Oral Judgment: (B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.)
By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 30.12.1991 passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur holding that the petitioner – Champalal could not have been retained in service, in public interest. Though this order mentions provision of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1979 Rules” for short) or Rule 13(1) thereof, it is not in dispute that same reference needs to be construed as reference to Maharashtra Zilla Parishad District Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1964 Rules” for short). Petitioner, thereafter had preferred an appeal under Rule 13 of 1964 Rules before the Additional Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur and that Authority has maintained said order.
2. During the pendency of this challenge, the petitioner expired on 03.01.2008 and his legal heirs are prosecuting this challenge further.
3. The deceased Champalal was a driver in the employment of respondent no.2 Zilla Parishad. He was due to retire in March, 1994, but, he has been removed from service on 30.12.1991 because of an accident which took place on 12.04.1991. It is not in dispute that at the time of accident he was driving a private Tractor and was using it for some personal work. He was not performing the duty under respondent no.2. In the said accident, a person was killed and Crime No.37/1991 under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Champalal. Before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ramtek, Champalal accepted his guilt and was convicted u/s 304A with imprisonment till rising of the Court with fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default, to undergo 30 days simple imprisonment. Impugned order dated 30.12.1991 passed by the Chief Executive Officer notes this punishment, and mentions that because of conduct which led to his conviction, Champalal was removed from service. The Appellate Authority has maintained this application of mind and action.
4. Shri Gode, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the legal heirs has after narrating the facts urged that the “conduct” looked into had no bearing on the performance of his duties by the deceased Champalal. The conduct, therefore, could not have been construed as misconduct and hence, respondent no.2 could not have inflicted any punishment therefor by holding any departmental inquiry. He submits that the provisions of Rule 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, which contemplate special procedure in certain cases is, therefore, not available in present facts. According to him only when for a conduct, which leads to conviction on criminal charge, when the departmental action under Rules, 6, 7 and 8 is possible, then only recourse to Rule 9(i) is permitted, and not otherwise. He has further submitted that the disciplinary authority in that eventuality is under an obligation and has to consider the circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders thereafter, as it deems fit. According to the learned Counsel, this obligation as cast, is preceded by words “may” and this word along with obligation to consider the circumstances, requires the respondent no.2 to apply mind to all relevant facts before taking any decision or before inflicting any punishment. His submission is, it is not conviction which attracts Rule 9, but, it is conduct which leads to that conviction, which is relevant. He is taking support from the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at 1976 (1) LLJ 68 Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another .vrs. T.R. Chellappan. In order to point out relevance of conduct in the scheme of Rule 9, he has also relied upon the judgment of Full Bench of Allahabad High court reported at 1967 (2) LLJ 16 KunwarBahadur .vrs. Union of India. Judgment of Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported at AIR 1973 PandH 1 Om Prakash .vrs. The Director, Postal Services and others, is also cited before us to show how the Full Bench has considered the similar provisions in hypothetical situation, where the government servant has a domestic fight with his neighbour. The Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at (1985) 2 SCC 358) Shankar Das .vrs. Union of India and another is also relied upon to emphasize the scope of word “conduct” in Rule 9.
5. Without prejudice to this argument, our attention has also been invited to Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution of India and judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1989 SC 1185 Union of India .vrs. Parma Nanda and AIR 1986 SC 555 SatyavirSingh and others .vrs. Union of India and another, to urge that for an isolated incidence punishment of removal from service inflicted upon Champalal is, shockingly disproportionate. Learned Counsel therefore, prays for setting aside the impugned order and for directions to reinstate with consequential benefits till the date of superannuation and for release of all other benefits after superannuation, in favour of the legal heirs.
6. Shri Mohokar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent no. 2 has submitted that the deceased Champalal was a driver with the Zilla Parishad, which is a local authority and hence, an accidenta serious offence, committed by him and accepted by him has been found relevant by the Chief Executive Officer to deny continuation in public employment. Learned counsel submits that though the Chief Executive Officer has mentioned wrong provision of law, that by itself is not fatal in present situation and provision looked into by the said Authority is pari materia. The said application of mind has also been maintained by the Appellate Authority, and in view of this concurrent application of mind, this Court should not interfere. He is relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported at 2008 (6) Mh.L.J. 805 SatishPralhadrao Raikwar .vrs. State of Maharashtra and another to show that the employee like the deceased in such situation is not entitled to any opportunity of hearing or show cause. He has also invited attention to a Division Bench judgment reported at AIR 1960 Bom. 285 MadhosinghDaulatsingh .vrs. State of Bombay and others to urge that the word “conduct” as employed in Rule 9 has been appropriately interpreted there, and such conduct need not have any impact or bearing directly on the employer. His submissions is, though in present facts, the conduct i.e. accident is in his capacity as a driver, the said conduct had direct impact on the employment of the deceased in very same capacity with respondent no.2.
7. Learned A.G.P. appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 has adopted the arguments of Adv. Shri Mohokar, and submitted that the conduct of the deceased of committing a negligent act has been found sufficient by the Authority possessing jurisdiction to remove him from services, and hence, there is no jurisdictional error or perversity.
8. We find that the provisions of Rule 13 of the 1979 Rules and provisions of Rule 9 of the 1964 Rules are identical. Mere wrong mention of a Rule by the respondent no.2 in his order dated 30.12.1991 is, therefore, not sufficient to vitiate it.
9. The judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Madhosingh Daulatsingh .vrs. State of Bombay and others (supra), considers the provision of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, qua police officer and rude behaviour with a member of public in private life. The contention before the said Bench by that employee was that such conduct must have reasonable relation to the nature of service. The Division Bench found that such conduct need not necessarily arise in the course of employment. It is further found that if, a servant like petitioner behaves in the manner which is inconsistent with the nature of his service, then that would affect or at any rate likely to affect the interest or good name of the employer. The Division Bench also noticed that there was no provision restricting recourse to the disciplinary action in such manners, either under the Police Act or Regulations and the penalty of withholding of increments for two years and reduction to a lower stage in the time scale was upheld.
10. In paragraph no.5 it is observed that it was not a condition precedent that misconduct must arise out of employment and not outside it. The test has been found to be whether the servant conducted himself in a way inconsistent with faithful discharge of his obligations undertaken by him, either expressly or impliedly in accepting the services.
11. In Shankar Das .vrs. Union of India and another (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has while considering the provisions of Article 311 (2) observed in paragraph no.7 that the Constitution does not contemplate that a government servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in no-parking area should be dismissed from service. The right to impose penalty carries with it the duty to act justly. In facts presented to it, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant before it, was dismissal. Though the appellant was a cash clerk, who was punished under Section 409 of Indian Penal Code, and sum involved is of Rs. 5000/- only, he was given benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, but because of his conviction, the government had dismissed him from service summarily.
12. In Om Prakash .vrs. The Director, Postal Services and others (supra), the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court has considered the provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 in the background of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The appellant was convicted for using a forged cash memo for claiming medical reimbursement and was given benefit of Section 4 of the said Act. Because of this incidence, he was dismissed from government service. While considering this challenge, the Full Bench has observed that there was no provision enabling the employer to dismiss or remove an employee from service because of his conviction on criminal charge and disciplinary action can be taken for conduct which led to conviction or a criminal charge, if such conduct constitutes misconduct according to relevant services rules. While appreciating this issue further, this Full Bench also considers illustration in which a government servant assaults his neighbour and stands convicted for the same. The Full Bench found that it may not be possible to take departmental action against such government servant, unless the competent Authority holds that the conduct of the delinquent officer was unbecoming. The Full bench has concluded that the Rule making authorities justifiably do not provide for a disciplinary action in every case of conviction and let its necessity and the matter to be decided by the competent Authority after appreciateing original conduct and not the conviction. The Full Bench therefore set aside the order of punishment which was only on the ground of conviction.
13. Perusal of the judgment of Hon. Apex Court in case of Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another .vrs. T.R. Chellappan (supra), becomes necessary in this background. AUGUST 29, 2012.
14. The language of Rule 14, looked into by the Hon’ble Apex Court in this judgment, is same as that of Rule 9. The relevant words are “disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass/make such order thereon as it deems fit”. This language is appreciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para-21 of the judgment. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the word “consider” has been used in contradistinction to the word “determine”. It has been thereafter held that when the issue is of punishment upon an employee, the disciplinary authority has to consider entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed. The matter can be objectively determined only after delinquent employee is heard and is given chance to satisfy the authority regarding final orders that may be passed by the said authority. The term “consider” postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing aggrieved person in summary enquiry. The Hon’ble Apex Court has noted that the delinquent employee may have been guilty of some technical offence, for instance, violation of the Transport Rules or the Rules under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, where no major penalty may be attracted. Little later it has also observed that conviction of delinquent employee would be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority has to embark upon a summary enquiry as to the nature of extent and penalty to be imposed. If such authority is of the opinion that the offence is too trivial or of a technical nature, it may refuse to impose any penalty in spite of such conviction. This is found to be salutary scheme of said Rule. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of SatishPralhadrao Raikwar Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (supra) has in para-8 noted the significance of gravity of misconduct which leads to conviction of Government servant while considering similar provisions i.e. Rule 13(i) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982.
15. In AIR 1989 S.C. 1185 "Union of India v. Parma Nanda", Hon. Apex Court, through its larger bench, in paragraph 29 observes that cases where the penalty is imposed under cl. (a) of the second proviso to Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India, constitute an exception to the normal rule. Where the person, without enquiry is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank solely on the basis of conviction by a criminal Court, the Court or Tribunal may examine the adequacy of the penalty imposed in the light of the conviction and sentence inflicted on the person. If the penalty impugned is apparently unreasonable or uncalled for, having regard to the nature of the criminal charge, it may step in to render substantial justice and may remit the matter to the competent authority for reconsideration or by itself substitute one of the penalties provided under cl.(a). Another larger bench of the Hon. Apex Court in AIR 1986 S.C. 555 "SatyavirSingh v. Union of India" draws on earlier Constitutional Bench view to note in paragraph 6 (100) that in an appeal, revision or review filed by a civil servant dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by applying to his case Cl. (a) of the second proviso or an analogous service rule, it is not open to him to contend that he was wrongly convicted by the criminal Court. He can, however, contend that the penalty imposed upon him is too severe or excessive or was one not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case. Both these Larger Bench judgments rely upon the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon. Apex Court in AIR 1985 S.C. 1416 "Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel". In view of these cases, we do not find it necessary to refer to various other judgments, to which learned counsel for the petitioner has invited our attention.
16. Scrutiny of the present controversy in the backdrop of this law is essential. As present accident is by a driver outside his employment or duty hours and in private capacity, though it may not constitute a “misconduct” as understood in labour jurisprudence, here that concept of misconduct under Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act. 1946 or Rules and Model Standing Orders framed thereunder will not be relevant and need not be gone into. Only question will be whether such an accident can be construed as “conduct” under Maharashtra Zilla Parishads District Services (Conduct) Rules, 1967! We only observe that these Conduct Rules do not define what is “conduct” or “misconduct”. What type of behaviour or nature of acts/omissions are accepted and prohibited is envisaged in it. Rule 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules,1967 lays down special procedure in certain cases. It begins with non-obstante clause and exclude the application of Rules 6,7 and 8; in its entire body, said Rule 9 nowhere uses the word “misconduct”. Rules 6 is about procedure for imposing major penalties, Rule 7 is procedure for minor penalties and Rule 8 speaks of the joint inquiry. Exclusion of requirement to follow this procedure in circumstances where Rule 9 gets attracted is deliberate and obviates need of a fresh fact finding inquiry due to proof thereof in the shape of a conviction in criminal prosecution. In criminal prosecution, standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is adopted while in disciplinary proceedings, it is preponderance of the probabilities. It is to be borne in mind that the strict rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are not attracted in a disciplinary enquiry. Hence, conviction after a trial is accepted as sufficient proof of “conduct” in the scheme of said Rule 9. Not employing word “misconduct” while excluding the Rules 6 to 8 is not indicative of the fact that “conduct” subjected to scrutiny in Rule 9 must always be one for which otherwise a departmental action is open. Absence of any defined “misconduct” in the Conduct Rules or then in Discipline and Appeal Rules is to keep the concept of “conduct” therein wide enough to curb any practice unbecoming on part of the zilla parishad servant. Effort of petitioner to limit its scope because of opening part of the non-obstante clause in Rule 9 therefore, has to fail. But then the consideration whether such conduct has any relevance in the light of the Conduct Rules is not dispensed with. Here, impact of solitary incidence or “conduct” of deceased Champalal on his employment deserved consideration. If such “conduct” had any impact, whether it was unbecoming on part of Champalal as a Zilla Parishad servant to indulge in it also warranted scrutiny? Respondent no. 2 as disciplinary authority ought to have recorded its own findings in this regard before deciding to punish Champalal under Rule 9 of the 1967 Discipline and Appeal Rules. Such an approach and application of mind is lacking in present matter. Rule 9 required respondent no. 2 disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case and then pass such order thereon as it deemed fit. Thus duty to balance circumstances leading to conviction of Champalal with administrative need to preserve efficiency and prestige of employment is not discharged by the respondent no. 2.
17. The impugned order does not show that respondent No.2 Chief Executive Officer had issued any show cause notice to deceased Champalal or then had given him any opportunity as to why punishment of removal from service should not be inflicted upon him. It also reveals non-application of mind qua the nature of conduct. The deceased had put in about 19 years of service as a driver before his removal and his past service record or performance does not find any mention. Whether a solitary accident resulting in a charge under Section 304 (A) of the Indian Penal Code was sufficient to remove from employment has not been, therefore, evaluated. The fact that he was to retire just three years thereafter which also may have been a relevant factor for determining proportionate punishment to be selected, has been ignored. The order choosing a particular punishment passed by respondent no. 2 ought to have been dependent on and commensurate with the nature of the conduct viz. the circumstances constituting offence or leading to conviction of Champalal. Obligations as found by the Hon. Apex Court in case of “Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another .vrs. T.R. Chellappan,” "SatyavirSingh v. Union of India" and “ Union of India v. Parma Nanda” (all supra), are not discharged by employer and our perusal of punishment order dated 13.12.1991 shows that Champalal was mechanically punished not on account of his conduct/circumstances, but only because of his conviction. Circumstances necessitating removal from service as a proportionate punishment are no where reflected in the punishment order.
18. Shri Mohokar, learned counsel, has invited our attention to the report submitted by the Police Officer to Judicial Magistrate Fist Class to show the nature of conduct. According to him, after giving dash to a Bicycle Rider, the deceased did not wait there or did not go to the nearest Police Station. He was required to be arrested. He has urged that this conduct was sufficient to warrant the removal. The document relied upon by him to show these facts is not on record before us and has not been considered by respondent no. 2. The punishment is not being imposed by this Court and, therefore, all relevant facts having bearing upon it needed to be considered by the said respondent Chief Executive Officer as a disciplinary authority. Moreover, this report cannot be accepted as correct reproduction of the events which transpired at the time of accident. Admission of the deceased Champalal is only of a charge as framed and not of the alleged events recorded in his report by the police officer. We, therefore, are not in a position to countenance the efforts made by Shri Mohokar, learned counsel. The appellate authority i.e. respondent No.1 – has also fallen in same error. It has also overlooked the fact that its conduct which is punishable departmentally and not the conviction which needs to be taken cognizance of. Order of the punishment dated 30.12.1991 as also appellate order dated 23.2.1994 are, therefore, unsustainable and the same are quashed and set aside. 3 years after the punishment, Champalal had reached he age of superannuation and he expired 14 years after the said superannuation. Thus, during his lifetime he actually suffered the punishment and hence, this judgment is of no practical utility for him. Hence, we see no point in placing the issue back before respondent no. 2 for reconsideration of the controversy.
19. The reinstatement cannot be given to Champalal and he has expired in year 2008. He reached the age of superannuation in March, 1994. There is nothing before us to show entitlement of deceased to back wages and hence wages from the date of removal till the date of superannuation can not be allowed and same are declined. We direct respondent No.2 to treat Champalal as superannuated after attaining his normal age of superannuation i.e. w.e.f. 31.3.1994. If he was otherwise eligible and not already paid, the pension payable to him upon such superannuation shall be calculated till the date of his death i.e. till 3.1.2008 within period of four months from today and fifty percent thereof shall be paid to his widow namely petitioner No.2 Smt. Leelabai Paliwal after completing necessary verification as per law. For the period after death of Champala, she or the other dependents shall be paid family pension in accordance with law after examining their entitlement to the same.
20. In case the pension is found payable to Champalal, his widow shall receive fifty percent of the amount of the arrears thereof, within period of six months from today. The person entitled to family pension shall receive the arrears of the family pension within further period of six months. The current family pension shall however be released to eligible person within 6 months from today. If this exercise is not completed within the stipulated period, the person entitled/widow shall be entitled to interest upon the amount remaining in arrears at the rates prescribed from time-to-time on Provident Fund.
21. The Writ Petition is thus partly allowed.
22. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No orders as to costs.