1. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners who are public servants are seeking the relief of quashing of their chargesheets filed in Court or FIR filed with the jurisdictional police and in cases where the Court has taken cognizance of the offences and issued process, they want all such proceedings to be quashed on the ground that sanction under Section 19 of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1998 is not granted/refused.
2. W.P. Nos. 2608/07, 3733/07, and 3855/07 are cases where chargesheets are filed without sanction, still the Court has taken cognizance of the offence and issued process to the accused.
3. In W.P. Nos. 3368/07, 3833/07, 3760/07, 4025/07 and 4026/07 the sanction sought for is expressly refused, still chargesheet are filed, the Court has taken cognizance of the offence and issued process to the accused.
4. At the time of hearing all these writ petitions, the learned Counsel appearing for the parties submitted that it would be appropriate for this Court to decide the question of necessity of sanction as a preliminary point, so that depending on the answer to the said question, the cases could be decided on merits separately. Therefore, in all these cases the preliminary point that arise for consideration is as under:
“Whether the Court can take cognizance of offence punishable under Section 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant without the previous sanction of the Central Government/State Government/Authority competent to remove him from office?”
5. Sri B.V. Acharya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, contended that, under the scheme of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for short, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under the Act alleged to have been committed by public servant except with the prior sanction of the Central Government/State Government/competent authority to remove him from his office. Previous sanction is a condition precedent for taking cognizance of the offence by the Court. Without sanction, if the Court were to take cognizance of the offence and issue process to the accused, the entire proceedings before the Court is void, ab initio. In the instant cases, not only the Government has not accorded any sanction to prosecute the public servant, but has refused sanction. In spite of the same, chargesheet is filed and the Court has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under the Act and has issued process. Therefore, he submits that the entire proceedings before the Court is required to be quashed.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the other petitioners adopting the aforesaid argument, further contended that though no sanction is required to file FIR or to conduct investigation, when once the sanction is refused by the Government, the police authorities have to close the case. By not doing so, they have kept these public servants under tension and tormenting them. Therefore, even those FIRs are liable to be quashed.
7. In support of their contentions they relied on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of R.S. Nayak Vs. A.R. Antulay and Others reported in AIR 1984 SC 684 and also subsequent judgments where the aforesaid legal position has been reiterated by the Apex Court.
8. Per contra, Sri Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contended that, as is clear from Section 19 of the Act, no sanction is required to register FIR to conduct investigation and to file chargesheet before the jurisdictional Court. Though in Antulay’s case, the Apex Court has held that when valid sanction is sine quo non for prosecuting a public servant, in the case of Lalu Prasad Alias Lalu Prasad Yadav Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2007) 1 SCC 49, the Supreme Court has laid down that in the cases covered under the Act in respect in public servants, the sanction is of automatic nature and therefore the grant of sanction is a mere formality and in view of the law enunciated by the Apex Court, no such sanction is required. Therefore the chargesheets were filed without sanction and the Courts have taken cognizance of the offence committed under the Act and have issued process, which is in line with the law declared by the Apex Court and therefore no case for interference much less quashing of the proceedings before the Court is made out.
9. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, first it is necessary to look into the statutory provision and the object with which those provisions were enacted by the Parliament. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a successor of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. As the title of the Act makes it clear that this enactment is passed by the Parliament, for effective provision for preventing the bribery and corruption. Indisputably, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction at the hands of the Court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not to defeat it. However, Section 19 of the Act bars the Court from taking cognizance of the offence enumerated under the Act alleged to have been committed by the public servant except with the previous sanction of the Government /competent authority empowered to grant requisite sanction. The object underlying such provision was to save the public servant from the harassment of frivolous or unsubstantiated allegations. The policy underlying Section 19 is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of public servants. Existence of a valid sanction is a pre-requisite to the taking of cognizance of the enumerated offence under the Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant. The bar is to the taking of cognizance of the offence by the Court. Therefore, when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of such offences, it must enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offences alleged to have been committed by him as public servant. Undoubtedly, the accused must be a public servant when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused. The principle of immunity, is the protection of all acts which the public servant has to perform in the exercise of the function of the Government. The purpose for which they are performed protects these acts from criminal prosecution. However, there is exception. When a criminal act is performed under the colour of authority, but which in reality is for the public servant’s own pleasure or benefit, then such acts shall not be protected under the doctrine of State immunity. Keeping these objects one for the benefit of public, another for the benefit of the public servants, we have to interpret Section 19 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act reads thus:
19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution –
[1] No Courtshall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction –
[a] in the case of person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government;
[b] in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;
[c] in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.
[2] Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section [1] should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.
[3] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [2 of 1974]
[a] no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section [1], unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;
[b] no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;
[c] no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.
[4] In determining under sub-section [3] whether the absent of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
Explanation – For the purposes of this section –
[a] error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction:
[b] a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.
10. In the repealed Act of 1947, the corresponding Section was 6. The said provision was the subject matter of interpretation in the case of R.S.Nayak Vs. A.R.Antualy and others reported in AIR 1984 SC 684, wherein the Supreme Court held as under:
19. Section 6 bars the Court from taking cognizance of the offences therein enumerated alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority empowered to grant the requisite sanction. Section 8 of 1952 Act prescribes procedure and powers of Special Judge empowered to try offences set out in S.6 of 1947 Act. Construction of S.8 has been a subject of vigorous debate in the cognate appeal. In this appeal we will proceed on the assumption that a Special Judge can take cognizance of offences he is competent to try on a private complaint. Section 6 creates a bar to the Court from taking cognizance of offences therein enumerated except with the previous sanction of the authority set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-sec.(1). The object underlying such provision was to save the public servant from the harassment of frivolous or unsubstantiated allegations. The policy underlying Section 6 and similar sections, is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of public servant. (see C.R.Bansi V. State of Maharasthra, (1971) 3 SCR 236: (AIR 1971 SC 786). Existence thus of a valid sanction is a pre-requisite to the taking of cognizance of the enumerated offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant. The bar is to the taking of cognizance of offence by the Court. Therefore, when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of such offences, it must enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant. Undoubtedly, the accused must be a public servant when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused because Ss.161, 164, 165, I.P.C. and S.5(2) of the 1947 Act clearly spell out that the offences therein defined can be committed by a public servant. If it is contemplated to prosecute public servant who has committed such offences, when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence, a sanction ought to be available otherwise the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. A trial without a valid sanction where one is necessary under Section 6 has been held to be a trail without jurisdiction by the Court. (see R.R.Chari v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 SCR 121; [AIR 1962 SC 1573) and S.N.Bose v. State of Bihar, (1968) 3 SCR 563: (AIR 1979 SC 677)), it was held that a trial without a sanction renders the proceedings ab initio void. But the terminus a quo for a valid sanction is the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence. If, therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be a public servant, no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him. This approach is in accord with the policy underlying Section 6 in that a public servant is not to be exposed to harassment of frivolous or speculative prosecution. If he has ceased to be a public servant in the meantime, this vital consideration ceases to exist. As a necessary corollary, if the accused has ceased to be a public servant at the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant. Section 6 is not attracted. This aspect is no more res intergra. In S.A.Venkataraman v. The State, 1958 SCR 1037 at p.1048; (AIR 1958 SC 107 at p.112), this Court held as under:
“In our opinion, in giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the words used in Section 6 of the Act, the conclusion is inevitable that at the time a Court is asked to take cognizance not only the offence must have been committed by a public servant but the person accused is still a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority before the provision of S.6 can apply. In the present appeals, admittedly, the appellants had ceased to be public servants at the time the Court took cognizable of the offences alleged to have been committed by them as public servants. Accordingly, the provisions of S.6 of the Act did not apply and the prosecution against them was not vitiated by the lack of a previous sanction by a competent authority.”
And this view has been consistently followed in C.R.Bansi’s case (AIR 1971 SC 786) and K.S.Dharmadatan v. Central Government, (1979) 3 SCR 832; (AIR 1979 SC 1495). It therefore appears well settled that the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by public servant as required by S.6 is the date on which the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused.
23. Offences prescribed in Ss.161, 164 and 165 I.P.C and S.5 of the 1947 Act have an intimate and inseparable relation with the office of a public servant. A public servant occupies office which renders him a public servant and occupying the office carries with it the powers conferred on the office. Power generally is not conferred on an individual person. In a society governed by rule of law power is conferred on office or acquired by statutory status and the individual occupying the office or on whom status is conferred enjoys the power of office or power flowing from the status. The holder of the office alone would have opportunity to abuse or misuse the office. These sections codify a well-recognised truism that power has the tendency to corrupt. It is the holding of the office which gives an opportunity to use it for corrupt motives. Therefore, the corrupt conduct is directly attributable and flows from the power conferred on the office. This interrelation and interdependence between individual and the office he holds is substantial and not severable. Each of the three clauses of sub-section (1) of S.6 uses the expression ‘office’ and the power to grant sanction is conferred on the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office and S.6 requires a sanction before taking cognizance of offences committed by public servant. The offence would be committed by the public servant. The offence would be committed by the public servant by misusing or abusing the power of office and it is from that office, the authority must be competent to remove him so as to be entitled to grant sanction. The removal would bring about cessation of interrelation between the office and abuse by the holder of the office. The link between power with opportunity to abuse and the holder of office would be severed by removal from office. Therefore, when a public servant is accused of an offence of taking gratification other than local remuneration for doing or forebearing to do an official act (S.161. I.P.C.) or as a public servant abets offences punishable under Sections 161 and 163 (S.164, I.P.C.) or as public servant obtains a valuable thing without consideration from person concerned in any proceeding or business transacted by such public servant (S.165, I.P.C.) or commits criminal misconduct as defined in Section 5 of the 1947 Act, it is implicit in the various offences that the public servant has misused or abused the power of office held by him as public servant. The expression ‘offices’ in the three sub-clauses of Section 6(1) would clearly denote that office which the public servant misused or abused for corrupt motives for which he is to be prosecuted and in respect of which a sanction to prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority entitled to remove him from that office which he has abused. This interrelation between the office and its abuse if severed would render S.6 devoid of any meaning. And this interrelation clearly provides a clue to the understanding of the provision in S.6 providing for sanction by a competent authority who would be able to judge the action of the public servant before removing the bar, by granting sanction, to the taking of the cognizance of offences by the Court against the public servant. Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to prosecute can be given by an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he has misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider. By a catena of decisions, it has been held that the authority entitled to grant sanction must apply its mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts before according sanction. A grant of sanction is not an idle formality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the umbrella of protection of Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and the aforesaid requirements must therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution could be launched against public servants. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1979 SC 677). The Legislature advisedly conferred power on the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office to grant sanction for the obvious reason that that authority alone would be able, when facts and evidence are placed before him, to judge whether a serious offence is committed or the prosecution is either frivolous or speculative. That authority alone would be competent to judge whether on the facts alleged, there has been an abuse or misuse of office held by the public servant. That authority would be in a position to know what was the power conferred on the office which the public servant holds, how that power could be used for corrupt motive and whether prima facie it has been so done. That competent authority alone would know the nature and functions discharged by the public servant holding the office and whether the same has been abused or misused. It is the vertical hierarchy between the authority competent to remove the public servant from that office and the nature of the office held by the public servant against whom sanction is sought which would indicate a hierarchy and which would therefore, permit inference of knowledge about the functions and duties of the office and its misuse or abuse by the public servant. That is why the Legislature clearly provided that that authority alone would be competent to grant sanction which is entitled to remove the public servant against whom sanction is sought from the office.
26. Therefore, upon a true construction of Sec.6, it is implicit therein that sanction of that competent authority alone would be necessary which is competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is alleged to have misused or abused for corrupt motive and for which a prosecution is intended to be launched against him.
11. In the case of Prakash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab reported in 2007 (1) SCC 01, it was contended before the Apex Court that, the provisions contained in Section 6 of the old Act was in para materia with Section 19 of the Act. However, the effect of Section 6(2) of the old Act corresponding to Section 19(2) of the Act, was lost sight of and therefore the judgment in Antulay’s case is to be considered per incuriam. Repelling the said contention, the Apex Court after referring to the relevant paragraphs in Antulay’s case, held that the Court adopted a construction which is based on the avoidance of mischief rule. Therefore the plea that the effect of Section 6(2) of the old Act was not kept in view does not merit acceptance. Though a mere reference to a provision in all cases, may not in all cases, imply consciousness as to the effect of that provision the case on hand does not fall to that category. In Antulay’s case not only there was reference to that provision, but the Court adopted a construction which kept in view the object of the statute and the need for interpretation in a particular way. Thereafter they reviewed the entire case law on the point and ultimately have held as under:
“The correct legal position, therefore is that an accused facing prosecution for offences under the old Act or new Act cannot claim any immunity on the ground of want of sanction, if he ceased to be a public servant on the date when the Court took cognizance of the said offences. But the position is different in cases where Section 197 of the Code has application.”
12. Again the said question arose for consideration in the case of Lalu Prasad Alias Lalu Prasad Yadav Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2007) 1 SCC 49. In the aforesaid case, sanction has been accorded both under the provisions of Section 19(1)(b) of the Act and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and it is the validity of that sanction which was under consideration. Again it was contended that the decision in Antulay’s case is per incuriam because of the fact that Section 19(2) of the Act has not been considered and therefore the said decision cannot be regarded as binding precedent in respect of the issues which did not relate to three questions which were required to be decided in that case. The said argument, i.e. this is a case of casus amissus was held to be without any substance. Repelling the said argument, they relied on the passage of the Apex Court in Kalicharan Mahapatra Vs. State of Orissa reported in (1988) 6 SCC 411, where it has been held as under:
“It must be remembered that in spite of bringing such a significant change to Section 197 of the Code in 1973, Parliament was circumspect enough not to change the wording in Section 19 of the Act which deals with sanction. The reason is obvious. The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who ‘is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’. Whereas the offences contemplated in the PC Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former PC Act was materially imported in the new PC Act, 1988, without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code.”
Thereafter the Apex Court at paragraph 10 held as under:
“It may be noted that Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act operate in conceptually different fields. In cases covered under the Act, in respect of public servants the sanction is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no consequence. Conversely, in a case relatable to Section 197 of the code, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be considered to find out whether the alleged act has nay nexus with the discharge of duties. Position is not so in the case of Section 19 of the Act.”
13. Therefore the aforesaid observation of the Apex Court has to be understood in the context in which it is made. They were pointing out the difference in the language employed in Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act. In Section 197 of the Code, the words used are “is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. Whereas, the words used in Section 19 are “alleged to have been committed by a public servant.” In case of Section 197, before according sanction, the authority has to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus with the discharge of duties. Conversely, while granting sanction under Section 19 of the Act, no such obligation is cast on the authorities according sanction. In that context it was said that under Section 19 of the Act, sanction is of automatic nature. In other words, the question of authority considering the nexus with the discharge of duties is not there. If a public servant is alleged to have committed any offence under the Act, if the authority is satisfied about the allegations, without going into the question whether such offence was committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, sanction could be accorded. In other words, sanction is automatic. It is this phrase ‘sanction is of automatic nature’ is sought to be construed as no sanction is required under Section 19 of the Act. If such an interpretation is accepted, it runs counter to the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act. It is well settled that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides. Reference to a particular sentence in the context of factual scenario cannot be read out of context. If the aforesaid words are read in the context in which it is used, it is clear that sanction is imposed on the Court taking cognizance of the offence committed under the Act by a public servant. If the aforesaid word ‘automatic’ is read out of context, it would defeat the object with which Section 19 of the Act is enacted, and renders the section otiose.
14. Therefore, in so far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of any offence by any Court is barred by Section 197 of the Code or Section 19 of the Act. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to public servants is brought out by the expression “no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction”. Use of the words “no” and “shall” make it abundantly clear that bar on the exercise of power of the Court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. “Cognizance in the context in which it is used means ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘the exercise of jurisdiction’ or ’power to try and determine causes’. In common parlance it means ‘taking notice of’. The Court therefore is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty.
15. A valid sanction is a pre-requisite to the taking of cognizance of the enumerated offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant. The bar is to the taking of cognizance of offence by the Court. Therefore, when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of such offences, it must enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant. The accused must be a public servant when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused. If it is contemplated to prosecute public servant who has committed such offences, when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence, a sanction ought to be available otherwise, the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. A trial without a valid sanction, where one is necessary, under Section 19 is a trial without jurisdiction by the Court. A trial without a sanction renders the proceedings ab initio, void.
16. The terminus a quo for a valid sanction is the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence. If, therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be a public servant, no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him. At the time a Court is asked to take cognizance not only the offence must have been committed by a public servant but the person accused is still a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority, before the provision of S.19 can apply. The relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by public servant as required by S.19 is the date on which the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused.
17. The holder of the office alone would have opportunity to abuse or misuse the office. These sections codify a well-recognised truism that power has the tendency to corrupt. It is the holding of the office which gives an opportunity to use it for corrupt motives. Therefore, the corrupt conduct is directly attributable and flows from the power conferred on the office. This interrelation and interdependence between individual and the office he holds is substantial and not severable. Each of the three clauses of sub-section (1) of S.19 uses the expression ‘office’ and the power to grant sanction is conferred on the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office and S.19 requires a sanction before taking cognizance of offences committed by public servant. The offence should be committed by the public servant, by misusing or abusing the power of office and it is from that office, the authority must be competent to remove him so as to be entitled to grant sanction.
18. The expression ‘offices’ in the three sub-clauses of Section 19(1) would clearly denote that office which the public servant misused or abused for corrupt motives for which he is to be prosecuted and in respect of which a sanction to prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority entitled to remove him from that office which he has abused. This interrelation between the office and its abuse, if severed, would render S.19 devoid of any meaning. This interrelation clearly provides a clue to the understanding of the provision in S.19 providing for sanction by a competent authority who would be able to judge the action of the public servant before removing the bar, by granting sanction, to the taking of the cognizance of offences by the Court against the public servant. Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to prosecute can be given by an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he has misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider.
19. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality. The solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the umbrella of protection of Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and the aforesaid requirements must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution could be launched against public servants. That is why the Parliament clearly provided that the authority alone would be competent to grant sanction which is entitled to remove the public servant against whom sanction is sought from the office.
20. Therefore from the aforesaid discussion it is clear that no sanction is required to file FIR or to register an FIR. No sanction is required to investigate after registering an FIR and also no sanction is required to file charge sheet before the jurisdictional Court. Sanction is required, before the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by the public servant under the Act and before issue of process. If at that point of time, if the accused continues to be a public servant and if there is no sanction under Section 19 of the Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence committed under the Act. If it takes cognizance of such offence and issues process, it is one without jurisdiction, void, ab initio and non est in the eye of law. It will have no legal effect. The Court is vested with the power to take cognizance of an offence under the Act, only when there is sanction accorded by the appropriate Government or appropriate authority. In spite of it, if it exercises power, the illegality is committed and the very object behind this provision making the sanction mandatory would be defeated, i.e., harassment to the public officials in discharge of their official duties. Then it becomes the duty of this Court to step in to undo the injustice done to such public servant.
21. Accordingly the preliminary point is answered as under:
A Court cannot take cognizance of offence punishable under Section 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant without the previous sanction of the Central Government/State Government/Authority competent to remove him from office.