Judgment:
ORDER
1. Contesting parties in this appeal had sought reference under Section 30/31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for apportionment of compensation in respect of 24 bighas and 4 biswas of land located in khasra numbers 1627 (3-18), 1637/2 (2-8), 1642/3/2(00-5), 1645(4-16), 1652/1(2-7), 1653(4-16) and 1654 (5-14) in the revenue estate of Village- Nangal Dewat, Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as the 'subject land'), which stands decided against the appellants vide impugned order of 15th February, 1987, wherein appellants were referred to as Interested Parties No. 3 and 4 and the first respondent, as Interested Party No.1, whereas respondents No. 2 to 7 were referred as successors in interest of Interested Party No.2 (hereinafter referred to as I.Ps).
2. The finding returned in the impugned order against the appellants of their having lost the bhumidari rights in respect of the subject land, in view of the revenue record i.e khasra girdawari and khatoni of 1970-71, being in favour of the respondents, disentitling the appellants to seek apportionment of the compensation awarded vide Award No. 23 of 1973-74, is assailed by learned counsel for the appellants by urging as under:-
(i) The respondents never pleaded they ever dispossessed the appellants from the land in dispute either in the year 1968 or thereafter.
(ii) The respondents never led any evidence that they dispossessed the appellants in the year 1968 or thereafter.
(iii) That no issue was framed as to whether the appellants were disposed from the suit land or the respondents came in possession of the suit land at any point of time.
(iv) That in the face of the judgment Ex.IP3/2,the respondents never pleaded that they were not paid the sale consideration.
3. The decision of the civil court dt. 28.05.1968, Ex. I.P. 3/2, granting a declaratory decree in favour of the appellants of being owners in possession of khasra No. 1653 and 1654, measuring 10 bighas and 10 biswas in the revenue estate of Nangal Dewat, Delhi, operates as res-judicata as per learned counsel for the appellants and so according to appellants' counsel, the finding returned in the impugned order of afore-noted decision (Ex. I.P. 3/2) being not res-judicata because after the said decision, rights of the parties can be changed under the law, is legally erroneous.
4. It was vehemently contended by learned counsel for the appellants' that the revenue record i.e. khasra girdawari for the year 1971-72 (Ex. S-4) indicates that on account of sale, appellants are in possession of the subject land and thereafter, the said land stands vested in the government on account of it being acquired. It was also urged by appellants' counsel that there is no documentary evidence that the respondents ever came in possession of the land in dispute after executing Sale Deed of 12th March, 1956 (Ex. S-1).
5. It was asserted with much vehemence by learned counsel for the appellants' that recording of the revenue entries creates no title and is for fiscal purpose only and civil suit for cancellation and declaration of rights in respect of agricultural land with consequential relief of permanent injunction is maintainable before the civil court and that evidence beyond pleadings cannot be looked into and the Court cannot suo motto make out a new case and that declaration under Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 is mandatory, otherwise aforesaid provision of law would become redundant. To support the above assertions, reliance was placed upon decisions in 'National Textiles Corporation Ltd. Vs. Naresh Kumar Badrikumar Jagad and Ors'.' 2011 IX AD (SC) 413; ‘Anand Prakash and Ors. Vs. Sh. Ram Kala and Anr.' 2010 II AD (Delhi) 781; 'Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal and Anr.' 2009 (2) CCC 141 (SC); 'Jawahar Singh and Ors. Vs. Financial Commissioner and Ors.'144 (2007) DLT 53; Sarwarni Vs. Inder Kaur and Ors.' IV (1996) CLT 21 (SC); 'Tejkumar Balakrishna Ruia Vs. A.K.Menon and Anr', IV (1996) CLT 24 (SC) and 'Jattu Ram vs. Hakam Singh and Ors.' JT 1993 (5) SC 423. Thus, it was fervently urged by learned counsel for the appellants' that the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the claim petition of the appellants ought to be allowed.
6. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was urged that appellants' claim petition is vague, as khasra numbers therein are unspecified and the revenue record (Ex. G-1 to G-4) relied upon by the respondents, entitles them to the compensation awarded and the decision (Ex. IP-3/2) relied upon by the appellants, is a nullity in the eyes of law.
7. Contesting Respondents claim to have delivered the possession of the subject land to the government and at that time barley crops were grown on it and the possession of the subject land was always with the respondents. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents upon decisions in 'Rama Shankar and Anr. Vs. Mukhtiare and Anr.' 135 (2006) DLT 577 (DB); 'Selvel Advertising Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Globsyn Technologies Ltd.' 135 (2006) DLT 581; 'Balbir Singh Vs. Pehlad' AIR 1988 Delhi 312; 'Prakash Chand Kashyap Vs. Union of India' AIR 1988 Delhi 316 and 'Hatti Vs. Sunder Singh' AIR 1971 SC 2320 to highlight that Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 is a complete code and the exclusive jurisdiction with relation to the agricultural lands is with the revenue courts and the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain suit in respect of a matter which is covered by the aforesaid enactment. Reliance was also placed upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in 'Rama Shankar Vs. Mukhtiar' 135 (2006) DLT 577 to assert that the entitlement to compensation is of the bhumidars who are in possession of the land in question.
8. At the outset, it needs no reiteration that pleadings of the parties are of paramount importance and any evidence beyond the pleadings cannot be considered by the courts, who cannot build up a new case while exercising the civil jurisdiction. Certainly, Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 cannot be treated as redundant and that the revenue entries cannot extinguish or create title. It is equally true that the decision of the Apex Court in Hatti (Supra), declaring that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking declaration of bhumidari rights in view of Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, holds the field till date and a Single Bench decision in Anand Prakash (Supra), in which there is a reference to the decision in Hatti (Supra), holds that a suit for cancellation of a Will and declaration of being joint bhumidars of agricultural land with consequential relief of permanent injunction is maintainable, as it was found that the suit of this nature would not be covered by any entry of Schedule-I to Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.
9. Upon having considered the rival submissions advanced by both the sides and on scrutiny of the evidence on record, it emerges that the ratio of the aforesaid decision in Anand Prakash (Supra), squarely applies to the instant case, as the appellants had not sought declaration of bhumidari rights, which stands covered by entry at Serial No. 4 in Schedule -I of Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, and infact what was claimed by the appellants before the civil court was the devolution of the bhumidari rights upon the appellants by virtue of contesting respondents herein selling the subject land to the appellants herein and thus, the civil court decision in Ex. IP-3/2 clearly operates as res-judicata, as it confers the title of the subject land upon the appellants. It is being so said, as it has come in the evidence of the contesting respondents that Ghasi Ram and his brother had sold the entire land in dispute to Satya Prakash and his brother i.e. the appellants herein. In the aforesaid factual context, the decision in Hatti ((Supra) and Balbir Singh (Supra), is of no avail to the contesting respondents.
10. A Division Bench of this Court in Rama Shankar (Supra), in proceedings under Section 30/31 of the Land Acquisition Act, had held that the recorded owner of the land in question would be entitled to the compensation awarded. Thus, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Division Bench in Rama Shankar (Supra), and in the light of the admission of the respondents in evidence that they had sold the subject land to the appellants, coupled with the revenue record i.e. the mutation (Ex. G-3) recording that appellants are the owners of the subject land whereas its possession is still with the contesting respondents, I hold that the Reference Court in the impugned order has misread the aforesaid revenue record i.e. mutation (Ex. G-3) to answer the reference in favour of the contesting respondents. I am in complete agreement with the legal proposition culled out in Jawahar Singh (Supra), regarding mere possession by itself being insufficient when Sale Deed is set up and there-being no challenge to it on ground of fraud or collusion etc. As already observed above, mutation (Ex. G-3), recognizing the appellants as the owners of the subject land, though by itself does not confer title upon the appellants but the same is in consonance with the civil court decision in Ex. IP -3/2, conferring legal status upon the appellants in respect of the subject land.
11. In the face of the aforesaid analysis, finding in the impugned order that the appellants had lost their bhumidari rights merely because in the revenue record of the year 1970-71, contesting respondents were shown to be in possession of the subject land, is clearly erroneous, being contrary to the mutation (Ex. G-3) and the finding returned in the impugned order of civil court decision (Ex. IP-3/2) being not res-judicata because after the said decision, rights of the parties can be changed under the law, is neither here nor there, as old entries continuing in the revenue record would not confer right upon the contesting respondents to obtain the compensation in respect of the subject land, which admittedly they had sold to the appellants without any demur.
12. Resultantly, the impugned order is set aside and the claim petition of the appellants is allowed and that of the contesting respondents stands dismissed. This appeal stands disposed of in terms as aforesaid, while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.