Oral Judgment:
1. By the present appeal, the appellant has questioned the legality and correctness of his conviction for the offence punishable under section 304 Part I of the I.P. Code for which he is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten (10) years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/-, with the default stipulation to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month, in Sessions Case No. 101/2010, by judgment and order dated 22nd August, 2011 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Latur.
2. Such of the facts as are necessary for the just decision of this appeal can be summarized as follows:
(a) One Laxmi Balaji Kakde was admitted in the Civil Hospital, Latur on 5th August, 2010. On her admission, she was medically examined, but she was found dead. Around 10 p.m. or so on that day, Dr. Siddiqui, attached to Civil Hospital, Latur passed on the information in writing to the police chowki attached to the Civil Hospital, Latur. ASI Narayan Bhujang Ranzunjare (PW9), who was attached to Gandhi Chowk Police Station, Latur, on receipt of said letter, registered accidental death (A.D.) No. 23/2010 in Gandhi Chowk Police Station of Latur. Immediately after registration of A.D., he rushed to the Civil Hospital where in presence of one Sanjay Vithal Survase (PW4) and other witness, he prepared inquest over the dead-body of Laxmi and drew inquest panchanama (Exh19). Thereafter, a requisition was sent to Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Latur to conduct the autopsy on the deadbody of said Laxmi.
(b) Dr. Swapnil Prabhakar Akhade (PW7) attached to Civil Hospital, Latur as Medical Officer, on 6th August, 2010, conducted the autopsy on the dead-body of Laxmi Balaji Kakde. On his examination of the dead-body, he noticed following external injuries:
(i) Lacerated contused wound on right occipital region of size 5.5 cm x 2.5 cm bone deep. The above injury was found at 11 cm above nape of neck and 12 cm medial to the right ear.
(ii) Contused lacerated wound on medial to left parietal protuberance on parieto occipital region of size 7.5 cm x 2.5 cm, nearly triangular in shape, oblique and it was located 12 cm from left ear and 17 cm from the right ear.
(iii) Abrasion, 2 cm x 1 cm on medial side of left forearm.
(iv) Abrasion, 0.3 cm in diameter on medial side of base of first toe of left foot.
According to him, these four injuries are ante-mortem injuries. On internal examination of the dead body, he noticed the following injuries:
(i) Contusion under the scalp : subgalial and sub-periosteal contusion under the scalp at high temporoparietal region on left side and sub-galial and subperiosteal contusion on the right occipital region.
(ii) Fracture of skull :
(a) Fissured fracture, 11 cm on left side, from 11 cm above the left frontal protuberance to posteriorly medial to left protuberance and ending at left occipital bone.
(b) A communicated fracture on left high temporo parietal region ; corresponding to external injury No. 2. The fracture shows infiltration of blood.
(c) Depressed fracture on right occipital region corresponding to the external injury No. 1. The fracture shows infiltration of blood.
(iii) Subdural hemorrhage was found on left temporo parietal region and also on right occipital region and on left side of cerebellum. Sub arachnoid hemorrhage was found.
PW7 Dr. Swapnil Akhade opined that death of the deceased was caused due to head injury. Accordingly, he prepared the postmortem report (Exh25). He further opined that the head injury sustained by the deceased is sufficient to cause death of a humanbeing in ordinary course. He also opined that the head injury can be sustained due to iron pipe (article B), referred and shown to him. The Medical Officer also collected sample of blood from the dead-body while conducting autopsy and the same was sent to the Chemical Analyzer for blood-grouping. The Medical Officer also handed over the clothes of the deceased to Police Constable attached to Gategaon Police Station who had accompanied the dead-body in the Civil Hospital.
(c) The clothes on the person of the deceased were seized under seizure panchanama (Exh23) in presence of Ramesh Babruvan Upade (PW6). Thereafter, the postmortem report, the inquest panchanama and the seizure panchanama were handed over to API Shri Sunil Ramrao Nagargoje (PW10), who at the material time, was attached to Gategaon Police Station and the enquiry in the said A.D. was entrusted to him. During the enquiry, he visited the place of incident i.e. the house of deceased on the next day at 8 a.m. and in presence of witness Shrimant Savata Mali (PW5) and others. He drew spot panchanama (Exh21), as the place of incident shown by the appellant Shivaji, who is brother-in-law of the deceased. During the enquiry, when he was recording the statements of witnesses, he had an occasion to record the statement of Balaji Kashinath Kakde (PW1), the husband of deceased, wherein Balaji made a statement that the appellant confessed before him that he had committed murder of Laxmi. This statement of Balaji (PW1) (Exh14) was treated as F.I.R. On the basis of this statement, a crime was registered against the appellant at CR No. 49/2010 for an offence punishable under section 302 of the I.P. Code. During the further investigation, the appellant was put under custody in the evening of 7th August, 2010. During the investigation, following to the registration of the offence, statement of witness Pandurang Digambar Dingne (PW2), Bhagirathibai Digamber Dingne, Digamber Dingne and Indrajeet Navale (PW3) and others were recorded. While in custody, on 10th August, 2010, the appellant made a disclosure statement under section 27 of the Evidence Act which was recorded in the memorandum (Exh28) in presence of witness Dilip Mane (PW8) and others resulting in recovery of one iron pipe (Article-B) and clothes of the appellant stained with blood found kept in his Maruti Van, which was found parked in the compound of the Government hospital at Chincholi. Those clothes were seized under recovery panchanama (Exh29). During further investigation, seized property at the instance of appellant and the clothes of the deceased were sent to office of the Chemical Analyzer at Aurangabad alongwith a letter of requisition (Exh34). During the investigation, statements of some more witnesses were recorded. On completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed against the appellant before the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Latur.
(d) On committal of trial to the Court of Sessions, learned trial judge framed the charge for an offence punishable under section 302 of the I.P. Code against the appellant at Exh6. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. During the trial, to substantiate the charge levelled against the accused, the prosecution examined in all ten (10) witnesses including Balaji Kashinath Kakde (PW1) husband of the deceased, Pandurang Dingne (PW2), who is son of sister of the complainant and appellant, who has witnessed the presence of the appellant in the evening on the day of incident and witnessed that quarrel was going on between the deceased and the appellant soon before the incident. To that extent, he has supported the case of prosecution, but turned hostile so far as actual incident witnessed by him, Indrajit Navale (PW3) neighbour who had also heard some noise from the house of the accused in the evening of the day of incident, Sanjay Vithalrao Survase, a panch witness to the inquest panchanama (Exh19), Shrimant Savata Mali (PW5) a panch witness to the panchanama of scene of offence (Exh21), Ramesh Babruvan Upade, a panch witness to the seizure panchanama of the clothes of the deceased (Exh23) as PW6, Dr. Swapnil Akhade (PW7), who conducted the postmortem on the deadbody of Laxmi and issued postmortem report (Exh25), Dilip Mane (PW8), panch witness to the memorandum of statement of appellant (Exh28) resulted in the recovery of iron bar and clothes of appellant from his Maruti Van, Narayan Ranzunjare (PW9), ASI attached to Gandhi Chowk Police Station, Latur, who recorded the A.D. on 5th August, 2010 and carried part-investigation during the enquiry in the said A.D., and PW10 Sunil Nagargoje, the Investigating Officer who completed the investigation and submitted the chargesheet against the appellant.
(e) Before the trial court, defence of the appellant was that on the day of incident, there were rains and the deceased went on the roof of the house to collect the wearing apparels kept for drying out. When he heard sound like falling something in the verandah and when he came out, he noticed that the deceased was found lying on the ground near the tulshivrandavan. Hence, he lifted her and took her to the hospital. According to him, he is innocent. He is no way responsible for the unnatural death of the deceased and the death of the deceased is an accidental death. He is falsely implicated in the present case to grab the property which has come to his share.
(f)The learned trial court discarded the defence taken by the appellant/accused, but was of the view that the incident about the death of deceased Laxmi is a homicidal death not amounting to murder committed by the appellant in a sudden provocation and hence, convicted the appellant for an offence punishable under section 304 Part I of the I.P. Code and sentenced as stated above. Admittedly, neither the State nor the complainant have questioned the legality and correctness of the acquittal of the appellant/accused for an offence punishable under section 302 of the I.P. Code. The judgment of conviction recorded by the court below convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under section 304 Part I of the I.P. Code is impugned in this appeal.
3. Heard learned counsel Mr. Satej S. Jadhav for the appellant and learned A.P.P. Smt. S.D. Shelke for the respondent/State. Perused the record.
4. From perusal of the record, it is clear that conviction of the appellant is based on the circumstantial evidence before the court below. These circumstances can be formulated as below:
(i) At the time of incident, only appellant and the deceased were present in the house;
(ii) Soon before the incident, quarrel took place between the deceased and the appellant;
(iii) Death of the deceased is an unnatural homicidal death;
(iv) An extrajudicial confession was made by the appellant before his brother i.e. the husband of the deceased;
(v) The blood stained clothes and an iron pipe/bar were recovered at the instance of the appellant from the van owned by the appellant; and
(vi) A false defence was taken by the appellant in his defence.
5. For better and proper appreciation of the rival submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.P.P. for the respondent/ State, submitted across the bar and to analyze the evidence to establish the circumstances formulated as above, I feel it necessary to advert to the material evidence recorded before the trial court.
“Balaji Kashinath Kakade (PW1) is the husband of deceased Laxmi and brother of appellant Shivaji. He has stated that at the time of incident, he alongwith his wife, his minor son and appellant were residing together in the house situated at village Chincholi, Taluka and District Latur. The appellant is shorttempered person. The appellant used to take quarrel with the deceased on the ground that deceased was not preparing the meal in time and was not cooking a tasty food. He has stated that the incident took place at about 7.30 p.m. or so. By profession, he is a autorickshaw driver. At the relevant time, he was returning to Chincholi from Latur in his autorickshaw. He received a telephonic message from the appellant that due to fall, his wife – deceased Laxmi had fallen down. This telephonic message was given by the appellant. He (appellant) had also informed through the said telephonic message that some mistake had been committed by him (appellant). PW1 Balaji further stated that while giving the telephonic message, the appellant appeared to be in disturbed mood. He has stated that when his auto was about to reach to his village, he noticed that the van owned by the appellant was coming from opposite direction. The appellant stopped the van. He went near the van. The conversation of the appellant with him was irrelevant and vague. Laxmi was found lying in the van and it was noticed that she had sustained head injury. He has further stated that he instructed the appellant to wait near the Government hospital as he would reach there after he drops the passengers in the auto. He stated that accordingly he dropped the passengers in the village. He went to his house. In the house, he noticed blood stains in the middle room and in verandah i.e. the courtyard. He has further stated that in the meantime, Laxmi was taken to the Government hospital in his village i.e. at Chincholi. The Medical Officer present in the Government hospital advised to shift Laxmi to Latur. When he reached in the Government hospital, the ambulance carrying Laxmi left for Latur. He has further stated that he alongwith his friend followed the ambulance. In the Civil Hospital at Latur, the Medical Officer examined Laxmi and declared her as already dead. He has further stated that on the next day, postmortem was conducted on the dead-body of Laxmi and thereafter, the dead-body was handed over to him. After the funeral was over, he enquired with the appellant about the incident. At that time, the appellant made an extrajudicial confession before him that a quarrel had taken place between him and the deceased over the preparation of meals. Deceased had said something to him due to which he got annoyed and gave a blow of iron pipe on the head of the deceased. Thereafter, he (PW1 Balaji) lodged the report in Gategaon Police Station (Exh14).
The witness (PW1 Balaji) was cross-examined at length. Cross-examination revealed that when PW1 Balaji was proceeding towards village Chincholi, he received a telephonic message from the Cell Phone No. 9967840810. Village Chincoli is at a distance of 15 minutes from the place where he received the telephonic message. The appellant met him in his van about 20 minutes after he received the telephonic message from the appellant. It is also brought on record in his further crossexamination that there were rains on the day of incident. Further it is brought on record that their sister is residing in the hutment area in the same village. He had not informed about the incident to his sister immediately after he met the appellant on his way. He has admitted that the appellant and his sister Bhagirthibai are the only close relatives he has, residing in that village. He has further stated that around 8.30 p.m. or so, he reached Government hospital at Chincholi and at that time, the husband of her sister, Digamber and one Naonath Panchal were present with him. It is brought in his further cross-examination that the husband of his sister – Digamber runs a tailoring shop in the front portion of his house. The appellant was doing work for about 6 to 7 years at Pune and Mumbai and 6 to 7 months prior to the incident, at his request and at the request of his sister, the appellant had returned to village Chincholi from Mumbai, as the appellant is their only brother. Certain suggestions were given in the further cross-examination of this witness that there was dispute amongst the two brothers as the relatives of the deceased were insisting the complainant – Balaji to dispose of their residential house and shift to Latur, to which the appellant was opposing. It is also brought on record that the roof of front two rooms is of tin sheds. There are old type tiles fitted in the courtyard. One day prior to the incident, there were heavy rains and there were rains even on the day of incident till 5 p.m. The deceased used to use the roof of the house for drying out the wearing apparels or clothes. PW1 Balaji stated that the appellant initially informed him on phone that deceased had fallen down from the roof while bringing back the wearing apparels and sustained injuries. It is also brought on record that the appellant never insulted him. The appellant was behaving properly with his son. The deceased never complained against the appellant to him or to his sister. The only omission brought on record in his evidence is that during the telephonic talk with him, the appellant told him that he had committed a mistake.”
6. PW2 Pandurang Digamber Dingne is the son of sister of appellant and complainant Balaji, the husband of the deceased. He has stated that the appellant and Balaji are his maternal uncles. On the day of incident at about 5.00 p.m., he visited the tailoring shop of his father which is located in the house of his maternal uncle. He was ironing the clothes in the shop of his father. Around 7 p.m. or so, the appellant returned back to his house. The appellant asked him to bring snacks for him. He brought the snacks. Thereafter, a quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased. Immediately after the quarrel started between them, he went to call his father. He has further stated that as his father was not present in the shop, he went in search of his father. After some time, when he returned to the house of his maternal uncle, he saw that wife of his maternal uncle Balaji was kept in the four-wheeler and was taken to the hospital. In his further deposition, he has not supported the case of prosecution, hence, he was declared hostile. After the witness was declared hostile, he was cross-examined by the learned A.P.P., in which he denied that he saw the incident of assault on the wife of his maternal uncle Balaji by the appellant with a iron rod, but he admitted that after the appellant returned to house, he asked Laxmi, wife of Balaji whether she had prepared the meals, to which she had replied that she did not prepare the meals and thereafter, the appellant asked this witness to bring snacks and on this count, a quarrel took place between the appellant and deceased Laxmi.
“This witness (PW2 Pandurang) was also cross-examined at length by the defence. It is brought on record in his cross-examination that at the time of incident, electric supply was on and there was no load-shading. It is also brought on record in his cross-examination that he did not witness that the deceased was climbing on the roof of the house with the support of tulshivrundavan. The fact is further brought on record that he witnessed that there was quarrel between Laxmi the deceased and the appellant. Before proceeding further, this Court will have to take a note of the fact that it revealed from the evidence of this witness, even though turned hostile, that he remained loyal to the prosecution to the extent that soon before the incident, he had witnessed that only the appellant and deceased Laxmi were present in their house. From his evidence, it is further established that the appellant asked deceased as to whether the meals were ready/prepared, to which the deceased replied in negative and hence, the witness was sent by the appellant to purchase snacks. It is further established that the quarrel took place between the deceased and the appellant thereafter, but soon before the incident. It is further established from the cross-examination of this witness that he did not witness that the deceased had climbed on the roof to remove the wearing apparels from the roof. What is the effect of it, will be seen in the later part of this judgment.
7. Indrajit Mahadeo Navale (PW3) is the neighbour where the appellant and deceased were residing. He has only stated in his evidence that on the day of incident, he was present at the S.T. stand till 7.30 p.m. to 8.00 p.m., and he heard quarrel from the house of the appellant. He has also stated that two days prior to the incident, the deceased had been to their house and informed to his wife that the appellant had a quarrel with her on the ground that she was not preparing the meals properly and used to tease and abuse her. In the cross-examination of this witness, this fact deposed by him is proved as an omission as he has not stated this fact in the statement recorded by the police during investigation.
8. The remaining witnesses examined by the prosecution are the panch witnesses to various panchanamas but in the given set of circumstances and facts, it is not necessary to discuss their evidence in detail. However, the evidence of PW7 Dr. Swapnil Akhade would play a very vital role while deciding the present appeal. In the evidence of Dr. Swapnil (PW7), who had conducted autopsy on the dead-body of Laxmi in the Civil Hospital, Latur on 6th August, 2010 through whom the prosecution has proved the postmortem report (Exh-25), he has stated that the external injuries noticed by him on the person of the deceased are ante-mortem injuries and the internal injuries noticed by him are corresponding to the external injuries which he has noticed and mentioned in column No. 17 of the postmortem notes. He has further deposed that cause of death of the deceased Laxmi was due to head injury sustained by the deceased. He has further opined that this injury can be caused due to assault/blow of an iron rod/pipe (Article-B), referred to him. This witness was cross-examined at length. He has admitted in his cross-examination that the injuries noticed on the person of the deceased can be caused due to forceful fall of the victim on the hard substance from the height of about fifteen feet. The two facts which he has admitted about causing of the injury to the deceased are also very important. First that the fall must be forceful from the height of fifteen feet and secondly, the fall must be on the rough substance.
9. At this juncture, I would like to advert to the evidence of PW5 Shrimant Savata Mali, the panch witness to the spot panchanama. It is to be noted from the recitals of the spot panchanama (Exh21) that the spot was pointed out by the appellant himself while drawing the panchanama in the A.D. enquiry recorded in Gategaon Police Station. No doubt, he has pointed out that the flooring in the courtyard which is described in the memorandum of spot panchanama as verandah, was made of old type tiles/farshi. At the same time, the height of the roof from the ground level was mentioned in the said panchanama to the extent of 5 feet 10 inches or so. Certainly from these facts which have been recorded in the panchanama defuses the admission given in the cross-examination of the Medical Officer who had conducted the autopsy on the dead-body of Laxmi that the injury was noticed on the person of the deceased in the nature of fracture on both the sides at the back side of the left ear as well as right ear and on the skull as depressed fracture. Considering the height of the roof and the flooring in the courtyard of the place of incident, the admission given by the doctor (PW7) about cause of the injuries due to fall are ruled out, but it is to be inferred that the death of the deceased is not an accidental death but it is a homicidal unnatural death.
10. During the course of submissions across the bar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would urge that no doubt, case of the prosecution is based on circumstances, then as per the prevailing law, this chain of circumstances ought to complete and if there is any break in the said chain of circumstances, then the benefit of doubt goes to the appellant/accused. In this context, he would urge that no doubt, one of the circumstances which requires consideration is the seizure of iron pipe/rod (Article B) and blood stained clothes of the appellant (Article C collectively) recovered at the instance of appellant after memorandum of his statement under section 27 of the Evidence Act was recorded in front of prosecution witness No. 8 Dilip Mane. However said PW8 Dilip Mane has admitted that the Maruti van from which these clothes and iron rod were recovered was found parked in the compound of Government hospital at Chincholi and it is admitted not only by the panch witness but also by the Investigating Officer Sunil Nagargoje (PW10) that this car was found in unlocked condition when examined. Learned counsel would further urge that it has come in the evidence of the Investigating Officer that the key of the said Maruti van was with him. In the circumstances, he would urge that this recovery of the clothes at the instance of the appellant, stained with blood, is doubtful. He would further urge that even though said iron rod and the blood stained clothes were sent for chemical examination to the office of the Chemical Analyzer, but till conclusion of the trial, the report of the Chemical Analyzer was not received. He would further urge that admittedly, the appellant had taken deceased in his Maruti van to the Government hospital at Chincholi. While he was shifting the deceased in his Maruti van, on his way to the hospital, he had an occasion to meet PW1 Balaji, his brother i.e. husband of deceased Laxmi. Unfortunately, the clothes (Article C collectively) were not referred to him in his evidence to get the clothes identified that those clothes which were recovered at the instance of the appellant were, in fact, on the person of the appellant. Neither these clothes were referred in evidence of PW2 Pandurang who was present at the time of quarrel took place between the deceased and the appellant, which fact is not shaken in the evidence of PW2. Under the circumstances, he would urge that the circumstance of recovery of iron bar and the blood stained clothes of the appellant at the instance of the appellant is missing and hence, benefit of doubt be given to the accused/appellant. He would further urge that considering these aspects, the defence taken by the appellant is a probable defence and the proof of this defence is not required as strict proof like the facts are required to be proved by the prosecution and only the probabilities are required to be established. Learned counsel would further urge that the circumstance of extrajudicial confession by the appellant before his brother husband of the deceased is not to be taken as an established circumstance as this circumstance is not established by the medical evidence. An attempt was made during the course of submissions by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was the extrajudicial confession in the words of PW1 Balaji that in the quarrel, the appellant lost his control and gave a blow of iron pipe on the head of his wife Laxmi and she sustained injury. He drew my attention towards the external injuries noticed by PW7 Dr. Swapnil while conducting the autopsy on the dead-body of deceased Laxmi as those injuries are found on the rare side of the head of the deceased and not on the front side of the head of the deceased. If in the quarrel, there was attack by the appellant, then the attack must be from the front side and not from the back side. Considering this aspect, possibility that the victim fell on the back side of the roof cannot be ruled out and that the benefit of doubt needs to be extended to the appellant. Learned counsel would further urge that alternatively if the court comes to the conclusion that the appellant is the author of the injuries found on the person of the victim which resulted in her death, in that premise, he would urge that at the time of incident, the age of the appellant was 25 years. It is urged further that in the hit of anger as the meals were not ready, he had attacked the wife of his brother but as he had lost his mental control, he attacked her. It is submitted that it was not an intentional attack to cause the death of the deceased but it was an attack on her only to teach her a lesson. No doubt, the attack was to cause the injury but not to cause the murder. He would further urge that the post-incident instances are also required to be considered as the appellant when noticed the effect of his act, immediately he shifted deceased Laxmi in his van to the hospital to save her life, even in absence of his brother at his residence. Thereafter, he also accompanied his brother to the Civil Hospital at Latur. These acts of the appellant clearly demonstrate that there was no intention in the mind of the appellant to commit the murder of deceased Laxmi. In the circumstances, it is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the offence punishable under section 304 Part I of the I.P. Code, which was held proved by the learned trial court, may be converted into an offence punishable under section 304 Part-II of the I.P. Code and the sentence awarded to the appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years deserves to be reduced to some extent to give him a chance to improve himself and not to become a harden criminal behind the bars.
11. Per contra, learned A.P.P. appearing for the respondent/State supports the findings recorded by the court below and the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court.
12. In the light of above submissions advanced across the bar, there is no doubt in my mind to hold that the first circumstance about the presence of only the appellant and the deceased in the house, stands established from the evidence given by PW2 Pandurang and also from the admissions brought on record in the cross-examination of PW1 Balaji. The second circumstance that soon before the incident, quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased, also stands established from the unshaken testimony of PW2 Pandurang who was later on declared hostile that at the material time, quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased in the house of the appellant. The cause behind this quarrel that as the deceased had not prepared the food before arrival of the appellant, the quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased, is also brought on record. The third circumstance that the death of the deceased is an unnatural homicidal death stands proved/established from the evidence of PW7 Dr. Swapnil. While holding that this circumstance also stands established, the defence taken by the appellant that the deceased fell down from the roof while removing the wearing apparels/ clothes kept to dry out on the roof of the house, is required to be discarded on three grounds. First, it is brought in the cross-examination of PW1 that 4/5 days before the date of incident, there was continuous rain. Secondly, it is also brought on record in the cross-examination of PW1 Balaji that on the day of incident till 5.00 p.m., there was continuous rain and thirdly, if the deceased in reality had gone on the roof of the house to collect the wearing apparels and she had collected those, then those clothes/apparels must have been found in the courtyard where the deceased was found lying, or if she was not successful in collecting the clothes/apparels, those must have been found on the roof of the house. However, the wearing apparels were neither found in the courtyard nor on the roof of the house. In view of above facts, which stand established, the defence taken by the appellant that the deceased fell down from the roof while collecting the wearing apparels from the roof is a false defence. It cannot be inferred that the death of the deceased is an accidental death, but the circumstances stand proved that the death of the deceased is a homicidal death. To come to this conclusion, there is one more ground as the fact is brought on record in the cross-examination of PW2 Pandurang who was present at the spot that he had not witnessed that the deceased had been climbing on the roof to collect the wearing apparels, which fact further gets strengthened to discard this defence taken by the appellant. So far as the next circumstance about the extrajudicial confession made by the appellant to his brother is concerned, the same is also required to be held established as till this extrajudicial confession was made by the appellant before his brother PW1 Balaji, line of the investigation by the police about the death of Laxmi was of accidental death and not of homicidal death. The wheels of investigation turned down after the extrajudicial confession was made by the appellant before his brother and the statement of his brother PW1 Balaji was treated as F.I.R. and later on, the investigation was carried out from that angle. This circumstance is required to be considered in the light of next circumstance about the recovery of blood stained clothes of the appellant and the iron pipe/bar at the instance of the appellant from his van. In this connection, an explanation is offered by the appellant in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in answer to question Nos. 40, 41 and 42, wherein while answering question No. 42, he has not denied that the clothes on which blood stains were found, are not his clothes. In the light of this, though it is submitted that the clothes of the appellant were not identified by PW1 Balaji or PW2 Pandurang, still it is not disputed in answer No. 42 by the appellant that those clothes are his clothes and the blood was transferred on those clothes while putting the deceased in the van to the Government hospital for medical treatment. Considering this aspect and the recovery of iron pipe, the circumstance of extrajudicial confession and recovery of the clothes are held as established. Generally, to take false defence itself is not an incriminating circumstance but it is held in catena of judgments that to take a false defence, if the remaining circumstances held as proved, then to take false defence, to be treated as one of the additional incriminating circumstances. For the reasons recorded in this paragraph, this court has come to the conclusion that the defence taken by the appellant is proved and established against the appellant. Hence, to take a false defence is one of the additional circumstances which is held as an incriminating circumstance against the appellant.
13. Apart from the establishment of the chain of circumstances, the facts of the case are required to be considered from one another angle. From the unshaken testimony of PW2 Pandurang, it is established that in the evening of day of incident, only the appellant and deceased were present in the house. Considering this aspect, which is not shaken at all during the course of trial that at the material time, what happened in the house is in the exclusive knowledge of the appellant. Then the presumption under section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act will be in favour of the prosecution. Automatically presumption under section 106 never lies in favour of the prosecution but the mitigating circumstances are brought on record that the victim was in the exclusive custody or within the exclusive control of the culprit and hence, it is for the culprit or the person in whose custody the victim was, to disclose the true facts as to how the victim sustained injuries. The facts of the case in this appeal clearly establish that at the material time, deceased Laxmi was in the exclusive company of the appellant. She sustained fracture injuries on her vital part and those injuries are not properly explained by the accused; hence, this additional circumstance also goes against the appellant. In the light of this, the only inference and conclusion that can be drawn is that the appellant is the author of the injuries found on the person of deceased Laxmi resulting into her death.
14. Once it is concluded and inferred that the death of the victim Laxmi which is caused due to the injuries sustained by her and those injuries are caused by the appellant, then the question which requires consideration is as to what offence has been committed by the appellant and what would be the proper sentence for the offence committed by the appellant. While making submissions across the bar by learned counsel Mr. Satej Jadhav for the appellant, which I have discussed above, he has brought on record that at the material time, the age of the appellant was 25 years. He has also brought on record from the cross-examination of PW1 Balaji his brother (husband of the deceased) that generally the appellant was not of bad character. It is also successfully brought on record that there are no criminal antecedents to the credit of the appellant. The act was committed by the appellant in the hit of anger as when he, after his arrival in the house, asked the deceased whether the food was ready, she replied that the food was not ready and a quarrel took place on that count. It is successfully brought on record that on earlier occasion also, a quarrel had taken place between the appellant and the deceased on the same count. It is also brought on record that immediately after the act of assault was over, the appellant realized the mistake committed by him and then he made attempts to save the life of injured Laxmi by immediately shifting her to the hospital without waiting for return of her husband Balaji and with the help of his friends, he shifted injured Laxmi to the hospital. Whether these instances or the post-incident conduct of the appellant established that there was intention of the appellant to cause bodily injury to take away her life.
15. At this juncture, I would like to refer the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of "Kesar Singh vs. State of Haryana", reported in 2009 SCC (Cr)3 page1193, wherein it is observed in paragraphs No. 20 and 21 as to what is the exact distinction between `knowledge' and `intention'. The Apex Court has observed thus :
"20. We must keep in mind the distinction between knowledge and intention. Knowledge in the context of Section 299 would, inter alia, mean consciousness or realization or understanding. The distinction between the terms 'knowledge' and 'intention' again is a difference of degrees. An inference of knowledge that it is likely to cause death must be arrived at keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in each case. The accused must be aware of the consequences of his act.
21. Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the human mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intention connotes a conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity and summed up into action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a particular and specific end which the human mind conceives and perceives before itself.
This was discussed extensively in Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1991) 2 SCC 32], stating: "We may note at this state that 'intention' is different from 'motive' or 'ignorance' or 'negligence'. It is the 'knowledge' or 'intention' with which the act is done that makes difference, in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder. Therefore, it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressions as used in these provisions...
The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the circumstances, such as the, weapon used, the ferocity of attack, multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances. The framers of the code designedly used the words 'intention' and 'knowledge' and it is accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. But that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue. As compared to 'knowledge', 'intention' requires something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely the purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end."
Kenny in "Outlines of Criminal Law" (17th Edition at page 31) has observed:
Intention: To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connection is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct. Thus if one man throws another from a high tower or cuts off his head it would seem plain that he both foresees the victim's death and also desires it: the desire and the foresight will also be the same if a person knowingly leaves a helpless invalid or infant without nourishment or other necessary support until death supervenes. It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed.
Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it. It may well be a thing that he dislikes doing, but he dislikes still more the consequences of his not doing it. That is to say he desires the lesser of two evils, and therefore has made up his mind to bring about that one. Russell on Crime (12th Edition at Page 41) has observed: "In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word 'intention' is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims."
It can thus be seen that the 'knowledge' as contrasted with 'intention' signifies a state of mental realisation with the bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which human mind remains supine or inactive. On the other hand, 'intention' is a conscious state in which mental faculties are aroused into activity and summoned into action for the purpose of achieving a conceived end. It means shaping of one's conduct so as to bring about a certain event. Therefore in the case of 'intention' mental faculties are projected in a set direction. Intention need not necessarily involve premeditation. Whether there is such an intention or not is a question of fact. Law Applicable in this case."
16. I have reappreciated the entire evidence, in the light of above observations, about the distinction between `knowledge' and `intention' behind the act of the appellant, from the facts which were brought to the notice of this court during the course of submissions made across the bar, from the record received from the court below. Admittedly, only the appellant and the deceased were present in the house at the time of the incident. The medical evidence clearly established that there were no repeated blows on the head of the deceased at the hands of the appellant. As discussed hereinabove, the post-incident conduct of the appellant discloses that though in the hit of anger, the appellant attacked on the person of the deceased, but after the appellant realized the act committed by him, immediately he made an attempt to save the life of the deceased, but unfortunately did not succeed therein. In the circumstances and taking overall view of these circumstances, it is established that though the appellant caused bodily injury to the deceased having knowledge of his such act, certainly it cannot be inferred that there was intention of the appellant to cause the bodily injury to deceased Laxmi which may take away the life of the deceased. Under the circumstances, the case is made out to hold that the act committed by the appellant amounts to an offence punishable under section 304 PartII of the I.P. Code. In the light of this finding, the conviction recorded by the court below for the offence punishable under section 304 Part I of the I.P. Code is required to be converted into an offence punishable under section 304 Part-II of the I.P. Code. Considering the age of the appellant at the time of incident and the post-incident conduct of the appellant i.e. attempting to save the life of the deceased after he attacked her and since there are no criminal antecedents to his credit and also considering the facts brought on record, it is necessary to reduce the sentence awarded to him. In the premises, to my mind, the sentence to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay fine in the sum of Rs. 5000/with a default stipulation to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year by the appellant, would meet the ends of justice.
17. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction awarded to the appellant for an offence punishable under section 304 Part-I of the I.P. Code is hereby quashed and set aside, and is modified. The sentence awarded to the appellant by the trial court vide the impugned judgment and order is also quashed and set aside and modified.
The appellant is hereby convicted for the offence punishable under section 304 Part-II of the I.P. Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay fine in the sum of Rs. 5000/with a default stipulation to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. The appellant is entitled for setoff for the period of sentence he has already undergone. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.