Judgment:
S. Ravindra Bhat, J. 1. This common judgment will dispose of LPA 47/1994 and W.P.(C) 2549/2010. The appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in CWP 654/1980. The appellant is the Delhi Development Authority (hereafter referred to as “the DDA”), and the respondent in the appeal are the heirs of the original writ petitioners (hereafter referred to as “the original land owners”). The writ petitioner (in WP (C) 2549/2010, hereafter “Gupta Machine Tools”) claims a direction to the effect that the lands which are the subject matter of the appeal, were never acquired in accordance with law and seeks consequential directions. The said writ petitioner claims rights through the original landowners.
2. The facts necessary for deciding the appeal and the petition are that on 13.11.1959, a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 proposing to acquire a vast tract of land which included the lands of the original writ petitioner (hereafter called “the suit lands”). By a notification dated 15.12.1966, declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter called the “Acquisition Act”) was issued. The original land owner claimed to be owner of agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 1279/1203/170, measuring 2 bighas 17 biswa and Khasra No. 1277/1203/2/70, measuring 3 bighas and 11 biswas in Village Kilokari, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi. These were the suit lands. The original land owner filed the Writ Petition 654/1980 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, alleging inter alia that the Delhi Master Plan, after considering all the materials, was finally prepared on 30.11.1961 and the Central Government approved it and consequently published it on 01.09.1962. Citing Section 15 of the Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 (hereafter called “the Development Act”) and other provisions, more particularly, Section 55, the land owner contended that since the Zonal Plan in respect of the area within which the suit lands were located, were published on 21.03.1967, the 10-year period within which land could be acquired, had expired in March 1977. The original landowner’s writ petition thus sought a direction that the suit lands were not required to be kept open or in an unbuilt space nor were they subject to compulsory acquisition and that a direction ought to be given to the DDA to revoke the previous notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The land owner relied upon a notice issued to the original respondents, particularly the DDA, containing details of the ownership of the land, calling upon the DDA to either acquire or take possession of the land within six months of the date of the notice, i.e. 24.05.1979.
3. During the pendency of the writ petition, learned Single Judge had issued an ad-interim order by virtue of which any action taken in respect of the land in dispute would be subject to the result of the writ petition. The original land owner had received a notice issued by the Land Acquisition Collector, which was a notice under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, pertaining to the award. The notice was resisted on behalf of the land owner Bishan Devi by a reply dated 18.08.1986, stating that the suit land could not be acquired in view of the pendency of the writ petition.
4. On 17.09.1986, again during the pendency of the landowner’s writ petition, Award No. 223/86-87 was published in regard to the suit lands. Eventually, the writ petition was heard and allowed on 29.03.1993. Learned Single Judge, placed reliance on the judgment in Sahib Singh v. UOI 38 (1989) DLT 127 and ScindiaPotteries Ltd. v. UOI (W.P.(C) 21/1974, decided on 05.12.1977). It was held in those decisions that if DDA does not acquire land for six months after notice is issued on behalf of the land owner, under Section 55 of the Development Act, the lands are free from acquisition. The relevant reasoning in the impugned judgment reads as follows:
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The provision of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act came up for interpretation in writ petition No.21/74, Sindia Potteries Ltd. v. Union of India decided on 5th December, 1977 and subsequently in the case of Sahib Singh v. Union of India reported in 38 (1989) DLT 127. In both these cases it was held that when a notice under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act is issued, and the Administration does not acquire the land for a period of 6 months, thereafter, the lands are free from notice of acquisition. It is an admitted case on record that after the service of notice dated 24th May, 1979 the respondent did not take a decision to acquire the land. It is apparent that even after more than 30 years, the respondent has not shown any inclination or intention to acquire the land inspite of the notice under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act having been received by them.
Under these circumstances, the writ petition has to succeed and is accordingly hereby allowed. The lands in question are free from notice of acquisition. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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5. An appeal filed against the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge was dismissed for non-prosecution on 16.02.2001. Consequently, the stay of the impugned order, made at the outset when the appeal was admitted, stood vacated. Eventually, a Division Bench of this Court heard the application for restoration of the appeal. At that stage, Gupta Machine Tools also filed an application, being C.M. No. 3765/2006, seeking impleadment. The Court allowed the applications subject to payment of costs and at the same time observed as follows:
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…………..Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that there is a huge and unexplained delay in taking proper steps in accordance with law by the Appellant and in the meanwhile a right has been created in favour of a third party with the Respondent having received the entire consideration for transferring possession of the property to that third party. It is submitted that in view of these developments, the appeal ought not to be restored to its original number. It is also submitted that in respect of some other property adjoining the land in question a No Objection Certificate was issued for transferring the land by the concerned authority in the Delhi Administration primarily on the ground that the present appeal was dismissed.
In our opinion, there is no doubt that the manner in which the appeal was handled by the Appellant leaves much to be desired. But, we cannot overlook the fact that the land was acquired for the purposes of the planned development of Delhi, nor can we overlook the fact that Scindia Potteries, on which the learned Single Judge relied, was set aside by the Full Bench of this Court and the judgment of the Full Bench was upheld by the Supreme Court. It is quite clear that as at present advised, the Appellant has a good prima facie case on merits in the appeal. This is also, incidentally, recorded in the order dated 13th March, 2000 passed by the Division Bench.
In so far as the submission of learned counsel for the Respondents that the delay is unexplained, we find that the Appellant has explained the delay in the application, extracts of which we have quoted above. It is not as if there is a day to day explanation given by the Appellant, but it is quite clear that there is an overall explanation which clearly suggests that the matter was not handled with due care and caution. However, the negligence of the Appellant should not be allowed to override the public interest in the acquisition of the land in question.
In so far as the creation of rights in a third party is concerned, we are of the opinion that no rights of title have been created in that third party. There is no agreement to sell made out in favour of the third party, let alone any sale deed. All that has been executed is a Will and a proposed sale deed along with a General Power of Attorney to deal with the land. These documents can hardly be said to create any rights in the third party. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate how third party interests are involved which could non-suit the Appellant.
Under the circumstances, taking a broad view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Appellant has made out a case for restoration of the appeal as well as for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration.
We, therefore, allow both CM Nos. 2722-2733/2006 subject to costs of Rs. 25,000/- to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondents within six weeks.
CM No. 3765/2006 (Impleadment)
This is an application for impleadment filed by M/s Gupta Machine Tools Ltd. who claim to have taken possession of the land in question from the Respondents.
There is no serious objection to this application and so we allow the application for impleadment and permit M/s Gupta Machine Tools Ltd. to make its submissions at the final hearing of the appeal.
The application is allowed. Amended Memo of Parties be filed in two weeks.
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6. The appeal was again dismissed on 21.04.2001 for non-compliance with regard to payment of costs. However, by order dated 08.08.2011, the appeal was finally restored and enhanced costs was directed to be paid by the DDA.
Contentions of DDA
7. Learned counsel for the DDA argued that the premise on which the impugned judgment in the LPA was based, was the prevailing legal understanding that in the event of a legal notice, in line with Section 55 was issued, calling upon the authorities to acquire lands covered by a Master Plan, it was incumbent upon them to acquire the lands within six months, failing which the power of acquisition could not be exercised. Learned counsel emphasized that this understanding or reasoning was based on an erroneous interpretation of Section 55 of the Development Act. The error which crept in through the decision in ScindiaPotteries (supra) was repeated in Sahib Singh (supra) and merely followed in the impugned judgment. In this respect, learned counsel relied upon the Full Bench decision in RoshnaraBegum v. UOI AIR 1996 Del 206 to state that the view contained in Sahib Singh and Scindia were disapproved and the restricted manner in which Section 55 was interpreted was held incorrect. It was also emphasized that the Full Bench reasoning with regard to interpretation of Section 55 of the Development Act was approved by the Supreme Court in Murariand Others v. UOI and Others 1997 (1) SCC 15.
8. Learned counsel for the DDA emphasized that the original land owner herself was clear that the suit lands were covered by acquisition and in fact, refused to participate in the award making process by stating about the pendency of the writ petition. In her writ petition, which was allowed by the impugned judgment, there was no mention of the fact that the lands were not subject to acquisition; no attempt was made by her to contend that the award – made in 1986 – was in any way flawed or unsustainable. In these circumstances, it could not be said more than 25 years later, in an impleadment application, by a third party, i.e. Gupta Machine Tools that the award was void. Learned counsel also questioned the locus standi of Gupta Machine Tools to maintain a writ proceeding in respect of the suit land, contending that it was neither recorded owner nor had it acquired any interest in them before the acquisition process began. Learned counsel relied upon some of the documents placed on the record and contended that Gupta Machine Tools had, in fact, sought to indulge in suppression of material facts and that its attempts to claim ownership or interest in the land cannot be countenanced. Learned counsel relied upon the provisions of the Delhi Restriction on Transfer of Land Act, 1972 as well as the decision of the Supreme Court reported as MeeraSahni v. Lieutenant Governor and Others 2008 (9) SCC 177.
9. It was urged on behalf of the DDA that even otherwise this Court should not entertain challenge to the award made in 1986, when the original land owner never chose to do so. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Aflatoonv. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi 1975 (4) SCC 285 as well as the decisions in VishwasNagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association v. Under Secretary, Delhi Administration 1990 (2) SCC 268 and RamjasFoundation and Others v. UOI and Ors 1993 (Supp) 2 SCC 20. Learned counsel emphasized that precisely the same grounds were taken into consideration in Aflatoon(supra) by the Supreme Court and the writ petition therein challenging the culmination of the acquisition proceedings, was held to be barred by laches.
Contentions of the land owner:
10. Learned senior counsel, Sh. Ravi Gupta, argued that the decision in RoshnaraBegum (supra) was premised upon the zonal plans not having been finalized. In the present case, pleadings clearly demonstrated that Zonal Plans had in fact been finalized in 1967 and that the 10-year period envisioned by Section 55 had ended. Consequently, the plain text of the provision had to be given effect to which was done in the impugned judgment. It was urged that if the DDA wished to acquire the land once the Zonal Plan was notified, the 10 year period provided by Section 55 was adequate for it to muster its resources. Upon the expiry of that period, it lost the jurisdiction and competence to deal with such lands to the extent they were notified in the Zonal Plans for the purpose of acquisition. Therefore, it was urged that the impugned judgment does not call for any interference. Learned counsel for the land owner also urged in addition that even though the question of suit land not being covered by the award had not been urged specifically, the fact remained that the acquisition had been quashed. Once the acquisition was quashed, the jurisdiction to make an award was subject to the final picture of the proceedings. DDA, however, chose to rely upon completely irrelevant facts and the Land Acquisition Collector made an award in respect of a notification which did not cover the suit lands in 1986. This was an aspect that the Court should in exercise of its award and jurisdiction under Article 226 not lose sight of, whether or not a ground in that regard is urged. It was also emphasized that as a consequence of the DDA’s appeal being dismissed for non-compliance in the year 2001, the land owner was free to seize the suit lands; resultantly, transactions with Gupta Machine Tools did take place and it acquired an interest. Consequently, the ground urged by Gupta Machine Tools too was available to the landlord, in DDA’s appeal in defence of the impugned judgment.
Contentions of Gupta Machine Tools, in W.P.(C) 2549/2010
11. In W.P. 2549/2010, Gupta Machine Tools argued that the suit lands are not the subject matter of acquisition since the award (bearing no. 223/86-87) dated 17.09.1986 is illegal and void. The main contention here is that the said award was made pursuant to notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, dated 13.11.1959 whereas the suit lands was in fact sought to be acquired under notification published under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, on 24.10.1961. It was submitted that the award relied upon, i.e. 223/86-87, is premised upon the Section 4 Notification being issued on 13.11.1959 and, therefore, the assessment of compensation was as on that date. This not only shows utter non-application of mind but in fact nullified the award since the notice of acquisition under Section 4 was in fact issued later. In support of the submission, senior counsel for Gupta Machine Tools relied upon the Division ruling of this Court in KalkaPrasad Aggarwal v. Lieutenant Governor (judgment dated 16.03.2010 in W.P. 12974-75/2006). In that case too, the Division Bench was confronted with a similar situation where the impugned award had cited the Section 4 Notification dated 13.11.1959 repeatedly whereas in truth, the suit lands were not included in that notification. Other decisions, such as SandeepKakkar v. UOI 111 (2004) DLT 291, Sh. Matwal Chand v. UOI 2004 (75) DRJ 461 were also relied upon.
Points for consideration:
12. The above discussion would reveal that the following points arise for consideration:
(1) Whether on a fair reading of Section 55 of the Development Act and the decision of the Full Bench in RoshnaraBegum (supra), the suit lands could not be subject matter of acquisition after expiry of the six months period, from the date of notice issued by the land owner?;
(2) Is Gupta Machine Tools’ writ petition maintainable; if so is it entitled to the reliefs claimed?
Analysis and Findings
Point No.1
13. Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act reads as follows:
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55. Plans to stand modified in certain cases
(1) Where any land situated in any area in Delhi is required by the master plan or a zonal development plan to be kept as an open space or unbuilt upon or is designated in any such plan as subject to compulsory acquisition, then, if at the expiration of ten years from the date of operation of the plan under section 11 or where such land, has been so required or designated by any amendment of such plan, from the date of operation of such amendment, the land is not compulsorily acquired, the owner of the land may 1[serve on the Central Government a notice] requiring his interest in the land to be so acquired.
(2) If the Central Government fails to acquire the land within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the notice, the master plan or, as the case may be, the zonal development plan shall have effect, after the expiration of the said six months as if the land were not required to be kept as an open space or unbuilt upon or were not designated as subject to compulsory acquisition. ”
14. A reading of the impugned judgment (in the landowner’s writ petition) would reveal that the court followed the reasoning in ScindiaPotteries and SahebSingh. In those cases, the court held that if a landowner issued a notice under Section 55 of the Development Act, the DDA had the choice of acquiring his lands within six months, failing which it could not do so. The reasoning in those judgments were doubted, and the matter was referred to a Full Bench, which in RoshanaraBegum held that such a restricted interpretation of the powers of the DDA were unwarranted. The relevant extracts from RoshanaraBegum read as follows:
“(82) In order that Section 55 could come into operation, the first element which must be established is that the particular land is designated in Master Plan or the Zonal Development Plan for compulsory acquisition. It is admitted fact that in the present cases no Zonal Development Plans have been prepared for the localities where the land in question, subject matter of the present cases, is located. So, we have to see whether the learned Single Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that land, which has been notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition for planned development of Delhi, can be deemed to be designated in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.
(83) The Master Plan is prepared under Section 7 of the Act. The Master Plan is to define the various zones into which Delhi may be divided for the purpose of development and indicate the manner in which the land in each zone is proposed to be used (whether by carrying out thereon of development or otherwise) and the stages by which any such development shall be carried out and shall serve as a basic pattern of framework within which the Zonal Development Plans of the various zones may be prepared. The Master Plan can provide for any other matter which is necessary for the proper development of Delhi. The Master Plan was prepared under the said provision and was put into force w.e.f. 1st September 1962.
(84) SH.P.N.LEKHI, senior counsel, has urged before us that looking to the various "pages of the Master Plan, particularly page Iii and pages 3, 5, 10 to 22, 38, 39, 42, 71 and 86, it would be quite clear as to what land was required for compulsory acquisition for carrying out the development and thus any notification issued either prior to the enforcement of the Master Plan or after the enforcement of the Master Plan for acquiring the land for the planned development of Delhi would mean that the said land stands specified in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.
(85) He has referred to the meaning of the word "designated" appearing in the Oxford Dictionary, Words and Phrases. In nutshell the meaning of the word 'Designated' is to mark, point out, indicate or specify or describe. Same meaning appear also in Black's Law Dictionary which indicates that the word means to mark, trace, denote by indication, to point out, to -particularise. We have gone through the various pages of the Master Plan and we find that the Master Plan had generally indicated the land which is under use for different purposes and land which may be generally required for development purposes. It is not possible to hold that particular land has been specified or earmarked or pointed out or indicated for compulsory acquisition in Delhi by the Master Plan. Only indication in the Master Plan is in general way and not in particular or specific way as to which land is to be required for compulsory acquisiton. Section 55 does not say that if any notification had been issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land for public purpose of planned development of Delhi, then the said notification would lapse if the said land is not acquired within the stipulated period after the interested person had given any notice. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act also does not require the authority to specify any particular land. Only requirement is to indicate the locality in which the and is sought to be acquired. It is only if the declaration issued under Section 6 in respect of a specific land that it can be said that a particular land has now been earmarked for compulsory acquisition but that also would be under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. May be the notifications under Section 4 and 6, if issued for the planned development of Delhi, would mean by inference that the land so sought to be acquired would be developed in accordance with the Master Plan and the Zonal Plans to be brought into existence under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act. But it cannot be said with any rationality that the said kind would be* deemed to have been so designated for compulsory acquisition for the purposes of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act. Mere fact that in the Master Plan no area has been so designated for compulsory acquisition would not mean that Section 55 of the Act required any such designation being made in the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan and if no such* designation had been made, the land cannot be acquired for planned development of Delhi.
(86) It may be also emphasised that notification issued in 1959 for planned development of Delhi was upheld by the Supreme Court in case of Aflatoon and it was noticed that some interim plan had been prepared in respect of development in Delhi and land so sought to be acquired as per notification issued in 1959 would be needed for the development of Delhi in accordance with the said interim plan. But that would not mean that the land so notified under the Land Acquisition Act would be deemed to be designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan itself. Unless and until in the Master Plan itself the land is designated meaning thereby is specified, particularised, earmarked or pointed out, provisions of Section 55 would not come into play at all and such designation should be also indicated in the Master Plan itself that it was for compulsory acquisition
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(102) The Supreme Court in M.Satyanarayana Vs. State of Karnataka A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 7762 has laid down that a statute cannot be construed merely with reference to grammar. Statute, whenever the language permits, must be construed reasonably and rationally to give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature. The expression *and* has generally a cumulative effect, requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together and it is the antithesis of 'or.
(103) If the Legislature intended that the land should be only specified in a Master Plan for compulsory acquisition and not in the Zonal Development Plan, then the Legislature would have used some different expressions in Section 55 of the Act. By having mentioned both,, the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan, in Section 55, the intention of the Legislature is obvious that if a particular land has been designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan, the same would normally be also designed so in the Zonal Development Plan which is a more detailed plan specifying various purposes for which a particular land in that particular zone is to be used. The Master Plan only generally indicates the different zones for purposes of various activities like residential, industrial, residential-cum-commercial or commercial and for institutional purposes. So, the Land Use Plan, which is prepared under the Master Plan, indicates generally the purposes for which land so indicated is to be used. It is only in the Zonal Development Plans that details are worked out and specifications are made for use of the said land even if the Land Use Plan of the Master Plan shows a residential area, it is the Zonal Development Plan which would indicate as to what sort of commercial and institutional places are to be indicated for more beneficial use of the residential area. So, keeping in view the object and purpose of preparing the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plans which is in pursuance to the object of having a planned development of Delhi indicates that if the particular land had been designated for compulsory acquisition, it is so designated not only for purpose of the Master Plan but also for the purpose of the Zonal Development Plan and in order to give full meaning to the object which was in view of the Legislature while drafting Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, we are of the view that the word 'or' appearing in between "the Master Plan" and "the Zonal Development Plan" in this Section should be read as 'and'.
(104) Assuming that the argument advanced by Mr.Lekhi is correct that once the land is notified for compulsory acquisition in Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition . Act, it would be deemed to have been so designed in the Master Plan, even then the provisions of Section 55 would not come into force till the Zonal Development Plan is also prepared and thereafter 10 years period had lapsed and the land so designated is not acquired within the stipulated period after service of notice, only in that situation, it may be possible to say that the land has gone out of the expression 'compulsory acquisition' used in Section 55 of the Act. It is not possible to agree with the contention that if the land is deemed to be designated for the purpose of the Master Plan, it would not be deemed to be designated by same inference for the purpose of the Zonal Development Plan.
(105) It is well settled rule of interpretation that the words used in particular provision should be given their natural meaning and court is not empowered to legislate. It is only where there is some ambiguity in the words used by the Legislature that the court has to give meaning to those words keeping in view the object for which the legislation was brought into existence. (See in this connection Shri Ram Vs State of Maharashtra, , Shiv Ram Anand Vs Radha Bai Shanta Ram, , S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and another, and State of Kerala Vs Mathai Verghese 1986(1) Scc 746), Keeping in view the plain language of Section 55. it has to be held that the Master Plan itself if indicated particular land for compulsory acquisition, only then Section 55(2) would be applicable.
(106) The authorities had deliberately not shown any particular land in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition although notifications have been issued from time to time for compulsory acquisition of the land for purposes of planned development of Delhi which, of course, has to be in accordance with the Master Plan or the Zonal Development Plan as the case may. But it cannot be said that once the notifications have been issued under Section 4 and declarations under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land subject-matter of such notifications and declarations would be deemed to be shown in the Master Plan as designated for compulsory acquisition. Looking to the constraints of limitation prescribed under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act the authorities might have advisably thought fit not to show any particular land whatsoever in the Master Plan as designated for compulsory acquisition. Whether the authorities had, due to their inertia or negligence or deliberate omission, led the things to remain status quo and they have no good explanation for not completing the acquisition proceedings in a reasonable time even then the ground of challenge to such acquisition proceedings could not be on the basis of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act which can be resorted to only if a particular land had been clearly designated in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.
(107) In view of the above discussion, we hold that in the present cases before us, Section 55 was not at all invokable as n land has been at all designated in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.”
15. The Full Bench decision was appealed against, by special leave, to the Supreme Court. In its judgment reported as P. Murari v Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 15, RoshanaraBegum was approved and affirmed. The relevant extracts of Murari, read as follows:
“12. Learned counsel for the appellants as well as the counsel appearing for the transfer petitioners also strenuously urged with great force that the land was sought to be acquired for the planned development of Delhi and, therefore the provisions of Delhi Development, Act, 1957 became applicable to such acquisition of land and the acquisition or land can be made only in accordance with master plan and zonal plans to be framed under the Delhi Development Act. It was contended that on the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of the land for planned development of Delhi it has to be inferred that the land which was notified under Section 4 of the Act for planned development of Delhi is the land designated for compulsory acquisition within the meaning of Sub-Section (1) of Section 55 of the Delhi Act but as the land sought to be acquired was not so acquired within the period of six months from the date of service of notice under sub-section (2) of section 55 of the said Act by the land owners, therefore after the expiry of the period of 10 years of the coming into force of the master plan, the land sought to be acquired went out of the compulsory acquisition and the same would be deemed to have been released from acquisition. It was submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 55 provides that the owner of the land may serve on the Central Government a notice requiring his interest in the land to be acquired and if the Central Government fails to acquire the land within the period of six months the same shall have the effect as if the land were not required to be kept as an open space or unbuilt or were not designated as subject to compulsory acquisition. It was asserted that since some of the land owners whose land was sought to be acquired had given such notice to the Central Government but the Central Government did not acquire the land within the specified period and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings must be quashed on that account. After a careful consideration of the submissions made above, we are of the view that there is absolutely no merit in this contention. It must be shown that the particular land is designated in the master plan of zonal development plan which is the subject matter of acquisition.
13. It may be pointed out that in the present case before us no zonal development plans were prepared with regard to the said land. In the master plan there is no particularisation of any land which can be said to be required for compulsory acquisition under the Delhi Act. Neither Section 55 nor any other provisions of the Delhi Act contain any inhibition for acquisition of the land for the public purposes of planned development of Delhi under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. As said earlier, the notifications under section 4 of the Act were already issued between the period from 1959 to 1965 as a result of which the application of Section 55 of the Delhi Act was locked up by virtue of acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act. This apart the land cannot be acquired within the period of six months as contemplated in Section 55 of the Delhi Act unless an agreement under Section 11(2) of the Act has reached because if the objections are filed under Section 5-A or in response to notice under Section 9 and 10 the proceedings are bound to consume considerable time beyond the prescribed limit of six months contained in Section 55 of the Delhi Act. It is for these reasons that Section 15(1) was enacted in the Delhi Act which provides interalia that if in the opinion of the Central Government any land is required for the purpose of development, or for any other purpose, under the said Act, (Delhi Act) so the Central Government may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. It is thus distinctly clear that despite the enforcement of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 Section 15 (1) thereof lays down that the land for the purposes of development may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. This contention was also advanced before the High Court, The Full Bench of the High Court after considering the arguments at length and taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration recorded the following conclusion:-
“Assuming that the argument advanced by Mr. Lekhi is correct that once the land is notified for compulsory acquisition in Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, it would be deemed to have been so designated in the master plan, even then the provisions of Section 55 would not come into force till the zonal development plan is also prepared and thereafter 10 years period had elapsed and the land so designated is not acquired within the stipulated period after service of notice, only in that situation, it may be possible to say that the land has gone out of the expression of compulsory acquisition used in Section 55 of the Act. It is not possible to agree with the contentions that the land is deemed to be designated for the purpose of master plans it would not be deemed to be designated by same inference for the purpose of zonal development plan."
We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High Court referred to above. Thus the argument based on the provision of Section 55 (1) and (2) of the Delhi Act have no merit and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained.”
16. The decision in RoshanaraBegum is now authoritative in that in the absence of particularization of land in the Master Plan, there is no question of Section 55 applying to denude the authorities of their power of eminent domain under the Acquisition Act. Furthermore, the Full Bench pertinently held that:
“Section 55 does not say that if any notification had been issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land for public purpose of planned development of Delhi, then the said notification would lapse if the said land is not acquired within the stipulated period after the interested person had given any notice.”
17. The above interpretation is in consonance with the settled principle of statutory interpretation that unless statutory power is curtailed expressly or through necessary implication, courts should not, by the interpretive process of their judgments, trench on those. Thus, there is a presumption against implied repeal, which was explained by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v Kedia Leather and Liquors AIR 2003 SC 3236 in the following manner:
“14. The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature, which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the court applies the doctrine, it does not more than give effect to the intention of the Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of the construction and comparison of the two statutes. The Court leans against implying a repeal, "unless two Act are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied, or that there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together." (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 366, with reference to Re: Barry (1936) Ch. 274). To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earlier, it is necessary to scrutinize the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of the earlier Act. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two enactments. The area of operation in the Code and the pollution laws in question are different with wholly different aims and objects; and though they alleviate nuisance, that is not of identical nature. They operate in their respective fields and there is no impediment for their existence side by side.”
18. Section 53 (2) provides in the most general manner that provisions of the Development Act would override other provisions in any law, rule, regulation, which are inconsistent with its provision. Significantly, the said enactment itself refers to provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, in other places, but does not affect its operation in any specific manner. Therefore, there is no statutory clue that Parliament intended Section 55 to curtail or limit the powers, under the Land Acquisition Act, except in circumstances when any land is specifically mentioned in the Master Plan or any Zonal Plan. Furthermore, as held by the Supreme Court in Murari(supra) by reason of previous notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the lands were “locked up”:
“As said earlier, the notifications under section 4 of the Act were already issued between the period from 1959 to 1965 as a result of which the application of Section 55 of the Delhi Act was locked up by virtue of acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act.”
19. The Supreme Court, as noticed earlier, expressly affirmed the reasoning in RoshanaraBegum. This Court also notices that the process of acquisition had already begun, and even completed, through the declaration in 1966, under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act, when the notice was issued on behalf of the original landowner, in 1979. Having regard to these facts, and the circumstance that the reasoning in ScindiaPotteries and Sahib Singh was disapproved and overruled by the Full Bench, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The first point is, therefore, answered in favour of the DDA, the appellant.
Point No.2
20. This question, as to maintainability of Gupta Machine Tools’ writ petition, arises on account of the two fold objection by DDA and the Central Government, viz the said writ petitioner has no locus standi, and that the petition is barred by laches.
21. The main argument of Gupta Machine Tools, in its writ petition, is that the Award, made during pendency of the landowner’s writ petition, is no award in the eye of law, as it is premised on an irrelevant Section 4 notification dated 13-11-1959. The notification which sought to acquire the suit lands was issued in 1961, and the Section 6 declaration was issued on 15th December, 1966. Thus, the award, which cited the earlier and inapplicable notification, and proceeded to calculate compensation on that basis, is void. Since the award has no legal status, and the time to make a new award is long gone, the suit lands are not subject to acquisition, and the Court should declare it to be so, and make consequential directions.
22. DDA contends that Gupta Machine Tools was never the landowner, and the original landowner never asserted this ground. On the other hand, the landowner’s notice, issued before she approached the court, was that the time provided by Section 55 had passed, as a result of which the acquisition was vitiated. DDA and the Central Government both urged that the landowner, on receiving notice to lodge claims, and upon receiving notice of award, never protested that the award could not have been made, or that it was premised on an inapplicable notification. Further, the landowner, even after becoming aware of the award, chose not to amend the writ petition, and incorporate any ground about the award being vitiated as is sought to be argued by Gupta Machine Tools. Therefore, the contention cannot be accepted. Gupta Machine Tools’ locus standi is suspect because it could not have acquired any interest as long as the writ petition was pending, or even the appeal. It was also submitted that the provisions of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 prohibits such transactions. Section 3 of the said Act reads as follows:
“No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union territory of Delhi which has been acquired by the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose.”
23. The question of locus standi of Gupta Machine Tools requires examination first. The pendency of the appeal, and the existence of stay of judgment of the learned Single Judge, meant that the validity of the notification pertaining to suit lands was still not finally decided; the operation of the order quashing it stood suspended, pending final decision. The dismissal of the appeal, and the hiatus created during the period when the appeal was not restored to the original file of the court does not afford any comfort to Gupta Machine Tools, because eventually, it was restored, and it is nobody’s case that provisions of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act were complied with. The original landowner, as well as Gupta Machine Tools, do not rely on any document which creates, or passes title in favour of the latter. It is in this context that the observations of the Supreme Court in MeeraSahni (supra) become relevant. The Court first noticed the imperative nature of provisions of the said enactment, and also recalled previous rulings (U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow (1996) 3 SCC 124 SnehPrabha (Smt) and others vs. State of U.P. and Anr (1996) 7 SCC 426; Ajay Kishan Shinghal and Ors. vs. Union of India (1996) 10 SCC 721 and Star Wire (India) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698) which had held that during pendency of acquisition processes, landowners cannot seek to transfer title. The Court, after these, held as follows:
„The competent authority as envisaged under Section 2(b) of the aforesaid Act is, therefore, the Additional District Magistrate (Revenue), Delhi Administration and he is the only authorized competent person to exercise the powers vested under sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Delhi lands Act. No other authority or anyone else, subordinate to him was ever authorized to exercise the aforesaid power.
18. On perusal of the documents placed on record we find that the permission/NOC which is referred to and relied on by all the appellants herein appears to have been issued not by the Additional District Magistrate, who is the competent authority in the present case. The same appears to have been issued by some person signing for Tehsildar and for Additional District Magistrate. In any case Tehsildar is also not authorized to act as a competent authority as envisaged under Section 5, 6 and 8 of the Delhi Lands Act. Neither were we informed nor was any evidence placed on record identifying the authority or the person on whose instructions the aforesaid two documents were prepared. Therefore, the aforesaid documents which are relied on cannot be said to be valid and legal permission granted by the competent authority under the provisions of the Act permitting transfer of land by way of sale to the present appellants.”
24. In this case, as held earlier, the transaction sought to be relied on, was much after the acquisition process had begun, and in any event, after the declaration under Section 6. No permission in terms of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act was sought or given. As a consequence, Gupta Machine Tools did not possess the necessary locus standi to maintain a writ petition. Furthermore, the incongruity of the entire situation is starkly brought home by the fact that the individual who could have taken the ground urged, i.e the original landowner, chose not to do so during the pendency of the writ petition, and even during the appeal. Gupta Machine Tools has sought to highlight this, in 2010, through its writ petition. The petition is held to be barred as brought about by an incompetent person, who had no locus standi to claim any relief in respect of the suit land.
25. The next question relates to laches. Counsel for the respondent landowner and Gupta Machine Tools had relied heavily on KalkaPrasad Aggarwal (supra), where too, the Division Bench had to deal with a set of facts in which the award was made with reference to a notification that did not include the suit lands. However, one vital aspect which the Court considered in that writ petition was that the ground appeared to have been urged at the relevant time, and was taken by the landowner, at the outset, unlike in this case. In this regard, the Court recollects the Constitution Bench judgment in Aflatoon(supra) on the question of laches. The Supreme Court held, in that context that a landowner who approaches for relief, after the declaration under Section 6 is issued, cannot contend about illegality:
“We do not think that the appellants were vigilant. That apart, the appellants did not contend before the High Court that as the particulars of the public purpose were not specified in the notification issued under s. 4, they were prejudiced in that they could not effectively exercise their right under s. 5A. As the plea was not raised by the appellants in the writ petitions filed before the High Court, we do not think that the appellants are entitled to have the plea considered in these appeals. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the, notification even after the publication of the declaration under s. 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the, public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under s. 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the, acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under s. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be, putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitionsare liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners..”
More recently, in Banda Development Authy, Banda vs Moti Lal Agarwal and Ors. 2011 (5) SCC 394, it was held that:
16. It is true that no limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but one of the several rules of self imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will not entertain petitions filed after long lapse of time because that may adversely affect the settled/crystallized rights of the parties. If the writ petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar cause, the High Court will treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the grievance of the petitioner on merits. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench considered the effect of delay in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and held :
“..It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it......It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any Rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general Rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
..........Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable.”
18. In Ajodhya Bhagat v. State of Bihar (1974) 2 SCC 501, this Court approved dismissal by the High Court of the writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing the acquisition of his land and observed:
“The High Court held that the appellants were guilty of delay and laches. The High Court relied on two important facts. First, that there was delivery of possession. The appellants alleged that it was a paper transaction. The High Court rightly rejected that contention. Secondly, the High Court said that the Trust invested several lakhs of rupees for the construction of roads and material for development purposes. The appellants were in full knowledge of the same. The appellants did not take any steps. The High Court rightly said that to allow this type of challenge to an acquisition of large block of land piecemeal by the owners of some of the plots in succession would not be proper. If this type of challenge is encouraged the various owners of small plots will come up with writ petitions and hold up the acquisition proceedings for more than a generation. The High Court rightly exercised discretion against the appellants. We do not see any reason to take a contrary view to the discretion exercised by the High Court.”
26. In an earlier judgment, State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi (1996) 6 SCC 445, the Supreme Court held that if acquisition of land is held to be legally indefensible, or even void, the High Court can be justified in refusing to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction if there is delay:
“The order or action, if ultra vires the power, it becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for ; the award of the Court under Section 26 enhancing the compensation was accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. The order of the appellate court had also become final. Under those circumstances, the acquisition proceedings having become final and the compensation determined also having become final, the High Court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing the notification under Section 4 [1] and declaration under Section 6.”
27. In view of the above position, it is held that Gupta Machine Tools’ petition questioning the acquisition, in 2010 is not maintainable; the relief claimed by it, as well as through it, by the original landowner, is barred by the principle of laches.
28. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that DDA’s appeal, against the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in CWP 654/1980 has to succeed. The said impugned judgment is set aside. LPA 47/1994 is allowed. The Petitioner in WP (C) 2549/2010 cannot, for the same reasons, be given any relief. The said writ petition, is therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs.