ManjulaChellur, Ag. C.J.
The present reference became inevitable on account of two divergent views expressed by two Division Benches while interpreting the award of the Industrial Tribunal which was referred to in I.D. No.27 of 2002 dated 15.12.2004. Having regard to the facts on record which led to the present situation, it would only be proper to narrate the brief history of the past litigation.
2. When a dispute arose between Petty Contract Workers and Contract Line Workers on one side and the Kerala State Electricity Board (for short 'Board') on other side in respect of regularisation of service of Petty Contract Workers and Contract Line Workers, Government as per G.O.(Rt) No.2929/2002/LBR dated 27.09.2002 referred the following question for consideration to the Industrial Tribunal, Palakkad:-
"whether the demand for regularisation of the services of petty contract workers and contract line workers by KSEB is justifiable?If so what relief they are entitled to?"This reference of the Government in I.D. No.27/2002 came to be disposed of by the Industrial Tribunal by an award dated 15.12.2004 in favour of petty contract workers and workmen worked along with them for regularisation and in that process Tribunal issued relevant directions.
3. By filing W.P.(C) No.28836 of 2005, Board challenged the award of the Industrial Tribunal on several grounds. Ultimately the writ petition came to be dismissed subject to the clarifications given in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Two writ appeals came to be filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.28836 of 2005. W.A. No.627 of 2008 was filed by the Board and W.A. No.615 of 2008 was filed by one of the Unions, a party to the award. W.A. No. 627 of 2008 filed by the Board was considered and disposed of by a judgment dated 10.07.2008 as per Ext.P5 holding that the award does not say that regularisation should be done from Exts.W23 and W24 series lists only. W.A. No.615 of 2008 filed by the Union also came to be dismissed by another Division Bench on 22.10.2008 as per Ext.P6, wherein it was held that the regularisation is to be restricted only to such of those workmen whose name find a place in Exts.W23 and W24 series appended to the award.
4. A Special Leave Petition came to be preferred challenging both the judgments of Division Bench at Exts.P5 and P6. Both the Petitions came to be dismissed on 12.03.2010 opining that there is no good ground to interfere and petitions deserve to be dismissed. Subsequently Board issued a Circular dated 16.09.2010 to implement the award of the Tribunal. In this Circular it is said, a State wise seniority list of petty contract workers and contract line workers who had worked for not less than 1200 days preceding the date of above award has to be prepared to find out eligible candidates for the implementation of the award. When this Circular came to be issued, W.P.(C) No.30264 of 2010 was filed challenging the Circular and also preparation of State wise seniority list by the Board on the ground that the seniority list sought to be prepared as per the Circular is in violation of specific directions in Ext.P3 judgment. Subsequently, W.P.(C) No.30264 of 2010 came to be allowed on 07.12.2010 holding that the list for regularisation can be prepared only from the list of persons appearing at Exts.W23 and W24 lists in accordance with the clarification in Ext.P3 judgment which was confirmed by Ext.P6 judgment.
5. W.P.(C) No.22180 of 2011 came to be filed challenging the seniority list of petty contract workers and contract line workers prepared by Additional Labour Commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram dated 05.08.2011. This along with other similar writ petitions came to be disposed of by a common judgment dated 01.11.2011 by the learned Single Judge expressing anguish for not implementing the award dated 15.12.2004 even after lapse of 6 years. Further the list prepared by the Additional Labour Commissioner ordered to be set aside giving several directions and finally opined that Additional Labour Commissioner, while finalising the seniority list, must have due regard to the observations made by the Tribunal in Paragraphs 47 and 48 of the award and by this Court in paragraph 12 of the judgment, Ext.P6, delivered in W.P.(C) No.28836 of 2005.
6. The appellants in W.A. No.1618 of 2011 and W.A. No.9 of 2012 as stated above are directed against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.30264 of 2010 and W.A. No.8 of 2012 is directed against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.22180 of 2011. When W.A. No.1618 of 2011 came up for consideration before the Division Bench on 03.11.2011 their Lordships while referring the matter to Full Bench observed as under:
"It is seen that two Division Benches have rendered judgments expressing divergent views, in Writ Appeals filed against the common judgment of the learned Single Judge. Therefore, we feel the controversy has to be settled only by the Full Bench. Learned counsel takes notice for respondents 1 to 10. Learned Standing Counsel takes notice for 13th respondent. Notice to others will be considered later. There will be a direction to the KSEB not to absorb people in violation of Ext.P5 judgment until further orders."
7. As a matter of fact, there is not much controversy that the genesis of the entire litigation between the parties is the dispute in I.D. No.27 of 2002. The award in I.D. No.27 of 2002 is the foundation upon which the parties are fighting for their rights seeking directions from the Court in one manner or the other since 2004 till date. The controversy is with regard to the observation of two Division Benches in W.A. No.627 of 2008 and also W.A. No.615 of 2008.
8. In W.A. No.627 of 2008 Bench observed that award of the Tribunal does not indicate that regularisation should be done from those persons indicated at Exts.W23 and W24 series lists. In W.A. No. 615 of 2008, the observation of the Tribunal restricted the benefit of the award only to those persons whose names find a place in Exts.W23 and W24 series lists. W.A. No.627 of 2008 came to be disposed of on 10.07.2008 and W.A. No.615 of 2008 came to be disposed of on 22.10.2008. As a matter of fact, both these writ appeals ought to have been disposed of by a common judgment as the challenge in both appeals was against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.28836 of 2005. At least, while disposing of W.A. No.615 of 2008 on a subsequent date, i.e.22.10.2008, the disposal of W.A. No.627 of 2008 by a judgment on earlier date, i.e.10.07.2008, ought to have been brought to the notice of the Division Bench. We find no such attempt came to be made by the parties. The learned counsel for the appellants and also counsel appearing for complainants in the contempt proceedings in W.A. No.1618 of 2011 relies on several decisions raising several arguments.
9. D.D.H. Employees Union v. Delhi Admn. and others [1992 (2) LLJ 452] is relied upon to contend that there is no right vested with the persons employed under the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana providing employment for rural poor to tackle the problem of poverty to claim regularisation merely because they have put in more than 240 days service, as it would jeopardise public interest. In this judgment their Lordships refer to right to life enshrined in the Constitution of India including right to livelihood. Therefore, if the claim for regularisation of such employees is allowed, it would take away the rights of others as right to life includes right to livelihood which would take within its ambit right to work as well. Ultimately, the Delhi Administration was directed to keep employees who have completed 240 days or more on a panel and if registered with the Employment Exchange and if they are qualified to be appointed on the relevant posts, give them preference in employment against a regular vacancy.
10. 2006 KHC 883 SC in the case of Mayuram Subramanian Srinivasan v. C.B.I was relied upon to argue what the word and phrase incuria per incuriam would mean. At paragraph 11 of the judgment their Lordships held as under:
"11. "Incuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The "quotable in law", as held in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(1994 (2) ALL ER 293), is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, "in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority". Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Art.141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short "the Constitution") which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. The above position was highlighted in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991 (4) SCC 139). To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial conscience. The position was highlighted in Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P.(2004 (7) SCC 558)."
11. He also relies upon 1960 KHC 719 in the case of Ramnagar Cane and Sugar Co.Ltd. v. Jatin Chakravorty and others. This judgment was relied upon to contend that in order to bind the workmen under Section 18(3)(d) of Industrial Disputes Act, it is not necessary to show that workmen belong to the Union which was a party to the dispute before the Conciliator. Settlement in conciliation proceedings between a public utility concern and one union binds all its works was the opinion expressed in the said judgment. If the dispute pertains to common demand of all the workers and not a particular section, settlement in the conciliation would bind all the workers irrespective whether they were members of one Union or the other or even when they are not members of a Union which was a party to the proceedings.
12. 2006 KHC 2337 of Bombay High Court in the case of Mohammed Bilal Hanif Shaikh v. A.N. Roy and others was also relied upon. This judgment refers to the expressions 'judgment per incuriam' and 'judgment sub silentio' and law of estoppel. Paragraph Nos.8, 14 and 17 are relevant. Relevant portions of paragraphs 8 and 14 and paragraph No. 17 read as under:
"8. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Art. 141.xx xx xx xx
"It is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be a declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law". In short, the judgment is per in curriam if it is in an ignorance of a statue or Authority and it is sub silentio when a particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind.
14. xx xx xx
"A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has came to be attached to that pharase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind".
17. Therefore, the net result of these findings and conclusions arrived, by us, will be that the submissions made by Mr. Chitnis before us, regarding in-camera statements, cannot be accepted nor they are required to be even considered again because they were considered and rejected by the Division Bench in Sachin Nikam's case. When a particular submission was made fully and extensively, and, was considered by the court in earlier decisions directly and extensively, then the same cannot be permitted to be made again and again. That is not permitted at all."
13. Reliance was placed on 2006 KHC 1509 in the case of Punjab National Bank and others v. Manjeet Singh and another to contend that once an award is made in presence of the Unions the contention of the respondents that the award was not binding on them cannot be accepted. In such situation principles of natural justice were also not required to be complied with as the same would have been an empty formality, if Court is of the view that award has a binding nature. This judgment was relied upon to argue that there can be no estoppel against statute once High Court permits the authorities to issue a second notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act even beyond the time provided by the proviso to Section 6 of the Act. Such judgment of the High Court has to be regarded as per incuriam. When there is no conflict between law and equity, the law must prevail.
14. 2004 KHC 1184 SC in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad reliance is placed on paragraph Nos.23, 24 and 25 on the doctrine of Merger and how and what principles govern the said doctrine which read as under:
"23. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the Appellate Authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject matter at a given point of time.
24. It is trite that when an Appellate Court passes a decree, the decree of the Trial Court merges with the decree of the Appellate Court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the Appellate Court supersedes the decree of the Trial Court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the Appellate Court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the Trial Court. When a Special Leave Petition is dismissed summarily, doctrine of merger does not apply but when a appeal is dismissed, it does. (See V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (JT 2000(4) SC 473:AIR 2000 SC 1623)25. The concept of doctrine of merger and the right of review came up for consideration recently before this Court in Kunhayammed and Ors.v. State of Kerala and Another (2000 (3) KLT 354 (SC)) wherein this Court inter alia held that when a Special Leave Petition is disposed of by a speaking order, the doctrine of merger shall apply stating:
"41. Once a Special Leave Petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court.
42. "To merge" means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; and absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality.(See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68) 43. We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage".
15. AIR 1999 SC 1486 in Abhai Maligai Partnership Firm and another v. K.Santhakumaran and others was also relied upon on the question of entertainment of review petition by High Court against self same orders after dismissal of Special Leave Petition. Paragraph 4 is relevant which reads as under:
"4. The manner in which the learned single Judge of the High Court exercised the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the self-same order had been dismissed by this Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, to say the least, was not proper. Interference by the learned Single Judge at that stage is subversive of judicial discipline. The High Court was aware that SLPs. against the orders dated 7.1.87 had already been dismissed by this Court. The High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to review the self same order, which was the subject matter of challenge in the SLPs. in this Court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned order on 7-4-1994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions by this Court, on contest, no review petitions could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the case was an affront to the order of this Court. We express our strong disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High Court after the dismissal of their SLPs. by this Court, abused the process of the Court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly depricate the manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court after the dismissal of the SLPs. by this Court. The appeals deserve to succeed on that short ground. The appeals are, consequently, allowed and the impugned order dated 7.4.1994 passed in the review petitions is hereby set aside. The respondents shall pay Rs. 10,000/-as costs."
16. AIR 1989 SC 38 in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur was relied upon with reference to Article 141 to contend that statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta are not authoritative. At paragraph 12 of the judgment after referring to precedents of sub silentio and without argument, their Lordships made some casual expressions which carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority was the observation.
17. AIR 2005 SC 3766 Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. M/s.Aksh Optifibre Ltd and another was also relied upon. In this case their Lordships said, if the Court thinks that an issue does not arise then any observation made with regard to such an issue would be purely obiter dictum. It is a well settled proposition that the ratio decidendi of a case is the principle of law that decides the dispute in the facts of the case and therefore a decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that was not decided.
18. With the above law laid down by the Apex Court and various high Courts, we have to proceed with the reference on hand. The earliest of the decisions was the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 15.12.2004 in I.D. No.27 of 2002. Paragraph 48 of the award is the directions issued by the Tribunal to the management on the reference made by the Government in I.D. No.27 of 2002 which reads as under:
"48. Having considered all the points raised by either side, the following directions are issued to management:-a) 25% of the existing vacancies of Electricity workers as well as the vacancies that may arise during a period of five years from the date of this award shall be reserved for appointment from among the petty contractors and contract line workers. There shall be appropriate percentage of communal reservation within this 25% in terms of Articles 16 and 335 of the Constitution.b) The management shall in consultation with the State Government nominate an officer not below the rank of Deputy Labour Commissioner to prepare a State-wide seniority list of petty contractors and contract line workers who had worked not less than 1200 days preceding the date of this award and the same shall be published on the notice boards of all the offices of the management fro where this category of workmen are deputed for works. Similarly an officer not below the rank of Additional Labour Commissioner in the State Labour Department shall be authorised to finalise the seniority list after conducting personal hearing of the workmen who have submitted objections to the draft list and the final seniority list shall also be published in the same manner as stated above.c) All persons whose names figured in the final seniority list and who satisfy all the qualifications for appointment of Electricity Workers as per the orders of the management which are in force as on the date of this award, except the condition of maximum age limit, shall be eligible for submitting applications for appointment in terms of this award.d) The maximum age limit for appointment as per this award shall be 50 years as on the date of notification inviting applications for appointment.e) The management shall be free to formulate and finalise a recruitment procedure incorporating the above directions in consultation with KPSC as per Section 3 of Kerala Public Service Commission (Addl. Functions) Act, 1963.f) The KPSC shall be authorised to conduct a suitability test/interview and submit a select list of successful candidates.g) The management shall comply with the above directions and ensure that the selection process for appointment against 25% of the existing vacancies is completed within 120 days from the publication/pronouncement of this award and appointments are made within 60 days from the date of publication of select list by KPSC.h) If sufficient candidates are not available for filling up 25% vacancies in terms of this award, the remaining posts shall be treated as general."
19. At paragraph 45 an observation is made by the Tribunal that both management and Union have no idea about the actual number of workmen concerned in the dispute on the file of the Tribunal. Therefore, Tribunal doubted correctness of the list furnished by the Union at Exts.W23 and W24 and directed the lists to be verified by an independent officer who shall be authorised to prepare a seniority list based on the number of days worked by each workman. Bench mark of '1200 working days' was taken into consideration having regard to the facts and circumstances of the dispute on hand and the workmen concerned as per the Union who had worked for a long period ranging from 5 to 25 years. This observation was made on account of the opinion of the Tribunal that a person who worked for only few days cannot be given preference over other candidates who are otherwise eligible for appointment to the regular posts under normal recruitment procedure. After discussion at paragraphs 45 and 46 ultimately the Tribunal gave the directions at paragraph 48 of the award as stated above. The directions of the award does not refer to the list at Exts.W23 and W24 series lists. In other words, it does not restrict selection process to the persons listed at Exts.W23 and W24 series lists. It only indicates verification of correctness of the list furnished by union at Exts.W23 and W24. This further indicates not only the persons of Exts.W23 and W24 but all those persons who worked as petty contract workers and contract line workers complying the condition of number of days of working as opined by the Tribunal would come in the zone of consideration.
20. It is evident from the directions given by the Tribunal that a State wise seniority list of Petty Contract Workers and Contract Line Workers had to be prepared. There is further observation at paragraph 47 that the contract workers who are employed through other contractors for construction and other major works are not entitled for the benefit of the award. Therefore, the directions for regularisation of Petty Contract Workers and Contract Line Workers who had worked for not less than 1200 days preceding the date of award, i.e. 15.12.2004, was subject to the directions issued by the Tribunal after a detailed discussion and reasoning.
21. This award came to be challenged by the Board in W.P.(C) No.28836 of 2005 and the learned Single Judge by order dated 16.11.2007 dismissed the writ petition filed by the Board made certain observations at paragraph 12 of the judgment which reads as under:
"12. The learned senior counsel for the K.S.E.B voiced a concern that there is possibility of manipulation of the list of workmen and it may pave the way for the entry of ineligible persons through the back door. I think, the said apprehension is not well founded, as the field of choice of the workmen is confined to the workmen named in Exts. W23 an W24 series lists appended to the award. No worker, whose name does not find a place in the said lists shall be considered for selection. This clarification will prevent the entry of ineligible candidates through the back door."This observation of the learned Single Judge was the basis for the controversy which led to different judgments of two Benches.
22. The first Division Bench by judgment dated 10.07.2008, while disposing of W.A. No.627 of 2008, observed as under:
"We fully agree with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge and the appeal is dismissed. With regard to the observation in the impugned judgment that regularisation will be done only from Exts.W23 and W24 series lists, it is contended that equal treatment should be given to all persons who had service for more than 1200 days and members of one union who submitted the list before the Tribunal alone can be absorbed. It is submitted by some of the unions that they are challenging that part of the judgment seriously. In any event paragraph 48 of the award does not state that regularisation should be done from Exts.W23 and W24 series lists only. Award of the Tribunal is not liable to be set aside on any of the grounds urged by the appellant."
23. In the later judgment in WA No.615 of 2008 the Bench at paragraphs 6 and 7 observed as under:
"6. When the Union had raised a dispute before the Industrial Tribunal, Palakkad in I.D. No. 27 of 2002, had furnished the list of workmen who were working as petty contract workers and contract line workers. The award passed by the Industrial Tribunal would only benefit to those workmen whose names are mentioned in the list furnished by the Union while filing the claim petition before the Industrial Tribunal. The said benefit cannot be extended to such of those people whose names do not find a place in the list when the Union went for the first time before the Industrial Tribunal. Keeping this aspect of the matter in view, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge is fully justified in restricting the benefit of the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal only to such of those workmen whose names find a place in W23 and W24 series appended to the award and further that they should satisfy the other conditions stipulated in the award itself.
7. In that view of the matter we do not see any infirmity in the orders passed by the learned Single Judge which would call for our interference in appeal. Therefore, the writ appeal requires to be rejected and it is rejected."
24. Reading of the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the judgments of two Division Benches arising out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 28836 of 2005, makes it very clear that though the Tribunal did not restrict the benefit of regularisation to the persons whose names find place at Exts.W23 and W24 series, the learned Single Judge observed so. But the first Division Bench rightly observed, what was the directions of the Tribunal in the award dated 15.12.2004. In other words, the Bench in W.A. No.627 of 2008 opined, paragraph 48 of the award does not indicate that regularisation should be done from Exts.W23 and W24 series alone. However, in the second Division Bench judgment, i.e. in W.A. No.615 of 2008, the benefit came to be restricted to those workmen whose names are mentioned in the list at Exts.W23 and W24 series.
25. Having regard to the doctrine of per incuriam and sub silentio as interpreted by various courts, one has to understand the controversy on hand in the right perspective. While confirming the reasoning of the Tribunal the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.28836 of 2005 wrongly opined that the choice of selection is restricted to those workmen whose names find place at Exts.W23 and W24. This observation led to subsequent controversy whether the regularisation should be restricted to the persons whose names find place at Exts.W23 and W24 series or as per directions of the Tribunal. Neither the first Division Bench nor the second Division Bench found fault with reasoning and discussion of the Tribunal. Passing expression or remarks admittedly cannot be held as laying down a precedent. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal did not make any expression or pass remark that the workmen at Exts.W23 and W24 series alone are eligible for regularisation, but only made reference to the contentions raised by the Union which was a party to the proceedings. It is well settled that in a dispute affecting the rights of huge number of persons, if selected number of persons alone approach the Court and get a favourable order, it does not restrict the benefit to such persons and the benefit has to be extended to all other similarly placed persons.
26. First Division Bench judgment, i.e. judgment in W.A. No.627 of 2008 has clearly and categorically said, the directions at paragraph 48 of the Tribunal does not restrict the benefit only to those persons whose names find place at Exts.W23 and W24. In that view of the matter, the observations of the Division Bench in the later judgment, i.e. in W.A. No.615 of 2008 though did not set aside the observations and directions of the Tribunal, interpreted the directions of the Tribunal quite contrary to the actual directions issued by the Tribunal at paragraph 48. Therefore, the law laid down in W.A. No.627 of 2008 which refers to the factual position and actual intention of the Tribunal found in its directions are considered and has reached finality. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, the judgment in W.A. No.627 of 2008, i.e. the first Division Bench judgment has properly interpreted the directions of the Tribunal.
27. The selection process while regularising the services of the workmen by the Board has to be in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal in its award dated 15.12.2004 and confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A. No.627 of 2008 dated 16.112007 which has reached finality with the dismissal of Special Leave Petition against this judgment. Accordingly, reference is answered. Appeals to be placed before the Bench having roster for disposal.