Judgment:
1. The petitioners have filed this petition to quash Crime No.345 of 2009. The II respondent is the first informant.
2. The inter se relationship of parties and certain facts which are not in dispute are stated thus:
Petitioner 2 is the husband of sister of II respondent. Petitioner 1 is the son of petitioner 2. On 19-9-1999, II respondent constituted a trust called “Shushruthi Education Trust” under a registered trust deed. The II Respondent is the author of the trust. The primary object of the trust was to promote education and establish educational institutions.
The following were the trustees.-
TRUSTEES
i. Sri N. Srinivasa Murthy, S/o. Sri N. Narayanappa, aged about 47 years, residing at No.418/02, 6th Main Road, 4th Cross, Wilson Garden, Bangalore 560 027.
ii. Dr. L. Prashanth S/o. Sri V. Lakshminarayana, aged about 26 years, residing at No.515, Padmanabhanagar, Banashankari II Stage, Bangalore 560 070.
iii. Smt. Dharini Devi, D/o. Late B.S.V. Naidu, aged about 39 years, residing at No.68, Shushruthi Nagar, Andrahalli Main Road, Peenya II Stage, Bangalore 560 91.
iv. Miss. Mokshatara, D/o. Sri N. Srinivasa Murthy, aged about 20 years, residing at No.418/02, 6th Main Road, 4th Cross, Wilson Garden, Bangalore 560 027.
v. Sri. V. Lakshminarayana, S/o. Sri Vankataswamappa, aged about 49 years, residing at No.515, Padmanabhanagar, Banashankari II Stage, Bangalore 560 070.
vi. Sri L. Somashekar, S/o. Sri V. Lakshminarayana, aged about 18 years, residing at No. 515, Padmanabhanagar, Banashankari II Stage, Bangalore 560 070.
b. Smt. Dharini Devi, the Managing Trustee.
c. Dr. L. Prashanth, First Secretary for three years from the date of this trust deed.
In the event of the office of the Managing Trustee becoming vacant, remaining Trustees may co-opt any one of them as the Managing Trustee. In the event of the office of the Secretary becoming vacant either before the term or on ending the term of three years the remaining Trustees may co-opt anyone of them as the Secretary.
Petitioner 1 was the Secretary. Petitioner 1 was to hold the office for the period of three years from 10-9-1999. The daughter of II Respondent namely Miss. Mokshatara was also one of the trustees. Apart from petitioner 1 another son of petitioner 2 namely L. Somashekar was also one of the trustees.
3. The trust deed dated 10-9-1999 was amended by another deed dated 17-11-2001. The composition of trust was amended as following:
TRUSTEES:
i. Sri N. Srinivasa Murthy, S/o. Sri N. Narayanappa, aged about 50 years, residing at No.418/02, 6th Main Road, 4th Cross, Wilson Garden, Bangalore 560 027.
ii. Dr. L. Prashanth S/o. Sri V. Lakshminarayana, aged about 28 years, residing at No.515, Padmanabhanagar, Banashankari II Stage, Bangalore 560 070.
iii. Miss. Mokshatara, D/o. Sri N. Srinivasa Murthy, aged about 24 years, residing at No.418/02, 6th Main Road, 4th Cross, Wilson Garden, Bangalore 560 027.
iv. Smt. Dharini Devi, D/o. Late B.S.V. Naidu, aged about 42 years, residing at No.68, Shushruthi Nagar, Andrahalli Main Road, Peenya II Stage, Bangalore 560 91.
v. Sri. V. Lakshminarayana, S/o. Sri Vankataswamappa, aged about 51 years, residing at No.515, Padmanabhanagar, Banashankari II Stage, Bangalore 560 070.
vi. Sri L. Somashekar, S/o. Sri V. Lakshminarayana, aged about 19 years, residing at No. 515, Padmanabhanagar, Banashankari II Stage, Bangalore 560 070.
The II respondent became the Managing Trustee.
4. Now adverting to the disputed facts: II respondent filed first information against petitioners on 25-8-2009, alleging that I petitioner used to sign trust papers as the Secretary, without any authority. Both the petitioners took advantage of their relationship with II respondent. The petitioners were mis-managing the affairs and finance of the trust. Petitioner 1 has produced documents alleging that II respondent has tendered resignation. Petitioner 2 has abetted petitioner 1 in fabricating resignation letter of II respondent.
5. I have heard Sri R.L. Patil, learned Counsel for petitioners, Sri Vijaykumar Majage, learned HCGP for I respondent and Sri H.C. Hanumaiah, learned Counsel for II respondent.
6. Before adverting to rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to the settled principles of law regarding scope of jurisdiction to quash the first information either in exercise of statutory powers under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or under Article 226 of the Constitution.
7. In a decision in the case of Union of India and others v Ramesh Gandhi ((2012) 1 SCC 476), the Supreme Court referring to the earlier decisions in R.P. Kapur v State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri.L.J.1239 (SC)) and State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others (AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426 : 1992 (Cri.L.J.527 (SC)), has held:
31. Coming to the question of the scope of the jurisdiction to quash and FIR, either in the exercise of statutory jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the law is well-settled and this Court in a catena of decisions laid down clear principles and indicated parameters which justify the quashing of an FIR. We do not propose to catalogue all the cases where the issue was examined but notice only two of them and indicate the consistent principles laid down by this Court in this regard.
32. In R.P. Kapoor v State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, this Court at para 6 held” (Air p.869)
“6. …It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases failing under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the Trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings …”.
…
33. In State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, AIR 1992 SC 604, this Court after reviewing large number of cases on the question of quashing the FIR held at AIR paras 108 and 109 as follows—(SCC pp.378 and 379, paras 102 and 103)
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rate cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice”.
8. Sri R.L. Patil, learned Counsel for petitioners has made following submissions:
I. The allegations of first information accepted at their face value do not constitute offences alleged against petitioners.
II. The II respondent is in the habit of filing complaint after complaint against petitioners.
III. The learned Magistrate should not have referred the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.
9. The learned Counsel for II respondent has made following submissions
I. The II respondent is the founder trustee and the author of trust.
II. The petitioners were taken as trustees due to their close relationship with II respondent. The petitioners are misusing their position as trustees.
III. The petitioners with ulterior motive to oust II respondent from management of the trust have fabricated resignation letter of II respondent.
IV. Due to frequent mischievous acts committed by petitioners II respondent was constrained to approach the police.
V. The petitioners have relied on trust deed. The petitioners have pressed into service forged resignation letter in O.S.No.6093 of 2009 filed by II respondent on behalf of the trust.
VI. The II respondent is the founder trustee of “Shushruthi Education Trust”. As of now, the trust owns several educational institutions. It is beyond once comprehension that Ii respondent having toiled hard to improve the trust would submit his resignation after the trust has flourished.
10. As could be seen from the rival contentions of parties and proceedings between parties, there is serious controversy regarding management of the trust. At this stage, the averments of complaint and trust deeds dated 10-9-1999 and 17-11-2001 cannot be suspected. These documents would clearly indicate that II respondent is the founder trustee of “Shushruthi Education Trust”, which has been running several education institutions, besides a hospital called “Shushruthi Hospital and Research Centre”.
11. There is litigation between petitioners and II respondent regarding management of the trust. Therefore, at this stage, there are no grounds to suspect the contents of first information. It is not possible to hold that averments of complaint are inherently improbable or absurd.
12. The learned Counsel for petitioners has furnished the list of criminal cases filed by II respondent against petitioners, which are as follows.-
List of Complaints and FIR’s registered by Mr. Srinivasa Murthy against Dr. L. Prashant and his Family members for alleged incidences between 8-8-2009 to 5-9-2009 at Shushruthi Education Trust (R), in a span of 29 days.
| Meeting date of Trust | Complaint/FIR Date | Particulars | Status | Facts |
| 8-8-2009 4.00 PM | Complaint at Rajagopalnagar P.S. on 8-8-2009 at 11.30 AM | Alleged meeting of Shushruthi Education Trust, Chaired by Mr. Srinivasa Murthy | No action take and still pending | Claims for the first time that GPA has been fabricated and properties are being transferred. |
| 24-8-2009 | Complaint lodged at Rajagopalnagar PS on 24-8-2009 and registered on 25-8-2009 as FIR No.345/09 | Specifically about forging his signature in the Resignation letter dated 27-6-2009 | No action taken, as the matter is in Civil Court | In O.S. No.6093, dated 11-9-2009, he specifically claims that his signature has been forged in the resignation letter. After concluding our arguments on the I.A. No.1 and requesting for a forensic examination of the resignation letter, he submits on 31st May, 2010, I.A. No.3 (after a gap of 10 months of filing the FIR and 8 months of the filing the O.S. No. 6093) wherein he tries to cover up all his deficits and claims that, the signature on the resignation letter in his own, but was obtained by playing fraud on him as he has to sign 1000 papers per day. |
| Alleged criminal trespass on 26-8-2009 | FIR No.406/09 at Rajagopalnagar PS on 5-10-2009 at 1.15 PM | Alleged trespass of the campus on 26-8-2009 with rowdy elements and intimidating lady employees | Charge-sheet has been filed on 22-3-2010 | The FIR has been lodged after a gap of 41 days of alleged incident. A case of trespass has been filed on the Co-trustees. |
| 29-8-2009 4.00 PM Emergency Meeting | NCR No.64/2009 on 29-8-2009 at 12.30 PM at Ulsoor Gate Womens Police Station | Some lady staff of Trust and Bank, lodge a complaint alleging abuse, harassment etc., Case closed after enquiry | ||
| 5-9-2009 4.00 PM | FIR No.266/09 lodged at Wilson Garden P.S. on 5-9-2009 at 9.00 AM | Threat to blow up his house and family on the night of 4-9-2009 | B-report filed after investigation. |
14. As per the averments of complaint, petitioners are bent upon ousting II respondent from management of trust. In the circumstances, II respondent has filed aforestated complaints alleging various acts committed by petitioners during aforestated dates. At this stage, it is not possible to hold that first information lodged by II respondent is motivated to harass petitioners. Therefore, I hold there are no grounds to quash the first information.
15. The learned Counsel for petitioners would submit even if the Court were to allow investigation of the case, the same may be entrusted to the concerned Assistant Commissioner of Police, as petitioners have no faith in the officer-in-charge of Rajagopalnagar Police Station, who has registered first information.
16. The learned Counsel for petitioners would submit that a fair investigation would not ensue if investigation is conducted by the officer-in-charge of Rajagopalnagar Police Station.
17. In view of apprehension expressed by petitioners, I deem it proper to bring these facts to the notice of jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner of Police to exercise his power under Section 36 of Cr.P.C., as he deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
18. Therefore, I pass the following:
ORDER
The petitioner is dismissed with these observations.
A copy of this order shall be made available to the learned HCGP to communicate the same to the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner of Police.