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Mahavir Singh Vs. Chairman, Delhi Transport Corporation, Delhi I.P. Estate, New Delhi and Others - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
CourtCentral Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi
Decided On
Case NumberOA No.1572 of 2012
Judge
AppellantMahavir Singh
RespondentChairman, Delhi Transport Corporation, Delhi I.P. Estate, New Delhi and Others
Advocates:For the Applicant : Shri Vimal Puggal, Advocate. For the Respondents : -----
Excerpt:
.....dtc but no action was taken on the said legal notice and thereafter the applicant filed another appeal dated 27.07.2010 after a lapse of about more than 07 years, addressed to the chairman/general manager, i.p. depot, dtc and the applicant was informed vide letter dated 24.08.2011 that there is no provision of second appeal in this corporation. it is this order as well as the order dated 21.01.2003 (annexure a-1) passed by the da and order dated 27.02.2003 (annexure a-2) passed by the appellate authority, which are under challenge in this oa. applicant in para-3 of the oa has declared that the application is within the period of limitation prescribed under section 21 of the administrative tribunals act, 1985. 3. we have heard the learned counsel of the applicant at the admission.....
Judgment:

(ORAL)

Mr. M.L. Chauhan, Member (J):

Applicant has filed this OA, thereby praying for the following reliefs:

“(i)  To call for records and quash the orders dated 21.01.2003, 17.02.2003 and 24.08.2011, which have been made not only on erroneous ground but are in violation of principles of natural justice and violative of Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

(ii)  To quash the departmental proceedings initiated against the Applicant as the same has been conducted in violation of rules of the land and in violation of principles of natural justice.”2. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the applicant while working as driver at DTC Depot-II, Hari Nagar was proceeded departmentally and ultimately vide impugned order dated 21.01.2003 (Annexure A-1), respondent No.3 imposed the punishment of stoppage of next due two increments with cumulative effect. The order passed by the disciplinary authority (DA) was challenged by filing an appeal and the respondent No.2 rejected the appeal vide order dated 24.08.2011 (Annexure A-2). Thereafter the applicant did not resort to any statutory remedy as well as invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. However, the applicant issued a legal notice dated 26.02.2003 to the Chairman, DTC but no action was taken on the said legal notice and thereafter the applicant filed another appeal dated 27.07.2010 after a lapse of about more than 07 years, addressed to the Chairman/General Manager, I.P. Depot, DTC and the applicant was informed vide letter dated 24.08.2011 that there is no provision of second appeal in this Corporation. It is this order as well as the order dated 21.01.2003 (Annexure A-1) passed by the DA and order dated 27.02.2003 (Annexure A-2) passed by the appellate authority, which are under challenge in this OA. Applicant in para-3 of the OA has declared that the Application is within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

3. We have heard the learned counsel of the applicant at the admission stage. The question, which requires our consideration is whether the present OA has been filed within a period limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and further the reply given by the respondents to the applicant vide order dated 24.08.2011 that there is no provision of 2nd appeal will furnish a fresh cause of action to entertain the matter in the light of the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. According to us, the point in issue is no more res integra. The same stands settled by the decision of the seven-Judge Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P., AIR 1990 SC 10, whereby the Apex Court after taking into consideration the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has held that cause of action must be taken to arise not from the date of original adverse order but on the date when the order of higher authority, where a statutory remedy is provided, entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months’ period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when the cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. The Apex Court has further held that the aforesaid principle has no application when the remedy available has not been provided by law and repeated and unsuccessful representations, not provided by law, are not governed by this principle.

4. If the matter is seen in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of S.S. Rathore (supra) it is evident that the cause of action in this case has arisen on 27.02.2003 when the statutory appeal of the applicant against the order dated 21.01.2003 passed by the DA was rejected. It was permissible for the applicant to approach this Tribunal within a period of one year from the date of passing of the order by the appellate authority dated 17.02.2003. Admittedly, applicant has filed this OA on 19.04.2012 after a lapse of more than 09 years. The intimation given by the respondents vide letter dated 24.07.2011 that there is no provision of second appeal will not extend the period of limitation. The applicant has neither given any valid explanation why he has not resorted to the legal remedies immediately after passing of the order passed by the DA as well as by the appellate authority in the year 2003 nor has he moved any application for condonation of delay in terms of the provisions contained in Section 21 (3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. To the similar effect is the decision of the Apex Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and Anr., (2008) 10 SCC 115, whereby the Apex Court has held that reply given to an individual does not give rise to fresh cause of action or acknowledgement of jural relationship.

5. For the foregoing reasons, OA is dismissed at the admission stage itself, with no order as to costs.


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