Skip to content


S.K. Srivastava Vs. Union of India Through Secretary, New Delhi and Others - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
CourtCentral Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi
Decided On
Case NumberOA No. 2238 of 2011 MA No. 1650 of 2011 MA No. 2467 of 2011
Judge
AppellantS.K. Srivastava
RespondentUnion of India Through Secretary, New Delhi and Others
Advocates:For the Applicant: S.K. Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondents: R. Venkataramani, Sr. Advocate with Shri Alzo J. Joseph and Shri Rajesh Katyal, Advocates.
Excerpt:
dr. ramesh chandra panda, member (a): ma no.1650/2011 1. the instant oa was filed by the applicant during the vacation of the tribunal when interim relief sought by him in the ma no.1650/2011 to grant ex-parte stay of the order dated 29.6.2011 was pressed to be considered for which a special bench was constituted on 30.6.2011 and on consideration of the same it was noticed that the relief sought in the oa and ma being same, the best course was to refer the matter to the division bench for adjudication as notices in oa were already issued to the respondents on 21.6.2011. when the case came up on 04.7.2011 the matter was considered and we ordered that “instead of disposing of the ma no. 1650/2011, we deem it more appropriate to dispose of the oa itself.” oa no.2238/2011 2. the.....
Judgment:

DR. RAMESH CHandRA PandA, MEMBER (A):

MA No.1650/2011

1. The instant OA was filed by the applicant during the vacation of the Tribunal when interim relief sought by him in the MA No.1650/2011 to grant ex-parte stay of the order dated 29.6.2011 was pressed to be considered for which a Special Bench was constituted on 30.6.2011 and on consideration of the same it was noticed that the relief sought in the OA and MA being same, the best course was to refer the matter to the Division Bench for adjudication as notices in OA were already issued to the respondents on 21.6.2011. When the case came up on 04.7.2011 the matter was considered and we ordered that “instead of disposing of the MA No. 1650/2011, we deem it more appropriate to dispose of the OA itself.”

OA No.2238/2011

2. The applicant, who is an Indian Revenue Service (IRS) Officer of 1987 batch is aggrieved by the order 3/2011 dated 16.06.2011 by which all litigation cases relating to the applicant have been transferred to HRD Unit of CBDT. Brief facts of the case would reveal that the applicant was charge sheeted vide order dated 3.04.2006 and the said charge sheet was set aside by this Tribunal which was upheld by Delhi High Court vide order dated 18.11.2009, wherein, it was ordered to grant promotion to the applicant w.e.f. 28.07.2007, the date from which his juniors have been promoted. In compliance of the above order, the applicant was promoted to the rank of Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) vide order dated 11.05.2011 w.e.f. 28.07.2007. It is the case of the applicant that he has leveled certain allegations against the private respondents, on the basis of which some cases are pending in different courts. He has also raised certain alleged misconducts against them which have been ordered to be enquired into by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). The case of the applicant is that private respondents who have been conspiring against him and are involved in civil and criminal cases filed by him should not deal with the litigation cases of the applicant on the grounds of (a) conflict of interest and (b) they cannot be the judge of their own cause and conduct. It is further his case that Government vide order No.2/2011 have restrained those private respondents from dealing with the case of the applicant, as per which all matters pertaining to the applicant would be dealt by the CBDT including the applicant’s personal and vigilance matters by VandL Section under the CIT Vigilance, CBDT w.e.f. 20.01.2011 until further orders. His grievance is that the above order No.2/2011 was modified by the order No.3/2011 issued on 16.06.2011 which inter alia contains that all litigation matters relating to the applicant would be handled by the office of DGIT, HRD in place of CCIT, CCA. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the applicant is before this Tribunal in the present OA and is challenging the order dated 16.06.2011 (page-42 ) which has superseded the order dated 20.01.2011 (page- 43). By the order dated 16.06.2011 respondents have entrusted all litigation matters relating to the applicant to the Office of the Directorate General of Income Tax (DGIT) HRD from CCIT (CCA).However, the VandL Section of CBDT would continue to provide secretariat assistance and coordinate whenever required. In this background, he has come to the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, praying for the following relief(s):-

“(i)  To set aside and quash the impugned order No.3 dt. 16.6.2011 issued vide F.No. Dir (Hqrs) / Ch. (DT) / 68/ 01/ 2011 / 1590 (Annexure S-1) superseding Order No.2 of 2011 dt. 20.1.2011.

To direct the official Respondent not to allow the Private Respondents to deal with the case of applicant and not to let those Respondents deal with inquiry matter relating to applicant which the applicant is facing in pursuance to Charge Sheet dt. 26.9.2007 and allegations before complaint Committee on Sexual harassment in another inquiry as also in relation to liberty granted by this Hon’ble Court in OA No.1434 of 2008, order of this Hon’ble Court dt. 18.12.2008 and other allied matters in respect of fact finding inquiries and related matters including litigation therein forthwith.

To hold and declare any action taken by Private Respondents in the meantime in their official capacity qua applicant in pursuance to the above and in relation to the above as nullity ab-initio.

(iv).          To award the cost of present proceedings.

(v).To pass such other and further order/s which this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper.”

3. We heard Shri S. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Alzo K. Joseph and Shri Rajesh Katyal, learned counsel representing the respondents.

4. On receipt of notice from the Tribunal, the respondents have entered appearance and filed reply affidavit. On 18.07.2011, Shri Rajesh Katyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the present OA in the sense that in a pending Writ Petition (Civil) No.1373/2011 before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi the applicant has submitted CM. No 9075/2011 wherein relief asked for is the same or in any case substantially the same as has been sought in the present OA. Confronted with the position aforesaid, the applicant who was present in person submitted that he would withdraw the CM No.9075/2011. Shri Katyal submitted that if the applicant made any such prayer for withdrawal of the said application, the same would be opposed by the respondents in accordance with law. On subsequent dates when the case came up for hearing we were informed by the parties that the High Court of Delhi allowed the withdrawal of the said CM. Therefore, we continued the case for hearing and heard the case finally on 26.09.2011.

5. At this stage, we may refer to the preliminary objection raised by the respondents i.e. whether the issues raised in the OA would come within the functional jurisdiction of this Tribunal? The issue is whether the subjects relating to the litigations concerning the applicant transferred from one unit to another unit where the officers allegedly inimical to him are working and will be dealing with the matters relating to the applicant can be termed as “service matter” coming within the ambit of Section 3 (q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985? Respondents contend that the impugned order is mere administrative arrangement and does not affect the service conditions of the applicant nor the same can be construed as service matters. On the contrary, the applicant’s counsel canvassed that the litigation matters being the service matters relating to the applicant, he is prejudiced by the impugned order, and hence, the said order would come within the jurisdiction and scope of the Tribunal for adjudication. Keeping these rival contentions of the parties in mind we may first refer to the impugned order and then analyse the issues raised herein.

6. The impugned order dated 16.06.2011 under challenge by the applicant in the instant OA reads as follows:   “F.No.Dir.(Hqrs) /Ch.(DT) /68 /01 / 2011 / 1520

Government of India

Ministry of Finance

Department of Revenue

(Central Board of Direct Taxes)

North Block, New Delhi 16th June, 2011

Order No.3 of 2011

In supersession of order no.2 of 2011 dated 20.01.2011 issued vide F.No.Dir.(Hqrs)/Ch.(DT)/68(01)/2011, it has been decided with the approval of Secretary (Revenue) that all litigation matters relating to Shri S. K. Srivastava, IRS (87052) presently handled by VandL Section of CBDT shall be processed by the O/o DGIT (HRD). The DGIT (HR) shall submit files to Member (PandV) and Chairman, CBDT. Further, all litigation matters relating to Shri S. K. Srivastava presently handled by CCIT (CCA), Delhi shall also be handled by the O/o DGIT (HRD). The VandL section of CBDT shall continue to provide secretariat assistance and co-ordination wherever required. This order will be effective from the date of issue and until further orders.

                                                               (Anil Uniyal)

DeputySecretary

(Hqrs.),CBDT

Copy to :

1. Secretary (Revenue)

2. Chairman/Member (PandV), CBDT.

3. DGIT (HRD)/DGIT (Vig.)/CCIT(CCA), Delhi.

4. JS (Admn.)/CIT (Vig.), CBDT.

5. VandL/Ad. VI. Sections, CBDT.

6. Hindi Section.

7. Guard File.

All concerned sections / offices should list out all litigation matters regarding Shri S. K. Srivastava and transfer all records / files to O/o DGIT (HRD) by 21.06.2011, indicating the present status.”

7.   On the jurisdictional issue, Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents raised the issue that this Tribunal has got no jurisdiction to deal with the matters in the present O.A. the issue being beyond the scope of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Citing Section 3 (q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, dealing with the subject of definition of service matters, and other Sections dealing with the functional jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it was contended that the impugned order would not come under the item on “any other matters whatsoever” finding mention in the Section 3 (q) (v). Shri Venkataraman’s contention is that “any other matters whatsoever” appearing in Sub section (v) of Section 3 (q) means any other matter should be in respect of the matters referred to in Sub section (i) to (iv) of the Section 3(q) and cannot be outside the said scope. He placed his reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Tribunal passed in the case of Indian National NGOs Association of Army Electronics Inspection and others versus the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi and Others(1992-21-ATC (FB)-261). It is contended that the Full Bench framed 5 questions and outlined the interpretation of what constitutes service matters as defined in Section 3 (1) of the said Act and whether the issues would fall within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal for adjudication. The Full Bench has held that all matters relating to the conditions of service come within the definition of “service matters”. In other words to qualify as a service matter it has to have proximate nexus to a condition of service. It further noted that after specifying four species of conditions of service in clause (i) to (iv) the residuary clause indicates “any other matters whatsoever”. It is further stated that “any other matters whatsoever” occurring in the Section 3 (q) (v) means the conditions of service in respect of any other matter which have been enumerated in the same Section 3(q) (i) to (iv). Shri Venkataramani advanced the argument that the impugned order does not affect any of the applicant’s service conditions in the impugned order in terms of four specific subjects mentioned in 3(q)(i) to (iv). Hence the said order does not come within the scope of the Tribunal, and the same being outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the OA deserves to be dismissed.

8.   Per contra, Shri S. K. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the applicant would submit that “any other matter whatsoever” could be construed as service matters which are incidental and ancillary matters to the service conditions. He contends that the service matter has a very wide connotation. The reliefs sought for by the applicant are litigation matters concerning his conditions of service. He stated that the interested parties dealing with the disciplinary, vigilance, court and other associated matters / items of the applicant would be biased which would prejudice him. Therefore, the impugned order would come within the definition of Section 3(q) (v) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. He, in this context, placed his reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the matter of Nighat Parveen (Ms.) versus Union of India and Others (1996-2-SLR-769) to submit that meaning of the service matter connot be restrictive strictly to the conditions of service. But, the expression “service matter” has a very wide amplitude and the ancillary and incidental matter can come within the ambit of service matter. It is contended that the impugned order brings all litigation matters of the applicant to DGIT, HRD control where the private respondents are working. His submission is that the private respondents will provide biased view which would be against the applicant. As the applicant is prejudiced by the Order No.3 dated 16.06.2011, the same will come within the scope of the Tribunal for adjudication.

9. Having heard the contentions of the parties on this preliminary objection, it would be appropriate for us to take the extract of the relevant sections of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and those are the Section 3 (p), (q) and (r):-

“Section 3 (p) “Service” means service within or outside;”

“Section 3 (q) “service matters”, in relation to a person, means all maters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation (or society) owned or controlled by the Government, as respects-

(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits, tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;

leave of any kind;

disciplinary matters; or

any other matter whatsoever;”

“Section 3 (r) “service rules as to redressal of grievances” in relation to any matter, means the rules, regulations, orders or other instruments or arrangements as in force for the time being with respect to redressal, otherwise than under this Act, of any grievances in relation to such matters;”

10.  This Tribunal derives its powers under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and entertains applications under Section 19 which inter alia provides that if a person is aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal can submit an application before the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. The connotation of the “any order” has been indicated to be an order made by the Government / Officer by which the person has been aggrieved. Section 20 and 21 envisage also certain conditions on the admissibility or otherwise of an application filed before the Tribunal. In the context of these 3 Sections i.e. 19, 20 and 21, the applicant has filed this OA under Section 19 of the Tribunals Act. He is aggrieved by the Order No.3/2011 which has been approved by the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. There is grievance against the said order which means that the entrustment of the matters relating to vigilance, departmental proceedings and associated matters of the applicant through the private respondents working in DGIT (HRD), he would be prejudiced as he had leveled allegations against them. The fulfillment of the conditions stipulated under Section 19 would be as per the Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which provides jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal. The said Section 14 inter alia provides that the Tribunal shall exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to all service matters concerning a person appointed to any civil service of the Union and also stipulates that such service matters should be pertaining to the service of such members in connection with the affairs of the Union. The definition of terms and more specifically, “service matters” in relation to a person would mean all matters relating to the “conditions of his service” in connection with the affairs of the Union or by any State.

11.  A perusal of the provisions in Section 20 and 21 show that the Tribunal can be approached only by 'persons aggrieved' by an order. The applicant is an aggrieved person of the order dated 16.06.2011. The crucial expression 'person aggrieved' has to be construed in the context of the Act and the facts of the case. In Thammanna versus K. Veera Reddy, (AIR 1981 SC 116) it was held by the Apex Court that although the meaning of the expression 'person aggrieved' may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai versus Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, [(1976) 1 SCC 671] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic concept. The Court observed ". . . It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact, and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him". In the context of the above definition we are of the confirmed opinion that the applicant is an aggrieved person in respect of the impugned order.

12.  In Duryodhan Sahu Versus Jitendra Kumar Mishra [1998 - 7-SCC- 273], the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the issues of this Tribunal's jurisdiction observed that " The constitution of Administrative Tribunals was necessitated because of large pendency of cases relating to service matters in various Courts in the country. It was expected that the setting up of Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively in service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the Courts but also provide to the persons covered by the Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances. The basic idea as evident from the various provisions of the Act is that the Tribunal should quickly redress the grievances in relation to service matters. The definition of 'service matters' found in Section 3 (q) shows that in relation to a person the expression means all service matters relating to the conditions of his service." The Apex Court in I. N. Subba Reddy Versus andhra University [AIR1976 SC2049] gave the definition to the expression 'conditions of service' as all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it in matters like pension etc.

13.  The Administrative Tribunals Act envisages five different clauses which would bring such action within the ambit of the Tribunal to adjudicate the grievances on service matters of the persons. In this context, the interpretation given by the respondents is that the applicant’s remuneration, tenure including confirmation, leave of any kind and disciplinary matters are not covered by impugned order. At best the applicant’s argument to that his case gets covered by “any other matters whatsoever”, in the interpretation of the respondents, the administrative arrangements of allocating certain functions though concern the applicant and dealt by different officers would not come within the ambit of “any other matters whatsoever” clause and the applicant could not be aggrieved by such administrative arrangement. The said argument of the respondents has been repelled by the counsel for the applicant on the ground that applicant’s service matters would be dealt by a group of people against whom the allegations have been raised by the applicant. Thus, the applicant’s disciplinary, vigilance and service matters and more specifically the cases filed by him before the Tribunal and Courts would be dealt by such private respondents who would be interested parties, could prejudice him. Therefore, the order comes well within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for adjudication.

14.  On a very careful and dispassionate examination of the contentions, it is noted that the judgments relied on by the parties are complementary to each other. We find that there is force in the argument of the applicant’s counsel. We also note that the impugned order clearly stipulates that all litigation matters relating to the applicant would be handled by DGIT, HRD. The litigation matters of the applicant would of course include service matters pending adjudication in the High Court and in the Tribunal, disciplinary cases initiated against him and the allegations leveled by the applicant against some of the private respondents. In our considered opinion, the above matters dealt in the order No.3/2011 dated 16.06.2011 would be ancillary to the service matters and get covered under Section 3 (q) (v) (within the definition of “any other matters whatsoever”) related to the service conditions of the applicant. For the above reasons the preliminary objection of lack of jurisdiction is rejected. We may take up the matter on merits.

15.  We may advert to the main issue in this case. The instant OA filed by the applicant intends quashing of Order No.3 dated 16/6/2011 vide which all litigation matters relating to him were ordered to be processed by the office of DGIT, HRD. It was also ordered that VandL section of CBDT shall continue to provide secretariat assistance and coordination wherever required. He is alleging that the private respondents in the present case have personal interest and has alleged malafide against them. A careful perusal of the pleading including the grounds taken by the applicant and reply filed by the respondents along with accompanying documents including the observations of the High Court in various matters manifest that the applicant is in the habit of leveling allegations against any officer who deals with the matters related to the applicant. The respondents submit that the applicant is habitually doing this against officers of the department who are duty bound to look into the various alleged acts of misconduct of the applicant.

16.  Shri S. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the applicant would contend that the private respondents against whom the applicant had alleged certain charges and filed certain criminal complaints being either under investigation or being tried in various courts, would be handling applicant’s litigation cases. He drew our attention to the CBDT Chairman’s noting to bring home the arguments that the bias of the persons dealing with the subjects should be avoided. He, therefore, submits that there is reasonable apprehension that some of the private respondents who are handling the case would be biased against the applicant which would put the applicant in disadvantaged position to defend his cases. His principal contention is that those officers against whom the applicant has made allegations should not deal with the subject relating to the applicant, be it vigilance, disciplinary or any other matter which are the service matters of the applicant.

17.  Per contra, Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Advocate representing the respondents would submit that it is very strange that the applicant has been trying through the OA to dictate to the respondents as to who is to deal with his matters relating to litigations and who should not dealt with. This type of demand to issue a direction to the respondents is not legally admissible. He further submits that out of the 6 private respondents, 3rd respondent (Shri Sunil Mitra) has retired. Respondent No.4 (Shri Prakash Chandra) has also retired. Respondent No.7 has been transferred to the field and is not dealing with the applicant’s case and out of the remaining 3 private respondents, namely, 5th, 6th and 8th respondent, 5th respondent Shri S. S. Rana has become Member CBDT (Revenue) and may not be dealing with his cases. In case of Shri B. K. Jha, the 6th Respondent and Ms. Ashima Neb, the 8th Respondent would be the only officers who may handle the applicant’s matters in the HRD Office of CBDT. Shri Venkataraman draws our attention to the allegations of the applicant which have been commented upon by the Hon’ble High Court in order dated 15.06.2011 in W.P. No.4326/2011 wherein the Hon’ble High Court has specifically dealt with the allegations made by the applicant and has warned the applicant to be careful in future. The High Court in order dated 09.02.2010 in W.P. No.13606/2009 has further dealt with this reckless and scandalous allegations and has imposed a cost of Rs.20,000/- on the applicant. The said order was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Thus, he submits that the averments and allegations of the applicant in the present O.A. have to be discounted in the background of the allegations made by him in previous litigations and the manner in which the same has been commented upon by the High Court. It was submitted that the allegations of the applicant in the present O.A. being baseless, he was not entitled for any relief as prayed in the present O.A.

18.  During the final hearing we were informed by learned senior counsel that the applicant has got large number of cases which need to be dealt with by the VandL Section and has to submit the papers before the competent authority to pass appropriate orders. It would not be wise to keep these two private respondents outside the Sections just because the applicant has put certain malicious and biased allegations against them. Shri Venkataramani would go further to content that if such allegations are accepted as basis for keeping them off, it would be difficult to handle his cases by any officer in the CBDT as he has been leveling wild allegations against various people. He further submits a comparative statement indicating the extensive pleadings in the OA No.3116/2009 and the pleadings in rejoinder affidavit in OA No.2600/2010 go to show that the allegations made against many officers are really wild and beyond the stretch of imagination as to what lowest depth the ethical values can be taken by the applicant. He submits that the applicant’s wild allegations should not be heeded and the OA should be dismissed with costs.

19. In the context of the issue as to who all should not deal with the files/ matters relating to the applicant, we need to record some of our observations. The OA is filled with some irrelevant pleadings making the paper book as voluminous as possible. Sobriety is the hallmark of pleading has been given a pass in the OA. The controversy is simple and has been made out to be huge one - a mountain out of mole hill. We have wade through those not so relevant pleadings as well lest we may stumble with some relevant facts. But to our dismay the OA is packed with applicant’s allegations against officers in the CBDT that too some times in impolite language which is not expected from an officer of his rank. A list of cases filed by applicant are at Annexure R-1 which disclose that he has been filing a number of cases against a large number of officers from 2007 onwards, particularly against officers who worked in the Vigilance Directorate. He has particularly targeted two lady officers Ms Ashima Neb, and Ms. Shumona Sen both his IRS colleague-officers who had earlier worked in the Vigilance Directorate. Respondents have submitted that these complaints are based on misrepresentation and distortion of facts as the Hon’ble High Court pointed out in their judgments. It was stated by the counsel for the respondents that the litigations indulged in by the petitioner were with the sole motive of causing harassment to the authorities duty bound to probe allegations, or pursue any matter against him. Respondents have also pointed out that even after Ms. Shumana Sen and Ms. Ashima Neb were posted out of the Vigilance Directorate, the applicant continued almost slander campaign filing a series of defamatory letters marking disgraceful correspondences to their superiors and subordinates and marking copies to senior Government functionaries such as the Finance Minister, Secretary (Revenue), Secretary (Personnel), Chairman (CBDT) etc. etc. and also to the subordinates of the officers. In Para S of the reply affidavit, respondents have listed number of officers against whom the complaints and cases have been filed by the applicant. It is noticed that the applicant started filing a series of ugly and defamatory letters targeting Sh. Binay K. Jha, DIT(HRD) and Sh. S.S. Rana, DGIT(HRD) both being superior officers of Ms. Ashima Neb. The learned senior counsel for the respondents informed that earlier there were no complaints by the applicant against Sh. B.K. Jha, but the complaints began pouring in only after Ms. Ashima Neb Joined the Human Resources Directorate. It is apparent that the complaints against the senior officers began only to pressurize the senior officers not to take any action against the Applicant.

20.  Admittedly, 3 of the private respondents i.e. Respondent No.3, 4 and 7 are no longer dealing with the subjects, because two of them have retired and one is away in the field and not likely to handle the subject. In case of remaining 3 private respondents, namely, respondent No.5, 6 and 8, in case of 5th respondent Shri S. S. Rana who has become Member (Revenue) in CBDT is not in direct charge of HRD and will not be dealing with the applicant’s case. It is seen that the allegations are against the Respondent No.6 and 8. In this context, it would be appropriate for us to direct that the 6th and 8th respondents against whom certain personal allegations have been leveled (we are not going into the veracity of the allegations) should not deal with the applicant’s case. HRD and VandL Section of the CBDT, we are informed, have large number of officers from whom the competent authority can select the people of appropriate rank/grade to deal with the cases/matters of the applicant. Further, the impugned order indicates that the applicant’s case would be still handled through the VandL section by providing secretariat assistance and coordination. The only observation which we would like to leave with the competent authority is that 1st and 2nd respondents must ensure that the officers against whom the applicant had leveled some personal allegations should not deal/ process/ handle the matters of vigilance, disciplinary and associated matters relating to the applicant. The other officers available in the organization of the CBDT can handle his case. In this regard, the 1st and 2nd respondents are directed to issue appropriate clarifications.

21.  Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case we come to the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 16.6.2011 is valid and sustainable in the eyes of law as it does not indicate as to who should deal with which subjects. The said order would only need a clarificatory directions by the competent official respondent to the effect that the officers against whom allegations have been made by the applicant, would not in any manner deal with the applicant’s cases.

22.  In terms of the above orders, directions and observations, the OA is disposed of, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organize Client Files //