A.B. Chaudhari, J.
1. Heard. Admit. Taken up for final disposal with the consent of the learned Counsel for the rival parties.
2. In these Letters Patent Appeals, a common judgment and order dated 12th September, 2011, passed in Writ Petition Nos.1301/2011 (Wainganga Bahuuddheshiya Vikas Sanstha and others Vs. Anil Devaji Gaikwad and others), 1978 of 2011 (Diwakar Maloji Kamble vs. Wainganga Bahuuddheshiya Vikas Sanstha and others), 1979 of 2011 (Anil Dewaji Gaikwad vs. Wainganga Bahuuddheshiya Vikas Sanstha and others), 1315 of 2011 (Wainganga Bahuuddheshiya Vikas Sanstha and others Vs. Rajkumar Kisanrao Bhagat and others) and 1314 of 2011 ((Wainganga Bahuuddheshiya Vikas Sanstha and others Vs. Diwakar Maloji Kamble and others), by which the learned Single Judge of this Court held that the prior permission of the Nagpur University was required before terminating the services of the original appellants Anil Gaikwad, Diwakar Kamble and Rajkumar Bhagat who had filed appeals before the University and College Tribunal; and the orders made by the College Tribunal to hold de novo enquiry against them and the order directing reinstatement and payment of backwages were also confirmed.
FACTS:
3. Appellant No.1 Wainganga Bahuuddheshiya Vikas Sanstha runs Rajiv Gandhi Mahavidyalaya at Sadak-Arjuni, district Gondia. The three employees [(i) Anil Gaikwad (ii) Diwakar Kamble and (iii)Rajkumr Bhagat] were appointed in accordance with the procedure for selection about which there is no dispute. Anil Gaikwad was appointed as Lecturer in Economics on 21.9.1996, Diwakar Kamble was appointed as Lecturer in History on 21.9.1996, and Rajkumar Bhagat was appointed as a Lecturer in Sociology on 25.9.1994. The appointment orders of these three lecturers are similarly worded, so also the approvals granted by the Nagpur University. The approval was from the academic session of appointments and onwards on ad hoc basis subject to the conditions as per the Government Resolution dated 22.12.1995. Admittedly, all three of them had completed minimum period of 24 months. They were chargesheeted by the Management for certain acts of misconduct. Chargesheet was issued to Anil Gaikwad on 23.1.2007, Diwakar Kamble on 25.6.2004, and Rajkumar Bhagat on 8.4.2002.
4. In order to conduct Departmental enquiries against them, respective enquiry officers were appointed. Upon completion of enquiries against them, they were found guilty of majority of charges. After receipt of the enquiry reports in each case, the Management took decision and decided to terminate the services of all of them by different termination orders which were accordingly issued. All the three employees filed three different appeals before the University and College Tribunal under Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1984. These appeals were heard and disposed of by the Tribunal and were allowed with certain findings against the Management and certain findings against the employees. The Management filed three writ petitions in this Court, details in respect of which are already given here-in-above while Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble also filed two writ petitions. These writ petitions were heard by the learned Single Judge of this Court who disposed of the same by the impugned judgment and order. Hence, these Letters Patent Appeals, five in number, were filed by the Management being dissatisfied with the findings and orders made by the learned Single Judge.
SUBMISSIONS:
5. In support of these Letters Patent Appeals, Mr. Bhangde, learned Senior advocate with Mr. R.M. Bhangde, made the following submissions:
(i) The Courts below have committed a serious error of law in ignoring the basic principles of pleadings and proof which vigorously apply even in the cases of service matters and in particular, the cases where orders of dismissal from service are made consequent to the conduct of regular departmental enquiry. Right from the decision in the case of Shankar Vs. Britaniya Biscuits Co. A.I.R. 1979 SC 165 2 followed in Navbharat Daily Vs. Navbharat Shramik Sangha 1984 Mh.L.J. 483, the requirement of pleadings has been held to be a pre-requisite even in respect of the matters relating to the workmen. Perusal of the memo of appeal before the College Tribunal in all these cases will clearly show that the pleadings for assailing the departmental enquiry or the dismissal order etc. have not been made specifically in order that the other side has a sufficient and proper notice of what is going to be urged in appeal. The learned counsel took us through the memo of appeal, so also the replies to the memo of appeal in all these cases and argued that the grounds on which the termination of services of the respondents - employees have been set aside, have not been specifically pleaded and therefore, on the aforesaid principles the appeals preferred by the employees ought to have been dismissed.
(ii) In the recent past, there has been substantial change in respect of doctrine of natural justice qua the domestic enquiries which are held prior to the termination of the services of the employees. The Apex Court has in a series of decisions clearly held that the violation of principle of natural justice cannot be inferred at the drop of a hat, nay the test of prejudice has been elaborately laid down by the Apex Court and that is the present legal position which stands and is required to be applied with full force in the instant cases as well.
(iii) Perusal of the pleadings and memo of appeal in all these cases do not at all show sufficient and proper pleadings for showing so called prejudice allegedly caused to the employees after commencement of enquiry, during the course of enquiry and at the culmination of the enquiry. In absence of proper pleadings and proof about the prejudice, the Courts below could not have inferred the violation of principles of natural justice and set aside the order of dismissal of services of all these employees.
(iv) The 'real danger test' qua the bias recognized by the Apex Court has not been satisfied in all these cases and in the absence of satisfaction of the said test, the Courts below could not have inferred that the orders of termination of the services of these employees were vitiated.
(v) There is no rule that the domestic enquiry must be held at the headquarters of the institution only. In these cases, at any rate, fact remains that there was an implied consent on the part of the employees in shifting venue of the domestic enquiry from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur. There is nothing in the pleadings and memo of appeal to show otherwise. There are no pleadings as to how the employees were aggrieved due to shifting of the venue to Nagpur. In the absence of prejudice in the matter of shifting of venue to Nagpur, the Courts below could not have held that principles of natural justice were violated.
(vi) The memo of appeal nowhere speaks of any complaint regarding non payment of salary or T.A. D.A. because of the shifting of the venue from Sadak Arjuni to Nagpur and in the absence of such pleadings, no inference could be drawn about violation of principles of natural justice. The initial burden of proof being solely on the original appellants - employees, the same having not been discharged, the Management could not be expected to plead or lead any evidence in rebuttal. There is failure on the part of original appellants in proving their case and findings recorded by the Court on non payment of T.A. D.A. and alleged inconvenience due to shifting of venue are not based on any materials much less legal materials required to be placed on record. At any rate, mere inconvenience would not vitiate the enquiry.
(vii) The application for demanding T.A. D.A. for the travel between Sadak Arjuni and Nagpur, if seen, were made almost at the culmination of the enquiry and not at the commencement of the enquiry. This itself proves the case of the Management that no prejudice was caused in respect of the grievance about the payment of T.A. D.A. and shifting of venue which the Courts below have given undue importance.
(viii) The conduct of the employees to prolong the enquiry as much as they could is evident from the order made by the Enquiry Officer which is speaking order dated 26-4-2007 and shows how the employees were interested in prolonging the enquiry and in fact they succeeded in the same for about a period of three years. The employees were, therefore, guilty of clearly protracting the enquiry with ulterior motive.
(ix) The grievance of non payment of salary did not arise because the college was entitled to salary grant from the Government and it was the responsibility of the Government to make payment of the salary which made the same late and accordingly, the salaries were paid by the Management immediately after receipt of the salary grants but then the Management cannot be blamed for late payment. Still by a pursis dated 24-3-2007, offer to pay salary, T.A., D.A. was made.
(x) The employees were never put under suspension during the course of enquiry or at any point of time and therefore, the grievance about non payment of subsistence allowance or any allowance cannot survive. At any rate whatever T.A. D.A. that was asked for shifting venue was paid; and some times on their own volition the Management made the payment of T.A. D.A. to employees in order that they attend the enquiry with their representatives.
(xi) The grievance about non payment of T.A. D.A. or salary or change of venue etc. were required to be examined seriously in the sense whether the said grievance existed or not. As a matter of fact, it will be seen that after filing the applications for the said purpose namely T.A. D.A. there was no further persuasion thereof which clearly indicates that applications were mainly filed as a matter of formality and not intended to be pursued in the real sense. Thus, the grounds regarding change of venue or non payment of T.A. D.A. and consequent vitiation of enquiry are liable to be rejected forthwith.
(xii) Mr. Bhangde, learned Senior advocate, then continued his argument on the issue of bias. According to him, perusal of the memo of appeal does not show specific pleadings regarding bias. Bias is required to the pleaded and proved with proper pleadings and evidence. To infer bias, the materials required, must be satisfactory and answering the test of bias on facts as well as in law. At any rate, according to Mr. Bhangde, it is well settled legal principle that enquiry is vitiated, if there is a bias, provided it is conclusively found by the Court from the stage where the vulnerability erupts. According to him, the theory of percolation of bias argued by the employees cannot be imported in these cases. The submissions in the case of Anil Gaikwad that Mrs. Karanjkar participated in the process of decision making and she had also issued the chargesheet and she had appeared as a witness in domestic enquiry against him still will not vitiate the enquiry from the inception. The part of the process of the decision making would alone be the stage at which the bias could be alleged. What was important was that the decision making process only and therefore at the most, it ought to have been held that enquiry due to bias is vitiated from that stage and nothing more. Therefore, the proceedings held could not have been vitiated prior in point of time to the decision of inflicting punishment. Mr. Bhangde conceded that at the most proceeding could be sent back to the disciplinary authority, from the stage of taking decision in respect of the punishment to be imposed, in which Mrs. Karanjkar would not be included.
(xiii) In the case of Diwakar Kamble, Mr. Bhangde argued that in his case chargesheet was not issued by Mrs. Karanjkar though she had appeared as witness and had also participated in the decision making process. Therefore, the theory of existence of bias at the most could be applied from the stage of decision making process as in the case of Anil Gaikwad.
(xiv) Strongly assailing the view taken by the learned Single Judge on the requirement of prior permission of the University before effecting termination of services of these employees, Mr. Bhangde, learned Senior Advocate, vehemently argued that Statute 53 and relevant clauses of Ordinance 24 have not been correctly read and interpreted by the Courts below. He took us through the appointment orders of all the employees and argued that admittedly not a single appointment order of these employees was on permanent basis nor there is confirmation order issued to any of them. Even the approval granted by the University is not in the nature of confirmation of their services. According to him, factually, therefore, there is no evidence on record which was required to be brought by the original appellants that the appointment was on clear vacancy in the first place and, secondly, that it was confirmed by formal order of confirmation in the service. Apart from that, Mr. Bhangde continued to argue that none of these employees possess NET/SET qualification, even now and it is not in dispute that NET/SET qualification is pre-requisite for being in employment. It is a different matter, according to Mr. Bhangde that the State Government had granted exemption only with a view to protect their services till their retirement but then the status conferred on them as is clarified in the relevant Government resolution itself is of ad hoc nature. The learned Single Judge, according to him, however, ignored the said legal status of these employees of 'ad-hoc' nature and, therefore, the interpretation about application of provisions regarding prior permission is clearly illegal and, thus, liable to be set aside. Mr. Bhangde took us through the various Government resolutions which are regarding confirmation of service, qualifications for appointment to a particular post of Lecturer and so on and so forth. The learned Senior Counsel, on these aspects, concluded by saying that none of these employees were having protection required before dispensing with their services. At any rate, the services of the employees have been terminated not simplicitor but on the ground of serious misconduct proved against them in the enquiry, prior permission of the University before termination was not at all required. Mr.Bhangde then urged, in the case of Rajkumar Bhagat that perusal of his appeal memo will show that the pleadings are scanty and on the basis of those pleadings neither the Tribunal nor the learned Single Judge could have granted any relief to Rajkumar Bhagat. According to him, after the decision of the Tribunal, the said employee Rajkumar Bhagat did not file any writ petition in this Court as was done by Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble and, therefore, the findings adverse to him were accepted by him. Even then the learned Single Judge granted relief to Rajkumar Bhagat while disposing of the writ petition against him filed by the Management which is wholly illegal. He prayed for allowing these appeals. He cited following decisions:
(A) 2008 (7) Supreme Court Cases 153 (Pramod Kumar...Versus...U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and others).
(B) 2004 (9) Supreme Court Cases 747 (ICICI Ltd....Versus...Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. and another).
(C) 2005 (12) Supreme Court Cases 219 (Pradeep Kumar...Versus...Union of India and others).
(D) 2007 (4) Supreme Court Cases 241 (Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi and another...Versus...State of Gujarat and others).
(E) 1996 (9) Supreme Court Cases 322 (State of Punjab and others...Versus...Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy).
(F) 2008 (12) Supreme Court Cases 30 (Union of India...Versus...Y.S. Sadhu, Ex-Inspector).
(G) 2005 (8) Supreme Court Cases 211 (U.P. State Textile Corpn. Ltd....Versus...P.C. Chaturvedi and others).
(H) 1976 (3) Supreme Court Cases 574 (R.C. Sharma...Versus...Union of India and others).
(I) 2008 (9) Supreme Court Cases 31 (Haryana Financial Corporation and another...Versus...Kailash Chandra Ahuja).
(J) 2012 (4) Supreme Court Cases 653 (N.K. Bajpai...Versus...Union of India and another).
(K) 2011 (10) Supreme Court Cases 106 (Lalit Kumar Modi...Versus...Board of Control for Cricket in India and others).
(L) 2010 (5) Supreme Court Cases 349 (Union of India and others...Versus...Alok Kumar).
6. Per contra, Mr. A.M. Gordey, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. N.R. Patil and Mr. Raghute for the employees made the following submissions:-
(i) The memo of appeal filed by the employees in all these cases cannot be read in isolation, but it will have to be read in the context of the documents as well and record of the enquiry proceedings to find out whether the pleadings are adequate and the courts found the existence thereof and therefore recorded the findings of facts in favour of the employees. The law of pleadings does not require that even the evidence should be pleaded in the pleadings and therefore, no hard and fast rule can be laid that each and every fact must be incorporated in the pleadings nor such pleadings could be dubbed as insufficient or improper. According to Mr. Gordey, perusal of the memo of appeal in all these cases clearly shows that all the material pleadings have been set out giving clear indication to the Management or the respondents to the appeals, as to the grounds that were set up in support of the appeals. The various documents and the report of the Enquiry Committee filed on the record in that context were within full knowledge of the Management and Enquiry Committee as well and therefore, it cannot be said that the Management did not have notice in respect of grounds which were raised for assailing the domestic enquiry as well as the orders of termination.
(ii) The basic principle regarding the test of prejudice to find out whether the principles of natural justice have been violated or whether the entire enquiry is fully vitiated and if not, from what stage it is vitiated, is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case. In the instant case, according to Mr. Gordey, the prejudice is clearly borne out from the record and proceedings, various applications filed by the employees and the facts which are germane. All these facts are within the knowledge of the respondents to the original appeals and therefore, it cannot be said that further pleadings by couching the word 'prejudice' were required to be incorporated with emphasis thereon. According to him, it is for the Court to find out from the facts, documents, evidence on record, whether the test of prejudice has been satisfied or not and that is what has been found out by the Courts below and therefore, in the Letters Patent Appeal those findings of facts cannot be disturbed.
(iii) The entire record of the domestic enquiry does not anywhere show that any consent was obtained from the employees in writing for shifting the enquiry to Nagpur from Sadak-Arjuni. No reason is forthcoming to show why such step was taken in all the three cases, particularly when, the headquarter is at Sadak-Arjuni, the witnesses hailed from Sadak-Arjuni, so also the employees. Burden to explain was certainly on Management, which was not discharged and therefore, the prejudice caused to the employees to attend the enquiry at Nagpur travelling 120 k.m. from Sadak-Arjuni on various dates of enquiry, will have to be inferred. In fact, it is duty of the Court to draw inference. Inviting our attention to the various applications filed by the employees, Mr. Gordey, argued that applications for payment of T.A. D.A. and salary, clearly show even the oral requests were made to Management and Enquiry Officer and that is evident from the record and, therefore, it cannot be further expected that the same should have been pleaded in an elaborate manner when the documents speak for themselves. Not only that there are orders of Enquiry Officer in all these cases to provide T.A. D.A. to employees and therefore, it cannot be said that the Management or the Enquiry Officer were not aware of the prejudice being caused to the employees at the relevant time when the enquiry was being conducted. Thus, from the beginning of the enquiry the employees were shouting about the non payment of the allowances and the salaries as well. The expectation that the employees should have pursued the applications which were filed by them for salary, T.A. D.A. and for change of venue, time and again would have been an exercise in futility. Once they had made applications to the Enquiry Officer and the Management, to expect them to pursue their applications each and every time would be absurd. It was the duty of the Enquiry Officer as well as Management to make payments regularly and they failed.
(iv) The enquiry in these cases is clearly vitiated for want of payment of salaries, T.A. D.A. to the employees, particularly, in view of the fact that the venue was changed immediately after the initial formal dates given at Sadak Arjuni and thereafter, the venue was shifted to Nagpur. According to him, enquiry was shifted to Nagpur for convenience of the advocates who were appointed as Enquiry Officer and the presenting officers. It was wrong on the part of the Enquiry Officer and Management to look at the convenience of Enquiry Officers and presenting officers at the cost of denial of opportunity to the employees to defend themselves in a proper mental set up and with no pressures.
(v) The enquiry was kept at Nagpur mostly in the evening and so conducted till late night which itself is abnormal and then the employees were required to go back to their places at Sadak-Arjuni at a distance of 120 k.m. for which even the proper and regular facilities of public transport is not available and they were even required to board a truck for reaching their house at Sadak-Arjuni. Such type of conduct of enquiry was certainly bound to break the physical and mental condition of the employees which was systematically adopted by the Management and Enquiry Officers.
(vi) As to the bias, Mr. Gordey, learned Senior advocate argued that admittedly the chargesheet was issued by Mrs. Karanjkar in the case of Anil Gaikwad. Further, admittedly, she had appeared as a witness in the cases of Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble and in both these cases, she had participated in decision making process of terminating the services of these two employees based on the enquiry reports. He further argued that appearance of Mrs. Karanjkar as a witness in the enquiry to prove the case of Management when she herself has been a part of Management which was to take decision ultimately, the bias was writ large. The fact that Mrs. Karanjkar appeared as a witness against both of them in the enquiry and then took decision along with others to terminate the services of these employees in which she had appeared to prove the charges, would certainly show that the theory of percolation of bias would apply and therefore, it will have to be held that the enquiry is vitiated right from the beginning and therefore, has rightly been set aside.
(vii) As to the prior permission of University before terminating the services of the employees, Mr. Gordey strongly supported the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in its common judgment. He further argued that the very object of providing for prior permission of University before terminating the services of the employees was to extend protection to the employees who have completed considerable years of service with the employer and as held by the Full Bench in the case of Premlata Sudhakar Sathe vs. Governing Body of G.S. Tompe College, reported in 1981, Mh.L.J. 332, the said provision was inserted by the University with a view to prevent unscrupulous employer from throwing out employee from the employment. According to Mr. Gordey, the object of providing for prior permission as expounded by the full bench of this Court will have to be borne in mind. The qualification NET/SET was eventually brought in the year 1991 for the first time. Mr. Gordey, thus, urged that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are perfectly legal, correct and proper and cannot be interfered with. He therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeals. He cited the following decisions.
(a) AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1356 (Arjun Chaubey...Versus...Union of India and others).
(b) Rattan Lal Sharma...Versus...Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and others).
7. Mr. Raghute, the learned learned Advocate for Rajkumar Bhagat argued that the termination was not effected by the competent authority i.e. the Governing Body and hence, it is illegal. But none of the Courts have addressed the said issue though was raised. He assailed the findings of the learned Single Judge about violation of principles of natural justice due to change of venue, non-payment of T.A.D.A. and regular salary; and that of Tribunal on the question of prior permission of the University.
8. Mr. Jaiswal, learned Counsel for University supported the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and argued that the University has taken a clear stand before the College Tribunal by filing the written statement/additional written statement that the prior permission is required wherein the employees completed more than two years of the service irrespective of the fact that the approval was ad hoc. Mr. Jaiswal argued that employees had served for 12-14 years and that by itself was enough to hold in the light of the provisions of Statute 53 and Ordinance 24 that the prior permission of the University was required to be obtained. According to him, the Executive Council is entitled to verify the bona fides on the part of the Management before according permission to terminate the services of such employees. He challenged the contrary finding of the Tribunal as illegal and perverse and prayer for setting aside the same. He finally prayed for dismissal of the appeals.
CONSIDERATION:
9. We have heard learned Counsel for the rival parties on several dates. We have perused the entire record and proceedings. It would be proper for us to give some facts which are borne out of record of the enquiry committee and the College Tribunal. It appears that a group of employees in the said Rajiv Gandhi Mahavidyalaya, Sadak-Arjuni, was agitated for several reasons and one of the reasons pleaded by these three employees is that they were not regularly getting their salary because the salary bills were not being sent to the Joint Director of Higher Education regularly and that had happened, according to them, because of vacancy of the post of Principal who was supposed to sign the bills and the allegations that the President and the office bearers of the Management of the college wanted to have a lion's share from the salary of the employees. By and large, the allegations in the chargesheet issued to these employees were of the following nature:
(i) Delinquents had made false allegations against the Management about financial irregularities which was insubordination.
(ii) Letter to University was addressed by the delinquents to grant approval to Rajkumar Bhagat as officiating principal thereby undermining the authority of the Management.
(iii) Employees formed a group and made adverse publication against principal and Management of the college in the newspapers.
(iv) Instigated the students to go on strike on 11.1.2001 for one day.
(v) In 1999 and 2001, they left the Headquarters without permission of the principal.
(vi) Dereliction of duties in not following the order to work as officiating principal of the college.
(vii) 2002-2003: Refused to obey the orders of the Management to conduct practicals.
(viii) Lodged complaints to the Police Station and University against the office bearers of the Management.
(ix) Created terror in the college.
(x) Did not attend the meeting on 20th Sept.,1998, called by the President.
(xi) Made allegations against the Management directly to the Vice Chancellor.
(xii) Refused the orders to sign the transfer certificates of the students.
(xiii) Anil Gaikwad had projected and unsuccessfully attempted to get a false medical bill of his father's treatment for angioplasty in the sum of Rs.1.5 lacs.
10. FURTHER FACTS AND EVIDENCE:
ANIL GAIKWAD
To the chargesheet dated 23.1.2007, he filed his reply on 16.2.2007. The first date of enquiry was 3.3.2007 at Nagpur when the Enquiry Officer Shri S.V.Akolkar, Advocate, and Dr. S.M.Rajan as presenting officer, conducted the proceedings and by Exh.3 application Anil Gaikwad requested that he required 2/3 weeks time to engage representative and that the enquiry proceeding should be held at Rajiv Gandhi Mahavidyalaya, Sadak-Arjuni since he was not in a position to bring his representative at such a long distance and it was too expensive for him and that is why the enquiry should be held at the Headquarters. The enquiry officer though made endorsement on the application-Exh.3 did not pass any specific order about his request to hold the enquiry at the headquarters and about the issue of expenditure mentioned by him. Thereafter, on 8.3.2007, the date was fixed in the college at Sadak-Arjuni and they attended the proceedings at Sadak-Arjuni. However, the next date for recording evidence was abruptly fixed at Lokmat Bhawan, Nagpur, on 17th March, 2007, at 3 p.m. and there is no reason any where on record as to why contrary to the request to fix the enquiry at headquarters, venue was changed to Nagpur which is at a distance of 120 kms. from Sadak-Arjuni. Thereafter, on 17th March, 2007, enquiry was held at Lokmat Bhawan, Nagpur, when he filed application to collect the documents which was rejected and the examination in chief of witness for the Management Shri Bakht was recorded and was adjourned to 24.3.2007. On 24.3.2007, representative of Shri Gaikwad cross examined him and the enquiry was posted to 27.3.2007. At this stage, Management filed a Pursis before the enquiry officer with reference to application Exh.5 that was filed by Anil Gaikwad on 17.3.2007 that he had not received the salary for last three months and was unable to engage his Counsel. In this pursis, the Management stated that it was ready to settle salary due and TA/DA as well for the respective dates. Along with the Pursis, the Management filed letter addressed to him dated 19.3.2007, taking jibe at him by stating that he should get cleared his pending salary for three months on his own from the Joint Director which Management knew was impossible. It was then stated with sarcasm that if the Management attempts to make payment to him, he would make complaints to the authorities about financial irregularities as was done in the past and in that case his allegations against the Management about the same would be proved wrong. Then, it is further asked to him that, if the salary is paid by the Management till receipt thereof from the Joint Director, whether he would return the same along with interest to the Management. Lastly, it was stated that if he makes an application in writing for payment of salary for three months, he will have to give post dated cheques and, for Travelling Allowance (T.A.) and Dearness Allowance (D.A.), he would have to give written applications and proof of the travel and other expenses. The fact remains that the said salary and T.A., D.A. of three months was not paid by the Management at all in spite of above sermons given to him till 13th April 2007. Now, as reported before us, the salary grant was received by the Management on 7th April, 2007, for the salary of the months September, October and November, 2006 and was paid to Anil Gaikwad on 13.4.2007 while the evidence of the Management was completed by 27.4.2007. Thus, right from 23.1.2007 i.e. issuance of chargesheet till completion of evidence of the Management in the enquiry proceedings held at Nagpur, the delinquent Anil Gaikwad was paid no salary at all. Not only that, he was also not paid T.A.D.A. for the said period and it is submitted before us that the T.A.D.A. was not paid to him because he had not submitted the bills during that period about the actual expenditure incurred by him but he submitted the bills at the end of the enquiry on 7.1.2009 and was therefore paid TA/DA on 3.10.2009 in the sum of Rs.21,200/- i.e. long after the evidence of the Management in the enquiry was concluded. Thus, the Management clearly derided him. Thereafter, the stage came for the examination of delinquent and his witnesses. On 5.4.2007, the enquiry officer Mr. Akolkar resigned and on 8.4.2007 another enquiry officer Advocate Mr. S.S.Ghadge and Advocate Mr. S.S.Joshi, as presenting officer, both from Nagpur were appointed, who held the proceedings at Nagpur on 8.4.2007 and adjourned it to 9.4.2007 when the Management filed 87 documents and delinquent filed 91 documents. Thereafter, the proceedings were conducted on 11.4.2007 at 4.30 p.m. onwards and on 18.4.2007, 19.4.2007, 20.4.2007, 25.4.2007, 26.4.2007, 27.4.2007 on which date the evidence of the Management was closed. Thereafter, on 29.4.2007, Anil Gaikwad filed an application that he suffered from high blood pressure (159/110), cervical spondylitis as certified by the Civil Surgeon but at the request of the Management he was referred to the medical board. Then, on 11.6.2007, he filed his affidavit evidence along with the list of seven witnesses residing near Sadak-Arjuni. He was cross examined on 13.6.2007, 21.6.2007 and thereafter on 22.7.2007. Enquiry Officer Shri S.S.Ghadge was appointed as District Judge. On 17.1.2008, Advocate Shri P.C. Marpakwar was appointed as enquiry officer who posted the enquiry on 21.1.2008 in the evening at 7 p.m. and he conducted the proceedings till conclusion. There is absolutely no pleading or materials on record placed by the Management as to when and in what mode and manner salary for the period from December 2006 till the culmination of enquiry was paid. That ought to have been disclosed by the Management since the non-payment of salary for several months to the employees had been a regular feature which is clear from several documents on record.
11. The submission made by Shri Gordey that the enquiry was conducted mostly in the evening is not correct, at least till 21.1.2008, since till then enquiry was conducted in the afternoon though at Nagpur. However, after 21.1.2008, it clearly appears that the enquiry was conducted, on all dates, after 7 p.m. and that was obviously for the convenience of new Enquiry Officer Shri Marpakwar, Advocate, Mr.Joshi, Advocate, presenting officer and Shri N.R.Patil, Advocate, for the delinquent. On 25.4.2007, Anil Gaikwad had filed an application stating therein that he was always of the view that the enquiry should be conducted at the headquarters at Sadak-Arjuni and if it is held at Nagpur, it be held only once in a week preferably on Saturday, and since 2/3 weeks he was feeling weak and had pain in the chest and was advised by the Doctor to avoid travelling long distances and, therefore, the enquiry proceedings should be held at Sadak-Arjuni permanently. Thereafter, on 13.8.2008, he filed another application stating that as enquiry proceedings were fixed after 7 p.m., no buses were available for making journey of 120 kms. and many times, he reached home at about 1 a.m. to 3 a.m. in the night that too by boarding truck from the highway. He also suffered an accident and, in absence of proper conveyance, it was difficult to attend the enquiry which should not be held in the evening.
Another application dated 28.4.2007 refers to his previous application dated 25.4.2007 wherein similar grievance is made. There is one more application on page No.577 of the record filed by him stating that in spite of illness he was present in the enquiry and reserved his right to seek justice. On 26.4.2007 when one of his Advocate Shri A.R. Sambre withdrew, he informed the enquiry officer accordingly and sought adjournment but the enquiry officer made a hard hitting order dated 26.4.2007 which we have seen and we find that the said order shows wholly one sided approach. only to condemn him.
12. FURTHER FACTS AND EVIDENCE DIWAKAR KAMBLE:
Chargesheet was issued to him on 5.6.2004. Diwakar Kamble filed his reply to chargesheet on 26.4.2004 and in the covering letter he stated thus:
“Since the college is at Sadak-Arjuni and I am residing at Sadak-Arjuni itself, it is expected that the enquiry should be held at Sadak-Arjuni only. It is further requested to further disburse my unpaid salary immediately so that I can effectively participate in the enquiry.”
13. Shri B.R. Taori (retired judicial Officer) was appointed as enquiry officer who held first sitting on 17.11.2004 and conducted the enquiry till 1.4.2005 at Nagpur. On 24.10.2005 since he resigned, Advocate Shri H.D.Dangre was appointed as enquiry officer. It appears that, he was not paid salary for about 11 months as on that date i.e. on 26.4.2004. After the appointment of Advocate Mr. H.D. Dangre as enquiry officer, the first sitting took place on 11.12.2005 in his office at Nagpur and thereafter on 19.12.2005, 20.12.2005, 11.2.2006, 7.2.2006, 1.3.2006, 8.3.2006, 18.3.2006, 25.3.2006, 8.4.2006, 11.5.2006, 21.5.2006, 10.6.2006, 3.3.2007 and 10.3.2007 on which dates Management closed its evidence and, thereafter, from 10.4.2007, the delinquent and his witnesses were examined and cross-examined till 30.7.2007. when delinquent closed his side. Written note of argument was filed by the Management on 9.12.2007 and by the delinquent on 17.12.2007 and thereafter, it is stated that oral hearing had taken place on 18.12.2007 and alleged re-hearing on 26.9.2008 i.e. after nine months and, thereafter, enquiry report was submitted after about six months by Shri Dangre. To sum up, right from 17.11.2004 till the last date i.. 17.11.2007, all the sittings were held at Nagpur. There is no evidence of payment of T.A.D.A. to the delinquent or his witnesses from 17.11.2004 till 17.11.2007.
14. FURTHER FACTS AND EVIDENCE RAJKUMAR BHAGAT
Chargesheet was issued to him on 8.4.2002. One Mr. P.K. Halwe, Advocate, was appointed as enquiry officer who held his first sitting on 9.5.2002 at Sadak-Arjuni and continued to do so at Sadak-Arjuni till 27.7.2002. In his case an order dated 26.4.2006 was passed in his appeal by the College Tribunal for production of the entire record of the enquiry proceedings. Mr. Raghute has made a grievance before us that the entire record of the enquiry was not produced before the Tribunal in spite of the said order by the Tribunal to produce the record. Pursuant to that, Mr. Bhangde, learned Senior Advocate, has produced before us the remaining record in the case of Rajkumar Bhagat which are the order sheets etc.. We do not think that we would be making any mistake in law in considering the documents in the said file, since the file has come to us from proper custody and at any rate there was a Tribunal's order dated 26.4.2006 to produce it.
15. We have perused the said file produced by Mr. Bhangde. It is seen that on 27.7.2002 at Sadak-Arjuni, next date was fixed 4.8.2002 at Nagpur and the enquiry was conducted at Nagpur till it was over on 24.4.2004. During enquiry, on 10.10.2002, Advocate Mr. S.V.Akolkar was appointed as enquiry officer and thereafter Advocate Mr. A.M. Deshpande was appointed in his place. The proceedings at Nagpur took place on the following dates;
04.08.2002, 10.08.2002, 18.08.2002, 25.08.2002,
01.09.2002, 06.10.2002, 10.10.2002, 12.10.2002,
26.10.2022, 17.11.2002, 01.12.2002, 08.12.2002,
18.12.2002, 31.12.2002, 04.01.2003, 12.01.2003,
15.01.2003, 18.01.2003 and - 04.04.2004.
Total T.A./D.A. was paid to him as under:
27.09.2003 Rs.5000/-, 30.11.2003 Rs.1320/-,
10.01.2004 Rs. 2000/- 31.03.2004 Rs. 1596/-.
16. There is nothing to show why the venue was shifted to Nagpur from Sadak-Arjuni on 04.08.2002. But the order sheet dated 24.08.2003 shows consent for the place or address at Nagpur for holding enquiry subject to payment of T.A./D.A.. On 7.9.2003, he made a grievance that for last seven months i.e. from February 2003, his salary was not paid. There is no evidence to show that he was paid the salary of seven months. That means, without salary from February 2003, he attended sittings at Nagpur from February 2003 till September 2003. There is no evidence when and by what manner his salary after September 2003 was paid. This was all the more significant in view of the admitted position that salaries of employees were not being regularly paid due to disputes.
17. After having made survey of the facts and evidence as above, we now proceed to determine the questions raised before us.
PLEADINGS AND PROOF:
We have perused the various decisions about requirement of pleadings and proof even in respect of the disputes between workman and employer, employer and employee. We have no quarrel with the propositions. We have therefore gone through the pleadings in all these appeals and we are satisfied about the existence of material pleadings read with documents on the record of the Enquiry Committee and the Tribunal of which the appellants - Management had notice. Since the pleadings in respect of Diwakar and Anil are almost same, we quote the same from the memo of appeal.
“FACTS AND GROUNDS.
As regards the facts in the instant matter, the appellant craves leave to read and refer to the facts in the instant matter from the various documents, replies, submissions placed on record by the Appellant in response to the charge-sheet Dt. 05.06.2004 and all the proceedings initiated thereunder by the Management i.e. Respondent No.1 and the record of enquiry proceedings and so also the documents and replies given by the Appellant to the alleged second show-cause notice Dt. 12.05.2009 and other documents for the reason that the record of the enquiry has become very voluminous.
The appellant herewith also annexes the explanation Dt. 06.05.2009 addressed to the Respondent No. 1 i.e. the explanation with regard to the finding of the Enquiry Officer and the explanation and reply to the second show cause-notice dated 19.05.2009 as Annexures D and E respectively. The appellant state that the contents of abovesaid annexures are true and correct and the appellant craves leave to read and refer to the abovesaid annexures as contents of the instant Memorandum of Appeal apart from the brief facts stated thereinabove and hereunder mentioned. So also the grounds of instant appeal.
The enquiry proceedings were also held at Nagpur and not at the Headquarters i.e. at Sadak-Arjuni, Distt. Gondia. That is reason sufficient for holding the enquiry proceedings as illegal, arbitrary and without complying the principles of natural justice. The Appellant had time and again requested for holding the enquiry proceedings at the Headquarters and at a suitable time, date and place but the same was not considered by the Enquiry Officer.
The arguments in the enquiry proceedings ended on 30.7.2007 and though the written notes of arguments were filed in December, 2007 itself, the report of enquiry was not issued till April, 2009. Thereafter there were no hearing or rehearing on any date and it is falsely contended or observed in the report of the Enquiry Officer that enquiry was fixed for re-hearing and clarification on 29.9.08. Even if it is assumed, though not admitted, the enquiry proceedings were closed for issuance of enquiry report on 29.9.2008, yet the period between 29.9.2008 to 4.4.2009 is more than 6 months that itself require the matter to be re-fixed for hearing as it is required no report or judgment or orders are not to be passed after 6 months the matter is closed for such a stage without having had re-heard the parties after the expiry of 6 months. Thus the report of enquiry is vitiated.
The Appellant started working with the Respondent No. 3 College since the year 1993 and he came to be selected under proper procedure in 1996 and he has served for a continuous period as Lecturer in History in Respondent No.3-College. Thus the appellant is a confirmed, permanent and regularised lecturer in respondent No.3-College and governed by Statute 53 read with Direction 22 of 2002 issued by the Hon'ble Vice-Chancellor of R.T.M., Nagpur University under Sec. 14(8) of Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. Thus the respondent No. 1 and all the Respondents know and knew that the services of the Appellant cannot be terminated without permission and approval of R.T.M. Nagpur University, thus since the Respondent No. 1 or anybody acting thereunder has not sought any permission of the Respondent No. 4 University to terminate the services of the appellant and therefore, the order impugned in the instant appeal i.e. void-ab-initio.”
DOCUMENTS.
(i) Covering letter dated 16.4.2004 to reply to the charge-sheet by Diwakar Kamble.
I submit that the charge-sheet is voluminous and running into 320 pages along with the documents it is not possible for me to have a legal advise and file reply in detailed within 10 days.
Since the suspension order (which is now withdrawn and I have joined the duties) I had not been paid subsistence allowance and salary and now I am facing financial hardship. Due to financial crunch, it is not possible for me to arrange for legal fees and prepare a suitable reply within 10 days.
(ii) Reply to articles of charges - preliminary objection, end of para 3. I have been served upon the suspension order dated 28.7.2003. It is submitted that no prior permission was taken from the Nagpur University before suspending me and I had not been paid any subsistence allowance nor the salary, now the Management has withdrawn the suspension order and despite this had not paid me the salary of last 11 months.
(iii) Covering letter dated 24.6.2004 by Diwakar Kamble enclosing reply t o imputation of charges, para 2. Since the college is at Sadak-Arjuni and I am residing at Sadak-Arjuni itself, it is expected that the enquiry should be held at Sadak-Arjuni only. It is further requested to disburse my unpaid salary immediately so that I can effectually participate in the enquiry.
(iv) Written Notes of arguments by Diwakar Kamble, portion from paras 5 and 7. It is pertinent to mention here that the salary of almost 11 months is not paid. However, the instant charge sheet has been issued by the Management more particularly the president only to harass me for the reasons best known to him. It is submitted that the delinquent was put to unnecessarily hardship since the salary and travelling allowance has not been paid by the Management till today. It is further submitted that the enquiry has to be vitiated on this count only. The Management put the delinquent with unwarranted harassment at the hands of the Management for no fault.
(v) Explanation dated 6.5.2009 by Diwakar Kamble to the enquiry report, portion from para 4.
The said interim report also observed that the salary is directed to be paid of the lecturers which is pending of 9 months at that point of time. It is also established in the evidence that I and other lecturers were required to go to court for payment of our increment, unpaid salary and other allowances and the said petition was withdrawn because of the undertaking given by the Management before the Hon'ble Court that the salary and increment and other allowances which are in arrears of the lecturers including me will be paid expeditiously.
(vi) Explanation dated 19.5.2009 by Diwakar Kamble addressed to the President in response to President's letter dated 24.4.2009, translated paras. 1, 2 and 5.
1. Enquiry instituted against me by the Institution is most unjust. Hon'ble President issued me the suspension order on 28.07.2003. The said suspension order was issued to me for not signing transfer certificates of the college students as I was not the Principal and it was further mentioned that in this regard, the Institution will commence enquiry proceedings against me. However, no enquiry proceedings were conducted by the Institution for the period of 9 months subsequent to the suspension order. Similarly, I was not given the due allowances for the suspension period. During this entire period, I was mentally and financially exploited by the Institution by not conducting enquiry of any sort, by not issuing me chargesheet and giving me the pay for suspension period.
2. As I was not given subsistence allowance for suspension period as per rule, I had to make an appeal to the Complaint Redressal Committee of the Nagpur University on 15.10.2003. The Complaint Redressal Committee of the University gave decision on my appeal on 21st October 2004 that the Institution should give me the pay for suspension period within 7 days. I forwarded a copy of the said decision to the Hon'ble President and requested to give me the pay for suspension period. However, the Institution took no cognizance of the University's Complaint Redressal Committee. As a result, I preferred an appeal in the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Nagpur vide Writ Petition No.6158/2004 dated 16.08.2004. Subsequently, after the decision of the Hon'ble High Court, I was given pay for suspension period by the Institution. Thus, I had to suffer from the unjust financial loss because at first, I was deprived of pay for suspension period by the Institution and then, moreover, I had to do litigation in the Court of law. It proves that during suspension period, the Institution has exploited me financially and mentally.
5. Proceedings of the said enquiry are conducted against the principles of natural justice. After issuing me the suspension order, the Institution neither issued me the chargesheet for about 11 months nor gave me pay for period of suspension. After enquiry commenced, meetings of enquiry committee were held in the office of Enquiry Officer at Nagpur. Therefore, in order to appear before the Enquiry Officer I had to travel to and fro 120 kilometers every day. Similarly, I had to travel during odd hours. The said meetings used to continue till 8.00 p.m.. As a result, many a times I had to travel up to 12 to 1'O' clock at night even by truck also. I was not given in time the Travel Allowance and Daily Allowance payable during enquiry period. I was given the said Travel Allowance and Daily Allowance after one full year from the date of the last meeting of said enquiry and as such, I was subjected to mental and physical exploitation during the period of enquiry.
Application for grant of T.A. and D.A.
Dated 14.8.2007
To,
The President,
Vainganga Bahu Uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha,
Nagpur.
Subject : To grant daily allowance and travel allowance with regard to the meetings of Enquiry Committee.
Sir,
Enquiry held by the Management is in progress since 5.12.2004 till this day. To attend the said meetings, I am required to travel from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur. In every meeting, in spite of making verbal demands for D.A. and T.A. to the representative of the Institution repeatedly, I have not been given the same till date. As a result, I am facing financial crisis.
I, therefore, humbly request you to give me immediately the D.A. and T.A. as mentioned below.
Total no. of meetings - 37
Daily allowance - Rs.3680/-
Travel allowance - Rs.5728/-
Thus, I may be given total D.A. and T.A. of Rs.9408/-
Date 14.08.2007
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(D.M. Kamble)
Rajiv Gandhi College
Sadak Arjuni
Application for grant of D.A. and T.A.
Dated 06.10.2007
To,
The President,
Vainganga Bahu Uddehiya Vikas Sanstha,
Nagpur.
Subject: To grant daily allowance and travel allowance with regard to the meetings of Enquiry Committee.
Ref'nce: 1. My letter to the Hon'ble President, dated 14.08.2006
2. Letter of Respected Secretary bearing No.WBVS/2007/132, dated 20.09.2007
Sir,
In response to my above referred letter No.I, I received the above referred letter No.2 from the Respected Secretary on 24.09.2007. I am an employee of Rajiv Gandhi College, Sadak-Arjuni, District - Gondia. An enquiry is being held against me by the Institution since about 3 years. During this period, I have attended 37 meetings of the enquiry committee till this day. In my reply dated 24.06.2004 to the chargesheet given to me by the Institution, I had requested to hold enquiry if at all it was to be conducted, at the place of headquarters i.e. at Sadak-Arjuni. However, I did not receive any written letter whatsoever from the Institution. Similarly, in spite of making repeatedly the verbal demands for D.A. and T.A. to Advocate Shri Joshi, the representative of the Institution, I have not been given the said allowances.
It is true that I have repeatedly made demand for aforesaid allowances to the representative of the Institution. Therefore, I am denying the allegation made by Respected Secretary in this letter that I am deliberately defaming the Institution.
As suggested by the Respected Secretary in his letter, I am forwarding herewith the details of Daily Allowances and Travel Allowances in prescribed format. I request you to kindly grant me the D.A. and T.A. as per enclosed details.
Date :6.10.2007 Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
Shri D.M. Kamble
(Lecturer)
Rajiv Gandhi College,
Sadak Arjuni, District Gondia”
In the case of Rajkumar Bhagat, following are the relevant pleadings in his memo of appeal.
"VIII. That the enquiry is to be conducted at the place of service. But, as the enquiry officer, presenting officer and the defence representative were from Nagpur it was decided to hold an enquiry at Nagpur on the condition that on the day of the meeting of the enquiry the Management shall pay T.A.D.A. to the appellant but, the respondent Management did not pay it on each and every date of the meeting of the enquiry. Not only this but during the period of enquiry the respondent Management did not make effort for payment of the salary of the appellant on leaving the regular Principal of the College. The appellant was not paid the salary till October 2004. It is only before issuance of this impugned order the respondent Management made payment of salary to the appellant. On this reason also the order impugned is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside."
The Management filed its reply to the above pleading thus:
“17. As to ground No.(Viii) :- The appellant has participated in the enquiry without any objection. The appellant has not pointed out as to what prejudice is caused to the appellant by holding of the enquiry at Nagpur. The appellant has made the vague statement that the appellant was not paid the salary till October, 2004. The appellant has not pointed out as to from which date the salary was not paid to the appellant. The appellant has not pointed out as to what prejudice is caused to the appellant for the alleged default on the part of the management.”
18. It would be appropriate for us to refer to the following decision of the Supreme Court on the aspect of pleadings. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and ors. vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others, reported in (2004) 3 S.C.C. 137, the Supreme Court has held thus;
"15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.
19. Order 6 Rule 2(1) of the Code states the basic and cardinal rule of pleadings and declares that the pleading has to state material facts and not the evidence. It mandates that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved."
19. Equally, we have kept in mind the principles set out above and from the perusal of the above pleadings from the memo of appeal read with voluminous documents of enquiry proceedings, to our mind, clearly show that there are pleadings about not only the prejudice caused to the delinquents, but also the real danger and expression of mental set up, financial exploitation and a complete state of despair in which these delinquents were ensnared. What is significant to note is that these employees started making grievance about non-payment of salary, subsistence allowance, T.A.D.A, change of venue of enquiry right from the first stage and repeated the same before Enquiry Officers. Even in the pleadings and the documents, the same can be also found. The judgment in the case of U.P. State Textile Corpn. Ltd....Versus...P.C. Chaturvedi and others, reported in 2005 (8) Supreme Court Cases 211, vide para 14 is thus clearly distinguishable on facts, as in the facts of the case before the Apex Court, no grievance was made at any time during the pendency of the proceedings but was made after completion of the enquiry, apart from the fact vide para 6, the same was not paid for the fault of employee. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the pleadings in the memo of appeal are clearly enough, satisfactory and proper, so also prejudice caused to them is evident from the above pleadings and averments in the documents. It will be at this stage necessary to note the pleadings in answer by the appellants.
20. From the records and proceedings of the Tribunal, we find that reply to appeal preferred by Rajkumar Bhagat only was filed by the Management and not to other two appeals. Even the said reply in para 17 is not specific but evasive. In response to the various pleadings and as stated in documents by all these three employees about change of venue of enquiry proceeding from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur, request to bring back the enquiry at Sadak-Arjuni, grievance about non-payment of subsistence allowance T.A.D.A. and salary, and for legal-aid, holding of enquiry after 8:00 p.m., no specific pleadings in rebuttal were even raised. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Bhangde, the learned Senior Counsel on this aspect.
21. THE VENUE FOR HOLDING ENQUIRY:-
In criminal law, there is a general principle that all crimes are local. Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However, there is a power of the High Court under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to transfer cases and appeals from one subordinate Court to another, but that power cannot be exercised at mere askance, but only in the circumstances enumerated in clauses (a), (b), (c) which read thus:
“Section 407 (1). Power of High Court to transfer cases and appeals. - (1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court -
(a) that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto, or
(b) .....
(c) that an order under this section is required by any provision of this Code, or will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses, or is expedient for the ends of justice.”
In the case of Mrs. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and another...Versus...Miss Rani Jethmalani, reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 468 while rejecting the request for transfer of criminal case from Bombay to Delhi, the Apex Court in paragraph No.2 stated thus:
"2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a partly or easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. ..._
22. Holding a domestic enquiry for certain acts of misconduct, if not a criminal trial, is certainly akin to a trial for proving charges. There is no reason why the principles akin to the above should also not apply in the matter of change or transfer in relation to venue. In fact in order to assure a fair trial and to comply with the principles of natural justice, it would be appropriate to apply the said general rule that ordinarily the charges for misconduct must be tried at a place where events or incidents leading to the charges have taken place. We also hold that in the absence of rule or provision prescribing the venue or place for holding domestic enquiry, it must ordinarily be held as indicated by us above. The place or venue of the enquiry could be changed only in exceptional or such circumstances beyond the control of the Management or the enquiry officer or even the delinquents. But then the reasons for such a change should be known. There may be cases where the ordinary place for holding enquiry is unsuitable, inconvenient or becoming riotous when the change of venue could be justified and such circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. Admittedly, in these three cases, the events leading to charges for misconduct arose at the College at Sadak-Arjuni, all the witnesses and in fact who were examined by both the rival sides were from Sadak-Arjuni or the nearby villages. The record of enquiry proceedings in all these three cases do not show nor it has been demonstrated before us that either the Management or the delinquents had made any written or oral request for change of venue from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur i.e. at a distance of 120 kms.. The Enquiry Officers in all these three cases have also not recorded any reason as to why the venue of the enquiry was changed as such action entails civil consequences. It appears to us that the only reason for doing so was the convenience of the Enquiry Officers who are the Advocates residing at Nagpur, so also the Advocates for the parties. But mere convenience of these Advocates could not be a reason to change the place of venue in contravention of the above principles set out by us above. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant in this regard about implied consent by the employees as they also engaged Advocates from Nagpur does not impress us. When the enquiry was shifted to Nagpur per force, they had no other choice but to defend themselves by engaging Advocates from Nagpur. And that would not wipe out the basic illegality committed in shifting the venue to Nagpur which must be held to have vitiated the proceedings.
23. Even assuming that the Management or the Enquiry Officer wanted to shift the venue of enquiry from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur for any reasons, or even for good reasons, still, in our opinion, the Enquiry Officer was under an obligation, in the first place, to obtain consent of the delinquents in writing, and secondly, to hear them, as well as the Management, for deciding the terms and conditions for changing the venue of the enquiry at a long distance of 120 kms. such as, place for holding enquiry i.e. Nagpur, proposed schedule required for holding enquiry at Nagpur, transport to be provided for the delinquents and their witnesses at the costs of the Management from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur and back, or for the expenses thereof, the accommodation at Nagpur if the delinquents and their witnesses are required to stay at Nagpur since enquiry in this case went even beyond 8.00 p.m. and also for their food. Not only that, the Enquiry Officer was under further obligation to ensure that regular salary of the delinquent-employees, irrespective of the fact whether the grant-in-aid salary was received or not by the Management, was paid to them and that T.A., D.A. for them was paid in advance after quantification thereof by the Enquiry Officer so that the delinquents with the aid of money in advance, could undertake journey to and fro. The record of the Enquiry Officer or the pleadings of the Management nowhere show compliance of the above aspects. This was all the more essential because the Apex Court has held that the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer holding departmental enquiry are of quasi-judicial nature. The Enquiry Officer is thus a quasi-judicial authority and as such, a great responsibility is cast on him as a quasi-judicial authority to ensure that the principles of natural justice and fair play are followed to the hilt and the delinquent-employees are not put to any prejudice because of the change in venue at a long distance.
24. Duties and Functions of Enquiry Officer In Moni Shankar...Versus...Union of India and another, reported in 2008 (3) Supreme Court Cases 484 the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph no.17 held thus:
“17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidence, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.
(See State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn.)”
In Roop Singh Negi...Versus...Punjab National Bank and others, reported in 2009 (2) Supreme Court Cases 570 the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph no.14 held thus:
“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.”
25. It is, thus, clear from the above proposition of law that the function of the Enquiry Officers is that of a quasi-judicial authority. That being so, the responsibility of the Enquiry Officers in all these cases was expected to be high. In the first place, the Enquiry Officers in all these three cases as an ordinary rule ought to have fixed the venue of enquiry at Sadak-Arjuni right from the commencement of enquiry till its culmination. That was not done. However, in the absence of any oral or written request from any party or any compelling reason for the Enquiry Officers, the same was shifted to Nagpur from Sadak-Arjuni and was held at Nagpur till its culmination for which no reasons are forthcoming. In the wake of opposition to hold enquiry at Nagpur from the beginning, we reject the theory of 'implied consent by the employees'. In all these cases since in fact the enquiry was held at Nagpur, acting as a quasi-judicial authority, the Enquiry Officers were bound to first obtain the consent of both the sides in writing for such a change if the Enquiry Officers wanted to change the venue for their convenience or convenience of others. In fact, in our opinion, the Enquiry Officers in all these three cases ought to have held hearing for changing the venue and if the change was to be made, the terms and conditions for making change ought to have been set out by making an order. That was also not done. The Enquiry Officers were made aware by the delinquents by written applications that the regular salary of the delinquent employees even on the date of commencement of the enquiry proceeding against them was not paid to them for a period stretching even up to 11 months. The distance between Sadak-Arjuni and Nagpur being 120 kilometers, it was the duty of the Enquiry Officers to ensure payment of regular salary up-to-date to the delinquent employees so also the T.A. and D.A. to them and their witnesses irrespective of the fact whether the salary grant from the Government was received by the College and the Management or not. It appears from the record that the salary was not being paid to the employees or delinquents for a long period up to 11 months at a stretch because salary bills were not properly and correctly projected by the College and the Management and that is why for the fault of the College and Management the salary bills were not sanctioned by the Government. Whatever may be the reason, fact remains that these delinquents were not paid even their regular due salary. The Enquiry Officers were also aware that the delinquent employees were not put under suspension so that they could receive subsistence allowance during the pendency of the enquiry. The Enquiry Officers were also under an obligation to order making arrangement for transport for the delinquents and the witnesses who were required to travel the distance of 120 kilometers and that they were properly accommodated for sojourn at Nagpur since the enquiry in one case was held after 8:00 p.m.. To sum up the Enquiry Officers in all these cases ought to have passed orders in writing, directing the Management to comply the aforesaid requirements first before shifting the venue to Nagpur from Sadak-Arjuni. Not only that it was their duty to ensure implementation thereof on each month and on every date. Admittedly, in the instant case there is a total failure on the part of the Enquiry Officers in that regard and therefore, we are compelled to hold that the Enquiry Officers in all these three cases miserably failed to perform their duty as a quasi-judicial authority. The conduct of the Enquiry Officer should not be as if he is a veritable arm of the management.
FAIR HEARING:
In the case of General Medical Council...Versus...Spackman, reported in 1943 (Appeal
Cases) 627 (638) it has been held that the rule of fair hearing cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity for ‘convenience and justice’ as Lord Atkin felicitously put it, ‘are often not on speaking terms’.
26. We have categorically held that the action of change of venue of the enquiry proceedings from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur was without consent of the parties and contrary to the normal rule that the enquiry should be ordinarily held at the place where the cause of action arose. We have already held that the Enquiry Officers in all these cases failed in performing their duties and functions. Thus, the change of venue in the facts and circumstances of the present case has affected the fairness of enquiry substantially to the utter prejudice of the employees. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellants that there were no pleadings about prejudice caused to the employees due to change of venue and therefore, no prejudice can be inferred, is factually wrong. The reason is that the employees as well as witnesses for both sides are from Sadak-Arjuni and admittedly during the period of conduct of enquiry no T.A.D.A. was at all paid to the delinquent employees or their witnesses for the entire period of about three years during which the enquiry proceedings were held at Nagpur, but some T.A.D.A. amounts were paid almost at the end of the enquiry. The further submission that the employees did not apply for T.A.D.A. with proofs or the actual expenditure incurred on each date of enquiry or immediately after commencement of enquiry and they had applied after the enquiry also does not appeal to us. The reason is that we have already held that it was for the Enquiry Officers to ensure the payment of T.A.D.A. before hand and equally it was the responsibility of the Management to make payment of T.A.D.A. to the delinquents and the witnesses in advance for undertaking journey to Nagpur. This was all the more important because the delinquents had at the initial stage itself and during the course of enquiry requested for holding the enquiry at Sadak-Arjuni and not at Nagpur. In the wake of these admitted facts, it would be an empty formality to ask for specific pleadings about prejudice due to change of venue. In the case of Anil Gaikwad, at the outset, he had filed applications Exhs.3 and 5 before the Enquiry Officer, making grievance for non-payment of salary, financial difficulties faced by him, due to the same inability to engage the Counsel, long distance between Sadak-Arjuni and Nagpur and further request to hold enquiry at headquarters so also claim for payment of T.A.D.A.. He was paid salary after completion of evidence of Management at Nagpur. On 13.8.2008, he even made a grievance that since the enquiry proceedings were fixed after 7:00 p.m., in the absence of regular public transport, he reached home at about 1:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. in the night at Sadak-Arjuni by boarding a truck from the highway to reach his home and he fell ill and Doctor advised him not to undertake long journey.
27. Similar is the case with Diwakar Kamble who also was not admittedly paid any T.A.D.A. during the enquiry which was taken from 7.11.2004 till 7.11.2007 so also his unpaid salary. In the case of Rajkumar Bhagat, he attended the enquiry from February 2003 at Nagpur till September, 2003 without any salary. It is an admitted fact that none of the delinquents were under suspension so that they could receive the subsistence allowance. Thus, in the absence of payment of subsistence allowance, regular salary during the relevant period and T.A.D.A. for attending the enquiry at Nagpur, the delinquents actually suffered a double whammy and were disabled mentally, physically as well as financially to effectively defend the enquiry against them. The venue was changed for the convenience of the Enquiry Officers as held by us. In fact, it is painful for us to imagine as to how and in what mental and financial condition the delinquents must have faced the enquiry and brought their witnesses for tendering evidence at Nagpur. Thus, in our opinion, from the above factual aspects, it is clear to us that the rule of fair hearing was completely sacrificed. The stand of the Management that in fact the delinquent employees took part in the enquiry even at Nagpur regularly and also examined their witnesses and had also engaged Advocates for defending them and therefore, it shows that there was no prejudice caused to them is in our opinion unfair. The test of real prejudice or real danger test cannot be brought down to sacrifice even the minimum or bare behaviour towards human being and in the instant case the delinquents. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the enquiry was not fair and proper and there is a breach of substantive compliance in respect of the change of venue and non-payment of regular salary and T.A.D.A. to enable the delinquents to participate in the enquiry effectively and the test of prejudice cannot be whittled down as contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants.
28. The reliance placed on the judgments in relation to the prejudice and the real danger test in the light of the discussion made by us above is of no assistance to the appellants.
29. Prior Permission of the University:
Following are the necessary details:
| Sr. no. | Names | Date of appointment | Date of termination | Number of years |
| 01 | Anil Gaikwad | 21.9.1996 | 13.5.2009 | 13 years |
| 02 | Diwakar Kamble | 21.9.1996 | 1.6.2009 | 13 years |
| 03 | Rajkumar Bhagat | 25.9.1994 | 29.10.2004 | 10 years |
“4. A Teacher shall subject to the procedure of Selection and Appointment, be appointed in a clear vacancy in the first instance on probation for two years (24 months) from the date of his appointment, at the end of which he shall be confirmed, on the expiry of which he shall either be confirmed or his services dispensed with, provided that notice of such confirmation or termination on services shall be given at least one month before the due date, in the absence of which it shall be construed that he has completed the period of probation satisfactorily and that he is deemed to be confirmed in service.
Provided that if any teacher already in service has completed two years of service temporary/probation in a clear vacancy, he will be deemed to be a confirmed teacher:
Explanation : It is hereby clarified that a clear vacancy means a vacancy which is not in a lien vacancy or leave vacancy and that the vacancy/post is in vogue in the Institution for not less than four years.
5. Termination of the services of any teacher shall take place only in accordance with the provisions of the college code ordinance (No.24) and contract appended thereto.
Provided that, in case of a teacher, who is already confirmed prior to the commencement of this Statute or in case of a teacher covered by para 4 above, no notice of termination shall be issued or termination made effective, without the prior approval of the Executive Council of Nagpur University.”
Rules 8 and 9 of the Ordinance 24:
“8. After confirmation the services of the party of the first part can be termination only on the following grounds:-
(a) Willful and persistent neglect of duty,
(b) Misconduct,
(c) Breach of any of the terms of the contract,
(d) Physical or mental unfitness,
(e) Incompetence
(f) Abolition of the posts.
Provided firstly, that the plea of incompetence shall not be used against the party of the first part after he has served the part of the second part for five years or more.
Provided secondly, the services of the party of the first part shall not be terminated under clause (c) or (f) without the previous approval of Nagpur University.
9. Except when termination of service has taken place under sub-clause (a) or (b) of clause (8), neither the party of the first part nor the party of the second part shall terminate this agreement except by giving to the other party three calendar months notice in writing or by paying to the other party a sum equivalent to thrice the monthly salary, which the part of the first part is then earning.
Notice period of termination of service by or of the staff on temporary or probation appointment should be restricted to one month only.”
31. The College Tribunal has held that since the aforesaid three delinquent employees were not confirmed in service and that they had not possessed NET/SET qualifying examination mandatorily required as per U.G.C. norms, they were in fact not confirmed in service nor could it be said that they are deemed to be confirmed in service. The Tribunal further held that they having served for considerable number of years could be granted some protections since it held that if not permanent they could be called as 'quasi permanent' in service. However, the Tribunal did not extend the protection regarding prior permission of the University before termination of their services. As against this, the learned Single Judge found that the question that arose for consideration is not whether the employees were entitled to a declaration of being the 'confirmed employees' and that is why whether for want of NET/SET qualification they were to be considered as confirmed employees or not was not relevant. The learned Single Judge held that the question was whether they should be granted protection in service in the sense that before terminating their services, prior permission of the University could be required.
32. The submission made by Shri Bhangde, the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants that in fact there is no formal order of confirmation in service coupled with the approval subject to the Government Resolution dated 22.12.1995 showing no permanent approval, clearly indicated that these employees could not claim the legal status of confirmed teacher in order to claim protection. There is a further submission made by him that even the deemed confirmation spoken of in paragraph nos.4 and 5 of the Statute 53 cannot be read de hors the mandatory requirement of possessing NET/SET qualification and that is why even if there is a protection extended by Government Resolution dated 22.12.1995, the same may continue to apply till their retirement but when it comes to examine the legal status in the meaning of the said provisions, the learned Single Judge erred in extending the same to them. Shri Bhangde, the learned Senior Counsel cited the decision in the case of Pramod Kumar...Versus...U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and others, reported in 2008 (7) Supreme Court Cases 153 and contended that any appointment made in violation of the required qualification must be held to be a nullity.
33. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants so also the submissions which are made by learned Counsel for the respondents on this aspect and after going through the findings recorded by the tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The said provision in Statute 53 was brought into force on 15.10.1977/2.1.1978. The mandate of UGC providing for NET/SET qualification came into force w.e.f. 1991 for the first time. The learned Single Judge has then made a detailed discussion about the object of the Government Resolutions dated 22.12.1995, 22.5.1998 and 18.10.2001 and we do not think it necessary to repeat the said discussion here. We, however, would like to mention that the preamble of Government Resolution dated 18.10.2001 clearly shows that it was not possible to apply the NET/SET norms mandated by U.G.C. in an abrupt manner in the State and to expel the lecturers from the Colleges who do not possess NET/SET qualification. The reason is as stated in the preamble that there are around 6000 lecturers appointed between 19.9.1991 to 11.12.1999 in the Universities and Colleges in the State and they are without NET/SET qualification. To disqualify or remove these 6000 NET/SET lecturers at a time would create chaotic condition in the State and that is why it was decided to protect their services even till their retirement in the absence of NET/SET qualification. The learned Single Judge has thus held that such lecturers obviously including the aforesaid three delinquent employees appointed between 19.9.1991 to 11.12.1999 formed a separate class who would continue in service till the date of retirement. Looking to the object of extending protection from service that too as aptly stated by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Premlata Sudhakar Sathe...Versus...Governing Body of G.S. Tompe College, reported in 1981 Mh.L.J. 332 about which the learned Single Judge has made a detailed reference in his judgment, we concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that it would be a contradiction of sorts if the services of the said teacher are allowed to be terminated without prior permission of the University as required by Statute 53 (3) and it would lead to an anomalous situation wherein on the one hand the State Government deems it fit to protect the services of a teacher till his or her retirement despite lack of NET/SET, and on the other hand on interpretation of Statute 53, the Management is allowed to terminate his services without prior permission from the University, if it so chooses. The very object of extending protection after completion of 24 months service by bringing the provision in the year 1977-78, long before U.G.C. norms cannot be made nugatory and the rule of 'hire and fire' cannot be allowed to be promoted. It would be a travesty of justice as observed by the learned Single Judge, if these employees, who have rendered continuous service for 13 to 14 years should not be granted protection.
34. We further find from the reading of paragraph nos.4 and 5 of the State 53 and the full Bench judgment in the case of Premlata Sudhakar Sathe...Versus...Governing Body of G.S. Tompe College (supra) that confirmation being automatic in service, there is no requirement of issuance of formal order of confirmation for the purposes of extending them protection about prior permission. It is a well settled legal position as is found in the instant case that there is a specific provision providing for confirmation in service if a person has worked for a period of 24 months from the date of his appointment. It is not the case of the Management nor has been established anywhere on record that these three employees who worked for 13-14 years did not work on a clear sanctioned post and therefore, it is not necessary for us to meet the contrary findings recording by the College Tribunal as the learned Single Judge has taken care of the said aspect. We are thus of the clear view that the learned Single Judge has made a detailed discussion on this issue and arrived at a correct conclusion that prior permission of the University before terminating the services of these three employees was required and that having not been obtained the termination orders were illegal.
35. Bias:
In view of the findings recorded by us on the major issues on the violation of principles of natural justice, the domestic enquiry not being fair, the prior permission of the University not having been obtained, it is not necessary for us to decide the question regarding bias argued by the learned Counsel for both parties.
36. Exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge and the present Letters Patent Appeals and reliefs:
The University and the College Tribunal recorded the following findings in respect of Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble.
(A) Prior permission of the University before terminating the services of these employees was not required to be obtained.
(B) There was violation of principles of natural justice due to non-payment of TADA and the change of venue of the enquiry.
(C) Since Mrs. Karanjekar had issued a chargesheet and also entered a witness box and deposed against Anil Gaikwad, Diwakar Kamble and Rajkumar Bhagat, the enquiry was vitiated due to bias.
The learned Single Judge recorded the following findings.
(a) All these three employees were entitled to protection of Statute 53 (5) i.e. obtaining prior permission of the University before terminating the services of these employees - finding by the Tribunal contrary thereto is set aside.
(b) The finding about vitiation of enquiry on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice for want of payment of T.A.D.A. and change of venue recorded by the Tribunal is correct in respect of Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble only but the said finding in respect of Rajkumar Bhagat is wrong.
(c) The finding recorded by the College Tribunal about bias due to issuance of chargesheet and appearance of Mrs. Karanjekar as a witness is correct in respect of Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble but it is wrong in the case of Rajkumar Bhagat because she neither issued a chargesheet nor appeared against Rajkumar Bhagat in the enquiry.
37. Appellants had filed the following writ petitions.
(1) Writ Petition No.1301/2011 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha through its President and others...Versus...Anil s/o Dewaji Gaikwad and others).
(2) Writ Petition No.1314/2011 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha through its President and others...Versus...Diwakar s/o Maloji Kamble and others).
(3) Writ Petition No.1315/2011 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha through its President and others...Versus...Rajkumar s/o Kisanrao Bhagat and others).
Two employees Diwakar Kamble and Anil Gaikwad filed the following petitions.
(1) Writ Petition No.1978/2011 (Diwakar s/o Maloji Kamble...Versus...Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha through its President and others).
(2) Writ Petition No.1979/2011 (Anil s/o Dewaji Gaikwad...Versus...Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha through its President and others).
38. These five petitions were decided by the learned Single Judge by the common judgment and order dated 12.9.2011. The Management/appellants filed the following five appeals.
(1) Letters Patent Appeal No.560/2011 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha Through its President and others...Versus...Diwakar s/o Maloji Kamble and others) in which there is a prayer to set aside the judgment of the College Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.1978/2011.
(2) Letters Patent Appeal No.121/2012 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha Through its President and others...Versus...Anil s/o Dewaji Gaikwad and others) in which there is a prayer to set aside the judgment of the College Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.1979/2011.
(3) Letters Patent Appeal No.555/2012 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha Through its President and others...Versus...Rajkumar s/o Kisanrao Bhagat and others) in which there is a prayer to set aside the judgment of the College Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.1315/2011.
(4) Letters Patent Appeal No.558/2011 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha Through its President and others...Versus...Diwakar s/o Maloji Kamble and others) in which there is a prayer to set aside the judgment of the College Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.1314/2011.
(5) Letters Patent Appeal No.561/2011 (Wainganga Bahu-uddeshiya Vikas Sanstha Through its President and others...Versus...Anil s/o Dewaji Gaikwad and others) in which there is a prayer to set aside the judgment of the College Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.1301/2011.
39. The learned Counsel for the appellants in the light of the above facts argued that though the College Tribunal held against all the three employees that prior permission of the University was not required before terminating their services, Rajkumar Bhagat did not file any writ petition to challenge the said finding as was done by Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble. Similarly, the learned Single Judge held against Rajkumar Bhagat by reversing the finding in his favour about bias and violation of principles of natural justice for non-payment of T.A.D.A.. No letters patent appeal has been preferred by Rajkumar Bhagat against the said finding. He, thus, argued that in the absence of any writ petition, challenging the adverse finding, recorded by the College Tribunal against Rajkumar Bhagat, the learned Single Judge committed an error of jurisdiction in granting relief to Rajkumar Bhagat on the sole ground that prior permission of the University before terminating his service also was not obtained. He cited the following decisions for the proposition of law that the appellants could not be put in worse position by having preferred an appeal before this Court and therefore, the learned Single Judge could not have granted any relief to Rajkumar Bhagat in the absence of any challenge by him in the writ petition.
(1) 2004 (9) Supreme Court Cases 747 (ICICI Ltd....Versus...Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. and another).
(2) 2005 (12) Supreme Court Cases 219 (Pradeep Kumar...Versus...Union of India and others).
(3) 2007 (4) Supreme Court Cases 241 (Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi and another...Versus...State of Gujarat and others).
40. The learned Counsel for the respondents opposing the submissions made above argued that this Court is entitled in this intra-court appeal to correct the errors committed by the College Tribunal or the learned Single Judge even on facts and evidence and therefore, even if Rajkumar Bhagat had not filed any writ petition or appeal or the other respondents, this Court is not denuded of its power to do justice.
41. This Court in a series of decisions while considering the jurisdiction in the letters patent appeal followed the decision in the case of Smt. Asha Devi...Versus...Dukhi Sao and another, reported in AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2048. It would be suffice to quote paragraph no.15 from the judgment of this Court in the case of Tata Press Limited and another...Versus...Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. and another, reported in 1995 (1) Mh.L.J. 220.
“15. One word more before we conclude. This is after all a Second Appeal, even though under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and not under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Nariman has, therefore, argued mainly relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Asha Devi, AIR 1974 SC 2048, which in its turn has relied on an unreported decision of a five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, that we have the same power which the learned Single Judge had as the first appellate Court in respect of both questions of fact and question of law and that it is thus open to us to review all findings of fact also in this Second Appeal. The position appears to us to be somewhat analogous. If a First Appeal is heard by a Court subordinate to the High Court, the High Court in Second Appeal can intervene only when there is a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if we are to govern ourselves, as we must, by the decision of the Supreme Court in Asha Devi (supra) and the decision of the five-Judge Bench referred to therein, we will have to hold that the questions of fact are not a prohibited area for us as they are in a Second Appeal governed by section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A combined reading of section 100 and section 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing the grounds for Second Appeal and providing further that no Second Appeal can be entertained on any other ground, will make it clear that facts are almost a no-entry zone for the Second Appellate Court. If that is so when the High Court is considering the First Appellate Judgment rendered by a subordinate Court, then one would have thought that the same should also be a fortiori the position when the High Court is sitting in appeal over a judgment rendered by a Judge of that very High Court sitting singly. But since we are to govern ourselves by the law declared in Asha Devi (supra), we must agree with Mr. Nariman that we are entitled to go into all the findings of facts. ..._
42. Similarly, in the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah and others...Versus...Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and others, reported in 1996 (3) Supreme Court Cases 52 speaking about letters patent appellate jurisdiction, the Apex Court in paragraph no.2 stated thus:
“2. A letters patent appeal, as permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correcting, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural language. That apart the construction of the aforementioned two documents involved, in the very nature of their import, a mixed question of law and fact, well within the powers of the Letters Patent Bench to decide. The Bench was not powerless in that regard.”
43. We have found that the findings recorded by the College Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge on the question of violation of principles of natural justice due to shifting of the venue of enquiry and non-payment of T.A.D.A. is in conclusion, legal, correct and proper. We have also found in the case of Rajkumar Bhagat on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in respect of bias in the case of Rajkumar Bhagat that the enquiry in his case was not vitiated due to bias is correct. We have however found that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on the question of vitiation of enquiry due to non-payment of salary, T.A.D.A. is not based on the pleadings and evidence on record and he wrongly held that the enquiry was not vitiated on that ground. We have also found from perusal of the records and proceedings, pleadings and evidence that the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge did not take into consideration and then address on the entire pleadings, documents and evidence on record to find out whether the delinquents were paid salary, T.A.D.A. and whether they were prejudiced for non-payment of T.A.D.A. and change of venue from Sadak-Arjuni to Nagpur in all details. The question before us is whether in the absence of any challenge by way of writ petition before the learned Single Judge by Rajkumar Bhagat to the findings recorded by the College Tribunal and also in appeal before us, we could examine the validity of those findings either of the College Tribunal or of the learned Single Judge.
44. In the light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, there is no manner of doubt that in this intra-court appellate jurisdiction, we are entitled to go into the findings of facts and evidence, if the learned Single Judge or the College Tribunal have recorded those findings contrary to the materials, pleadings and evidence on record. We have found accordingly and that is why we have recorded our independent findings of facts and evidence. It is true that after amendment of 1977 to the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of the provision of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was made clear by the explanation thereto that the provision of Code of Civil Procedure will not apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But even thereafter some of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure were taken help of for applying the principles imbibed therein while exercising writ jurisdiction. In the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh...Versus...State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1153, the Hon'ble Supreme Court applied the rigours of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that a decision of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. In the case of Chittor Co-op. Town Bank Ltd....Versus...T. Krishnaiah Chetty and another, reported in AIR 1983 Andhra Pradesh 259, the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court applied the provisions about filing of cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 in the Letters Patent Appeal. In the case of Sarguja Transport Service...Versus...State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others, reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 88, the Hon'ble Apex Court applied the provisions of the Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as the Rule of public policy as contained therein was concerned, holding that withdrawal of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without permission to institute a fresh petition would bar fresh petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
45. In the case of Puran Singh and others...Versus...State of Punjab and others, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1092 considering the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court held that though the provisions of Order 22 of Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable to the writ proceeding, still for substituting legal representatives on record within reasonable time, the High Court can consider allowing the same and proceed to hear the writ petition or writ appeal.
46. In the case of Commissioner of Endowments and others...Versus...Vittal Rao and others, reported in 2005 (4) Supreme Court Cases 120, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the compromise recorded by the learned Single Judge referable to Section 141 and Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, holding that power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was neither controlled nor affected by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
47. In the case of Saraswati Education Society, Dist. Gondia and another...Versus...Santosh s/o Bhaulal Rahangdale and another, reported in 2007 (1) Mh.L.J. 439, this Court applied the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure with full force to hold that any letters patent appeal against the same order without obtaining leave in the earlier letters patent appeal was not maintainable.
48. In the case of Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal...Versus...Mamta Bisht and others, reported in 2010 (12) Supreme Court Cases 204, the Hon'ble Apex Court applied the principles enshrined under Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the writ proceeding regarding non-joinder of necessary parties as fatal.
49. In the light of the above scenario, in our opinion, we are inclined to hold that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 Sub Rule (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure should be invoked in these cases for exercise of the appellate power for finding out the correctness of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as well as by the College Tribunal though Rajkumar Bhagat did not prefer any writ petition or appeal in this Court. We quote Order 41 Rule 22 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure:
“22. Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal. - (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.
Explanation. - A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.”
50. Reading of the first part of Rule 22 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and as has been the settled legal position shows that even if the respondent has not filed appeal from any part of the decree, he may not only support the decree but also state that the findings against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour. We, therefore, find that though we may not be able to modify the decree or operative order passed by the College Tribunal in the absence of any writ petition or letters patent appeal by Rajkumar Bhagat, we would be able to interfere with the findings recorded by the College Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge, if the findings are found to be perverse, illegal and contrary to the pleadings and evidence on record. Therefore, the power of this Court to interfere with the findings of facts on evidence and pleadings even in the absence of writ petition or letters patent appeal to that extent cannot be said to be not available. In the decisions cited above by Shri Bhangde, the learned Senior Counsel, what is stated is that in the writ petition or appeal preferred by the present appellants, this Court would not be able to modify the judgment and order of the College Tribunal for granting relief to the respondents, who did not prefer writ petition or appeal and consequently, the appellants cannot be put in worse position having preferred the appeals. We make it clear that we are not interfering with the ultimate order made by the College Tribunal which was in favour of Rajkumar Bhagat by granting any additional relief than the one granted by the College Tribunal in his favour so also in favour of Anil Gaikwad and Diwakar Kamble. In our humble opinion, therefore, the aforesaid decisions would have no application in the instant case since we are not putting the appellants in worse position because the appellants have preferred the appeals before this Court. We also find that all three respondents having succeeded before the College Tribunal, they were directed to be reinstated and de novo enquiry was ordered to be held against them. We would not be modifying the operative or ultimate judgment and order in all the three appeals made by the Tribunal obviously in the absence of any cross-objection. The learned Single Judge did not thus err in setting aside the finding about the prior permission of the University and then confirming the relief granted to Rajkumar Bhagat and others. We are supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court for taking the above view of inducting the principle set out in Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Anil Kumar Gupta and others etc....Versus...Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others etc., reported in AIR 2000 Supreme Court 659, the decision of the Delhi High Court in a writ petition decided by the Single Judge and then letters patent appeal decided by the Division Bench were challenged before the Supreme Court. During the course of hearing before the Supreme Court the learned Counsel for the appellants vide paragraph no.15 of the judgment had raised the point that the respondents had not put to challenge the findings of the Division Bench in Special Leave Petitions within time and therefore, any attack on the said finding about 'irregular' or 'tainted' appointments could not be considered. The Supreme Court, therefore, framed point no.1 in paragraph no.16 to the said effect and answered it in paragraph no.17:
“15. In reply to the said contentions, learned senior counsel for the appellants contended that the respondents had not filed any Special
Leave Petition in time to attack the finding of the Division Bench that the respondents appointments were ‘irregular’ or were ‘tainted’. It was argued that respondents could not be allowed to contend that they had the necessary experience of two years. To get over this argument, the respondents have preferred an independent appeal, i.e. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C), (CC.3960/99), with an application to condone delay. It was of course also submitted for respondents that even without filing an appeal they could attack the adverse observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court.
16. On those contentions, the points that arise for consideration are as follows:
(1) Whether the respondents can justify the final order of the High Court
on other grounds upon principles referable to Order 41, Rule 22 of the C.P.C. without filing an appeal in time?
(2) ...
(3) ...
(4) ...
Point 1:
17. In view of the recent Judgment of this Court in Ravindra Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam, (1999) 7 SCC 435 : 1999 AIR SCW 3578: (AIR 1999 SC 3571), it is, in our opinion, open to the respondents to attack the adverse findings arrived at or observations made by the High Court, even if the respondents had not filed a separate appeal against that part of the judgment. Hence, the respondents can contend that the finding or observations that their appointments were tainted was not correct. ...”
51. It is, thus, clear to us that the Apex Court did apply principles underlined the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the said case.
52. Back wages:
Shri Bhangde, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants relying on the following two decisions in respect of the proposition argued that the College Tribunal could not have awarded any back wages when it ordered holding of de novo enquiry.
(1) 1996 (9) Supreme Court Cases 322 (State of Punjab and others...Versus...Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy).
(2) 2005 (8) Supreme Court Cases 211 (U.P. State Textile Corpn. Ltd....Versus...P.C. Chaturvedi and others).
53. Having considered the submissions made by Shri Bhangde, the learned Senior Counsel, we find that the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court related to the order of re-enquiry for non-supply of copies of enquiry reports and the matter was relegated to the employer from that last stage. The Apex Court however declined to grant any back wages and left the question to be decided after the re-enquiry. We must follow the said precedent and hold that the order of award of back wages to the extent of 50% is illegal and will have to be set aside.
54. De NOv o Enquiry:-
Both the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal have found that de novo enquiry was required to be held from the beginning. But in case of Rajkumar Bhagat the learned Single Judge has held from the later stage. We have however recorded a finding that the re-enquiry will have to be held from the beginning in all the three cases, i.e. including Rajkumar Bhagat.
55. Subsistence Allowance:
It is manifest from the various findings recorded by us above that the enquiry in all these three cases have been found to be vitiated from the beginning not due to any fault of any of these three employees, but for the fault of the management and the Enquiry Officers. After their termination a few years back, can they be asked now to face de novo enquiry without penny in their pocket that too for no fault of theirs? The answer has to be `No.' We would, therefore, follow the course of action undertaken by the Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Vikas Mandal and anr. v. Education Officer and anr. - (2007) 11 SCC 352, vide para 9 and 10 thereof, which read thus:
“9. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, Rule 37(6), which is mandatory in nature, has not been strictly complied with. The inquiry committee comprising of three members, as already noticed, only one member nominated by the Management has submitted his inquiry report within the time stipulated as per Rule 37(6) and admittedly, the other two members nominated by the employee and an independent member have not submitted their report within the time prescribed under Rule 37(6). However, the learned Judges of the Division Bench, though noticed that the two members out of three found the employee not guilty, failed to appreciate that the said findings by the two members of the Committee were submitted after the expiry of the period prescribed under Rule 37(6). In our opinion, the report submitted by individual members is also no in accordance with the Rules. When the Committee of three members is appointed to inquire into a particular matter, all the three members should submit their combined report whether consenting or otherwise. Since the report is not in accordance with the mandatory provisions, the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court have committed a serious error in accepting the said report and acting on it and thereby ordering the reinstatement with back wages. Since, the reinstatement and back wages now ordered are quite contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 37(6), we have no hesitation in setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal, and learned Single Judge and also of the Division Bench of the High Court. In addition, we also set aside the order passed by the Management based on the report submitted by the Single member of the Committee, which is also quite contrary to the Rules.
10. In view of the order now passed by this Court, Rule 36(2)(a) is now to be invoked and as per the said Rule, one member from amongst the members of the Management is to be nominated by the Management or by the President of the Management if so authorised by the Management, and one member is to be nominated from amongst the employees of any private school and the third member to be chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the panel of teachers on whom State/National Award has been conferred. We direct the Management of the School to constitute the committee in accordance with sub-rules (i), (ii) and (iii) of Rule 36(2)(a) to go into the matter afresh. Respondent 2, the employee, will now be treated under suspension and he will be entitled to the subsistence allowance as per Rules with effect from the date of termination of his services. The inquiry shall be completed by the committee within a period of six months from the date of its nomination/constitution.”
56. Declaratory Reliefs:
Upon perusal of the operative part of the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, we find that the learned Single Judge issued certain declarations or order in the nature of declarations, which in our opinion, should not have been made in view of the fact that the appeals were directed against the termination of services only and not for seeking any declaration. In the result, we make the following order.
ORDER
Letters Patent Appeal Nos.560/2011, 121/2012, 555/2011, 558/2011 and 561/2011 are disposed of with the following order.
(i) The orders made by the University and College Tribunal, Nagpur, setting aside the termination orders of the original appellants before the Tribunal in Appeal Nos. N-18/2004 _ Rajkumar s/o Kisanrao Bhagat, N-18/2009 _ Anil s/o Dewaji Gaikwad and N-19/2009 - Diwakar s/o Maloji Kamble and granting liberty to the management to hold de novo enquiry against them are confirmed. As a sequel, operative order (D) of the learned Single Judge ordering further enquiry only from the last stage, i.e. from the stage at which decision was taken to terminate Shri Rajkumar Kisanrao Bhagat is set aside.
(ii) The order made by the learned Single Judge granting declarations in operative part (B) and (E) are set aside.
(iii) The orders made by the Tribunal and confirmed by the learned Single Judge awarding 50% back wages are set aside.
(iv) The management is permitted to hold de novo enquiry against all the three original appellants, namely Rajkumar s/o Kisanrao Bhagat, Anil s/o Dewaji Gaikwad and Diwakar s/o Maloji Kamble from the beginning subject to -
(a) treating them under suspension from the respective dates of their termination orders and making them payment of subsistence allowance as per rules with effect from the respective dates of their termination orders with arrears thereof within a period of two months from today in two equal monthly instalments.
(b) the Enquiry Officer, upon being appointed, on the very first sitting shall ensure clearance of arrears of subsistence allowance to them after hearing both the sides and shall then alone proceed to begin the de novo enquiry.
(c) the regular subsistence allowance shall be paid on due dates in accordance with rules.
(d) The enquiry shall be completed within a period of twelve months from today.
(v) No order as to costs.