This is plaintiff's second appeal.
2. Plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 17/1997/B for demarcation of southern boundary line of the suit property, by appointing Head Surveyor of the Survey Department, to do the same. The plaintiff had also sought permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from constructing compound wall on the southern boundary of the suit property or encroaching upon the suit property. The original defendant died during pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were brought on record.
3. Plaintiff's case, in short, was as follows:-
He is the owner in possession of the suit property known as “Borimollacodil Moddi” situated at Borimol in Quepem Taluka, being bounded on the east and north by Municipal road; on the west by the property of Carlos Mascarenhas, under survey no. 57/1 and on the south by the property bearing survey no. 56/1, which belongs to the defendants. The suit property bears survey no. 57/2. It was allotted to the plaintiff by way Deed of Gift and Acceptance dated 01/04/1965. The southern boundary of the suit property is safeguarded by a loose rubble stone addo and there are ten well-grown trees planted by his ancestors existing on the said boundary, which are enjoyed by the plaintiff. On 21/04/1994, the defendants cut one Jambul tree belonging to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed a case before Deputy Collector at Quepem for demarcation of the southern boundary and the same was demarcated twice, but the said demarcation was not acceptable to the defendant who had signed the plan under protest due to which the dispute is pending. On 14/04/1997, defendant tied a string across the southern boundary and inside the suit property. Hence the suit.
4. The original defendant, in his written statement, alleged as follows:-
The plaintiff has no locus standi. There is no cause of action. The suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It is denied, for want of knowledge, that plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit property. However, it is patently false that the suit property is safeguarded on its southern boundary by loose rubble stone addo. The loose rubble stones exist on the north-eastern boundary of the property of defendants which bears survey no. 56/1 and which is registered in the Land Registration office under nos. 16105 and 5703 of Book B-18 and which is protected by rubble stone addo on the east, west and partly on the north-western and on the southern side. This rubble stone addo was constructed by the defendants many years ago. In the year 1995, defendant had filed an application under the Land Revenue Code, 1968 before the Deputy Collector, Quepem, for resurvey and demarcation of only northeastern boundary portion of his property bearing survey no 56/1, which application was registered as Case No. LRC/Boun/4/95/599. The plaintiff also filed a counter application before the Deputy collector, Quepem, under Section 114 of the Land Revenue Code for demarcation of southern boundary of survey no. 57/2, which application was treated as Case No. LRC/Bound/3/95/600. By common Order dated 6/7/1995, both the applications were allowed. The field surveyor demarcated the entire northern boundary in respect of survey no. 56/1 and about 35 square metres of land belonging to the defendants was reclaimed from survey no. 57/2. The area of property of the defendant is 8056 square metres and whatever trees existing therein are in possession of the defendant.
5. The learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Quepem (trial Court) found that the plaintiff has proved that he is owner in possession of suit property, since by Deed of Gift, the suit property was gifted to him by his parents to the extent of their disposable share. Trial Court held that the surveyor Simon Pereira has correctly demarcated the boundary between survey nos. 56/1 and 57/2 and there is no boundary dispute. She further held that the plaintiff could not prove that defendant had interfered with the southern boundary of suit property. The trial Court therefore dismissed the suit. In the Regular Civil Appeal No. 110 of 2001, the learned Additional District Judge(III) hereinafter referred to as the First Appellate Court held that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and further that the plaintiff failed to prove the location of the southern boundary line of survey no. 57/2 and that the defendant had interfered with the same. The appeal therefore came to be dismissed.
6. The plaintiff challenges the judgments and decrees of the lower Courts in the present Second Appeal which has been admitted on the following sole substantial question of law:
“Whether the Courts below erred in rejecting the prayer for demarcation of the property which is maintainable under Articles 2340 to 2343 of the Civil Code on the ground that the suit was filed without joining other co-owners?”
7. Mr. M. B. D'Costa, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, pointed out that the plaintiff had produced title document along with translation at Exhibit PW1/L–colly., which duly proves the title of Pedro Constancio Furtado, father of the plaintiff, to the suit property. He then invited my attention to the Deed of Gift and Acceptance which along with its translation is at Exhibit PW1/A-colly. By this deed of Gift, Pedro Constancio Furtado and his wife Maria Remediana Mendes have gifted the suit property, on account of their disposable share with dispensation of 'colacao', to the plaintiff. He therefore argued that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. He contended that a third party cannot challenge the said Gift Deed and it is only other co-owners who can challenge the same. He contended that a suit for demarcation can be filed by any of the co-owners. He relied upon the commentary of Dr. Cunha Gonsalves, in this regard. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, the suit could not have been rejected on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. He further contended that even otherwise there were no specific pleadings in written statement as to who were the necessary parties and as to how they are necessary. In support of this contention, learned Senior counsel relied upon “Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhat Vs. Yashram Vasta (dead) by Lrs.”,[(1993) 3 SCC 49].
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff then took me back to the title document at Exhibit PW1/Lcolly, wherein the dimensions of the boundaries have been clearly mentioned and according to which, the southern boundary from east to west admeasures 52 metres. He submitted that since the defendant, in paragraph 3 of the written statement, has admitted the contents of paragraph 2 of the plaint, there is no dispute that the suit property bears survey no. 57/2. He therefore submitted that the lower courts ought to have decreed the suit and appointed the Head Surveyor to demarcate southern boundary of the suit property. He prayed that the appeal be allowed and the impugned judgments and decrees be set aside and the suit of the plaintiff be decreed.
9. On the other hand, Mr. J. E. Coelho Pereira, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants, argued that the suit filed by the plaintiff was essentially a suit for permanent injunction and the prayer for demarcation is simply consequential. He pointed out that the extent of alleged encroachment is not stated in the plaint. He contended that the substantial question of law as is framed does not at all arise. According to learned Senior Counsel, there are concurrent findings of facts given by lower courts to the effect that the location of the southern boundary is not proved by the plaintiff and further that interference with the same by defendants is also not proved. Relying upon the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “KoppisettyVenkat Ratnam v/s. Pamarti Venkayamma” [(2009) 4 SCC 244], he argued that interference by High Court with concurrent findings on facts, without formulation of substantial questions of law, is not permissible. He therefore argued that the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
10. I have gone through the entire material on record.
11. Translations of Articles 2340 to 2344 of the Portuguese Civil Code are provided by learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the plaintiff and correctness of the same is not disputed by learned Senior Counsel for the defendants. They are as under:
“Article 2340:- The owner, and so also any usufructuary or person possessing on his own behalf, has the right to demand from the adjoining owners, their concurrence to the demarcation of the respective boundaries between his property and theirs.
Article 2341:- The demarcation shall be made in accordance with the documents of title of each of them and in default of sufficient title documents for the purpose, on the basis of possession of the adjoining owners.
Article 2342:- If the title documents do not determine the boundaries or the area belonging to each of the owners and the issue cannot be decided on the basis of possession or by any other mode of proof before the court hearing the matter, the demarcation shall be done by distributing the land, subject matter of the dispute, in equal shares.
Article 2343:- If the title documents of the adjoining owners put together indicate an area bigger or smaller than the one which the totality of the land encompasses, the excess or deficiency shall be allotted proportionately to the share of each of them.
Article 2344:- If the boundary marks have been placed by a common uncontested title and there is a mistake while placing them, the mistake shall be rectified, and prescription cannot be raised.”
12. The cross-examination of plaintiff (PW1) reveals that he has four brothers and two sisters. The Gift Deed which is at Exhibit PW1/A reveals that Shri Pedro Constancio Furtado and Maria Remediana Mendes who are parents of the plaintiffs have gifted, to the plaintiff, on account of their disposable share with dispensation of “Colacao”, the property known as Borimolavorli Mordi, situated at Sirvoi of Tilamola bearing land registration no. 13033 of Book–27 of Quepem Comarca and Matriz no. 1076. Therefore, indisputably, disposable share of the parents of the plaintiff, which is half of the property, has been gifted to the plaintiff. There is nothing on record to show that the suit property has been partitioned by metes and bounds. It appears that at the time of evidence of PW1, Inventory Proceedings were pending for determination of shares of the co-owners. Therefore, co-ownership of the plaintiff to the suit property cannot be disputed. The first Appellate Court has, accordingly, held that plaintiff is not the exclusive owner of the suit property but is only a co-owner along with other brothers and sisters. The first Appellate Court has held that the suit is for declaring the location of the southern boundary and therefore it was necessary for all the co-owners to be joined as parties and since the plaintiff has not joined all the co-owners, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties.
13. Mr. D'Costa, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff has relied upon translation of the commentary of Cunha Gonsalves in “Treatise on Civil Law” (Vol. 12 Page 120), which is as under:
“If this Article in this part still in force, for the same reason or all the more so, the usufructuary or residing usufructuary, the emphyteuta and sub-emphyteuta, owner of the naked property and any of the co-owners may pray for demarcation. This is understandable because demarcation in strict sense, where there is no doubt about the dividing line, is an act to prevent future encroachments or an act of conservation of the real rights which the applicant exercises. It is, indeed, an act of administration and not claim to property.”
14. Demarcation is an act of marking a dividing line or boundary or limits. This may be an act of administration and not a claim to property. The above commentary of Dr. Cunha Gonsalves, a well known Goan Jurist and author of the 15 volume Treatise of Civil Law, which is supposed to be the best commentary on the 1867 Civil Code would hold good only when there is absolutely no dispute or doubt in respect of the dividing line. However, in the present case there was a dispute about the location of the southern boundary of the plaintiff's property and northern boundary of the property of the defendants. The plaintiff claimed that the area where Jambul tree which was cut by defendant existed, forms part of his property whereas the defendant claimed that the said tree was in his property. Before becoming eligible to the relief of demarcation, the plaintiff had to prove the location of dividing line or the boundary or the limit, of his property on the southern side. In the present case, it is not only the wife of the plaintiff who is not a party to the suit, but the other co-owners namely four brothers and two sisters, are also not parties to the suit. The direction for demarcation, if given, will not be binding on other co-owners of the suit property and hence they may raise objection. Further thing to be noted is that in spite of the fact that the suit property is listed under item no. 31 in the Inventory Proceedings, the plaintiff (PW1), in his cross-examination at page 14 of his deposition, has denied that this property also belongs to his brothers and sisters as co-owners. In the circumstances above, I do not find anything wrong with the finding of the first Appellate Court that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. In the case of “Laximishankar Bhat”(supra), it has been held that the allegations regarding non-joinder of necessary parties should be clear and not vague and that in the absence of any clear finding based on relevant material about existence of other co-owners and their being necessary parties, appellant cannot be non-suited on vague averments of the respondents. In the present case, the defendant has averred in the written statement that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. PW1 has been cross-examined on this aspect. PW1 has admitted that he has four brothers and two sisters, who have not been made parties to the suit. He has admitted that there is no partition by metes and bounds in respect of total estate left behind by his parents and that Inventory proceedings are pending, wherein his brother Glorio Furtado is “Cabesa de casal”. He has admitted that the suit property is listed under Item no. 31. There is finding by the first Appellate Court that by virtue of the Deed of Gift, the plaintiff has become the owner of the half share in the suit property and that he is co-owner along with his other brothers and sisters, who have not been made parties to the suit. He has held that as the suit is for declaring the location of the southern boundary line of the suit property, it was necessary for all the co-owners of the suit property to be joined as parties. Therefore there is clear evidence and specific finding that there are other co-owners and how they are necessary parties. The ruling in “Laxmishankar Bhat”(Supra), therefore does not help the plaintiff. The question of non-joinder, in the present case, goes to the root of the matter. Hence, the only substantial question of law, formulated in this Appeal, in my considered opinion, gets answered against the plaintiff.
15. Even if it is assumed for the time being that the suit is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, then also the plaintiff is not likely to succeed in the suit for demarcation of suit property. In that case, the substantial question of law as is framed, in my view, would not arise.
16. A perusal of the impugned judgment in Regular civil Suit no. 17/1997/B reveals that the trial Court held that boundary between survey no. 56/1 and 57/2 is correctly demarcated by surveyor Simon Pereira and no boundary dispute arises. Trial court further held that the plaintiff has not led any evidence to show that addo and jambul tree with which defendant is alleged to have been interfering with, falls within southern boundary of survey no. 57/2, belonging to plaintiff. As per the plan drawn by Simon Pereira, the length of the southern boundary of plaintiff's property, from East to West, is 51.60 metres, which is not agreeable to the plaintiff, according to whom the same is 52 metres. Thus, what the trial Court wants to say is that the plaintiff could not prove the location of the southern boundary, as claimed by him and also could not prove that the loose stone addo and the Jambul tree cut by the defendant falls within the southern boundary of the property claimed by the plaintiff.
17. A perusal of paragraph 16 of the impugned judgment in Regular Civil Appeal No. 110/2001 reveals that the first Appellate Court has concurred with the above findings of the trial Court by observing that he does not find any fault with the finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove as to what was the location of the southern boundary line of the suit property and that the defendants have been interfering with the suit property.
18. The above concurrent findings of the lower Courts are of facts, borne out from evidence on record and these findings, which cannot be termed as perverse and/or contrary to law, go to the root of the case. In the case of “KoppisettyVenkat Ratnam”(supra), the Apex Court has reiterated the legislative background stated in the Fifty-fourth Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, which led to the 1976 amendment in the Code of Civil procedure. The rationale behind permitting second appeal on question of law, as has been stated in the said Report, has been incorporated by the Apex Court in paragraph 4, as under:
“68. The rationale behind allowing a second appeal on a question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal having a jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and, where necessary, re-establish, uniformity throughout the State on important legal issues, so that within the area of the State, the law, in so far as it is not enacted law, should be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction. This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts have authority to make binding decisions on question of law.
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70. Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as 'substantial question of law' which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become 'third trial on facts' or 'one more dice in the gamble'. The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was:
(i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved;
(ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question;
(iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal;
(iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question.”
19. In paragraphs 5 to 16 of the Judgment, in the case of “KoppisettyVenkat Ratnam”(supra), the Apex Court has stated about various leading cases on the subject, decided after the 1976 amendment. Ultimately, it has been held that in a Second Appeal it is not permissible for the High Court to interfere with concurrent findings of facts without formulation of substantial questions of law.
20. I do not find any perversity or violation of any settled principles of law in Judgments of the lower Courts, for this court to formulate any additional substantial questions of law.
21. In view of the above, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs.