whose favour the HUDA had allotted 6 acres of land. Its grievance is over the cancellation of allotment on account of the delay in paying the allotment consideration.
3. Sri Ravivarma Kumar, the Senior Counsel appearing for Sri A.Ravishankar for HUDA has raised two preliminary objections. He submits that the majority of the petitioning land-owners have entered into the consent award and have also received the compensation amount. According to him, once the landowner gives the consent to the acquisition of his land and receives the compensation thereon, he loses the right of raising the challenge to the acquisition proceedings. He sought to draw support from the Apex Court's judgments in the cases of NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES v. JASWANT SINGH AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2003 SC 234 and URMILA ROY AND OHERS vs. BENGAL PEARLESS HOUSING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD. AND OTHERS reported in (2009) 5 SCC 242.
4. The details of giving the consent to the passing of the awards and the receipt of the compensation amounts by the various petitioning land-owners herein are culled out in the tabular form hereinbelow. It is based on the statement filed by the HUDA.
| Sl. No | W.P.Nos. | No. of petitioners who have given the consent | No. of petitioners who have received the compensation |
| 1. | 1914/2007 | 7 | 5 |
| 2. | 1915/2007 | 3 | 3 |
| 3. | 2733/2008 | 8 | 8 |
| 4. | 2447/2008 | 36 | 36 |
| 5. | 17000/2008 and 17052-54/2008 | 4 | 3 |
| 6. | 394/2008 | 5 | 0 |
| 7. | 9966/2008 | 8 | 8 |
| 8. | 5490-5491/2009 | 3 | 0 |
| 9. | 25570-72/2009 | 3 | 3 |
| 10. | 41507-519/2010 | 33 | 31 |
| 11. | 41520-26/2010 | 5 | 1 |
| 12. | 2348-2458/2011 | 88 | 84 |
| 13. | 37548-549/2009 | 2 | 2 |
| 14. | 34369-383/2010 | 15 | 15 |
| 15. | 14351-352/2011 | 2 | 2 |
| 16. | 39034 and 39035/2010 | 1 | 1 |
| 17. | 11927 and 11947/2011 | 21 | 20 |
6. He submits that on the passing of the award and taking of the possession, the lands vest in the State Government. The State Government has made over the lands to the HUDA. Anything that comes to be vested by the operation of law cannot be divested at the instance of the erstwhile landowners.
7. Sri B.N.Jayadeva, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.9966/2008, 2447/2008, 2348-2548/2011 and 11927-11947/2011 alleges the colourable exercise of power in acquiring the petitioners' lands compulsorily. He submits that the possession of the lands was forcibly taken from the petitioners by misrepresenting the facts.
8. He submits that even before the passing of the award, the large chunks of the lands were allotted to bigwigs. He submits that the award was passed only on 06.11.2003. On 19.11.2003, the HUDA has allotted 50 acres of land to Shariff Academy of Higher Education, Hassan vide HUDA's letter, dated 19.11.2003 (Annexure-R4). He also brings to my notice the extract of the HUDA's resolution for allotting 50 acres of land to Shariff Academy of Higher Education, 40 acres to Rajiv Gandhi Educational Trust, 30 acres to KSCA and 10 acres to Cultural Society. These bulk allotments are un-related to the housing scheme. He submits that though only a sum of `3.00 lakhs per acre was given to the petitioners, the lands are sold to the said beneficiaries for a consideration of `5.00 lakhs per acre.
9. Sri Jayadeva submits that the bulk allotment to the aforesaid beneficiaries is impermissible under the provisions of the KUDA Act. Section 16 of the KUDA Act, dealing with the particulars to be provided in a development scheme, contains no enabling provisions for making the bulk allotments to the said bodies.
10. Nextly, Sri Jayadeva submits that as many as 5 sale deeds are executed by the HUDA in favour of the beneficiaries. They cover an area of 54 acres. Such transactions clearly show that the lands are acquired for benefiting some organisations and individuals and not for the purpose of developing any housing layout.
11. Sri Jayadeva submits that the allotments made are far in excess of the acquired lands. He submits that the allotment may extend to 500 acres whereas the acquired lands measure only 394 acres. This itself is the signal proof of the fraudulent acts, so submits Sri Jayadeva. He relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of ROYAL ORCHID HOTELS LIMITED and ANR. v. G.JAYARAMA REDDY AND OTHERS reported in MANU/SC/1146/2011=(2011) 10 SCC 608 and the GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DEVENDRA KUMAR AND OTHERS reported in (2011) 12 SCC 375.
12. Sri Jayadeva submits that the giving of large chunks of lands to the KSCA does not sub-serve any public purpose. It is a private society and the public of Hassan cannot secure entry into the KSCA's premises as a matter of right.
13. He submits that once the scheme is brought in place, there cannot be any amendment to the same. In the instant case, as the respondents claim to have taken the possession in 2004 itself, there cannot be any modification of the scheme after five years. If the scheme is not implemented in five years, it is to be presumed that it has lapsed.
14. Sri Jayadeva submits that as the earlier order according approval to the HUDA's scheme is given by the Cabinet, any modification has to be approved only by the Cabinet. According to him, the approval to the modified scheme is given only by the Under Secretary. He has also produced the copies of the agenda note and of the Cabinet's resolution to show that the earlier scheme (as it stood before modification) was approved by the Cabinet.
15. Sri Jayadeva brings to my notice the making of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities (Allotment of Sites in Lieu of compensation for the land acquired) Rules, 2009. Rule 3 of the said Rules entitles the land-losers to get the developed lands between 35% and 40%, if he agrees to be compensated by way of residential sites. He further brings to my notice that the HUDA vide its letter, dated 08.06.2010 has requested the Government to take a decision in the matter of application of said Rules for the petitioners' cases. The said decision cannot be taken at HUDA's discretion.
16. Sri B.M.Mohan Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.39034 and 39035/2010 and 34369-34383/2010 submits that the compensation paid is too meagre. Because of certain political compulsions, the petitioners had to sign the consent award. He submits that the possession of the petitioners' land is not taken in a manner known to the provisions contained in the KUDA Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
17. Sri Mohan Kumar submits that the lands are being sold at a much higher price. He submits that the petitioners in W.P.Nos.39034 and 39035/2010 have constructed the residential buildings. He submits that the petitioners and their family members have been residing there. They have been paying the property tax. The petitioners' umpteen number of representations to exclude the lands in question from acquisition have not evoked any response from them.
18. Sri Mohan Kumar further produced the copies of the details of metre installations serviced by the KEB, of the electricity charges paid receipts and of the property tax paid receipts issued by the local body.
19. He submits that the petitioners in W.P.Nos.39034 and 39035/2010 have not received the compensation in respect of 7 guntas of land out of total extent of 1 acre, 27 guntas. He submits that on the said 7 guntas of land, the petitioners have raised the residential structure and the cattle-sheds.
20. Sri M.B.Naragund, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.2733/2008 and 25570-72/2009 complains of the total inaction in the matter of implementing the scheme. He submits that the HUDA is evincing interest only in allotting the poor farmers' lands to the influential bodies. He also reiterates the submissions made by the other learend advocates appearing for the petitoning land-owners. Smt.Manjula N.Tejaswi, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.17000/2008 and W.P.Nos.17052-54/2008 submits that she adopts the submissions made by the other learned advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioning land-owners in this batch of petitions.
21. Sri H.C.Shivaramu, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.394/2008, 14351-14352/2011, 41507-41519/2010 and 41520-41526/2010 submits that the scheme is not implemented at all; not even an inch of land is developed by the HUDA. On the other hand, 90% of the acquired lands is sold to the third parties on as is where is basis. When the HUDA has not even started the implementation of the scheme, it is to be held that the scheme has lapsed. He submits that the respondents are guilty of the dereliction of duty. He prays for the restoration of the land to the poor farmers. When there was no demand from the public for the housing sites, there was no need for the development scheme at all, so contends Sri Shivaramu.
22. The learned counsel submits that the Government has made it very clear that the HUDA may take up the scheme, if it has the necessary financial capability. It never approved or authorised the HUDA to raise the financial assistance for the purpose of acquiring the land.
23. He complains that the respondents have deviated from the public purpose and that they have misused their power conferred by the statute. Just because the poor ignorant farmers have received the compensation, the respondents cannot carry on with the acquisition proceedings, as per their whims and fancies.
24. He has also relied on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of SMT.NINGAMMA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in 2011 (4) KCCR 2919, wherein it is held that if the acquisition of land is flawed by the arbitrary exercise of power, the entire development scheme is liable to be quashed and the land-owners are entitled to the restoration of the lands.
25. Sri Shivaramu brings to my notice the resolution passed by HUDA on 1.2.2000 and 16.12.2004 in respect of other lands. The said resolutions provide for the sharing of the land between HUDA and the land-losers in the ratio of 60:40. He prays for the equal protection of law.
26. Sri Shivaramu makes a specific submission with reference to the petitioners in W.P.No.394/2008. He submits that the petitioners in the said case have not availed of the compensation and that they have built permanent structures on the lands in question and have been residing therein.
27. Sri Nikilesh Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.1914/2007, 1915/2007 and 5490-91/2009 submits that neither the delay nor the passing of the consent awards would come in the way of the petitioners challenging the acquisition proceedings, as it is a case of fraudulent exercise of power. He would contend that the cause of action for filing these petitions are the subsequent transactions between the HUDA and the several organisations and societies in whose favour the bulk allotments are made, even when the approved scheme does not provide for the same. He would submit that the acquisition proceedings cannot be saved in part on the ground that some of the petitioners had given their consent to the passing of the award. In support of his submissions, he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of ROYAL ORCHID HOTELS LIMITED (supra).
28. Sri Nikilesh Rao has also relied on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of GREATER NOIDA (supra) to advance the submission that the quashment of the acquisition proceedings cannot be confined only to those who have not accepted the compensation. He would contend that as the acquisition proceedings are actuated by malafides, they cannot be sustained even in respect of those land-owners, who have given the consent to the passing of the award. He read out para 47 of the said decision. It is extracted hereinbelow:
"47. We do no find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that quashing of the acquisition proceedings should have been confined to those who had not accepted the amount of compensation. Once the High Court came to the conclusion that the acquisition of land was vitiated due to want of good faith and the provisions of the 1894 Act had been invoked for a private purpose, there could not have been any justification for partially sustaining the acquisition on the ground that some of the landowners or their transferees had accepted compensation by entering into an agreement with the Authority. The situation in which the people belonging to this class are placed in the matter of acquisition of their land leaves little choice to them but to make compromises and try to salvage whatever they can. Therefore, even though some persons may not have resisted the acquisition and may have accepted the compensation by entering into agreements, it is not possible to find any fault in the approach adopted by the High Court."
29. Sri S.V.Rajesh, the learned counsel appearing for KSCA, respondent No.5 in W.P.Nos.1914/2007, 1915/2007, 5490-5491/2009 and respondent No.3 in W.P.Nos.9966/2008, 2447/2008, 2348-2458/2011, 11927-11947/2011, 14351-14352/2011, 39034/2010 and 39035/2010, 34369-34383/2010, 41507-41519/2010 and 41676-41695/2010 and 41520-41526/2010 submits that the Government vide its letter, dated 5.10.2005 (Annexure-R14 to the HUDA's statement of objections) has accorded approval to the HUDA's resolution to allot 25 acres to the KSCA at the rate of `3 lakhs per acre. The learned counsel submits that Section 39 of KUDA Act permits the sale of the lands, if it is for the purpose of playground. He read out Section 39, which is as follows:
"39. Prohibition of the use of area reserved for parks, playground and civic amenities for other purposes - The authority shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any area reserved for public parks and playgrounds and civic amenities, for any other purpose and any disposition so made shall be null and void."
30. He submits that the Zoning Regulations also permit the sale of the land reserved for playground. He submits that the acquisition proceedings are completed within 5 years from the date of the granting of the approval to the scheme. Therefore, it may be incorrect on the part of the petitioners to state that the scheme is not substantially implemented. He brings to my notice the Division Bench's judgment of this Court in the case of URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SHIMOGA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in 2004(5) KLJ 233. He read out the following portion of the order:
"6 .............................. The making of the award based on the declarations issued under Sections 17 and 19 of the Act would in our opinion constitute a step in the direction of implementing the scheme. Other steps like taking of possession, laying of roads and allotment of sites would also contribute to the implementation of the scheme in some measure or the other. Suffice it to say that the least which the authority was required to do was to ensure that an award is made in accordance with the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act within a period of 5 years to save the scheme from lapsing under Section 27 of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities act."
31. He submits that as the possession of the land is already taken by the Government and made over to the HUDA, the erstwhile landowners are not entitled to have the acquisition proceedings invalidated and to seek the re-possession of their lands. He sought to draw the support from the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Northern Indian Glass Industries (supra). The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:
"It is well settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the land owner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession."
32. Nextly, the learned counsel brings to my notice this Court's decision in the case of JEELANI MOSQUE COMMITTEE (R) v. THE SHIMOGA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER reported in ILR 2005 KAR 5819. He read out para 10 of the said decision, which reads as follows:
"10. Section 39 imposes a fetter on the 1st respondent not to sell or otherwise dispose off the reserved area for any other purpose as any such disposition is declared to be null and void. It is true that Community Hall does not find a place in the definition of 'Civic Amenity', while Section 39 prohibits disposal of the civic amenity site for any other purpose. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent was not able to point out to any other provision of the KUDA Act, which couched the authority with the power to change the user of the site from the purpose for which it is reserved. The legislature having not empowered the 1st respondent to change the user of the site, reserved for Community Hall, the action of the 1st respondent tantamounts to breach of public trust."
33. He submits that these petitions are liable to be rejected on the short ground of delay and laches. He submits that the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Royal Orchid (supra) does not come to the rescue of the petitioners in any way, as the facts of the said case and the facts of this case are entirely different. He submits that in the case of Royal Orchid (supra) the property developer had already entered into an agreement with the owners of the lands, whose lands came to be notified subsequently at his instance. He also offered the funds in return for the lands. Thus, as the fraud vitiated the initiation of the acquisition proceedings, the Apex Court held that the delay and laches would not militate against the landowners. In the instant case, as there is no fraud on power as such, it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the acquisition proceedings after 5 long years of the issuance of the acquisition notification and that too after receiving the compensation.
34. Sri K.S.Bharath Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the KSRTC - the respondent No.11 in W.P.Nos.11927-11947/2011, 41507-41519/2010 and 41676-41695/2010 and 41520-41526/2010 and Sri Srishaila, the learned counsel appearing for Smt.Swetha Anand for the KSRTC - the respondent No.8 in W.P.Nos.1915/2007 and 5490-5491/2009 and respondent No.11 in W.P.Nos.2348-2458/2011, 14351-14352/2011, 39034/2010 and 39035/2010 and 34369-34383/2010 make the submissions akin to the submissions of Sri S.V.Rajesh.
35. Sri M.S. Bhagwat, the learned counsel for Nethaji Rural Development Trust (petitioner in W.P. No.361/2008 and respondent No.6 in W.P.Nos.1914/2007, 1915/2007 and 5490-5491/2009, respondent No.7 in W.P. No.9966/2008, 2447/2008, 2348-2458/2011, 11927-11947/2011, 14351-14352/2011, 39034 and 39035/2010, 34369-34383/2010, 41507-41519/2010 and 41676-695/2010 and 41520-51526/2010) submits that the six acres of land was allotted by HUDA for a consideration of Rs. 5 lakhs per acre. He submits that as the allotment is unilaterally cancelled, the said party has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the cancellation order and consequently for a direction to HUDA to re-allot the land.
36. Sri Bhagwat submits that the writ petitions filed by the landowners are not in public interest. As none of the landowners are the applicants for the allotment of sites, they cannot have any grievance over the allotment of sites to the third parties. He also prays for the rejection of the petitions filed by the landowners on the ground of locus-standi and on the ground of delay and laches. His last submission is that the original scheme has to be retained; if the modified scheme is given effect to, the said party would loose the opportunity of getting the land measuring six acres.
37. Sri K.N. Nitish, the learned counsel appearing for Sri K.V.Narasimhan for Nisarga Educational Trust (respondent No. 4 in W.P.Nos.9966/2008, 1914/2007, 2447/2008, 1915/2007, 5490-5491/2009, 2348-2458/2011, 11927-11947/2011, 14351-14352/2011, 39034 and 39035/2010, 34369-34383/2010, 41507-41519/2010 and 41520-41526/2010) and for Chethana Neuro Centre (respondent No. 6 in W.P.Nos.5490-5491/2009, 2348-2458/2011, 11927-11947/2011, 14351-14352/2011, 39034 and 39035/2010, 34369-34383/2010 and 41507-41519/2010) submits that the said Trust is a bonafide purchaser of the land measuring 10 acres for a consideration of Rs.5 lakhs per acre. He submits that, as the said land is given for starting the educational institution, it falls within the meaning of civic amenities site. He also submits that the HUDA's resolution is further approved by the Government. It is only on taking the Government's sanction that the HUDA has executed the sale deed. He submits that the recitals and clauses in the sale deed are clearly indicative that the HUDA has the power to execute the sale deed. Without prejudice to these submissions, he contends that whether the HUDA really has such a power or not is a matter of indoor management of the HUDA, with which the allottees or purchasers are not concerned. For its internal problems, HUDA cannot cancel the sale deed. By cancelling the sale deed, the said Trust's precious rights cannot be extinguished. He submits that the rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller are governed by the provisions contained in Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
38. On the impermissibility of the cancellation of the sale deed in the writ proceedings, he read out paragraph 80 and 86 of the Full Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 2006 (6) ALT 523 in the case of YANALA MALLESHWARI AND OTHERS v. ANANTHULA SAYAMMA AND OTHERS.
They are extracted hereinbelow :
"80. Assuming that the petitioners filed suits before the civil Court for the relief, as is prayed herein before this Court, having regard to the pleadings, the civil Court has to necessarily frame the issues, which would be somewhat like this, namely, (i) whether the sale deeds executed by the vendors in favour of the petitioners are valid and binding on the owners of the property; (ii) whether the GPA executed by the owner in favour of the persons, who executed sale deeds enables such GPA holder to convey or transfer the immovable property; (iii) whether the person who obtained GPA from the real owner has not played fraud and misrepresentation on the real owner; (iv) whether the sale deed executed is void or voidable as vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation; and (v) whether the cancellation deed is liable to be cancelled. There could be other incidental or related issues but mainly these will be issues in case the petitioners go to civil Court. This Court cannot resolve these issues in writ petitions. Each one of the issues requires evidence - both oral and documentary. Such evidence must be relevant and must relate to existence or non-existence of every disputed fact in issue. Mere pleadings either by way of plaint or written statement or for that matter, an affidavit would not be sufficient to decide the issue either way. in such a situation, an assumption that a vendor cannot cancel the sale deed or the registering authority cannot accept and register the cancellation deed would be legally incorrect.
86. Whether the vendors file suits for cancellation of the instrument under Section 31 or for declaration of title under Section 34 - 106 -
or whether vendees file suits for cancellation of the cancellation deed, there are bound to be allegations of fraud, misrepresentation and illegality by both the parties. an elaborate procedure is available under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Evidence Act, Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act, which has to be followed by a civil Court. Certain issues cannot be adjudicated by resorting to summary procedure. In a writ petition, this Court decides the issues based on the affidavit evidence. Whenever affidavit evidence is not sufficient and further probe is required in the sense that persons who swear affidavits need to be cross-examined and confirmed with documentary evidence, a writ petition is not a proper remedy. In a sale transaction, it is essentially a contract between two persons and if one person after conclusion of the contract goes back and makes attempt or purports to make an attempt to deny the benefit of the contract of the other party, the remedy is only in the civil Court."
39. He also sought to draw support from the Full Bench judgment of Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Latif Estate Line India Ltd. Vs. Mrs. Hadeeja Ammal in W.A. Nos. 592 and 938/2009. The relevant paragraph in the said judgment is extracted hereunder:
"59. After giving our anxious consideration on the questions raised in the instant case, we come to the following conclusion:-
(i) A deed of cancellation of a sale unilaterally executed by the transferor does not create, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in the property and is of no effect. Such a document does not create any encumbrance in the property already transferred. Hence such a deed of cancellation cannot be accepted for registration. (ii) Once title to the property is vested in the transferee by the sale of the property, it cannot be divested unto the transferor by execution and registration of a deed of cancellation even with the consent of the parties. The proper course would be re-convey the property by a deed of conveyance by the transferee in favour of the transferor. (iii) Where a transfer is effected by way of sale with the condition that title will pass on payment of consideration, and such intention is clear from the recital in the deed, then such instrument or sale can be cancelled by a deed of cancellation with the consent of both the parties on the ground of non-payment of consideration. The reason is that in such a sale deed, admittedly, the title remained with the transferor, (iv) In other cases, a complete and absolute sale can be cancelled at the instance of the transferor only by taking recourse to the Civil Court by obtaining a decree of cancellation of sale deed on the ground interalia of fraud or any other valid reasons."
40. He also brought to my notice of the Apex Court's Judgment in the case SUNIL PANNALAL BANTHIA AND OTHERS v. CITY AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF MAHARASHTRA LTD. AND ANOTHER reported in 2007 STPL(LE) 38200 SC. He read out paragraph 22, which is as follows:
"22. On the legal question, it is quite obvious that having acted and held out assurances to the appellants which caused the appellants to alter their position to their prejudice, it was not open to CIDCO to take a unilateral decision to cancel the allotment on the ground that it had acted without jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction and in violation of its rules and regulations. Even on that score, the argument advanced on behalf of CIDCO is unacceptable having regard to Regulation 4 of the New Bombay Disposal of Land Regulations, 1975 extracted hereinabove which empowered CIDCO to dispose of plots of land even on the basis of individual applications. The said aspect of the matter has been dealt with in detail in Civil Appeal Nos. 408/07 and 410/07 referred to hereinabove."
41. Sri Ravivarma Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Ravishankar for the HUDA submits that there is no departure or aberration from the modified scheme, as approved by the Government. The HUDA has already received 16,651 applications for allotment. He submits that this number includes the applications made for allotment of sites in other layouts, where the applicants could not secure their allotment. He brings to my notice the demand survey report. It is stated therein that the cases of the unsuccessful applicants for allotment of sites in other layouts could be considered on priority basis for the allotment of sites in the SMKN layout. He submits that the HUDA's letter, dated 15.12.2000 and its accompanying documents are self-explanatory. The internal annexure to the said document reads as follows:
"3. F “KANNADAM”
42. To show that the allotment proceedings are of continuing nature, he read out Clause (iv) of the HUDA's Notification, dated 06.09.2005 calling for applications for allotment. It reads as follows:
"F “KANNADAM”
43. He also submits that the fixation of the allotment consideration at Rs.56.40 per sq.ft. is done on scientific lines, as is discernible from internal Annexure-5 to the said letter.
44. To show that the preliminary notification issued under Section 17(1) of the KUDA Act is also published in local newspaper in compliance with the requirements of Section 17(3) of the KUDA Act, he has produced the original 'Hassan Madyama' issue, dated 23.03.2001 containing the said notification.
45. The learned Senior Counsel submits that in
compliance with the interim order, dated 08.04.2009 passed by this Court, the Government has accorded approval to the modified scheme on 20.05.2009 (Annexure R60 to HUDA's additional statement of objections).
46. The learned Senior Counsel assures that the SMKN Layout would be an ideal layout in the State and perhaps in the country itself. It would have ultra-modern facilities. All the requirements for achieving this goal would be scrupulously adhered to.
47. On the Court's specifically asking the learned Senior Counsel as to how some portions of the acquired lands came to be sold to certain parties, on what basis the sale consideration came to be fixed, on what basis the extent of the land came to be determined in the absence of the auditing of the land requirements and further as to how the public property came to be disposed of without even issuing the advertisement/notification calling for applications for allotment, he fairly submits that some irregularities have taken place in the matter of allotment. He seeks leave of the Court to re-trace the HUDA's steps so that its acts could be brought in conformity with the approved scheme.
48. He submits that the sale deeds are not upholdable at all and that therefore they are liable to be set aside. For advancing the contention that under certain circumstances even the registered deeds, transferring the property, can be set aside in the writ proceedings, he brings to my notice the Apex Court judgment in the case of B.L.WADHERA v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2002) 9 SCC 108). He read out the operative portion of the said judgment from para 46(i); it is extracted hereinbelow:
"46 (i) consequent upon quashing of the Gram Panchayat resolutions dated 23.10.1983 and 8.12.1989, the government orders dated 3.3.1984 and 6.6.1990 and the gift deeds executed by the Gram Panchayat in favour of the respondent Trust, the possession of the land, the subject-matter of this litigation shall be handed over by respondent No.7, its Chairman, Directors, employees, representatives and agents, initially to the State Government who shall thereafter deliver it to the Gram Panchayat with specific directions for utilization of the land in the manner prescribed.
49. He also sought to draw support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of AKHIL BHARTIYA UPBHOKTA CONGRESS v. STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS reported in (2011) 5 SCC 29. The Apex Court is pleased to say in para 83 of the said judgment:
"83. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed. The allotment of 20 acres of land to respondent 5 is declared illegal and quashed. The Notifications dated 6.6.2008 and 5.9.2008 issued by the State Government under Sections 23-A(1)(a) and (2) are also quashed. The Commissioner, Town and Country Planning, Bhopal is directed to take possession of the land and use the same strictly in accordance with the Bhopal Development Plan. The State Government is directed to refund the amount deposited by respondent 5 within a period of 15 days from today."
50. He also relies on this Court's decision in the case of D.RAJENDRA KUMAR vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA and ORS. reported in ILR 2009 Kar.2029 wherein the allotment made by and the agreement executed by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board in favour of the allottee came to be quashed, as the same were running contrary to the Rules.
51. On being asked, what is the rate of interest at which the HUDA would give back the sale consideration which it has received from the allottees/purchasers in the event of the cancellation of the transactions, he submits that the interest rate cannot be more than 6%, as the HUDA itself has borrowed the funds from the financial institutions at the rate of 14.5% per annum.
52. The learned Senior Counsel submits that nothing survives for any consideration of the allegations being made by the petitioning land-owners, as they were relevant only in the context of the original scheme. On the approval accorded by the Government on 20.05.2009 to the HUDA's modified scheme, it is the anxiety of the HUDA to utilise the acquired lands strictly in accordance with law.
53. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners are not entitled to the allotment of any site under the incentive scheme, as they have resisted the compulsory acquisition by filing these petitions.
54. The learned Additional Advocate General Sri Nataraj submits that the matter is mainly between the petitioners and the HUDA. He submits that the eligibility list for the grant of sites as per the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities (Incentive for Voluntary Surrender of Sites) Rules, 1991 is prepared. He would further hasten to clarify that its basis is the extent of the land acquired from the petitioners; it cannot be construed as the list of the entitled persons.
55. The learned Additional Advocate General submits that even when the scheme may have elapsed, the acquisition is intact. The lapsing of the scheme in no way entitles the erstwhile landowners to seek the reversion or restoration of the land to themselves. He brings to my notice the Apex Court judgment in the case of OFFSHORE HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS. reported in (2011) 3 SCC 139. The provisions found in the relevant Sections 27 and 36 of the KUDA Act have received the following interpretation at the hands of the Apex Court:
"38. On a conjunctive reading of the provisions of Sections 27 and 36 of the State Act, it is clear that where a scheme lapses, the acquisition may not. This, of course, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where, upon completion of the acquisition proceedings, the land has vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition would not lapse or terminate as a result of lapsing of the scheme under Section 27 of the BDA Act. An argument to the contrary cannot be accepted for the reason that on vesting, the land stands transferred and vested in the State/Authority free from all encumbrances and such status of the property is incapable of being altered by fiction of law either by the State Act or by the Central Act. Both these Acts do not contain any provision in terms of which property, once and absolutely, vested in the State can be reverted to the owner on any condition. There is no reversal of the title and possession of the State. However, this may not be true in cases where acquisition proceedings are still pending and land has not been vested in the Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act.
39. What is meant by the language of Section 27 of the BDA Act i.e., "provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative", is that if the acquisition proceedings are pending and where the scheme has lapsed, further proceedings in terms of Section 36(3) of the BDA Act i.e., with reference to the land which, upon its acquisition, has vested in the State and thereafter vested in the Authority in terms of Section 36(3); such vesting is incapable of being disturbed except in the case where the Government issues a notification for revesting the land in itself, or a corporation, or a local authority in cases where the land is not required by the Authority under the provisions of Section 37(3) of the BDA Act."
56. He has also relied on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES (supra). He read out para 12 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereinbelow:
"12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land. As already noticed, the State Government in this regard has already initiated proceedings for resumption of the land. In our view, there arises no question of any unjust enrichment to the appellant Company."
57. Based on the aforesaid judicial view, he submits that the HUDA may use the acquired lands for some other purpose, if the scheme has lapsed or at the most the Government may draw the acquired lands to itself and give them to a Government Corporation or a local authority. It is his emphatic submission that for no reason and under no circumstances, the lands vested in the Government/authority can be revested in favour of the erstwhile land-owners.
58. He submits that as the petitioning land-owners have agreed to the acquisition of their lands and as their grievances are only over the outright sale of some portions of the properties in favour of some parties, their interest would be met, if the sale transactions are held to be bad.
59. He submits that the sale deeds executed by the HUDA in favour of the third parties is absolutely unjust. On the ground of outright sale of the lands in question, the acquisition proceedings cannot be invalidated. Only the sale transactions can be invalidated.
60. If the acquisition proceedings are to be quashed only in respect of the lands belonging to the petitioners, it would create serious problems, so submits the learned Additional Advocate General. Many landowners have accepted the compensation; they may have invested their compensation amount into long term projects and altered their positions materially. If the land acquisition proceedings are quashed in their entirety, that too without hearing them, it would affect their interest adversely.
61. He submits that as per the demand raised by the petitioners, this Court may kindly give a direction to the HUDA to meaningfully implement the modified scheme.
62. In the course of rejoinder, Sri Nikilesh Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the authorities relied upon by Sri Nitesh do not come to the rescue of the purchasers in any way. He submits that in the reported cases, relied upon by the purchasers, the transactions are between two private parties. What distinguishes this case from the facts of the reported cases are that there is no provision in law for executing the sale deed in favour of a party by the HUDA in respect of a civic amenity site or the area earmarked for the purpose of a playground. As the HUDA did not have the competence to execute the sale deed, no valid title has passed on to the purchasers.
63. It is submitted by Sri Nikilesh Rao that the petitioners in W.P.Nos.5490-5491/2009 have already filed the objections to the acquisition of the lands in question on the ground that they fall within the green belt.
64. The two preliminary objections are required to be considered first. Whether the petitions filed by the landowners are to be rejected on the short ground of maintainability, as some of them have given their consent to the passing of the award and have received the compensation thereof. The HUDA's reliance on the decisions in the cases of NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES AND URMILA ROY (supra) would come to the HUDA's rescue but in a qualified way. In the said decisions, it is laid down that once a land owner agitates for higher compensation, he loses the right of resisting land acquisition. In the instant case, majority of the petitioning land-owners have given their consent to the passing of the award and have also received the compensation amount thereof. They are therefore estopped from challenging the acquisition notifications. Their challenge to the impugned notifications fails. But that does not mean that no relief can be given to them. If the acquisition proceedings are found to be not liable to be invalidated, then the question of moulding the relief has to be examined.
65. Similarly, the second threshold objection of delay and laches also militate against the petitioning land-owners. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of HUDA, there is a delay of 5-9 years in challenging the acquisition notifications. The challenge to the acquisition notifications is liable to be negatived on the short ground of delay and laches. But the same does not disentitle the petitioners to get the moulded relief in these proceedings.
66. As held by the Apex Court in the case of ROYAL ORCHID (supra), the High Court may not enquire into belated or stale claim and may deny relief to the petitioner, if he is found guilty of laches. The Apex Court has also observed that the rule against the laches is one of the practice and not of law. In the said reported case, the owner of the land challenged the validity of the acquisition notifications after 12 years. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay. The Division Bench of the High Court nullified the acquisition of the land on the ground of fraud and directed the return of the land to the land-owner. The Division Bench's judgment was affirmed by the Apex Court, because the challenge to the acquisition proceedings was initiated on the alienation of the acquired lands to the private parties. In the instant case also, the grievance of the land-owners is over the diversification of the lands and the violation of the approved housing scheme.
67. On thus considering the preliminary objections, this Court proposes to take up the following core issues ad seriatim:
1) Whether the allotments made and sale deeds executed by HUDA in favour of organizations like, Nisarga Educational Trust, KSCA, Chetana Neuro Centre, Netaji Rural Development Trust, etc. withstand the scrutiny of law?
2) Whether the acquisition proceedings are liable to be declared as lapsed?
3) What relief, if any, can be given to the petitioning land owners?
68. In Re.Question 1): The allotments made by HUDA in favour of organizations like Nisarga Educational Trust, KSCA, Chethana Neuro Centre, Netaji Rural Development Trust, etc. are unsupportable and unsustainable for one simple reason. The requirements of public law are not complied with at all. No advertisement is issued calling for the applications from the desirous parties for the allotment of civic amenity sites. The allotment of land, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress (supra), has to be founded on a sound, transparent, discernable and well-defined policy. If the allotments are made without calling for the applications, such acts are to be treated as arbitrary and discriminatory. The allotment of land to the institutions/organizations engaged in educational, cultural, social or philanthropic activities or rendering services to society cannot be done in a manner inconsistent with the doctrine of equality.
69. There is no provision in the KUDA or the Rules framed thereunder for making the allotment of land without issuing the advertisement and without calling for the applications from eligible and desirous parties.
70. It is also helpful to refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of CENTRE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2012) 3 SCC 1), wherein the Apex Court has expressed the considered view that the methods like 'first come first served' when used for alienations of natural resources/public property are likely to be misused by unscrupulous people, who are only interested in garnering maximum financial benefit and have no respect for the constitutional ethos and values.
71. Equal opportunity, fairness and transparency can be ensured either by conducting a duly publicized auction or by fixing the allotment consideration and calling for applications and comparatively evaluating them for sub-serving the public interest.
72. In the instant case, the bulk allotments made by HUDA in favour of some societies/organizations is abhorable. It is not known on what basis the societies/organizations made the applications for the allotment of the lands. Further, neither the HUDA nor the Government have audited the land requirements of the allottee societies/organizations. The fixation of the allotment consideration is also not uniform for several allottee societies/organizations. It is not shown to this Court that the approved scheme provides for such allotments.
73. The allotments in favour of the said societies and organisations have deprived the land-owners of their land under the cover of public purpose; the diversification of the land for a private purpose is not permissible.
74. Considering all these aspects of the matter, I have no hesitation in holding that the allotment made in favour of Nisarga Educational Trust, KSCA, Chethana Neuro Centre, Netaji Rural Development Trust, etc. do not withstand the scrutiny of law. Such allotments are liable to be withdrawn, if they are already not yet withdrawn.
75. Subsequent to the allotments made in favour of the said organizations, good sense has dawned on the HUDA. In its meeting held on 29.2.2012, it has passed the resolution that without achieving the purpose of the scheme, making the bulk allotments is illegal. It has also resolved that the allotment consideration be refunded to the said organizations/societies.
76. The allied question that arises for my consideration is whether the HUDA is justified in cancelling the allotments without affording an opportunity of hearing to the allottees. The administrative decision-making, if it involves civil consequences, has to be made by adhering to the principles of natural justice. But when the allotments are void abinitio, the observance of the principles of natural justice would only be an empty formality. When the allotments are illegal per se, any direction to hear the allottess before cancelling the allotment would only amount to issuing a futile writ. In taking this view, I am fortified by the Apex Court's judgment in the case of S.L.KAPOOR v. JAGMOHAN AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1981 SC 136. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as follows:
"In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal."
77. In the case of GREATER NOIDA (supra) the Apex Court has held that the builders, who have engineered the acquisition of land, cannot step into the shoes of the state functionaries and offer justification for the acquisition of a particular parcel of land. The grievance of the builders of not being given an opportunity of hearing was held to be misconceived. The Apex Court took the considered view that the complaint of violation of audi alteram partem stands redressed, as they have been given the sufficient opportunity of hearing by it (Hon'ble Supreme Court).
78. The allotments made to the said organizations are directed to be cancelled, if they are not yet cancelled. Any amounts that HUDA has received from the said organizations shall be refunded to them within four weeks from the date of the issuance of the certified copy of today's order. The said amounts shall carry interest at the rate of 9.5% per annum from the date of the receipt of the amounts till the date of refund. This rate of interest is specified and prescribed based on the HUDA's resolution, dated 29.02.2012, wherein a reference is made to the HUDA taking the financial assistance from the Vijaya Bank at the rate of 9.5% per annum.
79. It is also made clear that the liberty is reserved to the said societies/organizations to respond to the advertisement, if, as and when HUDA issues the same calling for the applications for allotment. Other things remaining the same, that is, if the claims of the present allottees and of the fresh applicants are evaluated and found to be possessing the same merits and if they are required to pay the same allotment consideration, be it a pre-fixed allotment consideration or the open auction, the present allottees would be preferred.
80. A further consideration of the case of the allottees is required, if the allotment has culminated in the execution of the sale deed. The registered sale deed cannot be cancelled by an unilateral act of the vendor. In taking this view, I am fortified by the decisions of this Court in the cases of BINNY MILL LABOUR WELFARE HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED v. D.R.MRUTHYUNJAYA ARADHYA reported in ILR 2008 KAR 2245 and K.RAJU v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY reported in ILR 2011 KAR 120.
81. Following the said decisions, I direct HUDA to take steps for the cancellation of the sale deeds executed in favour of the allottees by filing the duly constituted suits in the competent civil court. I do not propose to set aside the sale deed in the writ proceedings. The facts of B.L.Wadhera's case (supra) and of the cases on hand are different. In B.L.Wadhera's case, the gift deeds executed by Gram Panchayat were quashed.
82. Further, the civil court shall make every possible endeavour to dispose of the anticipated suit/suits within eight months of its/their filing.
83. In Re.Question 2): No irregularities in the acquisition proceedings are pointed out. The irregularities are in the post-acquisition period. The bulk allotments of lands are made to different organizations/societies in contravention of the approved scheme and defying the requirements of public law. This aspect of the matter is already dealt with at length while examing with the question No.1. But on the ground of allotments being illegal, the acquisition proceedings cannot be declared as lapsed. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Private Limited (supra), once the acquired lands come to be vested in the Government, they cannot be divested. It is not in dispute that the award is passed and the possession of the lands is taken over by the Government, which in turn has placed them at the disposal of the HUDA. At this juncture, there cannot be any reversal of title and possession by restoring the lands to the owners. If the scheme itself has lapsed, the acquisition proceedings would lapse, if they (acquisition proceedings) have not attained the finality. In the instant case, as the acquisition proceedings are concluded, there cannot be any re-vesting of the lands in the erstwhile owners.
84. In the case of Northern Indian Glass Industries (supra), the Apex Court has held that the land owner has no right to seek the re-vesting of the land in himself, even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired. I see considerable force in the submissions urged on behalf of the Government that even if it is assumed that the scheme has lapsed, the Government may at the most draw the acquired lands to itself from the HUDA.
85. As the majority of the land-owners have accorded their consent to the land acquisition and have received the compensation-amounts, they are not justified in demanding the restoration of the lands to them. It is also to be noticed that besides some of the land-owners, who have accepted the compensation amounts have not come before the Court seeking the relief of restoration of the lands to them. If the lands are ordered to be restored to the petitioning land-owners and if the lands of those land-owners, who have not filed the writ petitions, are left with the HUDA, it would create not merely confusion but chaotic state of affairs. No housing layout can be formed in stray and isolated bits of lands. If the acquisition is intact in some pockets and disrupted in other pockets, it would affect the contiguity of the project adversely. Vesting of some lands in the State and re-vesting of some lands in favour of the land owners may render the implementation of the housing scheme an impossibility.
86. It is profitable to refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of OM PRAKASH AND ANOTHER vs. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS reported in (1998) 6 SCC 1. In para 30 of the said decision, the Apex court has this to say:
".......... We find considerable force in the contention of the learned Senior counsel for the respondent that it is neither advisable nor feasible to interfere with the acquisition of such large tracts of lands when the occupants of 9/10th of the acquired lands have not thought it fit to challenge these acquisition proceedings and the occupants of only 1/10th of lands are agitating their grievance since more than six years, firstly before the High Court and then before this Court. ........."
87. Following the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of THIMMAPPA AND ANOTHER vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in 2003 (6) Kar.L.J.5 declined to interfere with the acquisition proceedings, as the land acquisition in respect of 6 acres 10 guntas out of 7 acres 26 guntas had become final.
88. Considering all these aspects of the matter, I decline to grant the relief of declaration that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The second question is answered accordingly.
89. In Re.Question 3: It is not in dispute that the land-owners did not resist the acquisition in the first instance. On the other hand, they have readily accepted the compulsory acquisition of their lands. Majority of them have even given their consent to the passing of the award and received the compensation thereof. They have also made over the possession of their respective lands to the Government. It is only when the bulk allotments were being made in contravention of the approved scheme that some of the land-owners have chosen to file these writ petitions. Just because they have filed these writ petitions aggrieved by the subsequent developments, they cannot be disentitled to any relief. Nor there can be any discrimination between the land-owners, who have not filed the writ petitions and who have filed the writ petitions. The principle of equal protection of law has to be extended to the petitioning land-owners.
90. It is also not in dispute that HUDA had made bulk allotment of lands to the various organizations/societies even when there was no provision for the same in the sanctioned scheme. The HUDA has admitted its mistake and has made an honest effort to rectify the same. In its meeting held on 29.2.2012, the HUDA has said that because of the unsustainable bulk allotments, the land-owners are losing the opportunity to get the incentive sites. It is in this background that it has resolved to implement the housing scheme in question by giving 40% of the developed lands to the land-owners by requiring them to return the entire compensation amount with interest.
91. The Karnataka Urban Development Authorities (Allotment of sites in lieu of compensation for the land acquired) Rules, 2009 also provide for the allotment of sites to the persons, who voluntarily give up their lands. These Rules are made to speed up the land acquisition process free from litigation.
92. Section 31(3) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 also provide for the grant of other lands in exchange for the acquired land.
93. The HUDA's resolutions, dated 01.02.2000 and 16.12.2004 in respect of other lands, also provide for taking the land by the HUDA and the land-owners in the ratio of 60:40. This healthy precedent has to be followed in these cases too.
94. My answer to the question No.3 is that the petitioning land-owners are entitled to the allotment of developed lands. Their entitlement is to 40% of the lands acquired from them. Their obligation shall be to return the entire compensation amount along with interest at the rate of 9.5% per annum from the date of the receipt of the amounts till the date of the return of the amounts. I am prescribing the interest at the rate of 9.5% per annum based on the agenda note for the HUDA's meeting on 29.2.2012. The agenda note states that the HUDA has availed of the financial assistance in the region of Rs.15 crores from Vijaya Bank with interest at the rate of 9.5% per annum. While imposing the interest, neither the HUDA nor the petitioning land-owners can be permitted to make unlawful gain. The petitioning land-owners cannot be saddled with more interest liability than what is borne by the HUDA.
95. The Government shall accord approval to the HUDA's resolution, dated 29.2.2012 within one month from the date of the issuance of the certified copy of today's order. Needless to observe that the Government shall approve the said resolution on such terms, as are permissible in law.
96. The HUDA is directed to issue the demand notice to the land-owners, who have received the compensation, quantifying the amounts liable to be paid by them. It shall be done within one month from the date of the receipt of the Government's order of approval for the said resolution of the HUDA.
97. It is made clear that taking the alternative site or retaining the compensation is the option of the land-owners. If the land-owners opt for the incentive site allotments, they shall comply with the demand notice of the HUDA for the payment of amounts within three months from the date of the receipt of the demand notice.
98. W.P.Nos.394/2008, 9966/2008, 1914/2007, 2447/2008, 2733/2008, 1915/2007, 17000/2008 and 17052-167054/2008, 37548-37549/2009, 25570-25572/2009, 5490-5491/2009, 2348-2458/2011, 11927-11947/2011, 14351-14352/2011, 39034/2010 and 39035/2010, 34369-34383/2010, 41507-41519/2010 and 41676-41695/2010 and 41520-41526/2010 are accordingly allowed but to the extent indicated hereinabove. W.P.No.361/2008 is dismissed but subject to the observations made in the paragraphs dealing with question No.1 hereinabove.
99. Now that the main matters themselves are disposed of, nothing survives for Misc.W.2323/2009 for modification of the order, dated 14.6.2007 and I.A.s for vacating the stay. They are dismissed as having become unnecessary.
100. No order as to costs.