Judgment:
K. Kannan, J.
All the five writ petitions address the same issue of the validity of the order passed by the authority constituted under the Punjab Village Common Lands Regulation Act, 1961 (as applicable to Haryana). The contentions of the respective petitioners in the writ petitions are that the property had been held as per the respective shares much before 1950 as Proprietors and they had not vested in the Gram Panchayat to entitle the Gram Panchayat to apply for eviction under the Act. The Assistant Collector had observed that out of total extent of 11 bighas 13 biswas, Gujjar Singh was cultivating 6 bighas and 8 biswas. The Assistant Collector had made a specific reference to entries in the name of Gujjar Singh in the year, 1933-34, 1937- 38, 1938-39 and had reckoned a total extent of 10 bighas and 13 biswas alone was in his possession and for that alone the s exemption under Section 4(3)(ii) of the Punjab Common Lands Regulations Act would apply. At later point of time, he had come to occupy larger portions and when consolidations took place, he was in possession of 55 bighas and 5 biswas as per Ex.D-1 and in of the same, he was allotted land measuring 271 kanals 13 marlas.
2. Adverting to the fact that the petitioner's exemption limit and to relate to properties held by him for more than 12 years prior to the commencement of the Act, out of total extent of 1l bighas and 13 biswas shown through Ex.D-5, he was entitled only 159 kanals and 5 marlas but however, he was in possession of 273 kanals and 13 marlas The petition for eviction had been filed only for the balance of extent after allowing for property that had been held by him to the extent of 59 kanals and 5 marlas. As the order records the fact that he was to choose 58 kanals and 5 marlas of his choice but later he made a representation that the authority itself have selected the numbeRs. The impugned proceeding satisfies particular rectangle numbers and killas for which exemption was extended. The order for ejectment was made with an assessment of mesne profits for Rs. 26,000/-. It was also observed that if the property is not delivered, he will continue to be liable to pay Rs. 26,000/- every year.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the definition of Section 2(g) and points out to the exclusion provided under "2(g)(v) and 2(g)(viii)" and states that since the petitioner had been an individual cultivating the land in possession as a co-sharer till 26th January, 1950, the said property was liable to exclusion. It was also contended that he had a raised a dispute regarding title and moved an application before the Court for referring the dispute regarding title for adjudication under Section 13-A to determine whether the property was shamilat deh or not. The grievance is that the Assistant Ca lector did not give any finding on the application moved for a reference regarding title for adjudication.
4. As regards the contention of the petitioners that the petitions of the respective petitioners must have been referred for adjudication on title, I must hold that the referee cannot be compelled in every case merely because an issue regarding title was raised. The power of the Assistant Collector shall be exercised after he makes a summary inquiry as may deem fit and it allows, therefore, a discretion whether the matter involves examination of such facts, which could be done only in a detailed form of inquiry stipulated under Section itself. In this case, if either the petitions had been rejected and no order has been passed, I cannot find any issue as arising favourable for the petitioners because there was no material at all placed to show that in respect of entire extent, the petitioners had any documentary evidence to substantiate the claim that they were possession as co-shareRs. The Assistant Collector himself had noted that the revenue entries for certain years were only in respect of smaller extent and he had actually excluded that portion for which documents were available in the year 1935 itself. To specific query to the counsel for appearing before me as to how the petitioners we making a claim for whole extent without any documentary evidence, the counsel says that all documents are in custody of the parties and they will produce it if, a remand made. I cannot allow for reopening the issue unless, the same had been brought before the Assistant Collector or in the Appellate jurisdiction. The intention of what the petitioners hope to do if, remand were to be made is wholly irrelevant and cannot justify even a claim to ask for a remand of the case.
5. Every other case connected in the writ petition addresses the very same issue of a claim for treating the property held by several other petitioners contending that they were in possession of the property for longer than 12 years prior coming into force of the Act. The orders in the other cases also refers to the documentary evidence had used to find that there was any scope for granting exemption under Section 4(3)(iii) of the Act in the absence of any documentary. What is stated for the petitioner in C.W.P No. 16091 of 1990, will apply with equal force to the other petitioners as well. There is no error in the order passed by the Assistant Collector or in the manner of disposal by the Appellate authority. I find in all these cases, the issue regarding possession a pun question of fact and there is no scope for entertaining the plea of the petitioneRs.
6. All the writ petitions are dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.